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After 25 years of democracy, the legacy of land dispossession has not been redressed. The 
unequal distribution of agricultural land in South Africa is a direct consequence of the racially 
discriminatory laws, policies and practices which were in place for the largest part of the 
twentieth century. Accordingly, one of the key challenges the post-1994 government faced 
was how to address the unequal distribution of land – in general, but also specifically in 
relation to land for agricultural purposes.  
While there is consensus on the need for redistribution of agricultural land, much controversy 
persists around how to redistribute land so as to meet the various objectives, including a 
more equitable and diversified distribution of land ownership, food security, sustainability, 
affordability and effective implementation of relevant measures, undergirded by 
constitutionality. Accordingly, the question is not whether South Africa should pursue 
agricultural land reform, but rather how South Africa should go about it, specifically 
concerning the drafting and implementation of pertinent policy and legislative measures. In 
this process agricultural productivity, development and food security may not be 
compromised and mechanisms employed have to be aligned with constitutional imperatives, 
including the parameters provided for in the property clause, section 25 of the Constitution. 
The overarching aim of this dissertation is therefore to consider the regulation of agricultural 
land in South Africa from a land reform, specifically redistribution, perspective in order to 
assess whether current mechanisms employed as well as envisaged mechanisms are 
aligned with the Constitution, whether the approaches to acquiring agricultural land, flowing 
from the extant and envisaged regulatory framework, are likewise constitutional and 
whether, combined, an effective legal framework for redistribution in South Africa exists. 
With respect to the latter, efficacy for purposes of this study is linked to the legal dimension 
only and is not focussed on agricultural resources and components – in the broadest sense. 
For purposes of this dissertation, a comparative perspective is useful. It may be insightful to 
consider how Namibia and India (a) conceptualise the concept of agricultural land; (b) 
regulate agricultural land for redistribution purposes; (c) acquire agricultural land for 




In light of the above, various recommendations are made, relating to a: (a) proposed 
definition of “agricultural land”; (b) legal framework for the regulation of agricultural land; and 






Vyf en twintig jaar na die aanvang van die demokratiese bedeling in Suid-Afrika, is die 
nalatenskap van grondontneming steeds voortslepend. Die ongelyke verdeling van 
landbougrond in Suid-Afrika is ‘n direkte gevolg van die rasgebaseerde en diskriminerende 
wette, beleide en praktyke wat vir die grootste deel van die twintigste eeu in plek was. 
Gevolglik was een van die belangrikste uitdagings wat die regering ná 1994 gehad het, die 
aanspreek van die ongelyke verdeling van grond – in die algemeen, maar spesifiek ook met 
betrekking tot grond vir landboudoeleindes. Daar is konsensus oor die noodsaaklikheid van 
herverdeling van landbougrond, maar daar is kontroversie oor die wyse waarop die grond 
hervderdeel moet word ten einde die uiteenlopende oogmerke,  insluitend ‘n meer billike en 
verteenwoordigende eiendomsregprofiel ten aansien van grond, voedselsekerheid, 
volhoubaarheid, beskostigbaarheid en effektiewe implementering van toepaslike maatreëls, 
onderliggend aan grondwetlikheid, te bereik. Daarom is die vraag nie soseer óf Suid-Afrika 
grondhervorming van landbougrond moet beywer nie, maar eerder hóe te werk gegaan 
moet word, rakende die opstel en implementering van toepaslike beleidsdokumente en 
statutêre maatreëls. Landbouproduktiwiteit, ontwikkeling en voedselsekerheid mag nie deur 
die grondhervormingsproses in gedrang gebring word nie en die meganismes wat gebruik 
word moet belyn wees met grondwetlike imperatiewe, insluitend die parameters wat in die 
eiendomsklousule, artikel 25 van die Grondwet, beliggaam word.  
 
Die oorkoepelende doel van hierdie proefskrif is dus om die regulering van landbougrond in 
Suid-Afrika te oorweeg vanuit ‘n grondhervorming-, spesifiek herverdelings, perspektief ten 
einde te bepaal of die bestaande meganismes wat gebruik word asook voorgestelde 
meganismes, belyn is met die Grondwet, of die benaderings tot die verkryging van 
landbougrond wat vloei uit die huidige sowel as die voorgestelde regsraamwerk eweneens 
grondwetlik is, en of dit as ‘n geheel ‘n doeltreffende regsraamwerk vir herverdeling in Suid-
Afrika daarstel. Ten opsigte van die laasgenoemde is die fokus van hierdie studie slegs die 
regsdimensie en is daar nie op landbouhulpbronne en -komponente – in die breedste sin – 
gefokus nie.  
 
'n Regsvergelykende perspektief is ook nuttig vir doeleindes van hierdie proefskrif. Dit kan 
insiggwend wees om ondersoek in te stel  hoe Namibië en Indië (a) "landbougrond" definieer 
(of konseptualiseer); (b) landbougrond reguleer vir herverdelingsdoeleindes; (c) 





In lig van die bogenoemde word ‘n verskeidenheid aanbevelings gemaak, insluitend ‘n: (a) 
voorgestelde definisie van “landbougrond”; (b) regsraamwerk vir die regulering van 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1 Research problem  
The unequal distribution of agricultural land in South Africa is a direct consequence of the 
racially discriminatory laws,1 policies and practices, which were in place for the largest part 
of the twentieth century.2 Accordingly, one of the key challenges the post-1994 government 
faced was how to address the unequal distribution of land – in general,3 but also specifically 
in relation to land for agricultural purposes.4  
After 25 years of democracy, the legacy of land dispossession has not been redressed.5 In 
this regard, recent legislative developments in South Africa reiterate that:  
“…there is a need to redistribute agricultural land more equally by race and class, raise 
agricultural output and food security and to advance social justice and political stability by 
obtaining agricultural land to support and promote productive employment and income to poor 
and efficient small scale farmers”.6  
                                            
1 JM Pienaar Land Reform (2014) 80, 94, 375; Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture Final Report 
of the Presidential Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture (4 May 2019) 
<https://www.gov.za/documents/final-report-presidential-advisory-panel-land-reform-and-agriculture-28-jul-
2019-0000> (accessed 30-07-2019) 23-25; Report of the High Level Panel on the Assessment of key 
legislation and the acceleration of fundamental change (November 2017) 
<https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Pages/2017/october/High_Level_Panel/HLP_Report/HLP
_report.pdf> (accessed 06-06-2018) 29. For example, the Natives Land Act 27 of 1913 subsequently renamed 
the Black Land Act 27 of 1913, the Native Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936 subsequently renamed the 
Development Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936, the Group Areas Act 41 of 1950 and the Group Areas Act 36 of 
1966. Together, the Natives Land Act and the Native Trust and Land Act can be regarded as forming significant 
cornerstones of apartheid. See T Fenyes, C van Rooyen & N Vink “Reassessment of the Land Acts of 1913 
and 1936” (1990) Development Southern Africa 583-589 in this regard. See further HJ Kloppers & GJ Pienaar 
“The historical context of land reform in South Africa and early policies” (2014) 17 Potchefstroom Electronic 
Law Journal 677-706 680-684 and L Robinson “Rationales for rural land redistribution in South Africa” (1997) 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law 465-504, 472. For a discussion of the historical context of the Natives 
Land Act 18 of 1936, see P Wickins “The Natives Land Act of 1913: A cautionary essay on simple explanations 
of complex change” (1981) South African Journal of Economics 105-129; H Feinberg “The Natives Land Act 
of 1913 in South Africa: Politics, race and segregation in the early 20th century” (1993) International Journal of 
African Historical Studies 65-109. For a general discussion of land initiatives between 1913 and 1948, see H 
Feinberg “Black South African initiatives and the land: 1913-1948” (2009) Journal for Contemporary History 
39-61.  
2 Kloppers & Pienaar (2014) PELJ 677; L Ntsebeza & R Hall (eds) The Land Question in South Africa: The 
Challenge of Transformation and Redistribution (2007) 3; Pienaar Land Reform 80-136. 
3 A general lack of access to land existed in relation to residential, business, trade, commercial and agricultural 
purposes. In other words: a general need for access to the broad spectrum of land usage. 
4 Ntsebeza & Hall The Land Question in South Africa 3.  
5 Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture Final Report of the Presidential Advisory Panel on Land 
Reform and Agriculture (4 May 2019) 5.  




In this regard, there is consensus on the need and justification for redistribution of 
agricultural land, 7 but much controversy persists around how to redistribute land so as to 
meet the various objectives of land reform, including a more equitable and diversified 
distribution of land ownership, constitutionality of, food security, sustainability, affordability 
and effective implementation of relevant measures.8 Accordingly, the question is not 
whether South Africa should pursue agricultural land reform, but rather how South Africa 
should go about doing it, specifically concerning the drafting and implementation of pertinent 
policy and legislative measures.9 In this process agricultural productivity, development and 
food security may not be compromised and mechanisms employed have to be aligned with 
constitutional imperatives, including the parameters provided for in the property clause, 
section 25 of the Constitution.10 
 
Ultimately, the overarching aim of this dissertation is to consider the regulation of agricultural 
land in South Africa from a land reform, specifically redistribution, perspective in order to 
assess whether current mechanisms employed as well as envisaged mechanisms are 
aligned with the Constitution, whether the approaches to acquiring agricultural land, flowing 
from the regulatory framework, are likewise constitutional and whether, combined, an 
effective legal framework for redistribution in South Africa exists. With respect to the latter, 
efficacy for purposes of this study is linked to the legal dimension only and is not focussed 
on agricultural resources – in the broadest sense.11 
                                            
7 HP Binswanger-Mkhize, C Bourguignon & R van den Brink “Introduction and summary” in HP Binswanger-
Mkhize, C Bourguignon & R van den Brink (eds) Agricultural Land Redistribution: Toward Greater Consensus 
(2009) 3-42, 4, 7-8. 
8 Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture Final Report of the Presidential Advisory Panel on Land 
Reform and Agriculture (4 May 2019) 5. See also Binswanger-Mkhize et al “Introduction and summary” in 
Agricultural Land Redistribution 5; Pienaar Land Reform 360.    
9 Binswanger-Mkhize et al “Introduction and summary” in Agricultural Land Redistribution 21. 
10 Section 25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; Advisory Panel on Land Reform and 
Agriculture Final Report of the Presidential Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture (4 May 2019) 5.   
11 Efficacy for agricultural purposes may encompass various factors, including climate, natural resources, soil 
classifications, agricultural inputs, markets, financial and economic considerations, agricultural tools and 
implements and transport infrastructure. Though important, these factors fall outside the scope of the study. 
See Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Agricultural productivity in South Africa: Literature 
review (March 2011) 1-29, 9; SG Mahule Exploration of contributing factors leading to a decrease in agricultural 
productivity in restituted farms of Ehlanzeni District Mpumalanga Province Master’s thesis, Stellenbosch 
University (2015); BK Abrha Factors affecting agricultural production in Tigray Region, Northern Ethiopia DPhil 
thesis, University of South Africa (2015); B Sultan “Global warming threatens agricultural productivity in Africa 
and South Asia” (2012) 7 Environmental Research Letters 1-3; APA Vink Land Use in Advancing Agriculture 
(1975); DB Lobell, W Schlenker & J Costa-Roberts “Climate trends and global crop production since 1980” 
(2011) 333 Science 616-620 and T Folnovic “Factors that affect agricultural productivity” (11-03-2015) Agrivi 




2 Background and context  
2 1 Land reform within a constitutional context  
There is no universal concept of land reform.12 The concept of land reform relates to the 
aims or goals which the land reform programme aims to achieve. The concept of land reform 
depends on the jurisdiction and the relevant context, in particular the land issues pertinent 
to a specific jurisdiction given its historical background.13 Furthermore, the underlying 
reasons for the need to implement land reform guides the approaches and mechanisms to 
achieve the aims or goals of the land reform programme.14 In its most basic form,15 the 
concept of land reform can be defined as:  
“[T]he redistribution of property or rights in land for the benefit of the landless, tenants and farm 
labourers”.16  
Land reform has often been equated with agrarian reform.17 For example, in the Green 
Paper on Land Reform18 the terms “land reform” and “agrarian transformation” are used 
interchangeably. However, as set out in the Land Reform Report of the Advisory Panel for 
Agriculture and Land Reform in 2019:  
“Agrarian reform is a much wider concept than land reform [redistribution]. It includes changing 
access to land (redistribution) and the terms of access (tenure) but goes much further. Agrarian 
reform involves restructuring patterns of landholding; access to other natural resources like water, 
as well as capital, inputs, support services and markets. Agrarian reform should change the size 
[and] distribution of landholdings; land uses and types of crops/livestock; production 
technologies…and market structures and incentives…”.19 
                                            
12 Pienaar Land Reform 11, 816.  
13 11-12.  
14 12.  
15 This definition is too restrictive for the land reform programme that was embarked on in South Africa. The 
South African land reform programme also includes restitution and tenure security. See section 25(5)-25(9) of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
16 M Adams “Land reform: New seeds on old ground” (1995) Overseas Development Institute 1 
<http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/2979.pdf> (accessed 13-08-2019); Pienaar Land Reform 12.  
17 Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture Final Report of the Presidential Advisory Panel on Land 
Reform and Agriculture (4 May 2019) 16.  
18 Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, Green Paper on Land Reform (2011) GN 639 in GG 
34607 of 16-09-2011.  
19 Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture Final Report of the Presidential Advisory Panel on Land 
Reform and Agriculture (4 May 2019) 16; Binswanger-Mkhize et al “Introduction and summary” in Agricultural 




Moreover, land reform has also been described as reforms that “aim to increase the ability 
of persons to access land and to vest secure rights in relation to land”.20  
Within the South African constitutional context, land reform is embedded in the 
Constitution,21 specifically the property clause, which envisages a land reform programme 
broadly consisting of three legs22 constituting restitution,23 tenure security24 and land 
redistribution.25 Under these programmes, various legislative measures have been 
                                            
20 Pienaar Land Reform 14.  
21 Sections 25(4)-(9) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; Pienaar Land Reform 167. 
22 Pienaar Land Reform 19, 821. See also Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture Final Report of the 
Presidential Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture (4 May 2019) which highlights the importance of 
a fourth leg of land reform, namely Land administration. Land administration is also necessary for the 
successful implementation of the land reform programme. Land administration usually encompasses land 
survey, deeds and registries. However, these elements are not incorporated in section 25 of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 as such. See further Kloppers & Pienaar (2014) PELJ 677-678; JM 
Pienaar “Land reform embedded in the Constitution: Legal contextualisation” (2015) 114 Scriptura 1-20 7, 12. 
The creation of the Ministry of Rural Development and Land Reform in 2009 established a ministry dedicated 
to the social and economic development of rural areas in South Africa. In this regard, the Department of Rural 
Development and Land Reform, Comprehensive Rural Development Programme (12 August 2009), which is 
also part and parcel of the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, Rural Development 
Framework Policy (24 July 2013), is aimed specifically at addressing poverty and food insecurity by the creation 
of vibrant, equitable and sustainable rural communities. Accordingly, the focus on rural land development 
widens the scope of land reform to include land development. In this regard, see further section 1 of the 
Property Valuation Act 17 of 2014, where “land reform” is defined as “land redistribution, land restitution, land 
development and tenure reform” (my emphasis), which in effect broadens up the scope of land reform in South 
Africa and adds a fourth leg to the three sub-programmes.  
23 Section 25(7) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 states that “[a] person or community 
dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is 
entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to restitution of that property or to equitable 
redress”. This subsection essentially embodies the restitution programme and aims to provide equitable 
redress to a person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913. See the Restitution of Land 
Rights Act 22 of 1994 and the Restitution of Land Rights Amendment Act 15 of 2014. However, the 
Constitutional Court in Land Access Movement of South Africa v Chairperson of the National Council of 
Provinces 2016 5 SA 635 (CC) declared the Restitution of Land Rights Amendment Act invalid. See also 
Pienaar (2015) Scriptura 13-14 and Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture Final Report of the 
Presidential Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture (4 May 2019) 27.  
24 Section 25(6) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 states that “a person or community 
whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, 
to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure or to comparable 
redress”. This is in effect the tenure reform programme which entails changing or adjusting the basis on which 
control is held over land so that it is stronger and better protected against interference. See the Upgrading of 
Land Tenure Rights 112 of 1991; the Land Titles Adjustment 111 of 1993; the Ingonyama  Trust Act 3 of 1994; 
the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) 3 of 1996; the Communal Property Associations Act 28 of 1996; the Interim 
Protection of Informal Rights Act 31 of 1996; the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997; the Prevention 
of Illegal Eviction and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998; the Traditional Leadership and Governance 
Framework Act 41 of 2003; the Communal Land Rights 11 of 2004. See also Pienaar (2015) Scriptura 13 and 
Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture Final Report of the Presidential Advisory Panel on Land 
Reform and Agriculture (4 May 2019) 28-30. 
25 Section 25(5) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 provides that the State has a 
constitutional duty to take "reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to foster 
conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis". See in this regard the Land 
Reform: Provision of Land and Assistance Act 126 of 1993. See further AJ van der Walt Property and 
Constitution (2012) 12; E Lahiff “Land redistribution in South Africa” in HP Binswanger-Mkhize,  C Bourguignon 
& R van den Brink (eds) Agricultural Land Redistribution: Toward Greater Consensus (2009) 169-200, 170; P 
Jacobs, E Lahiff & R Hall “Evaluating land and agrarian reform in South Africa: Land redistribution” (2003) 




promulgated to give effect to the respective objectives of restitution, tenure security and land 
redistribution. Having a land reform programme embedded in the Constitution has important 
implications.26 It makes the property clause in the Constitution rather unique,27 compared to 
other jurisdictions that have embarked on land reform programmes.28   
In this regard, the property clause29 makes provision for two seemingly broad and 
contradictory parts.30 Firstly, it makes provision for the protection of existing property rights 
and interests against unconstitutional interferences31 and secondly, it mandates and 
provides the government with the necessary authority to promote land reform.32 The 
incorporation of land reform and other reform measures within section 25 indicates that the 
property clause is aimed at finding an equitable balance between the protection of private 
property on the one hand and “the promotion of a public interest which includes the reform 
of the property regime”,33 on the other. In other words, having the land reform programme 
embedded in the property clause also impacts “on how the property clause is to be 
interpreted”.34 What is needed is a purposive interpretation of the property clause and of 
measures promulgated in light of section 25.35 Section 25 should be applied in “such a way 
                                            
land-and-agrarian-reform-in-south-africa-land-redistribution/> (accessed 27-09-2019); Pienaar Land Reform 
168.   
26 Pienaar (2015) Scriptura 2, 14-16 specifically discusses the implications of having land reform embedded in 
the Constitution. See also Pienaar Land Reform 820-822; Van der Walt Property and Constitution 12; R Hall 
“Transforming rural South Africa? Taking stock of land reform” in L Ntsebeza & R Hall (eds) The Land Question 
in South Africa (2007) 87-106. 
27 Pienaar Land Reform 174-175. 
28 For example, both Namibia and India provide for land reform programmes, albeit not in its respective 
Constitutions. See Chapter 7 1 and Chapter 8 1 in this regard.   
29 For information regarding the historical development and structure of section 25 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 see M Chaskelson “Stumbling towards section 28: Negotiations over the 
protection of property in the interim Constitution” (1995) 11 South African Journal of Human Rights 222-240; 
L Ntsebeza “Land redistribution in South Africa: The property clause revisited” in L Ntsebeza & R Hall (eds) 
The Land Question in South Africa (2007) 107-131; CG van der Merwe & JM Pienaar “Land reform in South 
Africa” in P Jackson & DC Wilde (eds) Reform of Property Law (1997) 358; Pienaar Land Reform 167-191.  
30 Pienaar Land Reform 174; SRA Dlamini Taking land reform seriously: From willing seller-willing buyer to 
expropriation LLM, University of Cape Town (2014) 17.  
31 Sections 25(1)-(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; Pienaar Land Reform 174-175; 
AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 3 ed (2011) 12, 16.  
32 Sections 25(4)-(9) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; Pienaar Land Reform 175, 365 
where Pienaar describes section 25 as a “two-sided sword”; Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 12.  
33 Pienaar Land Reform 182; section 25(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See also 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National 
Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 798 (CC) para 50 where the Constitutional Court 
held that section 25: “has to be seen both as protecting existing property rights as well as serving the public 
interest, mainly in the sphere of land reform but not limited thereto, and also as striking a proportionate balance 
between these two functions.” See also Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) paras 
61-62.  
34 Pienaar Land Reform 175.  




that both the protective and the reformative purposes of the clause are respected, promoted 
and fulfilled”.36 
The purpose of the second part of the property clause37 is not only to “legitimate and to 
promote land reform and related reforms”,38 but also to allow for “the general reform or 
redevelopment of property law”.39 In this regard, it may be argued that the “restructuring of 
property law…and land reform measures and designs may bring about the changes”40 
needed to address the inequalities in relation to land ownership and land use.41 In this 
regard, Van der Walt explains that: 
“[T]raditional notions of property do not suffice in transformational contexts, where the foundations 
of the property regime itself are or should be in question because regulatory restrictions, even 
when imposed in terms of a broadly conceived notion of the public good, simply cannot do all the 
transformative work that is required. In this perspective it is not sufficient to demonstrate that 
property is subject to…public-purpose restrictions; the point is to identify and explain instances 
where transformation justifies changes that question the very foundations upon which the current 
distribution of property rests”.42  
In light of the historical racially based approach to land, particularly agricultural land, “land 
reform also embodies a sense of justice and fairness”.43 In this regard, the land reform 
programme aims to achieve restorative and redistributive justice.44 Importantly, “the land 
reform programme does not embody retributive justice”.45 Retributive justice entails:  
“…punitive justice where persons are punished in the process of transformation and reform on 
the basis of their participation in unfair, unlawful or discriminatory practices or on the basis of their 
benefitting from them. Retributive justice was excluded due to the fact that the land reform 
                                            
36 Pienaar Land Reform 175.  
37 Sections 25(5)-25(9) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
38 Pienaar Land Reform 176.  
39 176.  
40 168. 
41 Kloppers & Pienaar (2014) PELJ 707. See also S Tsawu An historical overview and evaluation of the 
sustainability of the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme in SA LLM, 
Stellenbosch University (2006) 1-2 and Pienaar Land Reform 375.  
42 AJ van der Walt Property in the Margins (2009) 16. See also Van der Walt Property and Constitution 12 and 
Pienaar Land Reform 820.  
43 Pienaar Land Reform 822. See also JM Pienaar “Land reform and restitution in South Africa: An embodiment 
of justice?” in J de Ville (ed) Memory and Meaning: Lourens du Plessis and the haunting of justice (2015) 141-
160, 150-158.  
44 Pienaar “Land reform and restitution in South Africa: An embodiment of justice?” in Memory and Meaning: 
Lourens du Plessis and the haunting of justice 150-158. 
45 Florence v Government of the Republic of South Africa 2014 6 SA 456 (CC) para 137. See also Pienaar 
Land Reform 823; Pienaar “Land Reform and restitution in South Africa: An embodiment of justice?” in Memory 




programme was the product of negotiated settlement, which, concerning property, is also 
reflected in section 25(1) and (2) of the Constitution.”46  
“Restorative justice is aimed at historical redress”,47 which is “especially relevant with 
respect to the restitution programme”.48 The restitution programme can be described as 
“close-ended”49 and forms a more concise part of the overall land reform programme. 
Redistributive justice, while it is also aimed at historical redress, is specifically linked to 
present “inequalities and existing needs”.50 In this regard, the redistribution and tenure 
security programmes differ from the restitution programme because it encompasses both 
historic or restorative and redistributive redress “by dealing with present-day inequalities, 
which are largely ascribed to the former, pre-constitutional approach to land”.51  
Importantly, for purposes of this dissertation the focus falls particularly on the redistribution 
programme. The concept of redistribution, in light of the South African Constitution is 
explored further in the following section.  
2 2 Access to land and redistribution  
The constitutional mandate to redistribute land is found in section 25(5) of the Constitution.52 
Section 25(5) of the Constitution provides that:  
“The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to 
foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis”.  
Two aspects of this constitutional mandate require further clarification. Firstly, section 25(5) 
of the Constitution is the only provision in the property clause that specifically refers to 
citizens. In this regard, African people were not only denied access to agricultural land in 
general, but were also divested of their South African citizenship, by being limited to reside 
                                            
46 Pienaar Land Reform 823.  
47 822.  
48 Pienaar Land Reform 822-823; Pienaar “Land Reform and restitution in South Africa: An embodiment of 
justice?” in Memory and Meaning: Lourens du Plessis and the haunting of justice 157. 
49 Pienaar Land Reform 272.  
50 Pienaar Land Reform 822. It is close-ended because the requirements have been set out clearly in the 
Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994. See also the Land Access Movement of South Africa v Chairperson 
of the National Council of Provinces 2016 5 SA 635 (CC) which declared the Restitution of Land Rights 
Amendment Act 15 of 2014 invalid. Furthermore, the legislation clearly identifies the applicants and 
beneficiaries under the Act. See also Chapter 9 of Pienaar Land Reform, which specifically provides for an in-
depth exposition of the restitution programme.   
51 Pienaar Land Reform 273.  




in the so-called homelands.53 The land assigned to Africans in the homelands was the least 
fertile and hardly sufficient for grazing or subsistence, let alone, small- or large-scale 
farming.54 Accordingly, the land generally allocated to Africans was not sufficient for them to 
earn a livelihood from it.55 In terms of section 25(5) of the Constitution, any citizen in 
principle, should have access to land and to this end access to land has to be broadened.56 
Secondly, section 25(5) does not guarantee or constitute a (fundamental) right to land.57 
While broadening access to land includes obtaining rights in relation to the land, it does not 
guarantee ownership as such. Moreover, it does not guarantee that everyone or every 
citizen will receive land.58 In this regard it is important to understand that there is a finite 
amount of agricultural land in South Africa, which may be State-owned or privately-owned.59  
Instead, “access” within the section 25(5) context refers to “opening up”60 land in order to 
derive some benefit from it. Similarly, a person would have the ability to derive or the 
possibility of deriving benefit from the land. “Access” to land does not provide for a (clear) 
right to derive a benefit from the land.61 In terms of the redistribution programme questions 
pertaining to who should benefit; how such a person, entity, community or institution may 
qualify to benefit; what the benefits should be and when or in which circumstances the 
benefits would accrue, arise.62 These questions need to be addressed in legislation and 
policy measures.  
Importantly, “broadening access to land” and “redistribution” are not necessarily identical or 
synonymous.63 The 1997 White Paper on South African Land Policy (“White Paper”) states 
that:  
                                            
53 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 21.  
54 Para 21.  
55 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 21.  
56 Pienaar Land Reform 274.  
57 283.  
58 Pienaar Land Reform 283. See in general JC Ribot & NL Peruso “A theory of access” (2003) 68 Rural 
Sociology 153-181. 
59 However, despite various attempts, there is still no accurate data on how much land is State-owned and 
privately-owned. Thus far two land audits in 2013 and in 2017 were conducted by the Department of Rural 
Development and Land Reform. See Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, Land Audit on 
State-Owned Land (February 2013) <http://www.ruraldevelopment.gov.za/phocadownload/Cadastral-Survey-
management/Booklet/land%20audit%20booklet.pdf> (accessed 15-08-2019); Department of Rural 
Development and Land Reform, Land Audit Report, Phase II: Private land ownership by raced, gender and 
nationality (November 2017) <file:///C:/Users/tinakotze/Downloads/land_audit_report13feb2018.pdf> 
(accessed 15-08-2019). Furthermore, another land audit was also conducted by AgriSA and the Land Centre 
of Excellence. See AgriSA, Land Centre of Excellence Land Audit: A transactions approach (November 2017). 
60 Pienaar Land Reform 283; Ribot & Peruso (2003) Rural Sociology 153-181.  
61 Ribot & Peruso (2003) Rural Sociology 153-181; Pienaar Land Reform 283. 
62 Pienaar Land Reform 283. 




“The purpose of the Land Redistribution Programme is to provide the poor with land for residential 
and productive purposes in order to improve their livelihoods…Land redistribution is intended to 
assist the urban and rural poor, farmworkers, labour tenants, as well as emergent farmers”.64  
While the broad aims of the redistribution programme include broadening access to 
residential and agricultural land,65 a specific target was set of redistributing 30% of 
agricultural land in white ownership to beneficiaries in the redistribution programme by 
2014.66 In light of this target, “redistribution”, is primarily aimed at altering ownership 
patterns. While “broadening access to land” may include altering land ownership patterns, it 
is a wider concept. In this regard, other options such as providing limited real rights in the 
form of a lease, for example, may also broaden access to land.67 Accordingly, an emphasis 
on leasehold, for example, as a means of broadening access to land will not contribute to 
reaching the 30% target because ownership of the land remains vested in the State. Only in 
instances where the lease is connected to the option to purchase and the purchase is indeed 
successful will it contribute to adjusting land ownership patterns and achieving the 30% 
target.68  
Importantly, redistribution and broadening access to land is not limited to rural and/or 
agricultural land only.69 The White Paper70 specifically provided that access to land has to 
be broadened in relation to rural and urban contexts.71 To this extent, the land redistribution 
programme requires that “legislation has to be drafted and other steps have to be taken 
specifically to effect access”72 to all land.73 For purposes of this dissertation, the focus is on 
                                            
64 Department of Land Affairs, The White Paper on South African Land Policy (1997).  
65 Department of Land Affairs, The White Paper on South African Land Policy (1997).  
66 Pienaar Land Reform 346; Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture Final Report of the Presidential 
Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture (4 May 2019) 12.  
67 Pienaar Land Reform 283, 346-347.  
68 346-347.  
69 Pienaar Land Reform 142-153, 286. Importantly, not all rural land or areas constitutes agricultural land. In 
this regard, agricultural land can be viewed as a subset of rural land. See Chapter 2 below where the concept 
of agricultural land in South Africa is dealt with. However, see Chapter 10, 3 1 where it is proposed that 
agricultural land should be defined in accordance with the purpose for which it is or can be used, as opposed 
to where it is situated.  
70 Department of Land Affairs, The White Paper on South African Land Policy (1997). 
71 Department of Land Affairs, The White Paper on South African Land Policy (1997) 32, 35; Pienaar Land 
Reform 286; Pienaar Land Reform 346; Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture Final Report of the 
Presidential Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture (4 May 2019) 17-18.  
72 Department of Land Affairs, The White Paper on South African Land Policy (1997) 32, 35.  
73 Rural (including agricultural) and urban land. In general, a rural area or countryside is a geographic area 
that is located outside towns and cities. As mentioned, agricultural land, although it forms part of rural land, 
should rather be regarded as a narrower category of land i.e. a subset of rural land. Urban land or urban areas 
encompasses human settlement with high population density and infrastructure of built environment. Urban 
areas are created through urbanization and are categorized by urban morphology as cities, towns, 




broadening access to rural, in particular, “agricultural land”.74 The legislation that aims to 
give effect to section 25(5) of the Constitution to provide access to land specifically is the 
Land Reform: Provision of Land and Assistance Act 126 of 1993. In terms of this Act the 
Minister may acquire and designate land and develop such land for purposes of small-scale 
farming, residential, public, community and business or similar purposes75 and provide funds 
for land purchase.76 However, the details of the redistribution programme, such as who the 
beneficiaries are; the respective qualifying and selection criteria for beneficiaries; and the 
type of land rights they may acquire, are found in a variety of arguably incoherent policy 
documents.77 Recent legislative developments, such as the draft Regulation of Agricultural 
Landholdings Bill,78 also provide for regulatory mechanisms which may contribute to making 
agricultural land available for redistribution purposes.  
In light of the background provided, the inquiry of this dissertation is twofold: (a) to what 
extent may the South African government interfere with and regulate private property rights 
in relation to agricultural land for redistribution purposes; and (b) how should the South 
African government regulate, acquire and redistribute agricultural land to promote land 
reform, particularly achieving redistribution goals, without impeding agricultural productivity? 
The former question entails a determination of whether the legislative and policy measures 
employed to regulate agricultural land are constitutional, whereas the latter question 
explores different options for the regulation, acquisition and redistribution of agricultural land 
in South Africa. As explained, ultimately, the question is whether the South African 
government can regulate agricultural land as proposed and set out in legislation and policy 
and whether, or in what way, the regulation of agricultural land may contribute to the 
redistribution of agricultural land in South Africa. 
3 Research aims 
The Constitution in general, and the property clause in particular, provide the constitutional 
framework for the regulation of agricultural land in South Africa. In this regard, the research 
aims to provide for an overview of the constitutional framework within which the regulation 
                                            
74 Pienaar (2015) Scriptura 13. See Chapter 2 below in general.  
75 Section 3 of the Land Reform: Provision of Land and Assistance Act 126 of 1993.  
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77 See Chapter 5, 2 3 – 2 5 below.  




and acquisition of agricultural land functions from a land reform, particularly redistribution, 
perspective.  
In light of the need to broaden access to agricultural land79 and to address the “inequalities 
in relation to agricultural land ownership and land use”,80 it is necessary to determine what 
constitutes agricultural land in South Africa. This is the case because “agricultural land” may 
be defined differently in a variety of legislative measures, for different purposes. Various 
pieces of legislation, bills and policies, with varied objectives, provide for seemingly different 
definitions of what agricultural land entails. While these definitions may differ within each 
context, there is still the need for the definitions to provide clarity in respect of which land 
specifically will be affected under which regulatory measure(s). In this regard, the 
dissertation aims to interpret and establish what constitutes agricultural land in South Africa. 
It also aims to determine if a different concept of agricultural land should not be provided for 
in legislation or policy. 
Once it has been established what possibly constitutes agricultural land, the focus shifts to 
the regulation of agricultural land specifically. For purposes of this study regulation of 
agricultural land is deemed to be the various mechanisms that provide for, regulate the use 
of and impact agricultural land including envisaged or suggested mechanisms. While there 
may be other mechanisms regulating or impacting agricultural land in general,81 and within 
the context of redistribution,82 the particular mechanisms explored for purposes of this 
dissertation include: (a) provisions relating to the subdivision of agricultural land; and (b) 
restrictions on the amount of land a person or entity may own (more commonly known as 
“land ceilings”). With respect to foreign (or non-citizens) land owners a further mechanism 
is explored, namely (c) restrictions on the acquisition and disposal of agricultural land.  
                                            
79 Section 25(5) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; Preamble of the Regulation of 
Agricultural Land Holdings Bill. 
80 My emphasis. Kloppers & Pienaar (2014) PELJ Abstract. See also Tsawu An historical overview and 
evaluation of the sustainability of the LRAD programme in SA 1-2 and Pienaar Land Reform 375.  
81 For instance: the Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act 16 of 2013; the Expropriation Act 63 of 
1975; the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996; the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997; 
the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994; the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation 
of Land Act 19 of 1998; the Land Reform: Provision of Land and Assistance Act 126 of 1993; the Subdivision 
of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970; the Environmental Conservation Act 73 of 1989; the National 
Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998; the National Environmental Management Act: Protected Areas 
57 of 2003; the Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act 43 of 1983; the Agricultural Pests Act 36 of 1983; 
the National Veld and Forest Fire Act 101 of 1998; and the Fencing Act 31 of 1963. 
82 See for example, the Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act 16 of 2013; the Expropriation Act 63 
of 1975; the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996; the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997; 
the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994; the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation 




These regulatory mechanisms not only impact an owner’s entitlements in relation to 
agricultural land, but may potentially also make more agricultural land available for 
redistribution purposes. Forming part and parcel of this study is thus an analysis of 
mechanisms for the regulation of agricultural land in South Africa. As mentioned above,83 
the mechanisms employed have to be aligned with constitutional imperatives, including the 
parameters provided for in the property clause, section 25 of the Constitution.84 These 
regulatory mechanisms may restrict or deprive an owner of his or her ownership 
entitlements.85 Any restriction on the owner’s right to property or ownership entitlements 
needs to comply with the provisions of the Constitution. Section 25(1) of the Constitution 
provides that:  
“No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no law 
may permit arbitrary deprivation of property”. 
The Constitution provides for deprivation of property and sets out the requirements that must 
be met in order for a deprivation to be constitutionally valid.86 In other words, section 25(1) 
creates a framework for the legitimate regulation of property.87 Before it can be determined 
whether the regulatory mechanisms are constitutional, the methodology for determining 
whether the implementation of a regulatory mechanism constitutes an arbitrary deprivation 
must be set out first. To this end, the methodology as set out in First National Bank of SA 
Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of 
SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance,88 (“FNB”) will be employed to determine whether 
the imposition of the regulatory mechanism passes constitutional muster.89 
                                            
83 See 1 above.  
84 Section 25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
85 AJ van der Walt & GJ Pienaar Introduction to the Law of Property 7 ed (2016) 47-50 provides that the content 
of ownership must be determined within the context of each individual case. The content of ownership may 
include several entitlements, notably the entitlement to use (ius utendi), dispose or alienate (ius dispondendi) 
and vindicate (ius vindicandi) the property. Other entitlements may include the entitlement to fruits (ius fruendi), 
to possess (ius possidendi), to resist any unlawful invasion (ius negandi), encumber and (under some 
circumstances) even to neglect or destroy the property (ius abutendi). Compare H Mostert & A Pope (eds) The 
Principles of the Law of Property (2010) 92-93; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and 
Schoeman’s The Law of Property 5 ed (2006) 92-93; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 173. 
86 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 17, 214, 218 and 251; AJ van der Walt “Transformative 
constitutionalism and the development of South African property law (part 2)” (2006) Tydskrif vir die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg 1-31; Van der Walt & Pienaar Introduction to the Law of Property 345-346.  
87 E van der Sijde Reconsidering the relationship between property and regulation: A systemic constitutional 
approach LLD, Stellenbosch University (2015) 128.  
88 2002 4 SA 768 (CC).  
89 The following cases subsequently followed the FNB methodology: Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan Municipality; Bisset v Buffalo City Municipality Transfer Rights Action Campaign v Member of the 
Executive Council for Local Government and Housing, Gauteng  2005 1 SA 530 (CC); Reflect-All 1025 CC v 




By regulating agricultural land effectively and employing the mechanisms provided for, 
arguably more or better suited agricultural land may be made available or become available 
for redistribution purposes. Therefore, also linked to the regulation of agricultural land, is the 
acquisition thereof. To some extent, the methods for acquiring sufficient land, most notably 
expropriation, have always been contentious.90 To this end, the research aims to provide for 
an exposition of the different approaches to acquiring agricultural land, including market-led 
approaches and expropriation (with or without compensation). Forming part and parcel of 
the acquisition of agricultural land for land reform purposes is the redistribution thereof. In 
this regard, there are numerous policies and schemes which provide for different qualifying 
and selection criteria of beneficiaries. The beneficiaries also acquire different types of rights 
in relation to the land acquired under the redistribution programme, depending on the policy.  
Having set out the legal position pertaining to (a) the concept of agricultural land; (b) the 
regulation of agricultural land; and (c) the acquisition of agricultural land in South Africa, the 
dissertation also aims to provide for a preliminary reflection on the efficacy of the 
redistribution programme; the extent to which the regulatory mechanisms discussed in 
Chapter 391 may promote or contribute to the redistribution process as a whole; and the 
most suitable approach in acquiring agricultural land for redistribution purposes.  
The research also aims to provide for a comparative perspective dealing with the following 
themes: (a) the concept of agricultural land; (b) the regulation of agricultural land; (c) the 
acquisition of agricultural land; and (d) the redistribution of agricultural land. The focus falls 
on Namibia and India as jurisdictions of comparative analysis.92 The comparison of these 
foreign jurisdictions may assist in exposing the difficulties or challenges and failures in 
                                            
Enterprises v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 2011 1 SA 293 (CC); National Credit Regulator v 
Opperman 2013 2 SA 1 (CC); Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic 
Development, Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape 2015 6 SA 125 (CC). See further Van der 
Walt Constitutional Property Law 222; Van der Sijde Reconsidering the relationship between property and 
regulation 110. See also T Roux “Property” in Woolman S, Roux T, & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of 
South Africa 2 ed (RS 2009, OS 2003) 46-1-46-37, 46-4; EJ Marais “Expanding the contours of the 
constitutional property concept” (2016) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 576-592, 592 where Marais states 
that Shoprite “confirms that FNB is still the leading judgment when it comes to adjudicating section 25 disputes, 
since the three legal questions set out by the majority accord with the first three steps in the FNB case 
methodology”. See also FJ Michelman & EJ Marais “A constitutional vision for property: Shoprite Checkers 
and beyond” in G Muller, R Brits, B Slade & J van Wyk (eds) Transformative Property Law: Festschrift in 
honour of AJ van der Walt (2018) 121-146 and BV Slade & R Walsh “The marginality of property in 
expropriation law: A comparative assessment ” in G Muller, R Brits, B Slade & J van Wyk (eds) Transformative 
Property Law: Festschrift in honour of AJ van der Walt (2018) 21-50.  
90 Pienaar Land Reform 226, 360.  
91 Chapter 3 provides for an exposition of the regulatory mechanisms available for the regulation of agricultural 
land in South Africa.  




conceptualising, regulating, acquiring and redistributing agricultural land. The comparative 
perspective may provide for recommendations with regard to a proposed framework for the 
regulation, acquisition and redistribution of agricultural land within the South African 
constitutional context.  
4 Research methodology 
4 1 Introduction  
The nature of the study requires a literature-based analysis of primary and secondary legal 
sources: the former comprising an analysis and/or discussion of relevant legislation, bills, 
policies and case law and the latter comprising a discussion of relevant text books, journal 
articles and commentaries. In this regard, the dissertation will primarily rely on legislation, 
bills and policy documents93 to provide an exposition of a definition of agricultural land and 
the regulation, acquisition and redistribution of agricultural land in South Africa. Case law 
pertaining to the regulation of agricultural land will only be considered where necessary and 
relevant. 
4 2 Comparative jurisdictions  
For purposes of this dissertation, a comparative perspective is useful. While the 
Constitutions and the historical context of land redistribution programmes may vary greatly 
from country to country, important lessons can be gained from their experiences in either 
regulating or acquiring agricultural land, while taking into account South Africa’s particular 
circumstances.  
As mentioned, the choice of comparative jurisdictions for purposes of this dissertation will 
be limited to Namibia and India. Both jurisdictions provide for redistribution programmes, 
albeit not in its respective Constitutions, to address the unequal distribution of ownership of 
agricultural land. It may be insightful to consider how Namibia and India (a) conceptualise 
the concept of agricultural land; (b) regulate agricultural land for redistribution purposes; (c) 
acquire agricultural land for redistribution; and (d) redistribute agricultural land in view of the 
fact that these two jurisdictions implemented their redistributions programmes before the 
advent of the new constitutional dispensation in South Africa.  Accordingly, the dissertation 
aims to provide for a comparative perspective by scrutinising relevant legislative measures, 
jurisprudence and legal developments, specifically with regard to the concept of agricultural 
                                            




land; the regulatory mechanisms that may open up land for redistribution purposes; the 
different approaches to acquiring such land and eventually redistributing said land.   
4 2 1 Namibia  
South Africa and Namibia are not only neighbouring countries but are also unique choices 
for comparative study because they share similar backgrounds of colonialism and race-
based minority rule, characterised by extensive land appropriation.94 Both countries also 
experienced negotiated settlements whereby new political dispensations were established 
in terms of which respective Constitutions provide for the protection of property rights in 
principle.95  
Although the content and scope of the protection of property rights and corresponding land 
reform measures differ, it is notable that South Africa and Namibia initially undertook a 
market-led approach to the acquisition of land for redistributive purposes. For various 
reasons and in different time periods, these countries have already moved or are currently 
moving away from the initial market-based approach.96 In this regard, the Constitution of 
                                            
94 See generally SK Amoo Property Law in Namibia (2014) 13-16, 224-226; D Shriver “Rectifying land 
ownership disparities through expropriation: Why recent land reform measures in Namibia are unconstitutional 
and unnecessary” (2006) 15 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 419-455 422-425; M Tong 
“Decolonisation and comparative land reform with a special focus on Africa” (2014) 9 International Journal of 
African Renaissance Studies 16-35 17-20; P Mufune “Land reform management in Namibia, South Africa and 
Zimbabwe: a comparative perspective” (2010) 6 International Journal of Rural Management 1-31 8-19; S 
Kariuki “Political compromise on land reform: A study of South Africa and Namibia” (2007) 14 South African 
Journal of International Affairs 99-114 99-103; S Pazcakavambwa & V Hungwe “Land redistribution in 
Zimbabwe” in HP Binswanger-Mkhize, C Bourguignon & R van den Brink (eds) Agricultural Land 
Redistribution: Toward Greater Consensus (2009) 137-167, 137; R Hall “A comparative analysis of land reform 
in South Africa and Zimbabwe” in MC Lee & K Colvard (eds) Unfinished Business: The Land Crisis in Southern 
Africa (2003) 256.  
95 Section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 and section 16 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Namibia respectively. See Pienaar Land Reform 815-831; Amoo Property Law in Namibia 224-
234; Shriver (2006) 15 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 422-425; Tong (2014)  International 
Journal of African Renaissance Studies 17-20; Mufune (2010) 6 International Journal of Rural Management 8-
19; Kariuki (2007) South African Journal of International Affairs 99-103; Pazcakavambwa & Hungwe “Land 
redistribution in Zimbabwe” in Agricultural Land Redistribution 137; Hall “A comparative analysis of land reform 
in South Africa and Zimbabwe” in Unfinished Business: The Land Crisis in Southern Africa 256. 
96 B Mynhart Expropriation: Comparing the Namibian position with those of Zimbabwe and South Africa in 
respect of just compensation and public interest LLB dissertation, University of Namibia (2011); Dlamini Taking 
land reform seriously: From willing-selling-willing buyer to expropriation 44-56 where the author reviews the 
willing-seller willing-buyer approach to land redistribution in South Africa. He also examines the implementation 
thereof in Namibia and Zimbabwe. See further NN Angula Land reform: A critical analysis of the willing-seller-
willing buyer policy as a mode of acquiring commercial land and the categorization of the beneficiaries and 
their ability to pay back the Agribank loan LLB dissertation, University of Namibia (2007); MP Sebola & JP 
Tsheola “Economics of agricultural land restitution and redistribution in South Africa: Willing buyer, willing seller 
business imperatives versus socio-political transformation?” (2014) 46 Journal of Human Ecology 113-123; 
Pazcakavambwa & Hungwe “Land redistribution in Zimbabwe” in Agricultural Land Redistribution 137; Hall “A 
comparative analysis of land reform in South Africa and Zimbabwe” in Unfinished Business: The Land Crisis 




each jurisdiction makes provision for the acquisition of land through expropriation.97 
Accordingly, forming part of the study is the respective regulatory approaches in the various 
jurisdictions regarding agricultural land and the relevant land reform goals, including the 
acquisition of agricultural land.  
While South Africa and Namibia are comparable given the shared historical backgrounds 
and consequent need for redistribution of agricultural land,98 other factors, such as the vast 
difference in population numbers in South Africa and Namibia; the amount of arable 
agricultural land; climate and rainfall due to the two jurisdictions’ topography, must also be 
kept in mind.99 
4 2 2 India  
Like South Africa, India shares a history of British colonial rule. At independence in 1947, 
India inherited an ineffective agricultural system characterised by insecure tenancies, small 
uneconomic land holdings and inequality in land ownership.100 In the decades following 
India’s independence, a significant body of land reform legislation was passed, dealing with, 
inter alia: 
“(1) abolishing intermediate interests in land, (2) regulating tenancy, (3) limiting the size of 
landholdings and redistributing the above-ceiling surplus, and (4) distributing government 
wasteland to those without agricultural land and houses.”101   
While India is an important comparative case study for land reform in general, it is their 
experience with land ceiling regulation, primarily aimed at redistributing surplus land to the 
poor, landless and marginal farmers,102 which is specifically relevant for purposes of this 
                                            
97 Section 25(2) of the Constitution of Republic of South Africa, 1996; section 16(2) of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Namibia and section 16 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. See also in general Mynhart 
Expropriation: Comparing the Namibian position with those of Zimbabwe and South Africa in respect of just 
compensation and public interest; Dlamini Taking land reform seriously: from willing-selling-willing buyer to 
expropriation; Angula Land reform: A critical analysis of the willing-seller-willing buyer policy as a mode of 
acquiring commercial land; Sebola & Tsheola (2014) Journal of Human Ecology 113-123; Pazcakavambwa & 
Hungwe “Land redistribution in Zimbabwe” in Agricultural Land Redistribution 137.   
98 JM Pienaar “Willing-seller-willing-buyer and expropriations as land reform tools: What can South Africa learn 
from the Namibian experience?” (2018) 10 Namibian Law Journal 41-64, 43.  
99 Pienaar (2018) Namibian Law Journal 63.   
100 T Hanstad, R Nielsen, D Vhugen & T Haque “Learning from old and new approaches to land reform in 
India” in HP Binswanger-Mkhize, C Bourguignon & R van den Brink (eds) Agricultural Land Redistribution: 
Toward Greater Consensus (date) 241 242-243.  
101 Hanstad et al “Learning from old and new approaches to land reform in India” in Agricultural Land 
Redistribution: Toward Greater Consensus 242, 244-251. T Besley & R Burgress “Land reform, poverty 
reduction and growth: Evidence from India” (2000) 115 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 389-430. 




dissertation. Similar to the envisaged South African framework,103 land ceiling legislation 
adopted and implemented by all the States in India placed limitations (or ceilings) on the 
amount of agricultural land a person or family may own.104 While basic points of departure 
are similar, important differences exist, for example, variations on several key aspects, 
including the ceiling area, compensation for above-ceiling land expropriation and defining, 
and prioritising beneficiaries.105 Apart from a few exceptions, it is evident that the land ceiling 
legislation in India has not lived up to expectations.106 The imposition of ceilings has 
generally not resulted in any meaningful redistribution of agricultural land, but instead, 
aggravated India’s existing problem of uneconomical fragmentised land holdings, which in 
turn, has led to a decline in agricultural productivity.  
Given that India is a federal state with 29 States each with their own legislation regulating 
agricultural land ceilings,107 it is not within the scope of this dissertation to discuss every 
State’s land ceiling measures. In this regard, the 2013 Agricultural Land Holding Policy 
                                            
103 Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, Agricultural Landholding Policy Framework: Setting 
upper and lower bands for the ownership and use of agricultural landholdings (July 2013); the Regulation of 
Agricultural Land Holdings Bill. See also Chapter 3, 3 3 below.  
104 The Urban Land (Ceilings and Regulation) Act 33 of 1976. However, see the Urban Land (Ceiling and 
Regulation) Repeal Act 15 of 1999. See also BD Acharya The Indian Urban Land Ceiling Act: A critique of the 
1976 Legislation (1989) <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/631451468750264120/pdf/multi-
page.pdf> 39-51; DB Acharya Policy of Land Acquisition and Development: Analysis of an Indian experience 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/631451468750264120/pdf/multi-page.pdf> 99-116; Hanstad et 
al “Learning from old and new approaches to land reform in India”  in Agricultural Land Redistribution: Toward 
Greater Consensus 247. 
105 Hanstad et al “Learning from old and new approaches to land reform in India”  in Agricultural Land 
Redistribution: Toward Greater Consensus 246-248; PS Appu Land Reforms in India: A Survey of Policy, 
Legislation and Implementation (1996); NC Behuria Land Reform Legislations in India: A Comparative Study 
(1997); CD Deecre & M Leon Empowering Women (2001); G Gopal “Gender and economic inequality in India: 
The legal connection” (1993) 13 Boston College Third World Law Journal 63-86 for an exposition of key 
aspects focused on in India. The identified beneficiaries are seemingly women and the poor. See further the 
Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill where the focus is not only on the poor. The Bill identifies black 
people as beneficiaries of agricultural land. Accordingly, while both India and South Africa’s ceilings legislation 
and policies focus on the redistribution of agricultural land for the poor, the South African perspective differs 
because the redistribution of agricultural land is also linked to race.  
106 Hanstad et al “Learning from old and new approaches to land reform in India” in Agricultural Land 
Redistribution: Toward Greater Consensus 246-248.  
See also Acharya “The Indian Urban Land Ceiling Act: A critique of the 1976 Legislation” 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/631451468750264120/pdf/multi-page.pdf> (accessed 28-05-
2017) 39-51. 
107 See the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act 1 of 1973; the Assam Fixation 
of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act 1 of 1957; the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition 
of Surplus Land) Act 12 of 1962; the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act 27 of 1961; the Haryana Ceiling on 
Landholding Act 26 of 1972; the Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holding Act 19 of 1973; the Jammu & 
Kashmir Agrarian Reforms Act 17 of 1976; the Karnataka Land Reforms Act 10 of 1962; the Kerala Land 
Reforms Act 1 of 1964; the Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act 20 of 1960; the Orissa Land 
Reforms Act 16 of 1960; the Punjab Land Reforms Act 10 of 1973; the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on 
Agricultural Holdings Act 11 of 1973; the Sikkim Agricultural Land Ceilings and Reforms Act 14 of 1978; the 
Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act 58 of 1961; the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling 




Framework108 identifies West Bengal as being of particular importance109 for the South 
African position in relation to the formulation and implementation of proposed ceilings 
legislation.110 Accordingly, the insights drawn from the experience of the States in India 
which successfully implemented land ceiling legislation will be important for guidance in 
establishing a clearly formulated legal and institutional framework for land ceilings in South 
Africa. Ultimately, South Africa may learn from the shortfalls experienced by land ceilings 
legislation and policy in India in order to formulate and implement effective regulation of 
agricultural land.111  
4 2 3 Conclusion  
The insights drawn from the difficulties, failures and successes of these jurisdictions’ 
redistribution programmes may provide guidance and proposals for the way in which South 
Africa conceptualises or defines agricultural land and regulates, acquires and redistributes 
such land to the extent that it may be accommodated within the South African constitutional 
dispensation.  
5 Overview of chapters  
This dissertation consists of three parts. Part one, consisting of Chapters 2 to 6, sets out the 
South African position in relation to (a) the concept of agricultural land; (b) the mechanisms 
for the regulation of agricultural land; (c) the constitutionality of the mechanisms discussed; 
(d) the approaches to acquiring agricultural land for redistribution purposes; and (e) a 
preliminary reflection pertaining to the redistribution programme as a whole in South Africa.  
Part two of the study embodies a legal comparative dimension. As mentioned above, the 
choice of jurisdictions for this comparative element to the study is limited to Namibia and 
India. Part two also provides for a thematic comparative perspective dealing with (a) the 
concept of agricultural land; (b) the regulation of agricultural land; (c) the acquisition of 
                                            
108 Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, Agricultural Land Holding Policy Framework: Setting 
upper and lower bands for the ownership and use of agricultural landholdings (July 2013).   
109 The Government of India, Ministry of Rural Development, Department of Land Resources Draft National 
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agricultural land; and (d) the redistribution of agricultural land in Namibia, India and South 
Africa.  
The final part of this dissertation, part three, will provide for conclusions and 
recommendations in light of the study. Accordingly, in total, this dissertation consists of ten 
chapters, this one being the introduction and Chapter 10 being the conclusion.  
Chapter 2 aims to determine what constitutes agricultural land in South Africa and its 
implications for broadening access to land and redistribution. Because different legislative 
frameworks and policies provide or allude to a definition of agricultural land, these measures 
are explored specifically in chapter 2: (a) the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970; 
(b) the Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land: Policy Framework and 
corresponding Bill; and (c) the Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill.  
Chapter 3 provides for an exposition of existing and newly proposed regulatory mechanisms 
in relation to agricultural land in South Africa in view of the land reform programme, 
specifically the redistribution programme.112 In this regard, “regulatory mechanism” for 
purposes of this study includes mechanisms that provide for the regulation of the use and 
promotion of agricultural land and how such mechanisms may impact agricultural land. 
While there may be other mechanisms regulating or impacting agricultural land in general, 
and within the context of redistribution the particular mechanisms explored for purposes of 
this dissertation include: (a) provisions relating to the subdivision of agricultural land; (b) 
restrictions on the amount of agricultural land an owner may own (known as land ceilings) 
and; (c) restrictions pertaining to foreign ownership of agricultural land. These regulatory 
mechanisms not only impact an owner’s entitlements in relation to agricultural land, but may 
also make more agricultural land available for redistribution purposes. These regulatory 
mechanisms are explored in light of (a) the underlying motivation for regulation; (b) the 
constitutionality; and (c) the overall efficacy thereof. While Chapter 3 only provides for an 
exposition of these regulatory measures and the underlying reason for such regulation, the 
subsequent chapters deal with the constitutionality and efficacy of the mechanisms.  
Consequently, Chapter 4 aims to determine whether the imposition of regulatory measures, 
namely (a) restrictions on the subdivision of agricultural land; (b) limiting the amount of land 
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any person may own; and (c) the restrictions imposed on foreigners in relation to the disposal 
and acquisition of agricultural land, is constitutional. Before this determination can be made, 
the methodology for determining whether the implementation of a regulatory mechanism 
constitutes an arbitrary deprivation must be set out. To this end, the methodology as set out 
in FNB,113 will be employed to determine whether the imposition thereof amounts to an 
arbitrary deprivation of property. 
Chapter 5 provides for an overview of the approaches to acquiring agricultural land for 
redistribution purposes. Although both State-owned and privately owned land may be 
available for redistribution, the manner of acquiring the land, specifically agricultural land, 
may differ depending on whether it is State or private land. For example, where State-owned 
land is already in the hands of the State to redistribute, land may have to be transferred from 
one department or Minister to another before it may be redistributed to the intended 
beneficiaries. Such a process will not involve market-led approaches or expropriation. 
However, where privately-owned land has to be acquired for redistribution purposes, 
different acquisition approaches, including market-led approaches and expropriation may 
be used. The focus, for purposes of this chapter, falls on the different ways of acquiring 
private agricultural land for redistribution. Such approaches include a discussion of market-
led approaches, expropriation (with or without compensation) and confiscation. 
Having set out the legal position pertaining to (a) the concept of agricultural land; (b) the 
regulation of agricultural; and (c) the acquisition of agricultural land in South Africa, Chapter 
6 aims to provide some preliminary thoughts on the efficacy of the redistribution as a whole; 
the extent to which the regulatory mechanisms discussed in Chapter 3 may promote or 
contribute to the redistribution process as a whole; and the most suitable approach in 
acquiring agricultural land for redistribution purposes.  
The following chapters provide for an exposition of (a) the concept of agricultural land; (b) 
the regulation of agricultural land; and (c) the acquisition of agricultural for redistribution 
purposes in Namibia (Chapter 7) and India (Chapter 8). Later in the study, Chapter 9 will 
provide for a comparative perspective between South Africa, Namibia and India regarding 
the concept of agricultural land; mechanisms for the regulation of agricultural land; 
approaches for the acquisition of agricultural land and the redistribution thereof. Therefore, 
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Chapters 7 and 8 are thus essential in laying the foundational basis for an in-depth legal 
comparative analysis to follow.  
Chapter 9 provides for such a comparative perspective and follows a thematic methodology 
to compare the legal position(s) pertaining to (a) the concept of agricultural land; (b) the 
mechanisms for the regulation of agricultural land; (c) the mechanisms or approaches for 
the acquisition of agricultural land; and (d) the redistribution in South Africa, Namibia and 
India. The comparison between Namibia, India and South Africa not only exposes the 
difficulties and failures, but also provide insights that are integral in providing guidance and 
proposals for the way in which South Africa could conceptualise, regulate, acquire and 
redistribute agricultural land, to the extent that it may be accommodated within the South 
African constitutional dispensation. It is in this light that the last chapter aims to suggest 
recommendations pertaining to the conceptualisation, regulation, acquisition and 




Chapter 2: The concept of agricultural land in South Africa 
1 Introduction  
The preamble of the Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill1 (“Regulation Bill”) states 
specifically that in order to gain access to land on an equitable basis “there is a need to 
redistribute agricultural land more equally by race and class”.2 In light of the need to broaden 
access to agricultural land3 and to address the “inequalities in relation to agricultural land 
ownership and land use”,4 it is necessary to determine what constitutes agricultural land in 
South Africa. In this regard, “agricultural land” may be defined differently in a variety of 
legislative measures, for different purposes. While there is no single definition of agricultural 
land, various pieces of legislation, bills and policies, with varied objectives, provide for 
seemingly different definitions of what agricultural land entails. While these definitions may 
differ within each context, there is still the need for the definitions to provide clarity in respect 
of which land specifically will be affected under which regulatory measure.  
Accordingly, the following measures are discussed in chronological order, starting with the 
pre-constitutional legislative measure, the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970 
(“SALA”). SALA is also dealt with first, in light of the body of case law dealing with the 
interpretation of “agricultural land” in South Africa before and after the advent of the 
constitutional dispensation. This discussion is followed by an exposition of the concept of 
agricultural land as set out in the 2016 Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land 
Bill5 and corresponding policy6 and the 2017 Regulation Bill. These legislative measures are 
also discussed in chapter 3, dealing with mechanisms for the regulation of agricultural land 
in South Africa. 
  
                                            
1 The Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill in GN 229 GG 40697 of 17-03-2017.  
2 Preamble of the Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill. 
3 Section 25(5) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; Preamble of the Regulation of 
Agricultural Land Holdings Bill GG 40697 of 17-03-2017.  
4 My emphasis. HJ Kloppers & GJ Pienaar “The historical context of land reform in South Africa and early 
policies” (2014) 17 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 677-706, 677. See also S Tsawu An historical 
overview and evaluation of the sustainability of the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) 
programme in SA LLM, Stellenbosch University (2006) 23, 117-119.   
1-2 and JM Pienaar Land Reform (2014) 375.  
5 Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Bill in GN 984 GG 40247 of 02-09-2016. 
6 Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Draft Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land 





2 The Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970 
2 1 Introduction 
SALA aims to protect agriculture as an economic activity by preventing the subdivision of 
large-scale agricultural land into small, uneconomic land parcels.7 It also prevents prime 
agricultural land from decreasing due to the expansion of townships and urban sprawl.8 In 
this regard, SALA restricts the subdivision of agricultural land and the acquisition of 
undivided shares in agricultural land except where the Minister has given permission to do 
so.9 Since its promulgation, all agricultural subdivisions have been and continue to be 
regulated by this Act.10  
Importantly, SALA is therefore not only a source which provides a definition of agricultural 
land – it is also a regulatory mechanism11 that impacts particular entitlements of land 
owners.12  
2 2 The definition of agricultural land  
The definition of agricultural land turns on the interpretation of SALA.13 In terms of SALA, 
agricultural land is not specifically defined.14 Instead, SALA defines agricultural land as a 
                                            
7 Kotzé v Minister van Landbou 2003 1 SA 445 (T) 448J-449B; Pienaar Land Reform 350; J van Wyk Planning 
Law 2 ed (2012) 380. See also G Frantz Repealing the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act: A constitutional 
analysis LLM thesis, Stellenbosch University (2010) in general.  
8 Pienaar Land Reform 350; Van Wyk Planning Law 380; Frantz Repealing the Subdivision of Agricultural Land 
Act 1.   
9 Sections 3-4 of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970. See also Van Wyk Planning Law 380.  
10 Despite having passed the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act Repeal Act 64 of 1998 it has not been put 
into operation. Accordingly, SALA still regulates the subdivision of agricultural land in South Africa. See 3 3 3 
below.   
11 See Chapter 3, 3 2 below.  
12 The content of ownership must be determined within the context of each individual case. Ownership may 
include several entitlements, notably the entitlement to use (ius utendi), dispose or alienate (ius dispondendi) 
and vindicate (ius vindicandi) the property. Other entitlements may include the entitlement to fruits (ius fruendi); 
to possess (ius possidendi), to resist any unlawful invasion (ius negandi), encumber and (under some 
circumstances) even neglect or destroy the property (ius abutendi). Compare H Mostert & A Pope (eds) The 
Principles of the Law of Property (2010) 92-93; AJ van der Walt & GJ Pienaar Introduction to the Law of 
Property 7 ed (2016) 47-48; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of 
Property 5 ed (2006) 92-93; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 173.  As the Subdivision of Agricultural 
Land Act 70 of 1970 prohibits the subdivision of agricultural land without ministerial consent, it restricts the 
owner’s power to freely use and alienate his or her property. Hence, potentially resulting in limitation of property 
in terms of section 25(1). 
13 Frantz Repealing the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 30-31.  
14 Section 1 of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970; Van Wyk Planning Law 381; Stalwo (Pty) 
Ltd v Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2008 1 SA 654 (SCA); Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd 2009 1 SA 
337 (CC). See CJ Nagel “The Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970, options to purchase and related 
matters” (2016) 79 Journal of Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law 276-286; NJJ Olivier & C Williams “The 
decisions in Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd & Another (Trustees of the Hoogekraal Highlands Trust 
& SAFAMCO Enterprises (Pty) Ltd (amicus curiae); Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs (intervening) [2008] 




“residual category”15 that entails any land, but excluding: (a) land situated in the area of 
jurisdiction of a municipal council, city council, town council, village council, village 
management board, village management council, local board, health board or health 
committee;16 (b) land which is a township as defined in section 102(1) of the Deeds 
Registries Act 47 of 1937;17 (c) “land of which the State is the owner or which is held in trust 
by the State or any Minister for any person;”18 (d) land which the Minister after consultation 
with the executive committee of a province concerned, and by notice in the Government 
Gazette excludes from the provisions of the Act;19 and (e) a number of other categories of 
land, often specific to particular provinces.20 In other words, agricultural land is described as 
a residual category of land because it does not fall within the ambit of the (a)-(e) categories 
of land listed in section 1 of SALA.  
The most significant of the exceptions listed above, is land situated in the area of jurisdiction 
of municipal, city or town councils or boards and land that is regarded as a township.21 The 
definition was applicable before the new local government dispensation came into operation 
in 1993, “when agricultural land was situated outside the areas of jurisdiction of 
municipalities”.22 However, South Africa’s transition to a democracy required the 
restructuring of local governments in order to rationalise the variety of local authorities in 
existence for the different population groups.23 In this regard, the Local Government 
Transition Act 209 of 1993 (“LGTA”) aimed to provide interim measures for the restructuring 
                                            
Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Another 2009 (1) SA 337 (CC): Be wary of these holdings” (2009) 2 Constitutional 
Court Review 429-448.  
15 Section 1 of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970. The definition of “agricultural land” was 
substituted by section 1(a) of the Subdivision of Agricultural Amendment Act 55 of 1972 and also by 
Proclamation R100 of 31 October 1995. The insertion of the proviso is discussed below. See also Frantz 
Repealing the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 30. 
16 Section 1(a) of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970. 
17 Section 1(b) of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970.  
18  Section 1(c) of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970. In other words, large tracts of land, 
including agricultural land, in the traditional or former national states and selfgoverning territories.  
19 Section 1(f) of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970. 
20 Section 1(b) of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970, which includes land which forms part of 
any area subdivided in terms of the Agricultural Holdings (Transvaal) Registration Act 22 of 1919 or which is 
a township as defined in section 102(1) of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937, but excluding a private 
township as defined in section 1 of the Town Planning Ordinance, 1949, not situated in an area of jurisdiction 
or a development area referred to in paragraph (a) of the definition of agricultural land.  
21 Section 1(a) of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970; Van Wyk Planning Law 381. This would 
include land in areas identified as urban prior to the municipal restructuring in 1993 in terms of the Local 
Government Transition Act 209 of 1993 and also peri-urban land that fell within the area of municipalities or 
town councils.   
22 J van Wyk “Is subdivision of agricultural land part of municipal planning?” (2009) 24 SA Public Law 545-
562 548.  
23 Van Wyk Planning Law 381. See in general N Steytler & J de Visser “Local government” in S Woolman & M 
Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (RS 6 2014) 22-1 – 22-138 and N Steytler & J de Visser 




of local government.24 The pre-interim phase provided for the appointment of temporary or 
transitional councils that would govern until the first democratic municipal elections took 
place on 29 May 1996. The interim phase commenced after the local elections of 1996 and 
lasted until the local elections of 5 December 2000 and the coming into operation of the 
Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 (“Municipal Structures Act”) on 1 
February 1999. The establishment of a new local government system would be finalised 
once a comprehensive and integrated framework for the system of local government had 
been enacted.25 During the interim phase, it was envisaged that transitional councils would 
be established.26  
Accordingly, the definition of agricultural land was amended in 199527 to include the following 
proviso:28 
“Provided that land situated in the areas of jurisdiction of a transitional council as defined in 
section 1 of the Local Government Transition Act, 1993 (Act No. 209 of 1993), which immediately 
prior to the first election of the members of such transitional council was classified as agricultural 
land, shall remain agricultural land”.29  
The proviso in effect declared all agricultural land prior to the transitional period to retain that 
classification30 and would therefore continue to be subject to the provisions of SALA.31 
However, when the Municipal Demarcation Act 27 of 1998 and the Municipal Structures Act 
were promulgated, it marked the end of the transitional period.32 It was unclear whether the 
                                            
24 Steytler & De Visser “Local government” in CLOSA 22-7 – 22-13.  
25 Sections 151(1) and 155 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. The framework for the 
system of local government encompassed the following legislative measures: The Local Government: 
Municipal Demarcation Act 27 of 1998; Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998; Local 
Government: Municipal Electoral Act 27 of 2000; Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000: Local 
Government: Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003; and the Local Government: Municipal Property 
Rates Act 6 of 2004. See also Steytler & De Visser “Local government” in CLOSA 22-12 – 22-13; Steytler & 
De Visser Local Government Law of South Africa and N Steytler “Strangulation of Local Governments” (2008) 
Local Government Project (Community Law Centre, University of Western Cape) 
<https://dullahomarinstitute.org.za/multilevel-govt/publications/strangulation-lg-4-march-08-ac.pdf> 
(accessed 07-09-2019) in general. 
26 Section 8 of the Local Government Transition Act 209 of 1993. 
27 Proclamation R100 of 1995, GG 16785, 31 October 1995.  Van Wyk (2009) SA Public Law 548 states that: 
“This proviso was inserted into SALA on the day that local government elections under permanent municipal 
structures were held. Its interpretation is central in determining whether or not agricultural land was done away 
with when the new local government dispensation with its back-to-back/wall-to-wall municipalities came into 
being. ” 
28 General Law Amendment Act 49 of 1996.  
29 Section 1 of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970. See also Kotzé v Minister van Landbou 
2003 1 SA 445 (T) 449B-449F.  
30 Frantz Repealing the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 31.  
31 31.  




proviso was to remain in effect after the transitional period came to an end. In other words, 
it was unclear whether there was any land that did not fall within municipal jurisdiction when 
the new local government dispensation came into operation. If this had been the case, 
“agricultural land” as envisaged by SALA would no longer exist, rendering SALA 
inoperative.33 
The promulgation of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act Repeal Act 64 of 1998 (“Repeal 
Act”), which never came into operation, created further uncertainty regarding the applicability 
of SALA.34 As a result, the definition of agricultural land became contentious, which resulted 
in various disputes.35 
The interpretation of the abovementioned proviso by the courts was central to the 
determination whether the category of “agricultural land” was abolished when the new local 
government dispensation, with its wall-to-wall municipalities, came into operation in 1999.36 
The interpretation and clarification by the courts constitutes not only a technicality as the 
specific category of land, namely “agricultural land”, and how it is defined and classified has 
particular important implications for the regulation thereof. For example, if the land is not 
regarded as agricultural land, then the subdivision restrictions in terms of SALA do not apply. 
However, the interpretation of SALA by the courts has resulted in conflicting judgments 
regarding the applicability of SALA. Accordingly, each of these cases will be discussed 
below.  
2 2 1 Kotzé v Minister van Landbou  
The first case which had to decide the applicability of SALA in the context of the new local 
government dispensation was Kotzé v Minister van Landbou37 (“Kotzé”). This case 
concerned the subdivision of a farm, which was co-owned by the applicants.38 The 
application for subdivision of the farm was lodged in July 2001 with the local authority.39 
Subsequently, the applicants concluded a contract of sale for three undivided portions of the 
farm. However, the contract of sale was subject to a suspensive condition which stipulated 
that the sale of the portions of land was subject to the owners obtaining written consent for 
                                            
33 Kotzé v Minister van Landbou 2003 1 SA 445 (T). 
34 Van Wyk (2009) SA Public Law 545.  
35 Kotzé v Minister van Landbou 2003 1 SA 445 (T); Stalwo (Pty) Ltd v Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2008 1 SA 654 
(SCA); Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd 2009 1 SA 337 (CC). See 2 2 1 – 2 2 3 below.  
36 Kotzé v Minister van Landbou 2003 1 SA 445 (T); Van Wyk Planning Law 381.  
37 2003 1 SA 445 (T); Van Wyk (2009) SA Public Law 55.  





subdivision thereof from the relevant authorities.40 Before obtaining consent, two of the 
buyers had paid deposits and the applicant proceeded to make improvements to the land.41   
In November 2001, the applicants received consent from the local authority.42 However, in 
January 2002, the applicants realised that they still required consent from the then Minister 
of Agriculture for the subdivision.43 In this regard, the applicants contended that the consent 
from the Minister was unnecessary in light of the statutory and constitutional changes to 
local municipal structures.44 In terms of the definition of “agricultural land” in SALA their farm 
was situated within the jurisdiction of a local authority (the Lephalele municipality) and would 
therefore not constitute agricultural land for purposes of the Act.45  
Subsequently, the question before the Court was whether “agricultural land” as intended in 
SALA, still existed in South Africa.46 If “agricultural land” ceased to exist, the parties would 
no longer require the consent of the Minister of Agriculture to subdivide their land.   
From the outset, Van der Westhuizen J considered and examined the current status of 
SALA.47 He considered the extent to which the Repeal Act has repealed SALA, if at all and 
found that it repealed SALA in its entirety. However, the judge concluded that the Repeal 
Act remained inoperative.48 The judge reasoned that it was the intention of the legislature to 
keep SALA in operation until such time when appropriate regulatory measures could replace 
the practice of subdivision.49 Consequently, on that basis SALA and its requirements 
continue to apply.50  
Once it was established that SALA still remained operational, the Court proceeded to 
determine the scope of the Act in view of the new local government dispensation.51 In this 
regard, Van der Westhuizen J had to determine whether agricultural land still existed in view 
                                            
40 Kotzé v Minister van Landbou 2003 1 SA 445 (T) 448A. 
41 448A-448B. 
42 448C. 
43 448 C-448D. 
44 448C-448F. 
45 448C-448F. 
46 Kotzé v Minister van Landbou 2003 1 SA 445 (T) 447I, 449I-450A; Frantz Repealing the Subdivision of 
Agricultural Land Act 32.  
47 Kotzé v Minister van Landbou 2003 1 SA 445 (T) 450C-450D.  
48 450C-450I.  
49 450C-450J.  
50 Kotzé v Minister van Landbou 2003 1 SA 445 (T) 450C-450D; Frantz Repealing the Subdivision of 





of the constitutional and statutory changes to the system of local government.52 Frantz notes 
that:  
“The effect of this new system of local government would have subjected all land previously 
classified as agricultural land, to the exception in the Act’s definition”.53  
If this was the case, SALA would be rendered practically ineffective. In particular, the Court 
held that this could not have been the intention of the legislature.54 Accordingly, the Court 
held that SALA had to be interpreted to mean what it meant when it was promulgated55  and 
its purpose did not fall away when the Constitution created a new functionality for local 
government.56 If the regulation of subdivision of agricultural land was up to local government, 
differing or divergent policies and decision processes would result in contrast to the Act’s 
agricultural policy that relates to the control and regulation of agricultural land.57 In such 
circumstances, it would be impossible for the Minister to regulate agricultural policy. In this 
light, the Court held that this may have a negative impact on issues of agricultural reform 
and access.58 
Although the Court in obiter remarked that it may be time for the legislature to repeal SALA,59 
it held that SALA would continue to apply until such a time when the legislature creates new 
legislation to regulate the practice of subdivision and/or finalises the repeal of the Act.60 The 
Court concluded that any land classified as agricultural land prior to the election of the first 
transitional councils would retain that classification.61 Accordingly, the Court found that 
agricultural land still existed for purposes of SALA. Therefore, the parties still required 
ministerial consent, as set out in section 3 of SALA, to fulfil the suspensive condition in the 
contract of sale.  
                                            
52 Frantz Repealing the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 34.  
53 34.  
54 Kotzé v Minister van Landbou 2003 1 SA 445 (T) 454I-455C.  
55 454I-455C.  









2 2 2 Stalwo (Pty) Ltd v Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd  
In Stalwo (Pty) Ltd v Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd62 the parties concluded an agreement for the 
sale of land.63 The land, which the appellant intended to use for industrial purposes, was 
however still zoned as agricultural land. Similar to the Kotzé case above, the respondent 
subsequently lodged an application for its rezoning and subdivision with the relevant local 
authority. Following this application, the appellant, duly aware of the possibility that the 
application could be rejected and undo the sale, took occupation of the land by way of a 
lease agreement.64 The appellant started to prepare the land for its intended industrial use.65 
In August 2005, the local authority granted its approval subject to various conditions.66 
The conditions required the respondent to effect substantial improvements relating to an 
access way, storm water drainage and other essential services on the land. In light of the 
costs the respondent would have to incur to effect these conditions, the respondent sought 
to increase the purchase price of the land. However, as could be expected, the appellant 
was not amenable to the increase in price. Consequently, the appellant sought an 
application declaring the contract binding between the two parties in the court a quo.67 The 
respondent opposed this application and contended that the agreement of sale was invalid. 
In short, the court a quo found that the land was to be defined as agricultural land and that 
the lack of ministerial consent required by SALA rendered the agreement void. On this basis 
leave to appeal was granted. 
The appeal also concerned the validity of the agreement of sale between the parties.68 The 
issues on appeal69 were whether the agreement offended against the provisions of (a) 
section 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981 (because it failed to record a material 
term upon which the parties had expressly agreed, namely that the sale was conditional 
upon the success of a subdivision and rezoning application to the local authority); and (b) 
whether the land was agricultural land as contemplated in the definition of “agricultural land” 
                                            
62 2008 1 SA 654 (SCA).  
63 Stalwo (Pty) Ltd v Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2008 1 SA 654 (SCA) para 1.  
64 Para 3.  
65 Para 3.  
66 Para 3.  
67 The High Court decision was handed down on 26 January 2006 under Stalwo (Pty) Ltd v Wary Holdings 
(Pty) Ltd case no 5349/2005 (unreported).  
68 Stalwo (Pty) Ltd v Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2008 1 SA 654 (SCA) para 1.  




in section 1 of SALA, which excludes land within a municipal area.70 For purposes of this 
chapter, the focus of the discussion falls on the second issue.71  
Again, like in Kotzé, the second issue largely turned on the interpretation of the proviso in 
section 1 of SALA. In this regard, the Court essentially had to consider 2 questions: (a) 
whether the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality (“NMMM”), is a “municipal council,” 
“city council” or “town council” within the meaning of section 1 of the definition of agricultural 
land in SALA; and (b) whether the land retained its original status as “agricultural land” by 
virtue of the proviso72 in the definition of agricultural land notwithstanding the fact that the 
land now fell within the area of jurisdiction of a municipal council.73  
With regard to the first question, it was common cause that the land fell under the jurisdiction 
of the NMMM, a category A municipality74 in terms of section 2 of the Municipal Structures 
Act at the time of the conclusion of the sale agreement. Prior to the establishment of the 
NMMM, the land fell under the jurisdiction of the Port Elizabeth Transitional Rural Council 
as contemplated in section 1 of the Local Government Transition Act 209 of 1993. However, 
SALA fails to define the terms “municipal council”, “city council” or “town council”. In this 
regard, the Municipal Structures Act provides that: 
“…[w]ith effect from 5 December 2000 … any reference in a law referred to in item 2 of Schedule 
6 to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996…, to a municipal council, municipality, 
local authority or another applicable designation of a local government structure, must be 
construed as a reference to a municipal council or a municipality established in terms of this Act, 
as the case may be.”75 
 In view of this section, the Supreme Court of Appeal held: 
“In terms of item 2 of Schedule 6 of the Constitution all law that was in force when the new 
Constitution took effect, continues in force, subject to any amendment or repeal and consistency 
                                            
70 Stalwo (Pty) Ltd v Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2008 1 SA 654 (SCA) para 4.  
71 See paras 6-12 for the court’s judgment on the first issue.  
72 Proclamation R100 of 1995, GG  16785, 31 October 1995.  
73 Stalwo (Pty) Ltd v Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2008 1 SA 654 (SCA) para 15.  
74 Section 155(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 provides for 3 categories of 
municipalities, category A, B and C municipalities. Category A, metropolitan municipalities, govern major cities. 
A category A municipality has exclusive municipal executive and legislative authority in its area. Category C 
municipalities, namely district municipalities, govern wider areas outside the major cities. These municipalities 
have municipal executive and legislative authority in an area that includes more than one municipality. 
Accordingly, district municipalities are further divided into category B, local municipalities. Category C 
municipalities share municipal executive and legislative authority in its area with a category C municipality 
within whose area it falls. See Steytler & De Visser “Local government” in CLOSA 22-16 – 22-24.  




with the new Constitution’ and ‘old order legislation does not have a wider application; territorially 
or otherwise, than it had before the [interim] Constitution took effect unless subsequently 
amended to have a wider application and continues to be administered by the authorities that 
administered it when the new Constitution took effect, subject to the new Constitution”.76 
Maya JA concluded that there could be no doubt that SALA constituted a piece of old order 
legislation envisaged by the Constitution and section 93(8) of the Municipal Structures Act. 
Accordingly, the Court found that the words “municipal council,” “city council” or “town 
council” within the meaning of section 1 of the definition of agricultural land in SALA must 
be construed to include a category A municipality such as the NMMM.  
With regard to the second question, the court a quo’s judgment traced the land back to a 
point in time where it would have been classified as agricultural land during the transitional 
period.77 The High Court showed that the land would remain agricultural land 
notwithstanding any changes to the local government structures.78 This conclusion was 
based on the reasoning in the Kotzé judgment.79 
Counsel for the appellant argued that if the interpretation in the court a quo and Kotzé is 
accepted, it means that the status of agricultural land would remain “perpetually frozen”80 
from the time the transitional councils were established and not on the basis of whether the 
land was situated within the area of jurisdiction of the local government structures as listed 
in the definition of agricultural land in SALA. A narrow interpretation in this regard would 
simply have preserved the status quo pending the demarcation and establishment of the 
final new order of local government structures.81 The Court agreed with this argument and 
further elaborated that the legislature contemplated the concept of agricultural land as fluid 
rather than static, and changing with the expansion of local authorities and the creation of 
new ones.82 In this regard, the Court held that the proviso must be interpreted restrictively 
(as it is an exception to the general rule) and within the context of the legislative scheme 
which guided the restructuring process of local government which was to use existing 
statutory provisions (such as the proviso) until new ones could be enacted.83  
                                            
76 Stalwo (Pty) Ltd v Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2008 1 SA 654 (SCA) para 16. 
77 Para 19.  
78 Para 19.  
79 Para 20.  
80 Para 21.  
81 Para 21.  
82 Para 22.  




Consequently, the Supreme Court of Appeal overturned the Kotzé decision and held that 
the amendment was intended to be temporary so as to only preserve the status of 
agricultural land. The proviso was meant to operate only for as long as the land situated 
there remained in the jurisdiction of the transitional council.84 Accordingly, the amendment 
was intended to enable the proviso only for so long as the land in question remained in the 
jurisdiction of the transitional council.85 However, once the transitional councils were 
replaced by municipal councils in 2000, the classified land lost its agricultural character 
unless the Minister specifically declared it to be agricultural land by notice in the Government 
Gazette.86  
The Court criticised the approach of the court a quo’s in Kotzé because it failed to 
acknowledge the radically enhanced status and power of the new constitutional order 
accorded to local government.87 The constitutional competences allow local government to 
administer and regulate land within their jurisdictions without executive oversight.88 
Furthermore, the Court pointed out that the Minister still has the power to exclude land for 
purposes of SALA in terms of the definition of SALA.89 Accordingly, the Court found that the 
land was not agricultural land because it lost its historical character as agricultural land once 
it was brought within the NMMM and it therefore did not fall within the purview of SALA. 
Ministerial consent was thus found not to be a prerequisite for the validity of the contract of 
sale.90 
2 2 3 Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd  
Leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court was granted in the judgment of Wary Holdings 
(Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd.91 The Constitutional Court had to decide, on the same facts, 
whether the property sold at the time of the conclusion of the contract constituted 
“agricultural land” as envisaged by SALA.92 
                                            
84 Stalwo (Pty) Ltd v Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2008 1 SA 654 (SCA) paras 22-25. See also Van Wyk (2009) SA 
Public Law 553.  
85 Stalwo (Pty) Ltd v Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2008 1 SA 654 (SCA) para 24.  
86 Section 1(a) of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970 provides that the Minister may, after 
consultation with the relevant executive committee of the province concerned, declare land as agricultural and 
by way of notice in the Government Gazette. See also Van Wyk (2009) SA Public Law 553.  
87 Stalwo (Pty) Ltd v Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2008 1 SA 654 (SCA) para 26.  
88 Para 36.  
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91 2009 1 SA 337 (CC). See also Van Wyk (2009) SA Public Law 552-553.  




Essentially, the Court had to determine whether (a) the legislature had intended to do away 
with the power of the Minister to preserve agricultural land or; (b) the Act recognised the 
need for national control and policy decisions that affect the reduction or fragmentation of 
agricultural land and the need for a consistent national agricultural policy.93 
In answering this question, the Court had to determine the intention of the legislature.94 The 
court held that: 
“A cardinal rule in the construction of any legislation is that the intention of the legislature must be 
sought in the words employed in the legislation.”95 
However, in interpreting the plain meaning of the words, the Court found that a purely textual 
interpretation could result in findings that suited both the High Court and Supreme Court of 
Appeal judgments.96 Subsequently, Kroon AJ made use of a further canon of statutory 
interpretation to determine the legislature’s intention. The Constitutional Court held that the: 
“…ordinary meaning of the words in a statute must be determined in the context of the statute 
(including its purpose) read in its entirety.”97  
The Court subsequently followed a purposive reading of SALA. It was pointed out that the 
essential purpose of SALA has been regulatory by which “the legislature sought in the 
national interest to prevent the fragmentation of agricultural land into small uneconomic 
units”.98 The Court stated further that there was no compelling reason why this purpose 
would have remained current only during the life of the transitional councils.99  
The Court also pointed out additional contextual indicators of the legislature’s intention. 
Firstly, the transitional provisions in the Interim Constitution and the reference to transitional 
councils in the proviso did not refer to the restructuring of local government, but rather dealt 
with the rearrangement of powers between the national and provincial government relating 
to concurrent competences. In this regard, there was thus no indication that any part of the 
agricultural functional area was to be administered by a future local government,100 nor was 
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there a suggestion that the functional area of agriculture was assigned to local 
government.101 Secondly, in response to the Supreme Court of Appeal’s view on the 
enhanced status of local government, the judge in the Constitutional Court contended that 
he was persuaded that:  
“…the enhanced status of municipalities and the fact that they have such powers is a ground for 
ascribing to the legislature the intention that national control over ‘agricultural land’ through the 
[Subdivision of] Agricultural Land Act, effectively be a thing of the past”.102 
The judge reasoned as follows: 
“[L]and, agriculture, food production and environmental considerations are obviously important 
policy issues on a national level. An interpretation of the [Subdivision of] Agricultural Land Act that 
would attribute to the legislature the intention to retain the national government’s role in effectively 
formulating national policy on these and other related issues, and to recognise the need for 
national policy to play a role in decisions to reduce ‘agricultural land’ and for consistency in 
agricultural policy throughout the country, is an interpretation that can and should properly be 
adopted.”103 
Accordingly, the Court found that the life of the proviso was not tied to the life of the 
transitional councils. The reference in the proviso to land within the area of a transitional 
council was dictated by the factual position existing at the time which had to be addressed. 
That was done by the proviso pinpointing the stage from which land classified as agricultural 
land would retain that classification, regardless of the development in local government 
structures that followed. The enhanced status of present day municipalities and the fact that 
they have extended powers was not a ground for ascribing to the legislature the intention 
that national control over agricultural land through SALA was effectively a thing of the past.  
Ultimately, the Court found that the effect of the amendment was that all land that was 
defined as agricultural land prior to the establishment of transitional councils remained 
classified as agricultural land.104 Furthermore, ministerial consent is still a requirement 
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before land may be subdivided, despite the fact that all land, including agricultural land, is 
now situated in the area of jurisdiction of a municipality.105  
2 3 Conclusion 
SALA continues to have important implications for redistribution, especially where private 
agricultural land is concerned.106 This has both benefits and disadvantages. For example, 
Pienaar notes that the procedures that require consent of the Minister of Agriculture (now 
the Minister of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development)107 before subdivision of 
agricultural land can take place, are time-consuming and may result in uncertainty and 
delays that could impact negatively on redistribution projects, especially where time is of the 
essence.108 On the other hand, however, the prohibition on the uneconomic subdivision of 
agricultural land is a legitimate consideration.109 It is thus critical that the continued use of 
SALA as a regulatory mechanism within the context of new developments is explored 
further.110   
Pertinently, the category of “agricultural land” still exists. However, it is still unclear what 
agricultural land is. Accordingly, it may be necessary to explore the concept of agricultural 
land as it is defined in specific Acts and in a specific case further.  
                                            
105 Pienaar Land Reform 351; Van Wyk Planning Law 382.  
106 Pienaar Land Reform 351. 
107 On the 29th of May 2019, President Ramaphosa announced the appointment of a reconfigured national 
executive following the general elections <https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-
announces-reconfigured-departments-14-jun-2019-0000> (accessed 15-08-2019). The Minister of Agriculture, 
Land Reform and Rural Development is responsible for the newly reconstituted Department of Agriculture, 
Land Reform and Rural Development (DALRRD). This is a new department arising from a merger between 
the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) and the Department of Rural Development and 
Land Reform (DRDLR). 
108 Pienaar Land Reform 352. See also MC Lyne & MAG Darroch “Land redistribution in South Africa: Past 
performance and future policy” (2003) 6-7 
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/237652958_Land_Redistribution_in_South_Africa_Past_Performa
nce_and_Future_Policy> (accessed 27-09-2019). 
109 See Frantz Repealing the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 153-157 where he comes to the conclusion 
that the prohibition on the uneconomic subdivision of agricultural land is a legitimate reason, and to that end, 
the Act ought to continue as a legitimate land use regulatory mechanism. 




3 The Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land: Policy Framework and 
corresponding Bill 
3 1 Introduction 
On 13 March 2015, the Minister of Agriculture published a Draft Preservation and 
Development of Agricultural Land Policy111 (“Draft Preservation Policy”) and Preservation 
and Development of Agricultural Land Framework Bill112 on the preservation and 
development of agricultural land. However, following stakeholder input, a revised Bill113 was 
published on 2 September 2016. Subsequently, in February 2017114 the Department of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries announced that the revised Bill would be reconsidered 
and redrafted and submitted to Parliament in 2019/2020.115 Although under consideration to 
be redrafted, the revised Bill116 remains relevant and thus forms the focus of this section 
because it may provide some insight into the concept of agricultural land in South Africa.117 
Both the draft policy and revised Bill seek to demarcate, protect and develop agricultural 
land for food security purposes.118 
The Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Bill119 (“Preservation Bill”) 
recognises that it is in the interest of everyone to have agricultural land protected, for the 
benefit of present and future generations.120 In this regard, the aims of the Bill are, amongst 
other things, to promote the preservation and sustainable development of agricultural land 
and  the provision of regulations pertaining to the subdivision and change of land use 
applications in relation to agricultural land; to identify protected agricultural areas; to put in 
place measures to promote long-term viable and resilient farming units; to provide for 
                                            
111 Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Draft Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land 
Policy (2015).  
112 Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Framework Bill in GN 210 GG 38545 of 13-03-2015.  
113 Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Bill in GN 984 GG 40247 of 02-09-2016. 
114 Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries “Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Bill to 
be redrafted” (7 February 2018) <https://legal.sabinet.co.za/articles/preservation-and-development-of-
agricultural-land-bill-to-be-redrafted/> (accessed 09-04-2019).  
115 Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries “Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Bill in 
the pipeline” (29 March 2018) <https://legal.sabinet.co.za/articles/preservation-and-development-of-
agricultural-land-bill-in-the-pipeline/> (accessed 09-04-2019).  
116 Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Bill. 
117 The definitions of agricultural land in both versions of the bills (the Preservation and Development of 
Agricultural Land Framework Bill (draft) in GN 210 GG 38545 of 13-03-2015 and the Preservation and 
Development of Agricultural Land Bill in GN 984 GG 40247 of 02-09-2016) are similar, and almost identical. 
Accordingly it is only necessary to discuss the definition in the 2016 version of the bill.  
118 Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Draft Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land 
Policy (2015) 8 (the policy) and section 3 of the Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Bill in GN 
984 GG 40247 of 02-09-2016 (the revised bill) where the objectives of the bill are set out.  
119 Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Bill.  




mitigating measures to counter-act the loss of agricultural land and to set up a National 
Agricultural Land Registry for all activities on agricultural land.121 Accordingly, if 
promulgated, the Act will replace SALA and will provide a new definition for agricultural land 
as discussed under the following section.  
3 2 The definition of agricultural land  
The Preservation Bill proposes to update the definition of agricultural land, as it was defined 
in SALA. However, agricultural land is still defined as a “residual category”.122 In terms of 
this Bill agricultural land, as a residual category of land, constitutes any land, excluding (a) 
land in a proclaimed township; (b) land included in an application for declaration as a 
township before the commencement of the new Act, provided that the application is 
approved; (c) land which immediately before the commencement of this Act, was formally 
zoned for non-agricultural purposes by any sphere of government or any public entity; and 
(d) land which the Minister, after consultation with other relevant Ministers and provincial 
Members of the Executive Council (“MECs”) concerned, excludes by notice in the 
Government Gazette.123 In other words, agricultural land is described as a category of land 
which does not fall within the ambit of the (a)-(d) categories of land listed.  
Furthermore, the Draft Preservation Policy,124 contains a rather different definition of 
agricultural land to that provided for in the Preservation Bill.  
The Draft Preservation Policy holds that agricultural land constitutes: 
“any land which is or may be used for the production of biomass that provides food, fodder, fibre, 
fuel, timber and other biotic material for human use, either directly or through animal husbandry 
including aquaculture and inland and coastal fisheries or any other agricultural purpose, excluding 
land which the Minister, after consultation with other relevant Ministers and MECs concerned, 
excludes by means of notice in the Gazette”.125  
                                            
121 Preamble read with clause 3 of the Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Bill. 
122 Clause 1 of the Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Bill. Agricultural land is described as a 
residual category of land because it does not fall within the ambit of the (a)-(d) categories of land listed in 
Clause 1 of the Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Bill. 
123 Clause 1 of the Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Bill.  
124 Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Draft Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land 
Policy (2015) in GN 210 GG 38545 of 13-03-2015. 
125 Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Draft Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land 




Furthermore, the Draft Preservation Policy also provides for a definition of “agricultural 
purposes”, as follows: 
“purposes normally or otherwise reasonably associated with the use of land for agricultural 
activities, including the use of land for structures, buildings and dwelling units reasonably 
necessary for, or related to, the use of the land for agricultural activities”.126  
Accordingly, the Draft Preservation Policy defines agricultural land in relation to the purpose 
for which it is used, whereas the Preservation Bill defines agricultural land as a residual 
category of land. 
Interestingly, while “agricultural land” is defined as a residual category of land in the 
Preservation Bill, the Bill also provides for “unique agricultural land” and distinguishes 
between “high potential cropping [or agricultural] land” and “medium potential agricultural 
land” with reference to the different “land capability classes” 127 as set out in the Draft 
Preservation Policy. In this regard, the Draft Preservation Policy not only provides for a 
definition of agricultural land, but also provides for sub-classification of agricultural land, 
including “unique agricultural land”;128 “high value agricultural land”;129 and “medium value 
agricultural land.”130 The sub-classification is determined with reference to the “land 
capability.”131 In this regard, the Draft Preservation Policy makes provision for eight land 
capability classes.132  
How these definitions of agricultural land set out in the Draft Preservation Policy and the 
Preservation Bill respectively may be reconciled and how the application of these definitions 
could play out in relation to other legislative and policy frameworks, are therefore also critical 
for purposes of the study. 
Although the definition of agricultural land in the Draft Preservation Policy and Preservation 
Bill differs substantially, the definitions may still be reconcilable. The Preservation Bill 
identifies geographical areas which constitute agricultural land within South Africa, by 
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excluding certain areas from its definition.133 In this regard, the Preservation Bill, like SALA, 
outlines the parameters of agricultural land in South Africa. The Draft Preservation Policy 
describes specifically what these geographical areas of land as demarcated through the 
operation of the definition of agricultural land in the Preservation Bill are or may be used 
for.134 In this regard, the definitions of agricultural land set out in the policy and Bill are 
reconcilable. The extent to which these definitions may operate in relation to other legislative 
and policy frameworks is explored below.135  
If revised and promulgated, the Preservation Bill, read with the Draft Preservation Policy, 
may provide for a clear and overarching or national concept of agricultural land in South 
Africa, namely certain demarcated land used for agricultural purposes. This will most 
certainly impact the manner of regulation of such land in light of constitutional imperatives.  
4 The Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill  
4 1 Introduction  
A different definition of agricultural land emerged in the Agricultural Landholding Policy 
Framework: Setting upper and lower bands for the ownership and use of agricultural 
landholdings136 (“ALPF”) in July 2013. This is in succession of the 2011 Green Paper on 
Land Reform137 (“Green Paper”) that introduced a four tier tenure system, comprising: (a) 
State and public land: leasehold; (b) privately owned land: freehold, with limited extent; (c) 
land owned by foreigners: freehold, but precarious tenure, with obligations and conditions 
to comply with; and (d) communally owned land: communal tenure, with institutionalised use 
rights.138 Essentially, the Green Paper identified and outlined four broad categories of land. 
A tenure system was allocated to each of the abovementioned categories of land. While the 
Green Paper did not create any new land categories,139 it was the first time that reference 
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Policy (2015) 5.  
135 See 4 below.  
136 Department of Rural Development and Land Reform Agricultural Landholding Policy Framework: 
Setting upper and lower bands for the ownership and use of agricultural landholdings (July 2013).  
137 Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, Green Paper on Land Reform (2011) GN 639 in GG 
34607 of 16-09-2011. 
138 Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, Green Paper on Land Reform (2011) 5-6; Pienaar 
Land Reform 244. Also see the background highlighted in the Memorandum on the Objects of the Regulation 
of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill in GN 229 GG 40697 of 17-03-2017 36. See further JM Pienaar “The 
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was made to (a) “freehold, but with limited extent"140 as a tenure system for private land,141 
and (b) the limitation on foreign property rights in an official policy document.142    
The 2017 Regulation Bill, developed to give effect to the ALPF, impacts on all agricultural 
land.143 To that end “agricultural land” is set out specifically in the Regulation Bill. 144  
4 2 The definition of agricultural land 
It is crucial to establish the definition of “agricultural land” because the Bill’s implementation 
and ultimately, its impact, turns on the definition thereof.  Therefore, the dissertation will aim 
to interpret and establish what constitutes agricultural land in general and for purposes of 
the implementation of this Bill specifically.  
The Regulation Bill holds that agricultural land means all land,145 other than (a) land in a 
proclaimed township or; (b) land that will be proclaimed as a township; (c) land which 
immediately prior to the commencement of the Act was formally zoned for non-agricultural 
purposes by any sphere of government or any public entity or; (d) which has been excluded 
from the provisions of this Act by the Minister; or (e) which has been determined as non-
agricultural land use in accordance with the provisions of the Spatial Planning and Land Use 
Management Act 16 of 2013 (“SPLUMA”).146  
Arguably, this definition of agricultural land is problematic for a number of reasons. For one, 
the definition presupposes that land is currently categorised and regulated only in formal 
land use schemes and/or in accordance with SPLUMA, whereas in reality, not all land fits 
into the scheme of the proposed definition.147 Secondly, the current legislative framework 
that regulates land-use management has not yet been integrated or aligned with other 
relevant laws.148 Lastly, the Bill is intended to apply only to “agricultural land”. However, land 
owned by mining entities for instance, which is neither determined by SPLUMA as “non-
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agricultural land” nor formally zoned as “non-agricultural land”, would inadvertently, fall 
within the scope of the definition of “agricultural land”.149 Accordingly, a possible disconnect 
between statutes, policies and schemes may exist.  
Furthermore, the Regulation Bill also provides for “public” and “private” agricultural land. 
“Public agricultural land”150 is defined as agricultural land that vests in the national 
government,151 public entity152 or municipality.153 While the Bill does not expressly provide  
a definition of private agricultural land, the Memorandum on the Objects of the Regulation 
of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill154 describes it as land owned by South Africans and foreign 
persons.155 Reference is furthermore made to private agricultural land in chapter 4 of the Bill 
with regard to disclosures in respect of (a) the present ownership of agricultural 
landholdings, including the race, gender and nationality of the owner, the use and size of 
the agricultural land holding and any real right registered against and licence allocated to 
the agricultural land holding; and (b) the acquisition of ownership of private agricultural land 
holdings after the commencement of the Bill.  
Apart from the attempt to distinguish between public and private agricultural land, the Bill is 
unclear where communal land fits in or if and how it will be impacted. With respect to large 
tracts of land where the government is registered as the owner of communal land,156 the 
                                            
149 Mabasa & Khumalo “Holding onto land: the Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill” (3 July 2017) 
<https://www.werksmans.com/legal-updates-and-opinions/holding-onto-land-the-regulation-of-agricultural-
land-holdings-bill/> (accessed 09-04-2019). 
150 Clause 1 of the Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill. 
151 As defined in section 239 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
152 As defined in section 1 of the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999.  
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154 GN 229 GG 40697 of 17-03-2017. 
155 Memorandum on the Objects of the Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill 37.  
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general JM Pienaar “Customary law and communal property in South Africa: Challenges and Opportunities” 
in T Xu & A Clarke (eds) Legal strategies for the development and protection of communal property (2018) 
127-155. Despite the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, National Land Audit (2013), it is 
also unclear how much land is owned by the State. See in this regard, P de Wet “Up to 21% of land is state 
owned, says surveyor general” in Mail & Guardian (05-09-2013) <https://mg.co.za/article/2013-09-05-up-to-
21-of-land-is-state-owned-says-surveyor-general> (accessed 28-05-2017); C Walker & A Dubb “Fact Check 
1: The Distribution of Land in South Africa: An Overview” PLAAS <http://www.plaas.org.za/plaas-




land is used by communities.157 However, the definition of public agricultural land in the Bill 
does not specifically include communal land. This raises two questions in particular, namely 
(a) whether all communal agricultural land is excluded from the scope of the Bill; and (b) 
what the potentially far-reaching implications thereof will be for the regulation of communal 
agricultural land if the Bill is applicable.158   
                                            
2015) <http://city-press.news24.com/News/Who-owns-the-land-Ownership-by-numbers-20150503> 
(accessed 28-05-2017). However, see the purpose of the Land Commission at Chapter 3, 3 3 3 1 2 below.   
157 See Pienaar Land Reform 464; B Cousins “More than socially embedded: The distinctive character of 
communal tenure regimes in South Africa and its implications for land policy” (2007) 7 Journal of Agrarian 
Change 281-315 285-287; C Walker “”Redistributive land reform: for what and for whom?” in L Ntsebeza & R 
Hall (eds) The Land Question in South Africa (2007) 132 138-140 and E Johnson Communal land and tenure 
security: analysis of the South African Communal Land Rights Act 11 of 2004 LLM thesis, Stellenbosch 
University (2009) 5 in this regard. Thus far, the South African government has failed to comply with the 
Constitution’s instruction to enact legislation required by sections 25(6) read with 25(9) for the millions of South 
Africans living on communal land. While there are laws that promote tenure security for farm dwellers and 
labour tenants, for instance the   Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997. 
Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996, there is seemingly no legislation beyond the Interim Protection 
of Informal Land Rights Act 31 of 1996 (“IPILRA”), introduced in 1996, to secure land rights of the people living 
in communal land areas. The Communal Land Rights Act 11 of 2004 (“CLARA”) empowered the Minister of 
Land Affairs (now the Minister of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development) to transfer ownership of 
communal land from the State to communities residing there, to be held under “new order rights”, the content 
of which was not defined. CLARA required that a community had to register its rules before it could be 
recognised as a juristic person, legally capable of owning land. The importance of CLARA was also underlined 
by the Constitutional Court in Bakgatla-Ba-Kgafela Communal Property Association v Bakgatla-Ba-Kgafela 
Tribal Authority 2015 6 SA 32 (CC) para 30. See in this regard, JM Pienaar “The Battle of the Bakgatla-Ba-
Kgafela Community: Access to and Control of Communal Land” (2017) 20 Potchefstroom Electronic Law 
Journal 1-23. However, after concerted opposition from rural people living in communal land areas, the 
Constitutional Court in Tongoane v Minister for Agricultural Land Affairs 2010 6 SA 214 (CC) declared CLARA 
invalid on procedural grounds in its entirety in 2010. See Pienaar “Customary law and communal property in 
South Africa: Challenges and Opportunities” in Legal strategies for the development and protection of 
communal property 138, 144-146 which provides that: “Following the unconstitutionality finding of 
CLARA…[IPILRA] is the only statutory measure that protects unregistered, informal land rights that are 
exercised by communities and individuals.” While the IPILRA provides for the protection of land rights of the 
people living in communal areas, it does not regulate who owns the communal land. Accordingly, most 
communal land was, and still is, held in trust by the State for the benefit of those who occupy and use it. See 
Report of the High Level Panel on the Assessment of key legislation and the acceleration of fundamental 
change (November 2017) 
<https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Pages/2017/october/High_Level_Panel/HLP_Report/HLP
_report.pdf> (accessed 07-09-2019) 258-264 and Pienaar “Customary law and communal property in South 
Africa: Challenges and Opportunities” in Legal strategies for the development and protection of communal 
property 138, 144-146 in this regard. Importantly, see recent developments, in particular the publication of the 
Communal Land Tenure Bill [B-2017] in GN 510 GG 40965 of 07-07-2017 which aims to regulate communal 
land.  
158 In this regard, it is unclear if and how the Regulation Bill and the Department of Rural Development and 
Land Reform, Communal Land Tenure Policy (23-24 August 2013) (“CLTP”) would function together. 
Accordingly, the implications of the CLTP should be considered. The CLTP seeks to reform communal tenure 
to ensure security of land rights and production relations for people residing in communal areas. To achieve 
this, the policy envisions institutionalised use rights, which shall be administered either by traditional councils 
in areas that observe customary law, CPAs or trusts outside of these areas. This is also illustrated by the 
“wagon wheel” diagramme in the CLTP: The first wagon wheel envisaged by the CLTP, proposes to transfer 
the “inner boundaries” of communal land that observe customary laws to traditional councils. Once a traditional 
council is in possession of the title, ownership will vest exclusively in the traditional council (a product of the 
Traditional Leadership and Governance Act 41 of 2003) – thereby preventing others from making decisions 
about the land. While traditional councils will get title deeds of these communal areas, the individuals and 
families will get “institutionalised use rights” to parts of the land within them. In this regard, the new policy is 




Despite two land audit reports released in November 2017 by the Land Centre of 
Excellence159 and the South African government160 respectively, there is still no reliable data 
on land ownership in South Africa.161 Accordingly, although the Regulation Bill distinguishes 
between private and public agricultural land, the State does not have reliable information on 
how much agricultural land it owns and has available for redistribution. 
The absence of reliable information on who owns “agricultural land” in South Africa has 
therefore influenced one of the express objectives of the Regulation Bill: To obtain accurate 
information about owners of agricultural land (or farmland), which will enable the State to 
have a better understanding of land ownership patterns in South Africa.162 Accordingly, in 
its current format, the Regulation Bill envisages the establishment of a register detailing 
public and private agricultural land. The Bill requires that every owner of agricultural land 
                                            
power over, communal land. In theory, the second wagon wheel provides for CPAs or trusts to own land titles. 
However, the new CLTP states that no new CPAs will be established in areas where traditional councils already 
exist – that is, most of the former Bantustans. In other words, the CLTP reserves communal land for control 
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communal areas. See Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, Communal Land Tenure Policy 
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To fully understand the CLTP, one must read it together with the Department of Rural Development and Land 
Reform, Rural Development Framework Policy (24 July 2013) and the Department of Rural Development and 
Land Reform, State Land Lease and Disposal Policy (25 July 2013). Importantly, see Pienaar “Customary law 
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spaces; gender equity in land governance structures and tenure rights and household food and nutrition 
security. Furthermore, and in particular, the State Land Lease and Disposal Policy applies to most of the same 
land as the CLTP. See Pienaar Land Reform 255-258.  
159 Land Centre of Excellence, Land Audit: A transactions approach (November 2017) 
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by race, gender and nationality (November 2017) 
<file:///C:/Users/Tina%20Kotz%C3%A9/Downloads/land_audit_report13feb2018%20(2).pdf> (accessed 09-
07-2019).  
161 G Nicolson “Who owns SA land? AgriSA tries and fails to provide a clear answer” (1 November 2017) Daily 
Maverick <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-11-01-who-owns-sa-land-agrisa-tries-and-fails-to-
provide-a-clear-answer/> (accessed 09-07-2019); Land Accountability and Research Centre “Who owns the 
land? Half an answer from AgriSA land audit” (8 November 2017)  available at: 
<https://www.customcontested.co.za/who-owns-the-land-half-an-answer-from-agrissa-land-audit/> (accessed 
09-07-2019);  CD van Rensburg “Land Audit’s bizarre recommendations” (1 February 2018) CityPress 
<https://www.fin24.com/Economy/land-audits-bizarrerecommendations-20180211> (accessed 09-07-2019); 
T Corrigan “Land audit figures inaccurate” (4 September 2018) available at: <https://www.iol.co.za/pretoria-
news/land-audit-figures-inaccurate-16879759> (accessed 09-07-2019); South African Institute of Race 
Relations “Who owns the land: A critique of the State land audit” (26 March 2018) 
<https://irr.org.za/reports/occasional-reports/files/who-owns-the-land-26-03-2018.pdf> (accessed 09-07-
2019).  




disclose information pertaining to ownership of the land, including race and gender.163 This 
information will then be recorded in a national register. To that end, the Bill envisages the 
establishment of a new administrative body, the Office of the Land Commission (“Land 
Commission”), tasked with the administration of the agricultural land holdings register.164 
However, before the land is accounted for by the Land Commission it is difficult to envision 
how the Bill once promulgated will function or be able to impose land ceilings. Presumably, 
preparation of the register of agricultural land is only the first step in the forced land 
redistribution process which is clearly the primary objective of the Regulation Bill.165 Once 
all information regarding the ownership of agricultural land is gathered, the next step will be 
the determination of which land falls into the definition of “redistribution agricultural land”. 
This step is explored further in Chapter 3 below.  
5 Reflection 
5 1 Introduction  
Having regard to (a) the preambles and/or objectives; (b) the definition of agricultural land; 
and (c) the application of SALA, the Preservation Bill and the Regulation Bill, the synergy 
between SALA and the Regulation Bill and the Preservation Bill and Regulation Bill is 
discussed respectively.  
5 2 The synergy between SALA and the Regulation Bill 
If it is assumed that the Preservation Bill will not be promulgated,166 SALA will continue to 
remain operational. If it is assumed that the Regulation Bill will be promulgated, then the 
coherency between SALA and the Regulation Bill needs to be explored. 
5 2 1 The preambles and objectives of SALA and the Regulation Bill  
The preamble of SALA briefly highlights its objective: To control the subdivision and, in 
connection therewith, the use of agricultural land. As mentioned above, SALA aims to 
protect agriculture as an economic activity by prohibiting the subdivision of prime agricultural 
land without the Minister’s consent.167 In contrast to this, the main aim of the Regulation Bill 
                                            
163 Clause 15 of the Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill. 
164 Clauses 4, 8 and 12 of the Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill. 
165 Clause 2 of the Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill. 
166 The Preservation Bill and corresponding policy was first introduced on 13 March 2015. However, following 
stakeholder input, a revised Preservation Bill was published on 2 September 2016. Subsequently, in February 
2017 the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries announced that the revised Preservation Bill will 
be reconsidered and redrafted and submitted to Parliament in 2019/2020. 




is to redress ownership patterns by obtaining and redistributing agricultural land.168 As 
mentioned, one way of obtaining agricultural land for redistribution is by way of imposing 
land ceilings.169 The imposition of land ceilings may inherently subdivide prime agricultural 
land into small uneconomic parcels. Accordingly, the imposition of land ceilings may conflict 
with the prohibition to subdivide land. Therefore, the imposition of the respective regulatory 
mechanisms in SALA and the Regulation Bill clash and may be irreconcilable. In this regard, 
the aims of SALA and the Regulation Bill, are opposed and may be difficult to reconcile in 
practice.  
5 2 2 The definition of agricultural land in SALA and the Regulation Bill 
While both SALA and the Regulation Bill define agricultural land as a residual category, the 
definitions differ substantially. Both bills exclude land in a township170 and land which the 
respective Ministers171 (now the Minister of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural 
Development) may exclude from the respective Act or Bill.172 Apart from these two similar 
categories of land excluded from the definition of agricultural land, the other categories listed 
in SALA and the Regulation Bill differ.  
For one, while SALA excludes land of which the State is the owner or land which is held in 
trust by the State or any Minister for any person,173 the Regulation Bill specifically does not 
exclude “public agricultural land” from the definition of agricultural land. By omission, this 
could mean that communal land is also part and parcel of the concept of agricultural land 
and will thus be impacted and/or regulated by the Regulation Bill. Accordingly, the provisions 
and regulatory mechanisms in SALA do not apply to State land which means that State land 
can be subdivided without the consent of the Minister. However, State land or public 
agricultural land as defined by the Regulation Bill, is not excluded from the definition of 
agricultural land. All agricultural land that vests in all levels of government, including public 
entities, will be subject to the imposition of regulatory mechanisms such as land ceilings in 
terms of the Regulation Bill. Where State land (or public agricultural land) is concerned the 
imposition of land ceilings in terms of the Regulation Bill will not conflict with the prohibition 
                                            
168 Clause 2 of the Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill. 
169 Clause 25 of the Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill. 
170 Section 1(b) of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970 and Clause 1(a) of the Regulation of 
Agricultural Land Holdings Bill. 
171 Previously, the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries and the Minister of Rural Development and 
Land Reform.  
172 Section 1(f) of the Subdivision of the Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970 and the Clause 1(d) of the Regulation 
of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill.  




to subdivide agricultural land. In this regard, the respective mechanisms in SALA and the 
Regulation Bill, where State land is specifically concerned, may be compatible and capable 
of operating together in practice.  However, where private agricultural land is concerned it is 
still unclear how the provisions of SALA and the Regulation Bill will operate in practice.  
In terms of both SALA and the Regulation Bill agricultural land is defined as a residual 
category. However, the exclusions listed in each legislative measure differ substantially. 
Accordingly, no clear, single definition of agricultural land emerges when comparing SALA 
and the Regulation Bill.  
5 2 3 The application of SALA and the Regulation Bill 
Clause 3 of the Regulation Bill posits that it is the prime legislation in respect of all 
agricultural land. According to this clause, key legislation pertaining to the acquisition and 
disposal of agricultural land, such as SALA (which preserves agricultural land in the national 
interest) will be trumped by the provisions of the Regulation Bill where a conflict between 
the Bill and any other Act exists. If SALA and the prohibition against subdivision can be 
easily superseded by the provisions of the Regulation Bill, regarding the acquisition and 
disposal of agricultural land, then the Bill’s operation may hold negative implications for long-
term food security. The interplay between these two legislative measures is further explored 
in Chapter 3. 
5 3 The synergy between the Preservation Bill and the Regulation Bill 
If it is assumed that the Preservation Bill will come into operation, then it will replace SALA 
and it will provide for a new definition of agricultural land. If it is assumed that the 
Preservation Bill is promulgated, then its interplay with the Regulation Bill has to be 
considered.  
5 3 1 The preambles and objectives of the Preservation and Regulation Bills 
From the outset, both bills aim to provide for a register of agricultural land.174 However, the 
registers will seemingly capture different information, in line with the different objectives of 
the two bills. In this regard, the Preservation Bill provides for the National Agricultural Land 
Register, which will capture information regarding the preservation, sustainable use and 
                                            
174 See preambles of the Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Bill and the Regulation of 




management of the natural agricultural resources.175 In contrast, the Regulation Bill provides 
for a register of agricultural land, which will capture data regarding the ownership of public 
and private agricultural land in South Africa.176  
With regard to its objectives, it appears that at least some of the objectives of the two 
respective bills overlap. For example, one of the objectives of the Regulation Bill is to 
promote food security and enable the State to effectively deliberate on matters of land and 
natural resource economics,177 whereas the Preservation Bill aims to promote the 
preservation and sustainable development of agricultural land and establish an appropriate 
framework that facilitates concurrent land uses on agricultural land, without jeopardising 
long-term food security.178   
However, apart from this overlap the preamble and objectives of the two respective bills 
differ drastically. The Regulation Bill’s main aim is to redress ownership patterns by 
obtaining and redistributing agricultural land,179 whereas the Preservation Bill’s main 
purpose is to promote the preservation and sustainable development of agricultural land and 
to ensure the sustainable use and development thereof.180 
To achieve these aims, both bills envisage to use different mechanisms. On the one hand, 
the Regulation Bill aims to use land ceilings and restrictions on the acquisition and disposal 
of agricultural land to ensure its main purpose, whereas the Preservation Bill on the other 
hand, aims to use restrictions on the subdivision of agricultural land to preserve agricultural 
land and to introduce measures to discourage land use changes from agriculture to other 
forms of development. These measures,181 when implemented simultaneously in terms of 
these respective bills, may clash. Accordingly, it will be important to establish when which 
Bill applies. In this regard, it is important to consider if or how the definitions of agricultural 
land in the Preservation and Regulation Bills could function together.  
                                            
175 Clause 46(1)(a) of the Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Bill. 
176 Clause 12 read with clauses 15 and 17 of the Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill. 
177 Clauses 2(c) and (f) of the Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill. 
178 Clauses 3(a) and (h) of the Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Bill. 
179 Clause 2 of the Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill. 
180 Clause 3 of the Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Bill. 




5 3 2 The definition of agricultural land in Preservation and Regulation Bills 
It seems the definitions of agricultural land envisaged in the Regulation Bill182 and the 
Preservation Bill183 are almost identical. Both bills describe agricultural land as residual 
categories, by providing a list of what it is not. Furthermore, both bills exclude: (a) land in a 
proclaimed township;184 (b) land which immediately before the commencement of this Act, 
was formally zoned for non-agricultural purposes by any sphere of government or any public 
entity;185 (c) land which may be proclaimed as a township in future;186 and (d) land which 
the Minister may exclude from the definition of agricultural land.187 
Apart from these four categories listed in both bills, the Regulation Bill lists a fifth category 
of land that does not constitute agricultural land, namely land zoned as non-agricultural land 
in terms of SPLUMA.188 Notwithstanding this fifth category, the definitions are seemingly 
coherent and capable of functioning together. 
Furthermore, neither the Preservation Bill nor the Regulation Bill includes land situated 
within the jurisdiction of a municipality or land of which the State is the owner or held in trust 
by the State, as SALA does. Arguably, this could mean that communal land is also part of 
the concept of agricultural land and will thus be regulated by the respective bills.  
While these definitions may differ slightly within each context, there is still a need for the 
definitions to provide clarity in respect of which land specifically will be affected and when 
which bill will be applicable. Both bills demarcate the geographical areas which constitute 
agricultural land within South Africa. However, it is important to establish whether the bills, 
with different purposes, may function concurrently or whether the Preservation Bill trumps 
the operation of the Regulation Bill or vice versa.  
                                            
182 Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill. 
183 Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Bill. 
184 Clause 1(a) of the Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill and clause 1(a) of the Preservation and 
Development of Agricultural Land Bill. 
185 Clause 1(c) of the Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill and clause 1(c) of the Preservation and 
Development of Agricultural Land Bill. 
186 Clause 1(b) of the Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill and clause 1(b) of the Preservation and 
Development of Agricultural Land Bill. 
187 Clause 1(d) of the Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill and clause 1(d) of the Preservation and 
Development of Agricultural Land Bill. 




5 3 3 The application of the Preservation and Regulation Bills 
Both bills, when enacted, will constitute national legislative frameworks regulating 
agricultural land. Clause 3 of the Regulation Bill posits that it is the prime legislation in 
respect of all agricultural land. According to this clause, key legislation pertaining to the 
acquisition and disposal of agricultural land, such as the Preservation Bill (which preserves 
agricultural land in the national interest) will be trumped by the Regulation Bill. This may 
create a legislative lacuna which has negative implications for long-term food security.189  
However, there are a number of interpretative tools to determine whether the bills may 
function concurrently in relation to agricultural land or whether one will trump the other. Both 
bills provide for potential future conflicts with other legislation. The following provisions serve 
as the starting point when dealing with these potential conflicts:   
The Preservation Bill provides that: 
“In the event of any conflict between a section of this Act and (a) other national legislation, the 
section of this Act prevails if the conflict specifically concerns the management or development 
of agricultural land”.190 
Accordingly, only where there is a conflict between the Preservation and Regulation Bill 
regarding the “management or development of agricultural land”, will the Preservation Bill 
trump the Regulation Bill. However, there is no indication what the “management and 
development of agricultural land” in the Preservation Bill entails. It is postulated that the 
“management and development of agricultural land” is a very broad concept which may, in 
light of the aims of the Preservation Bill, denote the control or use of land in such a way that 
it increases the agricultural productivity, given the land capability, which in turn increases 
agricultural output and income (profit) from the land and ensures food security.191 In this 
regard, chapter 2 of the Preservation Bill also provides for principles, norms and standards 
for agricultural land management and land classification systems. Protecting agricultural 
land; ensuring the sustainable use of agricultural land; facilitating diversity; providing 
                                            
189 See Department of Social Development and the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries The 
National Policy on Food and Nutrition Security (August 2013), published in GG 37915 of 22-08-2014; 
Department of Agriculture The Integrated Food Security Strategy for South Africa (17 July 2002).  
190 Clause 4(1)(a) of the Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Bill. 
191 Clause 3 of the Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Bill read with BN Basu, R Roy & P Nikhil 




assistance to increase agricultural productivity and controlling pests may thus all fall within 
the purview of “agricultural development”.  
Furthermore, the Regulation Bill provides that: 
“In the event of a conflict between the provisions of this Act and any other law relating to the 
acquisition and disposal of agricultural land, the provisions of this Act prevail.”192 
Only where there is a conflict between the Preservation and Regulation Bill relating to the 
acquisition and/or disposal of agricultural land, will the Regulation Bill trump the former. 
However, the “acquisition and disposal of agricultural land” is a broad concept which means 
that the Regulation Bill may trump the Preservation Bill in most cases where there is a 
conflict between the two Bills. In this regard, the bills may be read together and function 
concurrently, although the interrelationship between the two bills may be very complex. The 
interplay between these two bills is further explored in Chapter 3.  
6 Conclusion   
As stated, there is no single definition of agricultural land. Various pieces of legislation, bills 
and policies, with varied objectives, provide for seemingly different definitions of what 
agricultural land entails. While these definitions may differ within each context, there is still 
the need for the definitions to provide clarity in respect of which land specifically will be 
affected and knowing which legislative measure will apply and in which circumstances.  
All of the legislative measures (legislation and bills) discussed above define agricultural land 
as a residual category. When SALA and the Regulation Bill are compared it is clear that 
there is no uniform or single definition of what constitutes agricultural land. However, when 
the definitions of agricultural land as defined in the Preservation and Regulation Bill are 
compared, it is clear that the definitions are seemingly similar and almost identical and 
capable of providing a clear and uniform definition of what constitutes agricultural land in 
South Africa.  
Accordingly, if it is assumed that the Preservation Bill, read with the Draft Preservation 
Policy, will commence and replace SALA, then the definition of agricultural land for purposes 
of this dissertation may constitute: Any private or public land in South Africa used for 
                                            




agricultural purposes, except (a) land in a township; (b) land zoned for non-agricultural 
purposes in terms of any legislation; and (c) land excluded by the Minister by notice in the 
Government Gazette.  
Having established what may constitute agricultural land for purposes of the dissertation, it 
is unclear how the different regulatory mechanisms, specifically subdivision regulations and 
land ceilings, may operate together, if applied to the same piece of agricultural land. 
Accordingly, the different regulatory measures and how they may operate together in 




Chapter 3: Mechanisms for the regulation of agricultural land 
in South Africa  
1 Introduction  
Ownership is subject to various regulatory provisions or measures, some of which may 
severely affect the ownership entitlements of the property owner.1 In this context, the 
question is not whether a government has the power to regulate the use of property but 
rather to what extent the State can regulate vested rights and the corresponding implications 
of such regulation.2 The State’s ability to impose regulatory mechanisms on property holders 
is a legitimate constitutional activity, provided that the regulation complies with the 
Constitution.3 The State, as part of its inherent police power,4 must be able to regulate 
property to promote and protect the public interest.5 The public interest includes the nation’s 
commitment to land reform,6 and to reforms to bring about equitable access to natural 
resources such as agricultural land.7 Pertinently, section 25(5) of the Constitution provides 
that the State must regulate property by means of reasonable legislative and other measures 
to foster conditions which enable South African citizens to gain access to (agricultural) land 
on an equitable basis. In other words, to establish a more equitable distribution of land,8 the 
main purpose of redistribution is to provide land and access to land (including rights to use 
land) in an equitable manner to previously disadvantaged Black people who have no land 
or insufficient land.9 Furthermore, section 25(8) of the Constitution provides that no provision 
                                            
1 AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 3 ed (2011) 91. While the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 has brought a new dimension to the regulation of private property rights, it is acknowledged that 
ownership has always been subect to regulation (limitation). See AJ van der Walt & GJ Pienaar Introduction 
to the Law of Property 7 ed (2016) 93; H Mostert &  A Pope (eds) The Principles of The Law of Property (2010) 
116-157; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 176-178 and PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert The 
Law of Property 5 ed (2006) 95. See 2 below.  
2 E van der Sijde Reconsidering the relationship between property and regulation: A systemic constitutional 
approach LLD, Stellenbosch University (2015) 128. See also JB Baron “The contested commitments of 
property” (201) 61 Hastings Law Journal 917-967, 942 where the author explains that within the space 
demarcated by the limits of constitutional protection, the State is free to exercise its regulatory powers 
legitimately, even if it appears that it infringes individual freedom.  
3 See Chapter 4 below.  
4 The State’s power in relation to property has three dimensions, namely the police power, the power of eminent 
domain and the taxing power. See further J Murphy “Property rights in the new constitution: An analytical 
framework for constitutional review” (1993) 56 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 623-
644 630.  
5 Van der Sijde Reconsidering the relationship between property and regulation 23; Murphy (1993) 
THRHR  630; Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 3 17, 214, 218, 251; Reflect-All 1025 CC v MEC for 
Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government 2009 6 SA 391 (CC) para 33. See also 
PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 5 ed (2006) 521.  
6 Section 25(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
7 Section 25(8) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  





under section 25 in general may impede the State from taking legislative and other 
measures to achieve land and other reforms10 with the aim of redressing the results of past 
discriminatory measures and practices.11  
Depending on the underlying aim or the reason for regulation,12 there are numerous 
regulatory mechanisms that impact an owner’s entitlements in relation to immovable 
property, specifically rural13 and urban land.14 However, the focus, for purposes of this 
dissertation, falls on statutory measures in relation to rural immovable property, in particular 
agricultural land. Moreover, the focus is on regulatory measures or provisions that may 
impact an owner’s entitlements in relation to agricultural land and which may contribute to 
making agricultural land available for redistribution purposes.15  
Chapter 3 provides for an exposition of existing and newly proposed regulatory mechanisms 
in relation to agricultural land in South Africa in view of the land reform programme, 
specifically the redistribution programme.16 Accordingly, “regulatory mechanism” for 
purposes of this study includes mechanisms that provide for, regulate the use of, promote 
and impacts, agricultural land. While there may be other mechanisms regulating or 
impacting agricultural land in general, and within the context of redistribution, the particular 
mechanisms explored for purposes of this dissertation include (a) provisions relating to the 
subdivision of agricultural land and (b) land ceilings. With respect to foreign land owners a 
further mechanism is employed, namely (c) restrictions on the acquisition and disposal of 
agricultural land. These regulatory mechanisms not only impact an owner’s entitlements in 
                                            
10 Such as natural resources, including new mineral and water dispensations.  
11 Section 25(8) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See also the history of dispossession 
in South Africa set out in Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 14-21.  
12 For example, redistribution, tenure security, restitution, land use planning; township establishment, spatial 
planning and land management, and environmental, conservation and heritage considerations.  
13 Generally, land tax and the Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act 16 of 2013 and Expropriation 
Act 63 of 1975 may impact all land. Legislation that may impact rural land and ownership entitlements include: 
the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996; the Extension of Security of  Tenure Act 62 of 1997; the 
Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994; the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of 
Land Act 19 of 1998; the Land Reform: Provision of Land and Assistance Act 126 of 1993; the Subdivision of 
Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970; the Environmental Conservation Act 73 of 1989; the National Environmental 
Management Act 107 of 1998; the National Environmental Management Act: Protected Areas 57 of 2003; 
Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act 43 of 1983; the Agricultural Pests Act 36 of 1983; the National Veld 
and Forest Fire Act 101 of 1998; and the Fencing Act 31 of 1963. 
14 The Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act 16 of 2013 and Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 may 
impact all land. Other Acts that specifically impact urban land include: the National Building Regulations and 
Building Standards Act 103 of 1977; the Housing Act 107 of 1997; the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and 
Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998; the Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989; and the National 
Environmental Management: Air Quality Act 39 of 2004.  
15 Van der Walt & Pienaar Introduction to the Law of Property 365.  
16 Excluding land tax or property tax measures and mechanisms such as the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) 
Act 3 of 1996 and the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 which regulate and may impact an 




relation to agricultural land, but may also make more agricultural land available for 
redistribution purposes. While this Chapter provides for an exposition of the regulatory 
mechanisms in South Africa alluded to above, subsequent chapters will provide for an 
investigation into the constitutionality17 and efficacy18 of each of these mechanisms.  
2 The regulation of immovable property in South Africa in light of land reform 
considerations 
There are various statutory mechanisms available for the regulation of agricultural land in 
South Africa, impacting an owner’s entitlements. In this regard, the concept of ownership 
becomes important. There are different ways to define or describe the concept of 
ownership.19 The concept of ownership may also change as the needs of society develop.20 
In South Africa the concept of ownership, as understood in terms of traditional common-law, 
during the pre-constitutional era, has to adapt in line with the provisions of the Constitution 
in the constitutional era.  
Traditionally, according to Roman-Dutch Law, ownership was often conceptualised in 
absolutist and encompassing terms.21 Ownership has been described, inter alia, by way of 
the ownership entitlements linked thereto, or to which an owner is entitled to, and by way of 
the relationship between the person and the property in question.22 For example, Van der 
Merwe describes the notion of ownership as the “most comprehensive right embracing not 
only the power to use (ius utendi), to enjoy the fruits (ius frutendi) and to consume the thing 
(ius abutendi), but also the power to possess (ius possidendi), to dispose of (ius disponendi), 
to reclaim the thing from anyone who wrongfully withholds it or to resist any unlawful invasion 
                                            
17 See Chapter 4 in general.  
18 See Chapter 6, 3 below.  
19 Mostert & Pope The Principles of the Law of Property 91; Van der Walt & Pienaar Introduction to the Law of 
Property 45-46; CG van der Merwe “Things” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The Law of South Africa 2 ed (RS 
31-01-2014) paras 9, 59-69. 
20 Mostert & Pope (eds) The Principles of the Law of Property 91; Van der Walt & Pienaar Introduction to the 
Law of Property 45-46; Van der Merwe “Things” in LAWSA paras 9, 59-69.   
21 AJ van der Walt & P Dhliwayo “The notion of absolute ownership and exclusive ownership: A doctrinal 
analysis” (2017) 134 South African Law Journal 34-52 in general. See further H Scott “Absolute ownership and 
legal pluralism in Roman law: Two arguments” (2011) Acta Juridica 23-34, 23; P Birks “The Roman law concept 
of dominium and the idea of absolute ownership” (1985) Acta Juridica 1-37, 1; D Visser “The absoluteness of 
ownership: The South African common law in perspective” (1985) Acta Juridica 39-52, 39.  




of the thing (ius negandi)”.23 Ownership has also been described as the “most extensive” 
legal relationship that can exist between a person and property.24 
The common law conception of ownership, generally accepted in South Africa in the pre-
constitutional era, is found in Gien v Gien,25 where Spoelstra AJ held that:  
“The right of ownership is the most comprehensive real right that a person can have in respect of 
a thing. The point of departure is that a person can, in respect of immovable property, do with and 
on his property, as he pleases. This apparently unfettered freedom is, however, a half-truth. The 
absolute power of an owner is limited by the restrictions imposed thereupon by the law”.26  
The phrase plena in re potestas confirms the notion that the owner may act at will with the 
property within the limits of the law.27 This description of ownership as the most complete 
right does not suggest that ownership is absolute or that no limitations may be placed on 
it.28 In other words, it is accepted that ownership has always been subjected to limitations.29 
Different restrictions may be placed on the owner’s right to ownership and the entitlements 
flowing from it, namely statutory measures; limited real rights of third parties against the 
property in question; personal rights such as creditor’s rights of third parties against the 
owner; and neighbour law restrictions.30 Accordingly, the concept of ownership can be 
                                            
23 Van der Merwe “Things” in LAWSA paras 9, 59-69 in general. However, the content of ownership must be 
determined within the context of each individual case. Ownership may include several entitlements, notably 
the entitlement to use (ius utendi), dispose or alienate (ius dispondendi) and vindicate (ius vindicandi) the 
property. Other entitlements may include the entitlement to fruits (ius fruendi); to possess (ius possidendi), to 
resist any unlawful invasion (ius negandi), encumber and (under some circumstances) even neglect or destroy 
the property (ius abutendi). Compare Mostert & Pope (eds) The Principles of the Law of Property 92-93; Van 
der Walt & Pienaar Introduction to the Law of Propert 47-48; Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert Silberberg and 
Schoeman’s The Law of Property 92-93; Van der Merwe Sakereg 173.  
24 AJ van der Walt “Property, social justice and citizenship: Property law in post-apartheid South Africa” (2008) 
Stellenbosch Law Review 325-346, 325; H Mostert “Land as a ‘national asset’ under the Constitution: The 
system change envisaged by the 2011 Green Paper on Land Policy and what this means for property law 
under the Constitution” (2014) 17 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 760-797, 772.  
25 1979 2 SA 1113 (T). 
26 Gien v Gien 1979 2 SA 1113 (T) at 1120. The Constitutional Court in Van der Merwe v Taylor 2008 1 SA 1 
(CC) para 26 added a constitutional element to the concept of ownership laid down in Gien v Gien.  The Court 
describes the concept of ownership as potentially conferring upon the owner “the most complete or 
comprehensive right in or control over a thing”. The Court held further that: “The most comprehensive control 
over the property does not imply unfettered freedom to do with the thing as one pleases. However 
comprehensive, and although protected against arbitrary deprivation under section 25(1), ownership like any 
other right, is not absolute”. See further Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert  The Law of Property 91-92; CG van 
der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in FD Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles of the South African Law 9 ed (2007) 405-
665, 410; Mostert & Pope The Principles of the Law of Property 345.  
27 Mostert & Pope The Principles of The Law of Property 90. 
28 Mostert & Pope The Principles of The Law of Property 116-157; Van der Merwe Sakereg 176-178 and 
Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert The Law of Property 95. 
29 Van der Walt & Pienaar Introduction to the Law of Property 93; Mostert & Pope The Principles of The Law 
of Property 116-157; Van der Merwe Sakereg 176-178 and Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert The Law of 
Property 95; Scott (2011) Acta Juridica 23; Birks (1985) Acta Juridica 1; Visser (1985) Acta Juridica 39.  




described as an “abstract legal relationship”31 which implies: (a) the existence of “a legal 
relationship…between the owner and a thing (object) in terms of which the owner acquires 
certain entitlements”32 and (b) “the existence of a relationship…between the owner and other 
legal subjects in terms of which the owner can require that others respect his entitlement 
regarding the object”.33  
Nevertheless, the notion of ownership as assigning absolute power over property, especially 
in so far as it relates to the ability to exclude others from using and enjoying the resource, 
was a widely accepted interpretation of the concept,34 which suited the purposes of the 
South African government well during the time of apartheid.35 In the South African context, 
ownership entitlements and the ability to exercise ownership, were specifically also affected 
by the race-based approach to land during the apartheid era.36 Consequently, private 
ownership in general and ownership of land in particular, has been and remains 
contentious.37 In the constitutional dispensation, private ownership continues to exist,38 but 
must coincide with modern day practice, be aligned with future needs of the South African 
society, and endorse constitutional and transformational demands.39  
Accordingly, the concept of ownership in the constitutional era requires a different 
interpretation. In this regard Van der Walt explains that:  
“[T]raditional notions of property [and ownership] do not suffice in transformational contexts, 
where the foundations of the property regime itself are or should be in question because 
regulatory restrictions, even when imposed in terms of a broadly conceived notion of the public 
good, simply cannot do all the transformative work that is required.  In this perspective it is not 
sufficient to demonstrate that property is subject to…public purpose restrictions; the point is to 
                                            
31 Van der Walt & Pienaar Introduction to the Law of Property 53.  
32 53. 
33 53. 
34 Mostert (2014) PELJ 773; Van der Merwe Sakereg 12-13;  J Scholtens “Law of Property” in HR Hahlo & E 
Kahn (eds) The Union of South Africa: The Development of its Laws and Constitution, 571-621, 578-579.  
35  Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 14-21, 90; Mostert & Pope The Principles of The Law of 
Property 90. See also AJ van der Walt “Property rights and hierarchies of power: A critical evaluation of land-
reform policy in South Africa” (1999) 64 Koers 261-264.    
36 JM Pienaar “’Unlawful occupier’ in perspective: history, legislation and case law” in H Mostert & MJ de Waal 
(eds) Essays in Honour of CG van der Merwe (2011) 309-329, 311-314; Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member 
of the Executive Council for Economic Development, Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape 2015 
6 SA 125 (CC) paras 34-36. See also Mostert & Pope The Principles of The Law of Property 90-91, 116. See 
also Van der Walt (1999) 64 Koers 261-264. 
37 Mostert & Pope The Principles of The Law of Property 90.  
38 91. 
39 Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert The Law of Property 93. First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v 
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services; First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v 
Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) paras 49-50; Offit Enterprises v Coega Development Corporation 




identify and explain instances where transformation justifies changes that question the very 
foundations upon which the current distribution of property rests.”40  
In this regard, the Constitutional Court in Daniels v Scribante41 held that, within a 
constitutional context, “a re-appraisal of our conception of the nature of ownership and 
property”42 is required. The Court furthermore demonstrated the unfeasibility of the 
absolutist conception of ownership in the constitutional context.43 The Court explained that 
“the traditional or common law conception of ownership creates a hierarchy of rights with 
ownership at the top and lesser real and personal rights that may in circumscribed 
circumstances subtract from it”.44 The courts have rejected this absolutist conception of 
ownership in the constitutional era.45 The Court also referred to the judgment of the 
Constitutional Court in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers46 which held that:  
“In sum, the Constitution imposes new obligations on the courts concerning rights relating to 
property not previously recognised by the common law…The judicial function…is not to establish 
a hierarchical arrangement between the different interests involved, privileging in an abstract and 
mechanical way the rights of ownership over the right not be dispossessed of a home or vice 
versa. Rather it is to balance out and reconcile the opposed claims in as just a manner as possible 
taking account of all the interests involved and the specific factors relevant in each particular 
case”.47  
Specifically, section 25 “provides for reform of land, which indicates that a more socially 
responsible form of ownership is envisaged for the future”.48 While ownership or property 
                                            
40 AJ van der Walt Property in the Margins (2009) 16; Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 136 also 
refers to this quotation.  
41 2017 4 SA 341 (CC).  
42 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 115(b).  
43 Para 133.  
44 Para 134.  
45 Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) paras 133, 135. See also Van der Walt & Dhliwayo (2017) SALJ 
34-52 and P Dhliwayo & R Dyal-Chand “Property in Law” in G Muller, R Brits, B Slade & J van Wyk (eds) 
Transformative Property Law: Festschrift in honour of AJ van der Walt (2018) 295-317 in general.  
46 2005 1 SA 217 (CC).  
47 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 23; Van der Walt & Dhliwayo 
(2017) SALJ 34-52 and Dhliwayo & Dyal-Chand “Property in Law” in Transformative Property Law: Festschrift 
in honour of AJ van der Walt 295-317 in general.  
47 2005 1 SA 217 (CC). 
48 Mostert & Pope The Principles of The Law of Property 91. See also Van der Merwe v Taylor 2008 1 SA 1 
(CC) para 26; Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 13; Van der Walt Property in the Margins 16. See 
also L van Vliet & A Parise “The development of the social function of ownership: Exploring the pioneering 
efforts of Otto von Gierke and Léon Duguit” in G Muller, R Brits, B Slade & J van Wyk (eds) Transformative 




may be regulated to address the need for the redistribution of agricultural land,49 property, 
and the ownership entitlements attached thereto, are protected by section 25 of the 
Constitution, which provides for a framework that regulates the context and manner in which 
private property may be interfered with.50 The Constitutional Court in First National Bank of 
SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services; First National 
Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance51 held that the overriding purpose of 
the constitutional property clause is to strike a proportionate balance between the protection 
of existing property rights and the promotion of the public interest.52  
Van der Walt describes section 25 of the Constitution as “unique”53 in its combination of two 
seemingly contradictory parts. Part 1, consisting of sections 25(1)-(3), embodies the 
provisions that protect existing property rights and interests against unconstitutional 
interferences.54 In contrast, part 2, comprising sections 25(4)-(9), provides for a set of 
provisions that allows State action that promotes land reform and other related reforms, 
including the redistribution of land.55 Apart from this categorisation, Van der Walt further 
divides these two parts into four groups of provisions that deal with (a) deprivation; (b) 
expropriation; (c) interpretation; and (d) land reform.56 For purposes of this Chapter, the 
focus falls on the interaction between section 25(1), section 25(2) and section 25(5) of the 
Constitution, namely the regulation of the land owner’s entitlements in light of redistribution 
purposes. In view of the need to broaden access to land and redress the skewed ownership 
patterns in relation to agricultural land for South African citizens specifically, various 
regulatory mechanisms emerge that impact property holders, namely citizens and 
foreigners, generally and on agricultural land specifically. These regulatory mechanisms are 
discussed below.  
                                            
49 HP Binswanger-Mkhize, C Bourguignon & R van den Brink “Introduction and summary” in HP Binswanger-
Mkhize, C Bourguignon & R van den Brink (eds) Agricultural Land Redistribution: Toward Greater Consensus 
(2009) 3-42. 
50 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 91; Van der Sijde Reconsidering the relationship between property 
and regulation 128. 
51 2002 4 SA 768 (CC).  
52 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services; First 
National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 50.  
53 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 12. 
54 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 12; Pienaar Land Reform 174-179. 
55 Sections 25(5) and 25(8) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See also Van der Walt 
Constitutional Property Law 12; Pienaar Land Reform 179-185.  




3 Mechanisms for the regulation of agricultural land  
3 1 Introduction  
Property is protected in terms of section 25 of the Constitution. However, as explained 
above, the constitutional protection of property is not absolute and may be subjected to 
regulatory provisions or measures.57 There are various regulatory mechanisms, each with a 
different underlying aim,58 that impact ownership entitlements in relation to rural59 and urban 
land.60 Furthermore, as mentioned above,61 the concept of ownership can also be described 
as a relationship between the owner and the property and/or as a relationship between the 
owner and other legal subjects with limited real rights or personal rights.62 In this regard, the 
scope of the study is not aimed at regulatory measures that may impact the relationship 
between the land owner and other legal subjects working or residing on the agricultural land, 
such as labour tenants63 and occupiers.64 It would not be possible to discuss all regulatory 
mechanisms for purposes of this dissertation. Accordingly, in light of section 25(5) of the 
Constitution, the focus falls on regulatory measures that may impact ownership entitlements 
                                            
57 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 190; Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert The Law of Property 96; 
Mostert & Pope (eds) The Principles of The Law of Property 116. See also First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a 
Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services; First National Bank of SA Limited t/a 
Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) paras 49-50; Offit Enterprises v Coega Development 
Corporation (Pty) Ltd 2011 1 SA 293 (CC) para 46.  
58 For example, redistribution, tenure security, restitution, land use planning; township establishment, spatial 
planning and land management, and environmental, conservation and heritage considerations.  
59 Generally, land tax, the Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act 16 of 2013 and Expropriation Act 
63 of 1975 may impact all land. Rural land acts that may impact ownership entitlements include: the Land 
reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996; the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997; the Restitution of 
Land Rights Act 22 of 1994; the Restitution of Land Rights Amendment Act 15 of  2014; the Prevention of 
Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998; the Land Reform: Provision of Land and 
Assistance Act 126 of 1993; the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970; the  Environmental 
Conservation Act 73 of 1989; the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998; the National 
Environmental Management Act: Protected Areas 57 of 2003; the Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act 
43 of 1983; the Agricultural Pests Act 36 of 1983; the National Veld and Forest Fire Act 101 of 1998; and the 
Fencing Act 31 of 1963. 
60 The Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act 16 of 2013 and Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 may 
impact all land. Other acts that specifically impact urban land include: the National Building Regulations and 
Building Standards Act 103 of 1977; the Housing Act 107 of 1997; the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and 
Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998; the Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989 and the National 
Environmental Management: Air Quality Act 39 of 2004.  
61 See 2 above.  
62 Van der Walt & Pienaar Introduction to the Law of Property 53.  
63 Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996. Van der Walt & Pienaar An Introduction to the Law of Property 
369 provides that: “[l]abour tenants are entitled to apply, within four years from the commencement of the Act, 
to acquire land which they may occupy or use in terms of the labour tenancy. By making it possible for the 
labour tenants to acquire their own land, the Act promotes a more equitable distribution of land”. See also 
Pienaar Land Reform 307-317.  
64 The Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 and the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from the Unlawful 




in relation to agricultural land specifically and which may contribute to the redistribution 
programme.  
The study is limited to statutory regulatory mechanisms, excluding land tax measures,65 
which impact the relationship between the land owner and the agricultural land in question. 
In this regard, the following regulatory mechanisms in relation to agricultural land will be 
discussed:  (a) provisions relating to the subdivision of agricultural land; (b) placing ceilings 
on agricultural landholdings; and (c) placing restrictions on foreigners to acquire and dispose 
of agricultural land.  
3 2 Provisions relating to the subdivision of agricultural land  
3 2 1 Introduction  
The provisions relating to the subdivision of agricultural land can be found in the SALA and 
the Land Reform: Provision of Land and Assistance Act 126 if 1993 (“Act 126”).66 The aims 
of these statutory measures differ. The former act restricts the way in which owners exercise 
respective rights in relation to immovable property.67 The latter act, while it does not impact 
landowners’ entitlements, it allows the State to subdivide land acquired under the Act for 
purposes of redistribution. These two Acts, in relation to the subdivision of agricultural land, 
are discussed below.  
3 2 2 The Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970 
SALA acts as a regulatory mechanism that aims to protect agriculture as an economic 
activity and preserve agricultural land, by preventing the subdivision of large-scale 
                                            
65 Pienaar Land Reform 371. Land tax measures are well-known mechanisms and widely used to open up 
land for redistribution purposes.  
66 Originally known as the Provision of Certain Land for Settlement Act 126 of 1993. The Act has since 
undergone further amendments including, the Land Affairs General Amendment Act 11 of 2000; the Provision 
of Land and Assistance Amendment Act 58 of 2008 and the Rural Development and Land Reform General 
Amendment Act 4 of 2011. Since 2011, the Act has been known as the Land Reform: Provision of Land and 
Assistance Act 126 of 1993. See also T Kepe & R Hall “Land Redistribution in South Africa” Commissioned 
report for the High Level Panel on the assessment of key legislation and the acceleration of fundamental 
change, an initiative of the Parliament of South Africa (28 September 2016) 
<https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Pages/2017/october/High_Level_Panel/Commissioned_
Report_land/Commissioned_Report_on_Land_Redistribution_Kepe_and_Hall.pdf> (accessed 22-09-2019) 8 
where the report reiterates that: “While it is an apartheid-era law, passed by the National Party government 
during its own limited and pre-emptive attempts at land reform, it remains the legislation that enables the 
Minister to acquire funds for disbursement. The amendments to the Act have provided a mandate to the 
Minister to continue to appropriate funds to enable land redistribution under changed conditions”.  
67 G Frantz Repealing the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act: A constitutional analysis LLM, Stellenbosch 




agricultural land into small, uneconomic land parcels.68 It also prevents agricultural land from 
decreasing due to the expansion of townships and urban sprawl.69  
As mentioned, to achieve this aim, SALA regulates the subdivision of all agricultural land in 
the Republic70 and other actions that may result in the subdivision of agricultural land. The 
use of agricultural land is often determined by the size thereof. Accordingly, the provisions 
relating to the subdivision of agricultural land not only impacts the use of the land itself, but 
also have an effect on the land owner’s right to use the land as he/she pleases, as well as 
to dispose of his or her land through sale and bequests. The scope of the regulatory 
measures imposed by SALA on the land owner’s property rights is discussed forthwith.  
3 2 2 1 The scope / extent of the limitations in SALA 
SALA prohibits the subdivision of agricultural land provided that consent for the subdivision 
is obtained from the Minister of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development (previously 
the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries).71 This prohibition aims to prevent the 
uneconomic fragmentation of prime agricultural land.72 There are also other actions listed in 
SALA that are prohibited unless ministerial consent is obtained. These actions deal with the 
transfer of agricultural land and actions that may result in the act of subdivision.  
In this regard, section 3(b) provides that “no undivided share in agricultural land not already 
held by any person, shall vest in any person…unless the Minister has consented in 
writing”.73 This section aims to prevent the owner of agricultural land from transferring any 
undivided share in the ownership to another person without the Minister’s consent.74 
However, this section does not preclude agricultural land from being registered as a 
partnership asset.75 The only requirement is that the land be registered in the name of one 
partner, but not necessarily the other partner or partners.76 Accordingly, the partner with the 
registered right has a real right, whereas the other(s) have a personal right against the 
                                            
68 Coetzee v Coetzee 2016 4 All SA 404 (WCC) para 26. See also Pienaar Land Reform 350; J van Wyk 
Planning Law 2 ed (2012) 380. See also Frantz Repealing the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act in general.  
69 Pienaar Land Reform 350; Van Wyk Planning Law 380.  
70 Frantz Repealing the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 1; Coetzee v Coetzee 2016 4 All SA 404 (WCC) 
para 6.  
71 Section 3(a) of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970; Frantz Repealing the Subdivision of 
Agricultural Land Act 46. 
72 Coetzee v Coetzee 2016 4 All SA 404 (WCC) para 26. 
73 Section 3(b) of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970.  
74 Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert The Law of Property 107-108.  
75 Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert The Law of Property 107-108; Cussons v Kroon 2002 1 All SA 361 (A) 838E-
G.  




partner to manage the agricultural land as a partnership asset.77 In other words, while the 
immovable property, namely the agricultural land, forms part of the assets of the partnership, 
only the registered owner obtains ownership entitlements over it.   
Furthermore, section 3(c) of SALA provides that “no part of any undivided share in 
agricultural land shall vest in any person, if such part is not already held by any person”78  
unless the Minister has consented thereto in writing.79 The purpose of this section is to 
prevent the uncontrolled division of agricultural land into uneconomic parcels of land and 
the further division of such land into smaller shares,80 by prohibiting the holder of an 
undivided share in ownership of agricultural land from transferring a portion of his or her 
undivided share to another.81 However, as Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert explain, there 
is: 
“nothing which prevents the holder of two or more undivided shares in ownership of a single piece 
of land from transferring one (or more) of these shares to another, whether or not the latter already 
holds any share in the ownership of such land. The intention of the legislature was, therefore, to 
prevent the uncontrolled division of agricultural land into smaller (uneconomic units), as well as 
the further division of existing undivided shares in the ownership of such land into smaller “shares” 
”.82 
SALA also prohibits anyone from entering into a long-term lease which continues for any 
period over 10 years, unless ministerial consent is obtained in writing.83 The option to renew 
the lease after a period of 9 years and 11 months is also invalidated.84 
                                            
77 Frantz Repealing the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 46. Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert The Law of 
Property 107-108, 135. See Cussons v Kroon 2002 1 All SA 361 (A) 838G-H, which illustrates the position 
where agricultural land is registered as a partnership asset. 
78 Section 3(c) of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970.  
79 Section 3(c) of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970.  
80 Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert The Law of Property 108. However, in Coetzee v Coetzee 2016 4 All SA 404 
(WCC) paras 26-32 the High Court found that there were various factors which weighed in favour of 
subdivision. The Court held that the application for subdivision of the farm in such a way that would allow the 
appellant to remain in the cottage had realistic prospects of success. Consequently, the Court found that 
although various statutory consents would be required for the partitioning of the property, it did not, in the 
circumstances of the case, justify adopting an approach that ruled out terminating the parties’ co-ownership 
by way of a physical division between them of the commonly owned property. In the result, the appeal was 
upheld, the co-ownership of the farm was terminated, and permission to subdivide was granted. 
81 Frantz Repealing the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 48.  
82 Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert The Law of Property 107. See Coetzee v Coetzee 2016 4 All SA 404 (WCC) 
paras 26-32.  
83 Section 3(d) of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970; Frantz Repealing the Subdivision of 
Agricultural Land Act 48.  
84 See Letaba Sawmills (Edms) Bpk v Majovi (Edms) Bpk 1993 1 SA 768 (A) where the option to renew the 




Furthermore, the sale and advertisement for sale of a portion of agricultural land is also 
expressly prohibited in terms of SALA, unless written consent is obtained from the Minister.85 
SALA also limits the entitlement of an owner of agricultural land from granting and registering 
certain servitudes over his or her land.86 This section excludes certain servitudes from the 
requirement of ministerial consent. The inclusion of certain servitudes under the requirement 
of consent may be regarded as a way to prevent the registration of servitudes that are in 
fact masked as lease agreements. SALA is thus not only a source which provides a definition 
of agricultural land,87 it is also a regulatory mechanism that impacts particular entitlements 
of land owners.88  
It is questioned whether the provisions relating to the subdivision of agricultural land are in 
conflict with section 25 of the Constitution.89 The constitutionality of provisions on subdivision 
in SALA is explored in Chapter 4 below.  
3 2 2 2 New developments: The Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Bill  
Once promulgated, the 2016 Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Bill90 
(“Preservation Bill”) will replace SALA. The new Act when/if promulgated, will not only 
provide a new definition of agricultural land,91 but will also provide a corresponding 
framework for the subdivision and regulation of agricultural land. Although not yet finalised, 
it is evident that the subdivision of agricultural land will still be prohibited unless authorised 
by the Minister.92  
 
                                            
Minister. Accordingly the Appeal Court found the lease contract in contravention of section 3(d) of the 
Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970 and invalidated it.  
85 Section 3(e)(i) of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970; Frantz Repealing the Subdivision of 
Agricultural Land Act 50. See Tuckers Land Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Truter 1984 2 SA 150 (SWA); 
Smith v Tuckers Land Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd; Tuckers Land Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 
v Smith 1984 2 SA 166 (T) and Tuckers Land Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Wasserman 1984 2 SA 
157 (T). These cases illustrate the extensions and limitations of the restriction to sell or advertise for sale a 
portion of agricultural land where the required ministerial consent was not obtained. See further Geue v Van 
der Lith 2003 4 All SA 553 (SCA) which also deals with the court’s interpretation of section 3(e) of the 
Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970 and the scope of the sale of a portion of agricultural land.  
86 Section 6A of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970.  
87 See Chapter 2, 2 above.  
88 The content of ownership must be determined within the context of each individual case. Compare Mostert 
& Pope The Principles of the Law of Property 92-93; Van der Walt & Pienaar Introduction to the Law of Property 
47-48; Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert The Law of Property 92-93; Van der Merwe Sakereg 173. As the 
Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970 prohibits the subdivision of agricultural land without ministerial 
consent, it restricts the owner’s ability/competency to freely use and alienate his or her property.   
89 See Chapter 4, 3 4 2 1 below.  
90 The Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Bill in GN 984 GG 40247 of 02-09-2016. 
91 See Chapter 2, 2 above.  




The objectives of the Preservation Bill are to (a) promote the preservation and sustainable 
development of agricultural land; (b) identify and demarcate protected agricultural areas for 
sustainable use and development; (c) put in place measures to promote long-term viable 
and resilient farming units; (d) provide for measures, such as subdivision restrictions, to 
prevent the fragmentation of agricultural land; (e) prohibit and discourage land use changes 
from agriculture to other forms of development; (f) implement a national framework on the 
use of agricultural land; (h) provide for a framework that facilitates concurrent land uses on 
agricultural land; and (i) set up a National Agricultural Land Registry for all activities on 
agricultural land.93 The objectives of the Preservation Bill are therefore be more complex 
and encompassing, compared to the aim of SALA.  
 
To give effect to these objectives, chapter 2 of the Preservation Bill provides for “agricultural 
land management”. “Agricultural land management” includes the establishment of: (a) 
principles, norms and standards pertaining to the use of agricultural land; (b) an agricultural 
land classification system which focuses on the land capability; (c) agricultural sector plans; 
(d) protected agricultural areas; (e) agricultural land uses which include “farm uses”, 
“permitted uses” and “non permitted uses”; and (f) the regulation of change in agricultural 
land uses through subdivision restrictions.  Chapter 5 also provides for the establishment of 
a National Agricultural Land Register which will provide data on agricultural land 
management in South Africa. According to the Preservation Bill, the National Agricultural 
Land Register may contain the following information:  
 
“(a) spatial information on all agricultural land, including – (i) capability, suitability, potential and 
status of the natural agricultural resources; and (ii) socio-economic information; (b) per 
agricultural land parcel – (i) the use of agricultural land, (ii) information on the landowner, company 
or trust; including the nationality and gender and where applicable the land user, and (iii) any 
other information as may be prescribed by the Minister from time to time”.94  
 
In light of its complexity and the development of other legislative instruments, such as the 
Regulation Bill of 2017, it is unlikely that the Preservation Bill will pass through Parliament 
as initially scheduled.95 Already in 2018, during a briefing on its Quarter 2 Preliminary 
                                            
93 Preamble and clause 3 of the Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Bill. 
94 Clause 50 of the Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Bill.  
95 On 13 March 2015, the Minister of Agriculture published a draft policy and Bill on the preservation and 
development of agricultural land. However, following stakeholder input, a revised Bill was published on 2 
September 2016. Subsequently, in February 2017 the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 




Organizational Performance Report for 2017/18, the previous Department for Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries announced96 that the Preservation Bill would be reconsidered and 
redrafted. According to the Department, the Office of the Chief State Law Advisor (“OCSLA”) 
raised a number of concerns relating to the (a) possible infringement of powers in light of 
the concurrent mandate of the Bill and the respective responsibilities and roles of the 
different spheres of governments and departments; and (b) the constitutionality of the Bill.  
3 2 3 Land Reform: The Provision of Land and Assistance Act 126 of 1993  
Act 126 aims to inter alia (a) provide for the designation of certain land; (b) to regulate the 
subdivision of “designated land”97 acquired under the Act; (c) to provide for the rendering of 
financial assistance for the acquisition of land and; (d) to secure tenure rights.98 
 
There may be cases where a private land owner makes agricultural land available to the 
Minister of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development  (previously the Minister of 
Rural Development and Land Reform) in order to broaden access to land and effect 
redistribution.99 Generally, it is time-consuming and hampers the general flow of the 
redistribution process where a land owner has to apply for Ministerial consent under SALA 
for the subdivision of agricultural land.100 The usual laws regulating subdivision of 
agricultural land in SALA are therefore exempted from the operation of Act 126, unless the 
Minister directs otherwise.101 Accordingly, where redistribution projects flow directly from Act 
126, the subdivision of agricultural land is not an issue.102 Pienaar explains that “the idea is 
that land is to be subdivided into smaller portions for purposes pertinent to rural areas,”103 
                                            
96 Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries “Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Bill in the 
pipeline” (29 March 2018) <https://legal.sabinet.co.za/articles/preservation-and-development-of-agricultural-
land-bill-in-the-pipeline/> (accessed 09-04-2019). 
97 According to section 1 of the Land Reform: The Provision of Land and Assistance Act 126 of 1993 
“designated land” means land which is designated for settlement.    
98 Preamble of the Land Reform: The Provision of Land and Assistance Act 126 of 1993. See also Kepe &  
Hall “Land Redistribution in South Africa” Commissioned report for the High Level Panel on the assessment 
of key legislation and the acceleration of fundamental change, an initiative of the Parliament of South Africa 
(28 September 2016) 8.  
99 Section 2(1)(c) of the Land Reform: The Provision of Land and Assistance Act 126 of 1993. Other land, 
including State land which is made available for redistribution and settlement and land which is purchased by 
the State for redistribution and settlement may also be designated. See also Pienaar Land Reform 287.  
100 Pienaar Land Reform 290.  
101 Section 2(4) read with sections 5 and 10(2) of the Land Reform: The Provision of Land and Assistance Act 
126 of 1993; Pienaar Land Reform 288; Kepe & Hall “Land Redistribution in South Africa” Commissioned 
report for the High Level Panel on the assessment of key legislation and the acceleration of fundamental 
change, an initiative of the Parliament of South Africa (28 September 2016) 8. 
102 Pienaar Land Reform 351. The Provision of Land and Assistance Act 126 of 1993; the Land Reform (Labour 
Tenants) Act 3 of 1996 and the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 which have been promulgated 
to provide for the redistribution of land specifically, do not require compliance with the provisions dealing with 
the subdivision of agricultural land in the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970.  




including small-scale farming. The Minister retains the power to make regulations 
concerning any aspect of the Act, including the size of subdivided portions.104  
3 2 4 Subdivision: A constraint to redistribution?  
Where the redistribution of agricultural land flows directly from the operation of Act 126, the 
general restrictions on subdivision of agricultural land do not pose a constraint to land reform 
and the redistribution process. The prohibition against subdivision of agricultural land in 
SALA is precluded from the operation of Act 126. However, where other projects are 
concerned that do not fall inside the scope and operation of Act 126, SALA “continues to 
have important implications for redistribution, especially where private [agricultural] land is 
concerned”.105 SALA restricts when and how the subdivision of privately-owned agricultural 
land may take place. As explained, it was originally intended to prevent the fragmentation of 
agricultural land into uneconomic units. Kepe and Hall explain that SALA was intended to 
be used “for zoning purposes, as a measure to limit changes in land use and specifically to 
guard against the subdivision of agricultural land for residential purposes,”106 to ensure that 
farms operate as “economic units” or “viable farm sizes”.107 Accordingly, the argument 
whether subdivision of agricultural land is regarded as a constraint to land reform and 
redistribution purposes, also turns on the debate whether small or large-scale farms are 
more productive.  
Those in favour of subdivision argue that there are “few intrinsic economies of scale in 
primary production and that, other things being equal, smaller landholdings in which there 
is no hired labour are more efficient than large farms”,108 while others argue the inverse. In 
line with the argument in favour of small-scale production, Parliament passed the 
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Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act Repeal Act 64 of 1998.109 The 1997 Memorandum on 
the objects of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act Repeal Bill,110 expressly provides that:  
“It is no longer necessary to control the subdivision of agricultural land or for Government to 
determine what constitutes an appropriate land size. Land users and the market should be 
determinant of the land size. Appropriate zoning measures are considered sufficient for the 
protection of high potential agricultural land. Alternative land protection measures are also 
possible under the Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act, 1983 (Act No. 43 of 1983).”111 
Despite being passed in September 1998, this Act was never signed into law. Kepe and Hall 
note that:  
“the most significant obstacles to subdivision for land reform purposes are not legal; rather there 
are substantial, financial, institutional and ideological obstacles…there are no state initiatives to 
promote subdivision, and inadequate incentives for owners to subdivide, because there is not a 
sufficiently large, secure market of small holders ready to purchase land…”. 112 (own emphasis) 
Pienaar notes that it is crucial that the land market supplies small-scale portions of 
agricultural land, if there is a genuine need for small agricultural landholdings and that “the 
financial grant system is structured in such a manner that small-scale [agricultural] land 
parcels may be acquired by way of small grants”.113 However, as mentioned by Kepe and 
Hall, this is not the case in the current South African climate.114  
 
Furthermore, it can be argued that if SALA and Act 126 are read together, the prohibition on 
subdivision of agricultural land in SALA ensures that agricultural land identified for 
acquisition under Act 126 is not transferred to unintended beneficiaries. SALA seemingly 
does not pose a restraint on redistribution as such, but rather ensures that land owners do 
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not transfer parcels of land to beneficiaries, such as relatives, other than those identified by 
the State.  
3 3 Land ceilings  
3 3 1 Introduction  
Essentially, land ceilings impose restrictions with regard to the maximum size of land any 
person or entity may own. Any land over and above the ceiling limit is regarded as surplus 
land. If an individual, a family or entity owns more land than the ceiling limit, then the surplus 
land is to be acquired in order to be redistributed. Land ceilings act as a redistributive 
regulatory measure, because it makes more land available to be redistributed for agricultural 
use, be it for subsistence, smallholder and/or emerging farmers’ utilisation.115 Employing this 
mechanism (or similar mechanisms) is not unique to South Africa as several countries have 
at some stage, as part of their land reform programmes instituted size limitations in relation 
to farming units, for example, India, Egypt, Mexico, Taiwan and the Philippines.116 However, 
the imposition of land ceilings in some (if not most) of these countries has proven to be 
ineffective in relation to the redistribution of agricultural land.117  
Since the new constitutional dispensation and the abolishment of a racially based land 
control system(s), South Africa has followed an approach to land where access is possible, 
for all persons, in principle.118 This system is characterised by an open, unlimited market, 
which is not prescriptive with respect to farm sizes or the amount of agricultural land one 
person or entity may own.119 It is also not tied to any racial or cultural backgrounds and 
dispositions. There have also been no restrictions on or conditions relating to how much 
land persons, including foreigners, may own.120 Essentially, access to land is unrestricted, 
but subject to the imperative set out in section 25(5) of the Constitution in that the State has 
a duty to take necessary steps to broaden access to land for South African citizens.121  
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Pienaar notes that “the first stirrings of regulating land holding generally emerged in the 
Green Paper on Land Reform, 2011122 (“Green Paper”) which sets out a “fourfold vision for 
land reform”123 namely: 
(a) to reconfigure a single, coherent four-tier system of land tenure to ensure that everyone, but 
especially rural Blacks, has reasonable access to land with secure rights; (b) clearly defined 
property rights, sustained by a fair and accountable land governance system; (c) secure forms of 
long-term land tenure for resident ‘non-citizens’ engaged in appropriate investments which 
enhance food sovereignty and livelihood security; and (d) effective land use planning and 
regulatory systems”.124  
It is also the first document which provided for specific for foreign ownership of land. The 
Green Paper introduced the concept of a single land tenure framework, integrating the 
current multiple forms of land ownership (communal, State, public and private) into a single 
4-tier tenure system.125 This included the following: (a) State land and public land: leasehold; 
(b)   privately owned land: freehold, with limited extent; (c)   land owned by foreigners: 
freehold, but precarious tenure, with obligations and conditions to comply with; and 
(d)   communally owned land: communal tenure with institutionalised use rights.126  
While the Green Paper did not create any new land categories,127 it was the first time 
reference was made to (a) “freehold, but with limited extent"128 as a tenure system for private 
land,129 and (b) the limitation on foreign property rights in an official policy document.130  The 
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Green Paper also acted as the strategic thrust behind the Agricultural Landholding Policy 
Framework of 2013.131 
3 3 2 The Agricultural Landholding Policy Framework: The proposal of a land ceiling policy 
for South Africa   
In July 2013, the Agricultural Landholding Policy Framework (“ALPF”) was published.132 The 
ALPF provided for broad information regarding the envisaged regulation of agricultural 
landholdings in South Africa within the 4-tier tenure system.133 The policy document consists 
of three main sections: “(a) setting out the policy and the implementation thereof; (b) a legal 
comparative section; and (c) a summary of the whole of the document”.134   
3 3 2 1 The policy and the approach  
Pienaar identifies two areas which the ALPF impacts on, namely: “(a) broadening access to 
land in general; and (b) placing restrictions on the quantity of land one individual or entity 
may own”.135  In other words, the ALPF aims to regulate access to land in general and 
agricultural land ownership specifically. As a result, the means of achieving the 
aforementioned aims may also impact the agricultural land market.136 Ultimately, the ALPF 
aims to:  
“(a) facilitate the entry and participation of small farmers into mainstream agriculture; (b) 
redistribute land from large agricultural holdings to cooperatives and family owned landholdings; 
and (c) to increase efficiency, competitiveness and sustainability of all agricultural 
landholdings”.137 
The scope of the ALPF is limited to agricultural landholding, impacting all agricultural land 
in South Africa, regardless of where it is located; what the size of the landholding is; what 
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the landholding is used for or who the owner of the land is.138 In other words, all agricultural 
landholdings in urban and rural areas,139 whether privately or publicly owned, including 
agricultural landholdings in former homeland areas140 and commercial white farming 
areas,141 will be tied to specific ownership bands.142  
The approach of the ALPF is to provide for different agricultural landholdings types: upper, 
middle and lower band landholdings.143 In relation to these bands, ceilings on ownership 
and use of privately owned commercial agricultural land are set.144 Pienaar highlights that a 
three-pronged approach is proposed in this regard, namely 
“(a) [T]aking the necessary legislative and other steps to bring excessive agricultural landholdings 
below the ceiling point; (b) taking the necessary legislative and other measures to lift those 
holdings that are below the floor level; and (c) where holdings are operating within the bands, 
taking the necessary measures to optimise the exploitation of these holdings”.145  
The implementation strategy highlighted in the ALPF provides for different preliminary steps 
to be taken before setting out and implementing ceilings on agricultural landholdings. Firstly, 
district agricultural land use zones may be proclaimed through legislation such as the 
SPLUMA.146 Secondly, the ALPF proposes to introduce compulsory disclosures in order to 
get an accurate picture of the district agricultural landholdings.147 Once the disclosures are 
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made, the third step would be to map out the agricultural landholdings at district level in 
order to determine the upper, middle and lower band landholdings.148  
A District Land Reform Committee may then determine floor and ceiling levels once the 
lower, middle and upper bands have been proclaimed in a particular district.149 The following 
factors, although not limited, may be used to calculate the floor and ceilings levels for each 
district: (a) climatic factors; (b) matters pertaining to the high value, medium value, unique 
use in terms of grazing and cropping of the land; (c) matters pertaining to the current 
production output, commodity-specific restraints, farm size, economies of scale, number of 
farm workers and dependents; (d) variations in physical potential in terms of the soil type, 
soil depth, water availability etc.; and (e) capital requirements of different enterprises.150  
Once the District Land Reform Committee establishes the relevant bands, these measures 
would be employed, including expropriating the excess agricultural land above the ceiling. 
In this regard, expropriation would not only act as a way of acquiring agricultural land, but it 
would have also acted as a means of realising the regulatory framework envisioned in ALPF. 
In some areas, it may also be necessary to impose a right of first refusal to empower the 
State to acquire agricultural landholdings in excess of the proposed ceilings.151 Interestingly, 
the ALPF proposes equity sharing arrangements152 where it may not be viable to expropriate 
the excess land.153  
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Legislation needed to be introduced to make such arrangements compulsory. The 
constitutional implications also needed to be considered.154 
As mentioned, measures are also needed to elevate agricultural landholdings below the 
floor level155 in order to operate above the floor level requirements. This is necessary to 
ensure that agricultural landholdings operate at the optimum production capacities. Where 
agricultural landholdings fall within the determined upper and lower levels, additional 
measures are also necessary to enable farmers to become more efficient, profitable, 
competitive and sustainable.  
3 3 2 2 International comparison 
The ALPF provides for a short comparative review of countries where land ceilings were 
utilised as part of the relevant country’s land reform programme. The Policy specifically 
focuses on India,156 Egypt, Mexico, the Philippines and Taiwan.157 In this regard, the ALPF 
provides a broad overview and rather superficial comparative analysis of the imposition of 
land ceilings in the different countries. Although legal comparative work will be done in 
Chapter 9 below, it suffices to say at this stage that the imposition of land ceilings in some 
jurisdictions aggravated the existing problem of uneconomical fragmentised land holdings 
and failed to redistribute agricultural land effectively.158 The reasons for the failure of the 
imposition of land ceilings are numerous and varied.159 Some reasons, mentioned in the 
ALPF, include the cost of implementation, circumvention by spurious subdivisions, 
corruption and lack of accurate data on land-use capabilities and land values.160  
Despite the clear indication that the imposition of land ceilings may yield a negative 
outcome,161 all indications are that the South African government will move forward with its 
plan to implement ceilings on landholdings. This underlines the necessity for an in-depth 
study of the envisaged approach in South Africa. In this regard, the study aims to analyse 
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whether the imposition of land ceilings in South Africa is constitutional162 and effective.163 
Following a comparative analysis in Chapter 9, the potential success or failure of the 
imposition of land ceilings in South Africa will be discussed. 
3 3 2 3 Announcements in relation to land ceilings  
Subsequent to the Green Paper and ALPF, numerous uncoordinated and contradictory 
announcements and statements were made by the President and/or relevant Minister in the 
course of 2014 – 2016 regarding the limitation of land ownership.164 For example, broad 
statements regarding the limitation of land ownership of South Africans (both natural and 
legal persons) were made during the 2015-State of the Nation address.165 This entailed that 
ownership of farms would be restricted to 12 000 ha or two farms and that foreign land 
ownership would be prohibited.166 Pienaar notes that “details were scant and specifics 
emerged slowly and sporadically thereafter, leading to much speculation and uncertainty”167 
and that “developments were seemingly kept under wraps while rumours circulated about 
draft legislation being finalised”. 168 The first official version of the Regulation of Agricultural 
Landholdings Bill169 (“Regulation Bill”) made available in the public domain for comment 
appeared on 17 March 2017. The proposed Regulation Bill aims to give effect to the 
envisaged ceilings on landholdings proposed in the ALPF.  
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3 3 3 The Regulation of Agricultural Landholdings Bill 
The Regulation Bill170 aims, inter alia, to reverse the legacy of colonialism and apartheid and 
also to ensure a just and equitable distribution of agricultural land to Africans.171 The 
Regulation Bill provides amongst others, for the establishment of the Land Commission; the 
declaration of present ownership; the acquisition of private agricultural land; and the 
maintenance of a national register in respect of such agricultural declarations; the 
determination of ceilings in respect of agricultural land; and for the prohibition against 
acquisition of agricultural land ownership by foreign nationals. The last mentioned aspect is 
dealt with separately below.172 
3 3 3 1 Exposition of the chapters of the Regulation Bill 
The Regulation Bill consists of nine chapters. Pienaar points out that the preamble to the 
Regulation Bill centres on (a) “section 25 of the Constitution, the property clause,”173 and (b) 
“highlights the state's duty to take reasonable legislative and other measures to foster 
conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis”.174 As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, the State’s duty to broaden access to land is linked to sections 
25(5) and 25(8) of the Constitution, which states that no provision may impede the State 
from taking the necessary measures to effect land, water and related reform.175 The need 
for the redistribution of agricultural land is furthermore linked to specific, possibly conflicting 
goals, namely:  
“(a) to effect a more equal redistribution in light of race and class; (b) to raise agricultural output; 
(c) to raise food security; (d) to advance social justice; (e) to advance political stability; (f) to 
support and promote productive employment; and (g) to support and promote income to poor and 
efficient small scale farmers”.176  
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3 3 3 1 1 Chapter 1: Interpretation, objects and application of the Regulation Bill   
Chapter 1 deals with the interpretation,177 objectives178 and application of the Bill.179 The 
Regulation Bill focuses on agricultural land holdings specifically.180 Therefore, the concept 
of “agricultural land”181 is integral to the operation and implementation of the Regulation 
Bill.182 The approach to agricultural land is that all land is included, with some listed 
exclusions.183 The concept of “agricultural land” as provided for in the Regulation Bill was 
discussed in Chapter 2 and will this not be repeated here.   
Furthermore, in light of the importance of providing access to citizens,184 the concepts of 
“citizen”; “foreign person” and “foreign juristic person” are also set out.185 The interpretation 
of these concepts is pivotal to the operation and implementation of the Regulation Bill. The 
provisions of the Regulation Bill impact both natural and juristic persons.186 In this regard, 
the concept of “citizen” and “foreign person” includes juristic persons.187 Furthermore, a 
separate definition of “juristic person” is provided for.188 For purposes of the Regulation Bill 
a juristic person is deemed to be “Black” 189 where Black citizens own and control 50% or 
more of such juristic person.190   
Furthermore, an “owner” of agricultural land is defined as the person in whose name the 
agricultural land is registered,191 including agricultural land held by (a) a trustee in a trust 
(but excluding State trust land);192 (b) the executor of the estate or the Master where the 
owner is deceased; (c) a provisional or final trustee of an insolvent estate where a 
sequestrated estate is at hand; (d) the provisional or final liquidator of the company, where 
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a company is being wound up; where the owner is legally incapacitated, the representative 
by law; (e) the sheriff or deputy sheriff where agricultural land was attached by order of court; 
and finally, (f) an authorised representative of the owner.193  
“Public agricultural land” is also defined broadly, as including all agricultural land that vests 
in any of the various levels of government and/or public entities.194 However, communal land 
or land held in trust by the State is not mentioned in this definition. This raises two questions 
in particular, namely (a) whether all communal agricultural land is excluded from the scope 
of the Regulation Bill; and (b) what the potentially far-reaching implications thereof will be 
for the regulation of communal agricultural land.195   
The objective of the Regulation Bill is to acquire “redistribution land” and to eventually 
redistribute such land.196 To this end “redistribution land” is critical and is defined as being 
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land. 





“all agricultural land that falls between or exceeds any category of agricultural holdings 
contemplated in section 25”197 of the Regulation Bill. Accordingly, “redistribution land” is 
regarded as surplus agricultural land, namely agricultural land which falls above the 
proposed ceiling limit. 
Clause 2 sets out the objectives of the Regulation Bill, namely to acquire agricultural land 
for redistribution; to redress past imbalances in access to agricultural land; to promote food 
security; to provide a transparent and more conducive regulatory framework and utilising 
policy-relevant information on agricultural land ownership and usage; to provide certainty 
regarding ownership of public and private agricultural land; and to enable the State to 
effectively deliberate on land matters and matters related to natural resource economics, 
the property market and the extent of land use to meet the policy and legislative intent of the 
State.198 
Clause 3 of the Regulation Bill sets out the parameters for the operation or application of 
the Bill. As mentioned, the Regulation Bill is applicable to all agricultural land in South Africa. 
The operation or application of the Regulation Bill impacts all transactions whereby 
agricultural land is acquired or disposed of.199 To the extent that a transaction intends to 
exclude, limit or avoid the provisions of the Bill, such clause or provision in said transaction 
is void.200 
Furthermore, in the event that there is a conflict between the provisions of the Regulation 
Bill and any other law relating to the acquisition and disposal of agricultural land, the 
Regulation Bill expressly provides that it will trump any other law.201  
3 3 3 1 2 Chapter 2: The Land Commission  
At an overarching level the Regulation Bill provides for the establishment of a Land 
Commission;202  consisting of a chairperson and at least five, but not more than nine 
members,203  appointed for their knowledge of or experience in land-related matters.204 The 
Land Commission will be an autonomous body accountable to the Minister of Agriculture, 
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Land Reform and Rural Development (previously the Minister of Rural Development and 
Land Reform). The Land Commission shall serve as the principal body to oversee the 
collection and dissemination of all information regarding public and private agricultural 
land205 and will consequently develop and maintain a register of agricultural land holdings in 
order to monitor the distribution and redistribution of agricultural land.206 This will, in 
principle, enable the government to monitor and evaluate its compliance with the 
constitutional directive to ensure land, tenure and related reforms.207 The Land Commission 
will also advise the Minister.208 Linked to these functions, the powers of the Commission and 
responsibilities of the Chairperson are set out respectively.209 In order for the Commission 
to be effective, it has the following powers, “to determine its own staff establishment, collect 
and disseminate information, determine its own proceedings regarding meetings etc; and 
deal with matters incidental to its main functions”.210 Apart from the power to appoint 
members of the Commission and to make regulations, all other powers may be delegated 
to the Director-General of the Department of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural 
Development by the Minister.211  
3 3 3 1 3 Chapter 3: The register of agricultural land  
The register of agricultural land holdings is pivotal to the effective operation of the Regulation 
Bill.212 In this regard, Pienaar provides that the Land Commission has a twofold task: Firstly, 
it must establish a register in the prescribed format, in which all disclosure notifications in 
respect of private agricultural land holdings and information in respect of public agricultural 
land holdings must be recorded.213 Secondly, the Commission must maintain (or update the 
disclosures and information) on an ongoing basis, in respect of private and public agricultural 
land.214 The register may be maintained wholly or partly (a) on paper or on microfilm, or in 
any other medium; and (b) in a device for storing or processing information.215 
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The underlying idea of establishing and maintaining an agricultural land register is to: 
“…provide full details regarding the extent of agricultural land, whether it is privately owned or 
public; and with regard to the former – to whom it belongs and with regard to the latter, the level 
of state ownership. As the register has to be established from scratch, all the necessary 
information has to be collected and then recorded. After the initial reflections in the register 
subsequent to the commencement of the Act, the register has to be maintained. This means that 
all transactions, the acquisition as well as the disposal of agricultural land, are thereafter recorded 
and reflected in the register. In a sense the process of compiling the register is thus ongoing and 
never-ending”.216 
Furthermore, if any errors were incurred during this recordal process, it can then be rectified 
in terms of Regulation Bill.217 The rectification of errors can occur either on application to the 
Land Commission or mero motu by the Commission.218  A prescribed fee may be paid to 
obtain access to the information in the register,219 which includes statistical data (if available) 
from the information in the register.220  
3 3 3 1 4 Chapter 4: Disclosures in respect of private agricultural land  
Chapter 4 deals with specific disclosures in respect of private agricultural land. The 
Regulation Bill states that all private owners of agricultural land must, within 12 months after 
the commencement of the Regulation Bill, lodge duly completed notifications of ownership 
in the prescribed manner to the Land Commission.221 The notification or disclosure must 
include information pertaining to: the race, gender and nationality of the “owner”; the size 
and use of the land holding; any real right registered against and licence allocated to the 
parcel of land; and any other information as may be prescribed.222   
The State, as the owner of all public agricultural land and any statutory bodies, are exempted 
from the requirement to disclose information regarding its race, gender and nationality of the 
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owner to the Land Commission.223 Likewise, the information pertaining to race and gender 
is not required where the owner is a foreign person.224  
In this regard Pienaar explains that:  
“In other words, an overarching distinction is drawn between private and public agricultural land 
and, with respect to private agricultural land, a further distinction is made between citizen owners 
and foreign persons. Depending on the particular category of land, less or more information is 
thus required and reflected”.225 
Once the register is established, it also has to be maintained. In this regard, subsequent 
transactions have to be reflected in it as well.226 Accordingly, every person who acquires 
ownership of private agricultural land must, within 90 days from the date of acquisition of the 
agricultural land, lodge a duly completed notification of ownership.227 The same information 
that is needed to establish the register, is required.228 Importantly, the registrar is prohibited 
from issuing a deed of transfer in respect of agricultural land holdings before the notification 
of ownership, and all the necessary information, have been lodged with the registrar.229 The 
registrar must then, within 30 days of the registration of agricultural land holding, provide the 
Land Commission with a copy of the notification of ownership.230 By way of example, the 
process is thus as follows: The purchaser and the seller enter into an agreement with respect 
to agricultural land. Once ownership has been acquired, a duly completed notification is 
submitted to the registrar within 90 days of acquisition. Ownership of immovable property, 
thus agricultural land, only passes on registration in the deeds office.231 At the same time, 
however, the Regulation Bill provides that the registrar may not execute a deed of transfer 
unless the notification has been lodged with the registrar. 232 Pienaar raises the question 
how this process is going to unfold.233 She explains that the process is unclear, because it 
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seems as if this clause ignores the fact that ownership of immovable property is only 
acquired by way of registration, a derivative form of acquisition.234 
3 3 3 1 5 Chapter 5: Public agricultural land  
Chapter 5 regulates public agricultural land holdings. In this regard, it is required that 
someone or an institution has to lodge the necessary notifications. The accounting officer of 
the relevant department, public entity, municipality or municipal entity is responsible for the 
administration of the land holding and is thus required to submit the necessary information 
to the Land Commission.235  Here a set period of time is not provided, but the Regulation 
Bill merely states “within such period or periods as determined by the Commission”.236 
Therefore, where public agricultural land is concerned, various periods enter into the picture. 
“Not only are these time periods not the same as when private land is concerned, it is also 
quite possible that different time periods exist among public entities as well”.237 The 
information pertaining to public agricultural land holdings is likewise collected, recorded and 
maintained in the register.238 As explained, the register is thus a “fluid concept, constantly 
being amended and updated”.239 In essence, establishing and maintaining the register is 
thus a complex, multi-dimensional task.240 
3 3 3 1 6 Chapter 6: Prohibition on acquisition of and regulation of lease and disposal of 
agricultural land: Foreign persons  
Chapter 6 provides for the prohibition on acquisition of agricultural land by “foreign 
persons”.241 It also provides for the regulation of lease and disposal of agricultural land by 
foreign persons. Restrictions on foreigners acquiring agricultural land are discussed as a 
separate mechanism for the regulation of agricultural land in South Africa below.242 
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3 3 3 1 7 Chapter 7: Categories of ceilings for agricultural land holdings  
Chapter 7 provides for the categories of ceilings for agricultural land holdings. The provisions 
relating to determining the land ceilings are challenging.243 Initially, as mentioned, land 
ownership of South Africans (both natural and legal persons) would be curbed in that 
ownership would be restricted to 12 000 hectare (ha) or two farms.244 While it is unclear how 
the ceiling of 12 000 ha was established in the first place, the previous Minister of Rural 
Development and Land Reform announced the different land sizes on 8 May 2015,245 
comprising: (a) large scale farms in terms of which the ceiling for a large viable commercial 
farm shall be 5000 ha; (b) medium scale farms constituting 2500 ha; and (c) small scale 
farms amounting to 1000 ha.246 There was no clear basis for the different categories and 
the corresponding restricted land sizes. Furthermore, the Minister held that: 
“Any excess land portions between each of these categories – small scale and medium scale; 
medium scale and large scale; and, above the 12 000 ha maximum, shall be expropriated and 
redistributed; and compensation will be on the basis of the ‘just and equitable’ principle enshrined 
in section 25(3) of the Constitution”.247 
The use of expropriation and the determination of compensation under section 25(3) in this 
context is not problematic per se.248 However, the fact that excess land between the various 
categories outlined above will be expropriated can become rather problematic,249 depending 
on particular circumstances. In accordance with the categories set out above, this would 
mean that an agricultural landholding constituting for example 1750 ha, would automatically 
be reduced to 1000 ha to fit into the brackets provided, irrespective of actual utilisation of 
the excess land. Another example would be where a land owner owns a farm just below the 
2500 ha ceiling. In such a case, the farmer would be forced to reduce his or her farm size to 
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no more than 1000 ha as required by the prescribed categories of land. Apart from the fact 
that the brackets seem rather superficial and arbitrary, it may be extremely difficult or even 
impossible to manage the entire process and re-utilise the land effectively.250 The whole 
system would furthermore have to be managed and monitored very carefully. Farming 
enterprises may also have to be reconsidered in principle and reconstituted. At this stage of 
the development, it was unclear and worrisome how the various unique farming needs, 
demands, and enterprises could be accommodated within this “three category” approach.251 
In essence, diverse agricultural conditions, climatic factors and particular agricultural 
requirements were seemingly overlooked before the publication of the Regulation Bill, 
thereby envisaging a “one size fits all” approach. 
Interestingly, the wording of the 2017 Regulation Bill in relation to the determination of 
agricultural land ceilings is very clear: Different categories of land ceilings may be 
determined for different districts and regions.252 While the point of departure is thus that 
various regions and areas will be approached differently, there was still no certainty 
regarding precise ceilings in the Regulation Bill itself. Exact ceilings for each district are to 
be announced by notice in the Government Gazette, by the Minister, after 
consultation.253 The Minister has the discretion to determine special categories of ceilings 
and may also provide for exemptions of particular categories of land holdings from the 
operation of the Regulation Bill.254 For the determination of ceilings for agricultural land 
holdings for each district regard must be had to “such criteria and factors as may be 
prescribed.”255 The following criteria and factors are listed: (a) land capability factors 
(essentially high, medium or unique agricultural land, matters pertaining to production 
output, variations in physical potential in terms of soil type, and the relationship between 
resources); (b) capital requirements of different enterprises; (c) measure of expected 
household and agro-enterprise income; (d) annual turnover; (e) relationship between 
product prices and price margins; and (f) any other matter as may be prescribed.256 
Furthermore, the Minister is obligated to publish a draft of the proposed determination by 
notice in the Gazette and in the media circulating nationally and in the relevant district, 
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calling on interested persons to comment on the draft, in writing, no less than 30 days from 
the date of publication of the notice, before making a determination.257   
3 3 3 1 8 Chapter 8: Redistribution agricultural land  
Chapter 8 forms a key part of the envisaged goals of the Regulation Bill. It deals with 
“redistribution agricultural land”.258 As mentioned, “redistribution agricultural land” 
encapsulates the various parcels of agricultural land that are regarded as surplus land falling 
above the ceiling limit.259  
As explained, the owner is required to disclose the necessary information to the Land 
Commission, including the identity of the parcel of agricultural land that amounts to 
“redistribution agricultural land” in terms of the Regulation Bill.260 However, the owner can 
only make the necessary disclosures once the ceilings for the particular district have already 
been determined and finalised.261 Depending on the district or area, the size of the specific 
“redistribution agricultural land” will differ.262 In this regard, Pienaar explains that the land 
parcels will not only be different in size, depending on the particular ceilings in specific 
districts, “but the exact identification of the specific portion of land may be quite 
challenging”.263 She clarifies further that:  
“That is the case because, where immovable property is concerned, land and parcels of land are 
identified by way of deeds and registry information, essentially reflected in title deeds. Where the 
land exceeds the ceiling provided, it will probably form part of a larger existing parcel of land, 
identified in the title deed, possibly a (large) farm. There is no separate deed for the part or parts 
that exceed the ceiling as such. Nevertheless, such identification has to take place”.264  
Pienaar recommends that it may be worthwhile for the Minister to issue regulations or 
guidelines as to how such excess portions of land are to be identified or described for 
purposes of the register and the work of the Land Commission.265  
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Immediately following the duty to identify ceiling-surplus land, “redistribution agricultural 
land”, the next sub-clause provides that “Black” persons, must be offered the right of first 
refusal in respect of “redistribution agricultural land” within a prescribed period in the 
prescribed manner.266 Pienaar highlights that there is “a gap between identifying the 
redistribution [agricultural] land on the one hand and offering it to Black persons, on the 
other”.267 She questions how the land is to be offered and proposes that the land would first 
have to be subdivided and separated from the rest of the land (the larger farm) that falls 
within the ceilings or brackets.268 The Regulation Bill does not however provide for a 
Schedule of repealed legislation, which means that SALA is still in operation.269 It is unclear 
whether or how SALA will apply in conjunction with the Regulation Bill.270 If SALA applies, it 
means that a specific process, under SALA, would have to be followed prior to the land 
being offered for sale.271 The agricultural land in question, in accordance with the provisions 
of SALA, would have to be surveyed and subdivided with the consent of the Minister.272 
Thereafter a corresponding title deed has to be provided. Pienaar notes further that it is 
“unclear what the “prescribed manner” means with reference to offering the land for sale to 
Black persons”.273 She questions whether the Minister or land owner will take responsibility 
for the alienation of the agricultural land and everything linked thereto.274 It is also 
questioned whether the sale will occur on the open market and who or how the acquisition 
process will be monitored.275 
The interaction between the Regulation Bill and Act 126 complements one another at an 
overarching level. The implementation of land ceilings may effectively result in the 
subdivision of agricultural land for redistribution purposes, which Act 126 in any event allows. 
Furthermore, there may be cases where no Black person acquires the land. In such cases, 
the Regulation Bill provides that the Minister shall acquire the land, within the prescribed 
period.276 However, the Regulation Bill does not provide for cases where the Minister does 
not want to or cannot acquire the redistribution agricultural land.277 For example, the Minister 
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may not want to acquire the land, because the land does not meet specific developmental 
or planning objectives.278 If the Minister and the current land owner are unable to reach an 
agreement regarding the purchase price, the Minister may, subject to relevant legislation, 
expropriate the redistribution land in question.279  
Again, various questions arise as to how the transfer of ownership is to be reflected in the 
register.280 For example, when the land is purchased by the Minister for redistribution 
purposes, is the land regarded as private or public agricultural land? When land is 
expropriated, ownership vests in the State.281 However, it is unclear whether this land 
automatically qualifies as public agricultural land, to be reflected in that part of the land 
register. Furthermore, it is unclear what the implications are of noting that the land is “public 
agricultural land”.282   
Where there is disagreement between the land owner and the Minister about the 
identification of the agricultural land, the issue can be referred to arbitration under the 
Arbitration Act 42 of 1965.283  
The Minister may also be approached for exemptions from the ceiling limits.284  For example, 
“Institutional Funds that own agricultural land holdings portions of which constitute 
redistribution agricultural land in terms of the provisions of this Act, may apply to the Minister 
for exemption…”.285 
3 3 3 1 9 Chapter 9: Administrative and other matters  
Administrative and other related matters, inter alia investigations undertaken by the Land 
Commission286  and appointing a Chief Operations Officer, are dealt with in Chapter 
9.287 The Chief Operations Officer is appointed to assist the chairperson of the Land 
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Commission in discharging his or her responsibilities.288 The funds of the Land Commission 
are to be appropriated by Parliament and/or received from any other source through the 
National Revenue Fund.289  The Land Commission’s financial statements have to be audited 
annually.290   
No transaction dealing with the acquisition or disposal of agricultural land may be in 
contravention of the Regulation Bill. Any acquisition of land in any manner which is 
inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of the Regulation Bill, is unlawful and a court 
may make an order for the forfeiture of such land to the State.291 Pienaar highlights that this 
is a drastic provision, which begs the question whether there should not first be a possibility 
to rectify or otherwise address transgressions.292 She further suggests that:  
“In any event, it is thus imperative that everyone – current and future land owners – is informed 
of the new measures, how they function and their implications. This means that any change in 
land ownership, including as a result of testate or intestate succession, has to conform to the Act 
[the Regulation Bill] as well.”293  
In this regard the Regulation Bill provides for manuals, guidelines and rules to be drafted 
regarding the administrative nature of the Land Commission's work.294 While necessary and 
useful, it is questionable whether this will be sufficient to inform all role players.295  
Furthermore, any person who fails to lodge duly completed notifications or disclosures is 
guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine or to imprisonment.296 Likewise, the 
provision of false information or failure to appear before the Land Commission when called 
onto to do so also constitutes offences.297   
The Minister may issue regulations in relation to a long list of items.298 As mentioned, while 
the Regulation Bill has some general points of departure, much of the detail still needs to be 
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finalised and made public by way of regulations.299 Before any regulation may be published, 
the Minister has to publish a draft regulation or any amendment or repeal thereof, by notice 
in the Government Gazette, calling on all interested persons to comment in writing, within 
30 days of the publication.300 However, when the Minister alters the draft regulations as a 
result of the above, those alterations do not have to be published again before making the 
regulations.301 
 3 3 3 2 Reflection: Concerns and Challenges  
There is little clarity regarding the specifics for the implementation of the Regulation Bill. A 
number of concerns, challenges and possible pitfalls arise when analysing the Regulation 
Bill, set out forthwith.  
3 3 3 2 1 Administrative capabilities and costs  
The development of an effective land administration system302 is challenging. It requires 
financial resources and trained personnel, both of which are in short supply in South 
Africa.303 Whether the Land Commission will have the technical ability to administer such a 
registry sufficiently and accurately remains to be seen. The creation of the registry will be a 
monumental task equivalent to trying to recreate a significant portion of the existing Deeds 
Registry, while updating the registry continuously and simultaneously. The reason for this 
seems twofold: (a) to determine how much agricultural land the State, private individuals 
and foreigners own; and (b) to determine the characterisation of privately owned agricultural 
land by race, gender and nationality. In other words, the creation of the registry sets out how 
much land is owned, by whom and which land will be available for redistribution.  
                                            
299 These details include, the information that has to be reflected in the register contemplated in clause 12; the 
time the register has to be open for inspection; the format of and information to be contained in a notification 
or submission in terms of the Regulation Bill; the forms and information to be contained in the register in respect 
of public land as contemplated in clause 17 and, importantly, the criteria and factors that must be considered 
in the determination of the categories of ceilings of agricultural land holdings as contemplated in clause 25. 
300 Pienaar (2017) JQR 4; clause 37(2) of the Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill. 
301 Pienaar (2017) JQR 4.  
302 Land administration encompasses a set of systems and processes, including the registration system, 
administrative system (centralised or decentralised), surveying and valuation processes. However, it is not the 
aim of this dissertation to provide for a comprehensive critical analysis of the South African’s land 
administration system. This dissertation is only concerned with aspects of the land administration system which 
may contribute to effective redistribution. See also G Pienaar “Aspects of land administration in the context of 
good governance” (2009) 12 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 15-55. 
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Interestingly, while there is no accurate data on foreign ownership of agricultural land in 
South Africa, the Memorandum to the Regulation Bill states that foreign ownership of 
agricultural land has increased substantially in recent years. 
The envisaged creation of the Land Commission also raises fundamental fiscal concerns 
regarding the extent to which the Office will be capacitated with adequate financial and 
human resources, in order to discharge its mandate to create and maintain the registry.304 
The expected cost set out in the Memorandum to the Regulation Bill provides for R21.3 
million per annum “for the operation of the Land Commission as well as the acquisition of 
agricultural land”.305 However, the next sentence contradicts this statement: “This excludes 
the cost of acquisition of redistribution agricultural land”.306 An amount of R21.3 million per 
year seems like a minuscule and inadequate amount for acquiring agricultural land, while 
R1.2 billion is currently budgeted for Land Reform.307  
3 3 3 2 2 The redistribution process  
The preparation of the register is presumably the first step in the envisaged forced 
redistribution process, set out by the Regulation Bill. The second step would be to impose 
ceilings and then determine which land falls within the definition of “redistribution agricultural 
land”. Once it is determined that a parcel of land is “redistribution agricultural land”, Black 
persons, as defined,308 must be offered the right of first refusal in respect of redistribution 
land.309  As mentioned above, if Black persons fail to exercise their right of first refusal, the 
redistribution agricultural land must be acquired by the State through market-led approaches 
or expropriation.310 
What happens to the redistribution agricultural land after it has been acquired by the State 
is not dealt with in the Regulation Bill. Presumably, the State will acquire the land with a view 
to ultimately allocate the agricultural land to land reform beneficiaries. However, the precise 
definition of beneficiaries or an indication of how the beneficiaries will be determined is 
                                            
304 These costs should also be seen within the context of other recent developments such as the establishment 
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the installation of a Special Master for Land Reform (Labour Tenants) is confirmed.  
305 Memorandum of the Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill 42. 
306 Memorandum of the Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill 42.  
307 National Treasury, 2017 Budget Review 66. 
308 As defined in the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998, essentially being Indian, African and Coloured citizens. 
309 Clause 26(2) of the Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill.  




lacking. Another concern is that many Black people may not be able to exercise their right 
of first refusal. Arguably, only the wealthier sector of Black population would have the 
resources to obtain the agricultural land. However, the Regulation Bill does not contain any 
provisions dealing with the provision of financial assistance to Black people wishing to 
acquire the “redistribution agricultural land” under the Regulation Bill. These provisions are 
set out in different policies, discussed in Chapter 6. This means that most redistribution 
agricultural land is likely to be acquired by the State. 
Furthermore, having acquired the bulk of all redistribution agricultural land, the Minister is 
also unlikely to transfer any of it into the ownership of emergent Black farmers as this would 
conflict with the State Land Lease and Disposal Policy (“SLLDP”) of 2013. Under this 
Policy,311 emergent Black farmers that are settled on land acquired by the State for 
redistribution purposes are confined to leasehold tenure and cannot easily obtain individual 
title. In terms of this Policy small Black subsistence farmers are expected to remain perpetual 
tenants of the government.312 Bigger farmers with the capacity for commercial production 
must lease their farms for 30 years, and thereafter for another two decades.313 The farmers 
only have the option to purchase the farm at a market related price after 50 years. 314 The 
lessee’s right to exercise the option to purchase is depended on numerous factors such as 
whether the “farmer consents to the State’s rights of first refusal being registered against 
the title deep”,315 whether the farmer has expanded or maintained the production of the land 
or whether he or she has adhered to the lease agreement.316 In this regard, the Regulation 
Bill and SLLDP may not assist in redistributing land to Black people in any meaningful sense 
and may bring about creeping land nationalisation.317 In the interim, their leases may be 
terminated at any time for what the SLLDP describes as a lack of “production discipline”.318  
                                            
311 See Chapter 5, 2 4 2 below.  
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317 See Chapter 5, 2 4 2.  
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3 3 3 2 3 Disclosures of private agricultural land 
Private agricultural land owners are required to submit a disclosure of present ownership 
within 12 months of the Regulation Bill coming into operation. Concern is raised in respect 
of those persons who acquire ownership of a parcel of agricultural land right before the end 
of the submission date. It is unclear whether those owners will be penalised for not 
submitting within the time frame provided.  
3 3 3 2 4 Implications of the imposition of ceilings on agricultural land 
By imposing ceilings, the State may end up with a myriad of off cuts from existing farms 
spread across the region, which may lead to the fragmentation of prime agricultural land 
(contradictory to the legitimate purpose of SALA).319 Furthermore, the Regulation Bill does 
not set out how the State will determine which part of the farm to “cut off” if the land holding 
falls above the ceiling imposed. Importantly, there is no guarantee that the off cuts will have 
suitable soil, access to water, access to roads or to municipal services, all of which are 
crucial factors in case the beneficiary were to be an aspirant farmer. In other words, while 
the parcel of land that does not fall outside the scope of ceiling may be an economically 
viable unit, there is no guarantee that the land deemed to be surplus or redistribution 
agricultural land will be a viable unit in its own right. If the off cuts created by the Bill are 
relatively small, the beneficiary will either have to consolidate various portions or, if that is 
not viable, be expected to compete in a globalised economy but denied the opportunity to 
benefit from economies of scale.  
Redistributing land with the inherent promise of running a viable farm without giving 
emerging farmers the skills and capital to do so, sets up the new owners for inevitable 
failure.320 While the Regulation Bill does not provide for financial and post-settlement 
support, various policies discussed in Chapter 5 may provide assistance in this regard.321 
Failed farms mean that food security is at risk with dire implications for society as a whole, 
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especially for the poor.322 It is thus possible that the process may give rise to the exact same 
problems as those experienced following previous land reform attempts,323 including a lack 
of training and support programmes; lack of access to capital and insufficient and 
unsustainable use of land.324 Synergy between the financial and post-settlement support 
policies and the Regulation Bill is therefore required.   
Furthermore, the determination of specific land ceilings per district constitutes a complex 
bureaucratic operation that includes the gathering of information in relation to all of the 
factors set out for the different categories of ceilings.  In this regard, the Regulation Bill 
overlooks the degree of expertise that will be needed in evaluating all the data, some of 
which may fluctuate daily, such as product prices. Gathering all the relevant information is 
only the start. The information must also be verified, sifted and analysed. Some of the 
variables will also be difficult to assess. For example, the availability of water will depend on 
rainfall, availability of dams, the use of irrigation systems and the relevant provisions of the 
post-1994 water dispensation.325 Overall it amounts to an enormously difficult and time-
consuming task, often requiring high levels of expertise.   
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3 3 3 2 5 Cooperation with different departments or offices 
Before the newly reconfigured national executive following the May 2019 elections,326 which 
now provides for a Department of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development 
(“DALRRD”) (previously the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (“DAFF”) and 
the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (“DRDLR”)), it was unclear how the 
DRDLR and the DAFF would function together. While SALA prohibits the subdivision of 
agricultural land, unless the written consent of the Minister of Agriculture, Forests and 
Fisheries was acquired, the implementation of land ceilings provided for in the Regulation 
Bill inherently results in the land being subdivided into smaller – even uneconomic – parcels. 
In this regard, the Regulation Bill provides that: 
“In the event of a conflict between the provisions of this Act and any other law relating to the 
acquisition and disposal of agricultural land, the provisions of this Act prevail”.327 
The imposition of land ceilings will be automatic and enjoy preference328 and therefore, the 
land owner will not be required to apply for the subdivision of his or her agricultural land to 
the relevant Minister. However, if the Preservation Bill is promulgated it will repeal SALA. 
Like the Regulation Bill, the Preservation Bill provides that:  
“In the event of any conflict between a section of this Act and — (a) other national legislation, the 
section of this Act prevails if the conflict specifically concerns the management or development 
of agricultural land…”.329  
Arguably, the provisions dealing with the restrictions on the subdivision of agricultural land 
in the Preservation Bill330 may concern the management and development of agricultural 
land.331 In such cases, it is unclear whether the Regulation Bill or Preservation Bill will enjoy 
preference. Whether applications have to be lodged, in terms of the Preservation Bill, every 
time the imposition of a ceiling limit results in the subdivision of agricultural land, is unclear.  
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The imposition of land ceilings may further impact land-use planning schemes and the 
operation of SPLUMA, which fall under the jurisdiction of the DRDLR. In this regard, it will 
be necessary to determine the hierarchy where the Regulation Bill and other legislative 
measures, such as SALA and SPLUMA, are in conflict. 
Although both the Land Commission and the Office of the Registrar of Deeds fall under the 
DRDLR, it is unclear how the redistribution process will be reconciled with South Africa’s 
existing land registration process in terms of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937.332 No 
provision is made for the cooperation between the Office of the Land Commission and the 
Office of the Registrar of Deeds in the Regulation Bill in relation to the transfer of ownership.  
For example, there is no provision which either consolidates, apportions or divides the 
responsibilities of the members of the Land Commission and the Registrar of Deeds 
respectively. It is also questioned whether the register created by the Land Commission will 
replace the Deeds Registry wholly, partially or not at all, in light of the fact that the creation 
of the registry will recreate a significant portion of the existing Deeds Registry at least as far 
as agricultural land is concerned.   
Furthermore, cooperation between the Office of the Land Commission and the Office of the 
Valuer-General333 is required. Before land can be acquired for redistribution purposes under 
the Regulation Bill, the Valuer-General must provide for the valuation of the property in 
question.334 Again, no provision is made for the cooperation between these two 
departmental offices in the Regulation Bill.  
3 3 3 2 6 Constitutionality of land ceilings and restrictions on foreigners acquiring agricultural 
land  
A further pertinent issue is whether the determination and implementation of land ceilings in 
the manner set out in the Bill is constitutional, given the requirements of section 25(1) and 
(2) of the Constitution.335 As indicated above,336 one of the overarching aims of the study is 
to analyse the constitutionality of these regulatory measures and mechanisms. While this 
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Chapter sets out the legal position in terms of the Regulation Bill for the proposed land 
ceilings and restrictions on foreigners acquiring agricultural land,337 the following Chapter 
aims to determine whether these mechanisms are constitutional.   
3 4 Restrictions on foreigners acquiring and disposing of agricultural land  
3 4 1 Introduction  
The pre-constitutional era “institutionalised discriminatory and socially divisive and 
destructive agricultural…land use policies and management systems”338 which undermined 
what would ordinarily be regarded as “democratic forms of government and citizenship”.339 
At the start of the new constitutional dispensation, which is spearheaded by the abolishment 
of racially-based land control systems, South Africa followed an approach to land where 
access is possible, for all persons, in principle.340 This system is characterised by an open, 
unlimited market, which is not prescriptive with respect to farm sizes or the amount of 
agricultural land one person or entity may own.341 There have also been no restrictions on 
or conditions relating to how much land foreigners may own.342 Essentially, access to land 
is unrestricted, but subject to the imperative set out in section 25(5) of the Constitution in 
that the State has a duty to take necessary steps to broaden access to land for citizens 
specifically.343 In line with this duty, the State aims to broaden access to land for citizens by: 
(a) restricting the amount of agricultural land any person, citizen or foreigner, may own by 
way of land ceilings;344 (b) restricting the disposal of agricultural land by foreigners;345 and 
(c) restricting foreigners from acquiring ownership of agricultural land in future.346 Land 
ceilings and the restrictions on the disposal of agricultural land affect the existing ownership 
entitlements of foreigner land owners. However, the restrictions in relation to acquiring 
agricultural land do not affect any ownership rights because such rights do not yet exist. 
While land ceilings have already been discussed above,347 this section focuses on the latter 
two restrictions. Each restriction will be discussed in turn.  
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3 4 2 The disposal of agricultural land by foreigners 
The Regulation Bill specifically regulates the disposal of agricultural land holdings by a 
foreign person.348 In this regard, the Regulation Bill provides for a new procedure whereby 
foreign persons dispose of agricultural land.349 Where a foreign person intends to dispose 
of his or her agricultural land, it must first be offered to the Minister, in the prescribed 
manner.350 In this regard, the Minister has a right of first refusal to acquire ownership of the 
relevant parcel of land.351 Thereafter, the Minister must, within 90 days, decide whether 
there is an intention to acquire the land holding.352 If the Minister does not express an 
intention to acquire the agricultural land holding or indicates that he or she is not going to 
take up the offer, the foreign person must make the land available for acquisition by 
“citizens”353 on the open market.354   
The right of first refusal mechanism in effect and indirectly allows the Minister to (a) obtain 
agricultural land for redistribution in order to support and promote productive employment 
and income to poor and efficient small scale farmers; and to (b) ensure redress for past 
imbalances in access to agricultural land.355 The right of first refusal given to the government 
serves as a mechanism aimed at making more land available for acquisition and 
redistribution purposes. However, possible issues of constitutionality and/or efficacy emerge 
that require investigation.356 Such issues are discussed in Chapter 4 and 6 respectively.  
Unless proof is provided that these provisions had been complied with, the registrar may not 
execute a deed of transfer.357 Where agricultural land is at stake, the disposal of the land 
must be reflected in the register.358 Accordingly, it is required that a notification, pertaining 
to the disposal of the land, has to be submitted.359 The registrar must provide the Land 
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Commission, within 30 days of the registration of the disposal, with a copy of the notification 
of the disposal.360 Pienaar states that: 
“It is unclear how the new acquisition is to be recorded where the Minister took up the offer to 
purchase the land from the foreign person. In other words: is the new acquisition recorded under 
the public register (because the Minister bought the land in his official capacity) or under the 
private register as it will be utilised, finally, for purchase or acquisition by private individuals. The 
register will be adapted, nevertheless, as there will indeed be a shift from foreign land holding to 
South African land holding, either in the public or the private sphere”. 361 
Where a person ceases to be a foreign person,362 a notification is also required.363 Further 
questions arise in this regard, such as whether the person will now be able to acquire 
ownership of agricultural land and whether a new classification is necessary, or whether an 
automatic process starts.364 Likewise, on becoming a foreign person a notification is also 
required.365  “Again, it is unclear whether such notification automatically starts various 
processes or what the required response and/or channel would be for action”.366 
3 4 3 The acquisition of agricultural land by foreigners  
Foreigners are prohibited from acquiring ownership of agricultural land from the date of the 
commencement of the Regulation Bill.367 This prohibition does not apply in instances where 
agricultural land is acquired by a “foreign person” where a Black person has a controlling 
interest.368  
Foreign persons who are currently agricultural land owners will thus retain their ownership 
of the land once the Act commences. Importantly, this provision does not aim to extinguish 
a foreign person’s ownership of agricultural land. The Regulation Bill only prohibits 
foreigners, in relation to future acquisitions of agricultural land, from obtaining ownership of 
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the property. Accordingly, the provision prima facie, does not infringe the right to property.369 
Furthermore, in principle, this prohibition on foreign ownership does not prevent access to 
agricultural land.370 Contrary to the provisions of SALA, which prohibit the long-term lease 
of a portion of agricultural land without ministerial consent,371 the Regulation Bill makes 
provision for long-term leases:372  
“A foreign person may, from the date of the commencement of this Act, conclude a long term 
lease of agricultural land holdings”.373  
Ordinarily, the period of a long-term lease (in longum tempus)374 is a minimum of ten years 
or longer.375 However, the Regulation Bill defines ''long term lease''376 as:  
“any registered lease of agricultural land which, when entered into, was for a period of not less 
than 30 years or for the natural life of the lessee or any other person mentioned in the lease, or 
which is renewable at the will of the lessee for a period or periods which together with the first 
period amount to not less than 30 and not more than 50 years”.377 
Accordingly, a lease must be entered into between the foreign person and the Government 
for a minimum of 30 years, which may be renewed, provided that the overall period does 
not amount to more than 50 years. The lessee and the lessor must submit such a lease to 
the registrar.378 The registrar must, within 90 days of receipt of the lease, register the lease 
in the register or record of the deeds registry. 379 
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Therefore, two aspects are important: (a) the Regulation Bill does not aim to extinguish 
existing rights overnight;380 and (b) access to land is retained, but in the form of a limited 
real right (a lease) and not in the form of ownership. The prohibition on the acquisition of 
agricultural land by foreigners in effect provides citizens with an opportunity and preference 
to acquire ownership of land parcels. 
In light of this, the study aims to determine whether the restrictions in relation to the disposal 
of agricultural and the prohibition on acquisition of agricultural land by foreign nationals are 
constitutional.381 The study will specifically investigate whether the restriction of a legal 
entitlement to acquire property rights in respect of agricultural land in the form of a long-term 
lease will constitute an arbitrary deprivation of property.382  
4 Conclusion 
This Chapter begins with an exposition of the concept of ownership in the South African 
context. The concept of ownership has never been absolute and is subject to various 
regulatory provisions or measures, impacting ownership entitlements of the land owner.383 
While various regulatory mechanisms exist, the discussion in this Chapter was restricted to: 
(a) restrictions on subdivision of agricultural land; (b) the placing of land ceilings; and (c) 
restrictions on the disposal and acquisition of agricultural land by foreigners. Specifically, 
the provisions of SALA and the Regulation Bill were discussed. These mechanisms not only 
affect ownership entitlements, such as the right to dispose of property, but may also 
contribute towards redistributing agricultural land to intended beneficiaries. For example, the 
regulatory mechanisms may make more agricultural land available for redistribution 
purposes.  
Whether the prohibition on subdivision in SALA is a constraint to redistribution turns on the 
debate whether small or large-scale farms are more productive.384 Furthermore, it can be 
argued that SALA (read with Act 126) ensures that agricultural land identified for acquisition 
for redistribution purposes is not subdivided and transferred to unintended beneficiaries. In 
other words, SALA ensures rather than restrains redistribution of agricultural land.  
                                            
380 In this regard it is important that the provisions of the Regulation Bill will not operate retrospectively.  
381 See Chapter 4, 3 4 2 3 below.  
382 See Chapter 4, 3 4 2 3 below.  
383 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 91. 




Although a number of concerns, challenges and pitfalls were identified,385 the Regulation 
Bill makes provision for two regulatory mechanisms that broaden access to land and 
promote or contribute towards the redistribution of agricultural land. In this regard, the 
imposition of land ceilings creates “redistribution agricultural land” which must first be offered 
to Black citizens. In principle, this mechanism promotes a more equal distribution of 
agricultural land in terms of race, provided that Black citizens acquire the land.  
Furthermore, in principle, the prohibition on foreigners acquiring ownership of agricultural 
land makes more land available for acquisition by citizens. In this way, the prohibition 
broadens access to agricultural land. Similarly, the restriction on the disposal of agricultural 
land by foreigners indirectly contributes towards making more agricultural land available for 
redistribution purposes. The right of first refusal granted to the Minister, makes more land 
available to redistribute to intended beneficiaries of the redistribution programme.  
Despite ownership entitlements being subject to the provisions of SALA and the Regulation 
Bill, the imposition of such regulatory measures must pass constitutional muster.386 
Accordingly, the following chapter aims to determine whether the (a) restrictions on 
subdivision of agricultural land; (b) the imposition of agricultural land ceilings; and (c) 
restrictions on the disposal and acquisition of agricultural land by foreigners are 
constitutional. Such regulatory measures must also constitute effective measures for 
broadening access to land and redistribution purposes. The efficacy of these measures are 
explored in chapter 6.   
Essentially, the regulatory mechanisms in the Regulation Bill may open up land for 
acquisition to speed up the redistribution process. Once land is made available for 
redistribution, it needs to be acquired. The different methods for acquiring agricultural land, 
the requirements for the different methods and the implications thereof for redistribution are 
discussed in Chapter 6 below. 
                                            
385 See 3 3 3 2 above.  




Chapter 4: The constitutionality of mechanisms for the 
regulation of agricultural land 
1 Introduction  
The regulatory mechanisms discussed in Chapter 3 may restrict or deprive an owner of his 
or her ownership entitlements.1 Any restriction on the owner’s right to property or ownership 
entitlements needs to comply with the provisions of the Constitution.2 Section 25(1) of the 
Constitution provides that:  
“No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no law 
may permit arbitrary deprivation of property”. 
The Constitution provides for deprivation of property and sets out the requirements that must 
be met in order for a deprivation to be constitutionally valid.3 In other words, section 25(1) 
                                            
1 AJ van der Walt & GJ Pienaar Introduction to the Law of Property 7 ed (2016) 47-50 provide that the content 
of ownership must be determined within the context of each individual case. The content of ownership may 
include several entitlements, notably the entitlement to use (ius utendi), dispose or alienate (ius dispondendi) 
and vindicate (ius vindicandi) the property. Other entitlements may include the entitlement to fruits (ius fruendi), 
to possess (ius possidendi), to resist any unlawful invasion (ius negandi), to encumber and (under some 
circumstances) even to neglect or destroy the property (ius abutendi). Compare H Mostert & A Pope (eds) The 
Principles of the Law of Property (2010) 92-93; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and 
Schoeman’s The Law of Property 5 ed (2006) 92-93; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 173. See also 
AJ van der Walt & P Dhliwayo “The notion of absolute ownership and exclusive ownership: A doctrinal analysis” 
(2017) South African Law Journal 34-52 in general. See further H Scott “Absolute ownership and legal 
pluralism in Roman law: Two arguments” (2011) Acta Juridica 23-34, 23; P Birks “The Roman law concept of 
dominium and the idea of absolute ownership” (1985) Acta Juridica 1-37, 1; D Visser “The absoluteness of 
ownership: The South African common law in perspective” (1985) Acta Juridica 39-52, 39.  
2 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 17, 214, 218, 251; AJ van der Walt “Transformative 
constitutionalism and the development of South African property law (part 2)” (2006) Tydskrif vir die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg 1-31; Van der Walt & Pienaar Introduction to the Law of Property 345-346; E van der Sijde 
Reconsidering the relationship between property and regulation: A systemic constitutional approach LLD, 
Stellenbosch University (2015) 110, 128. 
3 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services; First 
National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 46. The following 
cases also subsequently followed the FNB methodology: Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
Municipality; Bisset v Buffalo City Municipality Transfer Rights Action Campaign v Member of the Executive 
Council for Local Government and Housing, Gauteng  2005 1 SA 530 (CC); Reflect-All 1025 CC v MEC for 
Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government 2009 6 SA 391 (CC); Offit Enterprises v 
Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 2011 1 SA 293 (CC); National Credit Regulator v Opperman 2013 
2 SA 1 (CC); Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape 2015 6 SA 125 (CC); Jordaan v City of Tshwane 
Metropolitan Municipality and others; City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v New Ventures Consulting 
and Services (Pty) Limited; Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v Livanos and others 2017 6 SA 287 (CC). 
See further Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 222; T Roux “Property” in S Woolman,  T Roux, & M 
Bishop  (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (RS 2009, OS 2003) 46-1-46-37, 46-3-46-5. Furthermore 
see EJ Marais “Expanding the contours of the constitutional property concept” (2016) Tydskrif vir die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg 576-592 592 where the author states that Shoprite “confirms that FNB is still the leading 
judgment when it comes to adjudicating section 25 disputes, since the three legal questions set out by the 
majority accord with the first three steps in the FNB case methodology”. See also FJ Michelman & EJ Marais 




creates a framework for the legitimate regulation of property.4 Van der Sijde points out that 
the property clause must be interpreted in such a way so as to strike an appropriate balance 
between the protection of private property and the need to ensure that the property serves 
the public interest.5 Importantly, Van der Sijde explains that: 
“The question…is not whether a government has the power to regulate the use of property but 
rather the extent to which the state can regulate vested rights and what the consequences of 
regulation are.”6 
Accordingly, it is necessary to determine whether the imposition of regulatory measures, 
namely (a) restrictions on the subdivision of agricultural land; (b) limiting the amount of land 
any person may own, namely land ceilings; and (c) restrictions imposed on foreigners in 
relation to the disposal and acquisition of agricultural land, are constitutional. Before this 
determination can be made, the methodology for determining whether the implementation 
of a regulatory mechanism constitutes an arbitrary deprivation must first be set out. To this 
end, the methodology as set out in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v 
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank 
v Minister of Finance,7 (“FNB”)8 will be employed to determine whether the implementation 
of these regulatory measures in the context of agricultural land are constitutional. In other 
words the question is whether any of the regulatory measures listed above arbitrarily 
deprives a person of his or her property.  Each step or question of the methodology is set 
                                            
(eds) Transformative Property Law: Festschrift in honour of AJ van der Walt (2018) 121-146 and BV Slade & 
R Walsh “The marginality of property in expropriation law: A comparative assessment ” in G Muller, R Brits, B 
Slade & J van Wyk (eds) Transformative Property Law: Festschrift in honour of AJ van der Walt (2018) 21-50.  
4 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 17, 190, 214, 218, 251; Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert The Law 
of Property 96; Van der Sijde Reconsidering the relationship between property and regulation 106. See also 
recent developments regarding the possible amendment of the Constitution to allow for expropriation without 
compensation in Chapter 5, 3 3 2 – 3 3 3 below. In this regard, see B Hoops “Expropriation without 
compensation: A yawning gap in the justification for expropriation?” (2019) 136 South African Law Journal 
261-302; T Ngukaitobi & M Bishop “The Constitutionality of Expropriation without Compensation” 
<https://www.wits.ac.za> (accessed 02-08-2019); Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture Final 
Report of the Presidential Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture (4 May 2019) 
<https://www.gov.za/documents/final-report-presidential-advisory-panel-land-reform-and-agriculture-28-jul-
2019-0000> (accessed 30-07-2019) 66-75. See futher First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v 
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 97 where the Court held that: 
“…there are appropriate circumstances where it is permissible for legislation, in the broader public interest, to 
deprive persons of property without payment of compensation”.  
5 Van der Sijde Reconsidering the relationship between property and regulation 97; Mkontwana v Nelson 
Mandela Metropolitan Municipality 2005 1 SA 530 (CC) para 81. See also Van der Walt Constitutional Property 
Law 17, 42; Van der Walt (2006) TSAR 1-31; Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture Final Report of 
the Presidential Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture (4 May 2019) 66-75. 
6 Van der Sijde Reconsidering the relationship between property and regulation 128.  
7 2002 4 SA 768 (CC).  
8 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services 2002 4 




out and discussed. Subsequently, each regulatory measure is analysed to determine 
whether it complies with the requirements of the FNB methodology to establish whether it is 
constitutional.   
2 The FNB-methodology 
2 1 Introduction   
Section 25(1), as interpreted in the FNB judgment, provides for a framework for the 
legitimate regulation of property. The Constitutional Court set out a series of steps or stages 
that constitute a methodology for determining whether a deprivation of property is 
constitutional.9 Each of the following questions represents a step of the methodology:10 
(a) Does that which is taken away or interfered with amount to property for purposes of 
section 25? 
(b) Has there been a deprivation of such property? 
(c) If there has been a deprivation, is such a deprivation consistent with the provisions 
of section 25(1)?  
(d) If not, is such a deprivation justified in terms of section 36 of the Constitution? 
(e) If it is, does it amount to expropriation in terms of section 25(2) of the Constitution? 
(f) If so, does the deprivation comply with the requirements of sections 25(2)(a) and (b)? 
(g) If not, is the expropriation justified under section 36? 
Some of these steps set out in FNB correlates to the requirements in section 25(1) of the 
Constitution, for a constitutional deprivation: (a) the deprivation must be effected in terms of 
law of general application; and (b) the law must not permit arbitrary deprivations.11  
                                            
9 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services 2002 4 
SA 768 (CC) para 4.  
10 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services 2002 4 
SA 768 (CC) para 46. Furthermore see, Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for 
Economic Development, Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape 2015 6 SA 125 (CC); Marais (2016) 
TSAR 592;  Roux “Property” in CLOSA 46-3-46-5. 




It is acknowledged that the FNB-methodology has not been without critique and has certain 
pitfalls and shortcomings.12 There may be various adjusted versions of the methodology to 
address the pitfalls and shortcomings. For example, Van der Walt, with the benefit of 
hindsight, proposed an adjusted version of the methodology.13 While mindful of the critique 
and suggested adjustments made to the FNB-methodology,14 the framework is still primarily 
used in constitutional property law disputes regarding section 25(1).  However, it is not the 
aim of this dissertation to fully analyse and consider whether the FNB-methodology is the 
best available methodology to determine whether a deprivation of property is constitutional. 
Despite the critique, the FNB-methodology is still regarded as authoritative precedent for 
determining whether there has been a constitutional infringement of a person’s property 
rights in terms of section 25 of the Constitution. It is in this light that the dissertation seeks 
to use the framework provided for by the FNB-methodology to test regulatory measures 
against the requirements in section 25.  
2 2 Does that which is taken away or interfered with amount to property for purposes of 
section 25? 
The first step in the FNB-methodology inquires whether that which is taken away or 
interfered with constitutes “property” for purposes of section 25 of the Constitution.15 The 
Court in FNB declined to provide for a comprehensive definition of property for purposes of 
                                            
12 See Roux “Property” in CLOSA in general. See also T Roux “The ‘arbitrary deprivation’ vortex: Constitutional 
property law after FNB” in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Conversations (2008) 265-281 and AJ 
van der Walt “Section 25 vortices (part 1)” (2016) 3 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 412-427; AJ van der 
Walt “Section 25 vortices (part 2)” (2016) 4 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 597-621.  
13 Van der Walt (2016) TSAR 616-617 provides for an amended or different version of the FNB methodology 
with the following steps or questions:  
“1. Beneficiaries: is the complainant a beneficiary of section 25 protection? 
2. Property: is the alleged property interest constitutional property for purposes of section 25? 
3. Deprivation or expropriation: is the alleged interference with the protected property interest: 
a. a deprivation of property covered by section 25(1)? 
b. an expropriation of property covered by section 25(2)-(3)? 
4a. Deprivation: if the interference is a deprivation of property, is it: 
a. authorised by law of general application? 
b. if it is authorised by law of general application, does the law permit arbitrary deprivation of property? 
4b. Expropriation: if the interference is an expropriation, is the expropriation: 
a. authorised by law of general application? 
b. for a public purpose or in the public interest? 
c. accompanied by provision of just and equitable compensation? 
5. Justification: if the law of general application 
a. permits arbitrary deprivation of property [or] 
b. authorises expropriation without providing for just and equitable compensation, is  
it justifiable in terms of section 36(1)?”.   
14 Van der Walt (2016) TSAR 616-617.  
15 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services 2002 4 




section 25.16 Accordingly, the meaning and scope of “property”17 has to be determined in 
each individual case.18 
Roux regards the inquiry whether the interest at stake constitutes constitutional property as 
the threshold question in any constitutional property inquiry.19 However, Van der Walt argues 
that the property question in FNB was not treated as a threshold question in any substantive 
sense.20 Instead, the Court dealt with the property question in a principled manner by relying 
on constitutional and contextual factors outside section 25 in its analysis whether a particular 
property interest should be recognised as property for purposes of section 25. In FNB, the 
property interest in question (corporeal movables) was unproblematic.21 However, the Court 
indicated that extensions of the category of interests that should be recognised as property, 
goes beyond that which is traditionally recognised as property in private law.22 Furthermore, 
                                            
16 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services; First 
National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 51.  
17 A broad range of rights and interests have been accepted as property for purposes of section 25, including 
(but not limited to): land and corporeal movables (First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner 
for the South African Revenue Services; First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 
2002 4 SA 768 (CC)); trademarks, which potentially opens up the possibility of recognising other intellectual 
property rights as property (Laugh it off Promotions CC v South African Breweries International (Finance) BV 
t/a Sabmark International 2006 1 SA 144 (CC)); mineral rights (Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and 
Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC)); goodwill (Phumelela Gaming and Leisure Limited v Gründlingh 2006 8 BCLR 883 
(CC)); a grocer’s wine licence (Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic 
Development, Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape 2015 6 SA 125 (CC)); licences more generally 
(South African Diamond Producers Organisation v Minister of Minerals and Energy N.O 2017 6 SA 331 (CC)); 
personal servitudes (National Credit Regulator v Opperman 2013 2 SA 1 (CC)); servitudes generally (National 
Stadium South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Firstrand Bank Ltd 2011 2 SA 157 (SCA)); and public servitudes (City of 
Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Link Africa (Pty) Ltd 2015 6 SA 440 (CC)).  
18 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 113, 117; National Credit Regulator v Opperman 2013 2 SA 1 
(CC) paras 57-64 where the Court established factors for construing the South African constitutional property 
concept. See also Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape 2015 6 SA 125 (CC) para 39 and specifically where the 
Court held that: “[T]o determine what kind of property deserves protection under the property clause cannot 
be restricted to private law notions of property. To do so would exclude other potential constitutional 
entitlements that may deserve protection from the ambit of protection under the property clause. It could also 
inadvertently lead to a failure to subject private law notions of property to constitutional scrutiny in order to 
ensure that they accord with constitutional norms. Extending our conception of property to embrace 
constitutional entitlements beyond the original ambit of private common law property will ensure that the 
property clause does not become an obstacle to the transformation of our society, but central to its 
achievement.” See further Van der Walt (2016) TSAR 599-605.  
19 Roux “Property” CLOSA 46-10; Roux “The ‘arbitrary deprivation’ vortex: Constitutional property law after 
FNB” in Constitutional Conversations 264-281.  
20 Van der Walt (2016) TSAR 599.  
21 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services; First 
National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 49(c).  
22 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services; First 
National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 49(d) referring to AJ 




to determine whether an interest, which is not traditionally recognised as property in private 
law constitutes property, would require a principled and contextual analysis.23   
As could be expected, the property question does not require much analysis in cases dealing 
with ownership of land and corporeal movables.24 In this regard, the Court in FNB held that 
ownership of land: 
“[L]ie[s] at the heart of our constitutional concept of property, both as regards the nature of the 
right involved as well as the object of the right…”.25 
Once it has been established that the right or interest constitutes property for purposes of 
section 25(1), the next question or step of the FNB-methodology becomes relevant.  
2 3 Has there been a deprivation of such property? 
The second step of the methodology inquires whether there has been a deprivation of 
property through State action.26 A determination of what constitutes a deprivation is central 
to the regulation of the use of property within the context of section 25(1) of the Constitution. 
The term “deprivation” is often used interchangeably with “limitation” or “regulation”.27 
However, these terms are not synonymous in the constitutional context.28 Accordingly, it is 
                                            
23 Van der Walt (2016) TSAR 599.  
24 Van der Walt (2016) TSAR 599. In Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 1 SA 297 (CC) it was contested 
whether the property at stake was a right to use land temporarily or movable corporeal property (gravel) 
removed from that land, but the Court did not spend any time on the property law question. Furthermore, in 
Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bisset v Buffalo City Municipality Transfer Rights 
Action Campaign v Member of the Executive Council for Local Government and Housing, Gauteng  2005 1 SA 
530 (CC); Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town City 2015 1 SA 530 (CC); Reflect-All 1025 CC 
v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government 2009 6 SA 391 (CC) and the 
City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Link Africa (Pty) Ltd 2015 6 SA 440 (CC) cases dealt with 
ownership of land and owners’ entitlements to use their land. None of the judgments spent any time on the 
property question. See also Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 115. You may also want to look at (or 
mention) South African Diamond Producers Organisation v Minister of Minerals and Energy N.O. and Others 
2017 (6) SA 331 (CC) as a contrast to the trend of focussing in the property question. 
25 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services; First 
National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 51. 
26 Roux “Property” in CLOSA 46-17-46-20; Roux “The ‘arbitrary deprivation’ vortex: Constitutional property law 
after FNB” in Constitutional Conversations 264-281. 
27 Van der Sijde Reconsidering the relationship between property and regulation 98. See also H Mostert The 
constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on the reform of private law and land 
ownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 315; Van der Walt & Pienaar Introduction to the Law of Property 
349.  
28 Van der Sijde Reconsidering the relationship between property and regulation 98. See further H Mostert The 
constitutional protect and regulation of property and its influence on the reform of private law and land 
ownership in South Africa and Germany (2002) 315 where Mostert explains that “deprivation” is a generic term 
which circumscribes a whole range of various interferences with the rights of citizens to their property. She 
also indicates that the terms “regulatory interference” and “acts of police power” are sometimes used to convey 




necessary to determine when the regulation of property amounts to a deprivation.29 
Generally, a deprivation may be defined as an: 
“[U]ncompensated regulatory restriction or limitation on the use, enjoyment and exploitation of 
property, in terms of legislation or other ‘law’.”30  
Regulating ownership entitlements is referred to as the “police power” of the State.31  
One way of determining whether a regulatory limitation or restriction amounts to a 
deprivation of property is to contrast it in some way with an expropriation.32 Both deprivations 
and expropriations involve some form of State interference with private property and may 
bring some measure of loss or diminution of value for the property holder.33 In fact, 
deprivations have been regarded as a subset of expropriations.34 However, the distinction 
between a deprivation and an expropriation is not always easy to make.35 In essence, Van 
der Walt & Pienaar describe the difference as follows:  
“[D]eprivations restrict the owner’s use and enjoyment of property…without necessarily taking the 
property away; whereas expropriation takes the property away from the owner…”.36  
In other words, as Marais explains:  
                                            
29 Van der Sijde Reconsidering the relationship between property and regulation 98.  
30 J van Wyk Planning Law 2 ed (2012) 212. See also Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 196; Van der 
Sijde Reconsidering the relationship between property and regulation 98-99.  
31 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 195; Van der Sijde Reconsidering the relationship between 
property and regulation 99; Van der Walt & Pienaar Introduction to the Law of Property 349-350.  
32 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 196. Furthermore see E van der Schyff Property in Minerals and 
Petroleum (2016) 286-288 where Van der Schyff distinguishes between an expropriation and a deprivation. 
Van der Schyff states that in the pre-constitutional era, the concept of expropriation entailed more than the 
mere dispossession or deprivation of property. Expropriation requires the “appropriation” of the particular 
property by the expropriator, which must be accompanied by compensation, whereas the regulation of property 
(deprivation) merely prevented a person from using his or her property in a particular manner. A deprivation 
does not entail the acquisition of property or rights and does not require compensation. However, the clear-
cut distinction between expropriation and deprivation that existed in the pre-constitutional era could not be 
maintained in the constitutional era. Expropriation is regarded as a subset of deprivation. While all 
expropriations are regarded as deprivations, only certain deprivations can be regarded as expropriations. See 
further B Hoops et al (eds) Rethinking expropriation law II: Context, criteria and consequences of expropriation 
(2015) for a comprehensive discussion of the concept of expropriation. 
33 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 196.  
34 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 204; Van der Schyff Property in Minerals and Petroleum 288.  
35 Van der Walt & Pienaar Introduction to the Law of Property 353.  
36 Van der Walt & Pienaar Introduction to the Law of Property 353; EJ Marais “Is onteiening sonder vergoeding 
werklik die antwoord?” (8 February 2018) Litnet Akademies <https://www.litnet.co.za/onteiening-sonder-




“Expropriation, therefore, usually entails the compulsory acquisition of property by the state – in 
other words, without the owner’s permission or co-operation – against payment of 
compensation”.37 
Usually, and especially after Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and Energy38 (“Agri 
SA”), it seems clear that State acquisition of property is an element of expropriation,39 while 
it is not necessarily an element of deprivation.40 Furthermore, a property holder will ordinarily 
not be compensated for a deprivation, whereas expropriations in the South African context 
currently require compensation.41 Marais explains further that:  
“The state does not always have to be the ultimate owner – private persons, such as beneficiaries 
of a land reform programme (especially under the land redistribution programme), may also be 
the ultimate owners of the expropriated property. It is thus impossible for the state to circumvent 
its obligation to pay compensation by claiming that the acquisition of property by private persons 
in such a context does not amount to state acquisition of property.”42 
In FNB, the Constitutional Court did not provide a comprehensive or exhaustive definition of 
what constitutes a “deprivation”. Instead, the Court indicated that the concept of a 
deprivation should be given a very wide meaning.43 In principle, the Court regarded all 
restrictions imposed on property as deprivations, because “any interference with the use, 
enjoyment or exploitation of private property involves some deprivation in respect of the 
                                            
37 Marais “Is onteiening sonder vergoeding werklik die antwoord?” (8 February 2018) Litnet Akademies  
<https://www.litnet.co.za/onteiening-sonder-vergoeding-werklik-die-antwoord/> (accessed 25-02-2019) 1-14, 
8. 
38 2013 4 SA 1 (CC). See further Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert The Law of Property 541. 
39 Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) paras 48, 58. However, see paras 
77-78 where Cameron J argues that State acquisition should not be regarded as an indispensable prerequisite. 
See also paras 102-103 where Froneman J argues that Mogoeng CJ erred in extrapolating an inflexible 
general rule of State acquisition as an essential requirement for expropriation. See also Marais (2015) PELJ 
2982-3031; Marais (2015) PELJ 3032-3061 in this regard.  
40 In light of the distinction proposed by Mogoeng CJ in Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and Energy 
2013 4 SA 1 (CC) para 48, Van der Schyff Property in Minerals and Petroleum 288 notes that: “It seems as if 
a constitutional merger has taken place between the two distinct concepts of regulation and expropriation 
under the umbrella of ‘deprivation’, as referred to in section 25(1) of the Constitution”.  
41 Section 25(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See also Van der Walt Constitutional 
Property Law 192, 196; Mostert The constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on 
the reform of private law and land ownership in South Africa and Germany 279; Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert 
The Law of Property 543.  
42 Marais “Is onteiening sonder vergoeding werklik die antwoord?” (8 February 2018) Litnet Akademies 
<https://www.litnet.co.za/onteiening-sonder-vergoeding-werklik-die-antwoord/> (accessed 25-02-2019) 1-14, 
8. 
43 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services; First 




person having title or right to or in the property concerned”.44 Accordingly, regulations that 
affect the use, enjoyment and/or exploitation of the property would result in a deprivation.45 
However, this wide interpretation has not been applied with uniformity in subsequent cases.  
In Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bisset v Buffalo City 
Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign v MEC, Local Government and Housing, 
Gauteng46 (“Mkontwana”), it appears as if the Constitutional Court provided for a narrower 
interpretation of the term deprivation.47 While the Court agreed with the broad interpretation 
set out in FNB, it created confusion by providing for a narrower interpretation of the term 
“deprivation”.  
The Court defined deprivations as instances of regulation that place a “substantial 
interference or limitation that goes beyond the normal restrictions on property use or 
enjoyment found in an open and democratic society”.48 In other words, normal restrictions 
on the use and enjoyment of property, commonly found in open and democratic societies, 
might not amount to deprivation.49 This narrower definition of deprivation could, if applied 
strictly create a vortex in the sense that it could suck the whole property challenge into the 
deprivation inquiry. Roux highlights that the extent  to which the law interferes with a property 
interest, which is an important factor for determining whether an interference is arbitrary, will 
not, or should not, be taken into account in determining whether the interference is a 
deprivation, but rather whether the interference is arbitrary.50 
Van der Walt argues that the Mkontwana decision at least potentially restricts the notion of 
deprivation to something significantly narrower than the wide definition used in FNB, 
because it excludes all regulatory interferences with property from the section 25 review that 
are perceived as normal in an open and democratic society: land use and planning 
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regulation; regulatory control over the use of potentially dangerous property and regulation 
of all licences and permits.51 A literal interpretation of a “deprivation” in Mkontwana would 
have restricted deprivation to just those deprivations that are not to be expected in an open 
and democratic society. In other words, only those excessive and disproportionate 
deprivations that would have failed the section 36-justification test would constitute 
deprivations.52 In this regard, Van der Sijde concurs with Van der Walt and explains that: 
“It seems illogical to restrict the application of section 25(1) to instances of serious restrictions or 
restrictions that somehow extend beyond what is acceptable in open and democratic societies”.53  
Instead, every instance of regulatory restriction should be capable of being assessed against 
the requirements in section 25(1), regardless of the severity of the deprivation.54  
The confusion created by the narrow interpretation in Mkontwana is evident in Reflect-All 
1025 CC v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government55 
(“Reflect-All”), where the Court stated that the Court in Mkontwana expanded, rather than 
restricted, the notion of deprivation of property for purposes of section 25.56 The Court found 
that the interference with just one of the landowner’s entitlements might be sufficient to 
establish a deprivation.57 
Furthermore, in Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd58  
(“Offit”), the Constitutional Court applied the FNB-definition of deprivation, but cited 
Mkontwana as authority.59 Instead of focusing on what would be normal in an open and 
democratic society, the Court focused on whether the regulatory limitation had a legally 
relevant impact on the rights of a property holder. In this regard, the Constitutional Court in 
National Credit Regulator v Opperman60 (“Opperman”) provided that any legally significant 
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interference with property amounts to a “deprivation”.61 The definition in Opperman alludes 
to the wider interpretation suggested in FNB.62 
In Agri SA, the Constitutional Court held that a “deprivation always takes place when 
property or rights therein are either taken away or significantly interfered with”.63 At first 
glance, this definition seems to allude to the narrow interpretation postulated in the 
Mkontwana decision. However, as Van der Sijde points out, it may also be possible that the 
wording of the Court when referring to “significantly interfered with”64 was intended to refer 
to the decision in Opperman, where a “legally significant” impact was required for an 
interference with property to constitute a deprivation.65 
At most, the post-Mkontwana decisions seem to suggest that a deprivation must be legally 
significant in the sense of not being de minimus.66 In Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member 
of the Executive Council for Economic Development, Environmental Affairs and Tourism, 
Eastern Cape67 (“Shoprite Checkers”) the Constitutional Court explained clearly that the 
formulation of the Mkontwana notion of deprivation, requires an interference with property 
that is significant enough to “have a legally relevant impact on the rights of the affected 
party”.68 Van der Walt explains that: 
“[W]hat was a strikingly narrow definition with a potentially sweeping vortex effect in the 
Mkontwana decision, now seems to be associated simply with the much less restrictive - and 
actually common-sense – observation that deprivation must be significant enough to be legally 
relevant”.69  
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Accordingly, there is no significant difference between the FNB-definition and this refinement 
thereof.70 In this regard, the Constitutional Court in South African Diamond Producers 
Organisation v Minister of Minerals and Energy N.O.71 confirms that:  
“There will be a deprivation only where the interference is “substantial” – meaning that the 
intrusion must be so extensive that it has a legally relevant impact on the rights of the affected 
party”.  
However, the significance of whether a narrow or wide interpretation of deprivation is 
followed should not be understated. Whether a litigant will be precluded from bringing a case 
to test the constitutional validity of a regulatory measure, will be dependent on whether the 
wide or narrow interpretation of the term deprivation is followed.72 If the narrow interpretation 
in Mkontwana is followed, then the category of regulatory measure that can be challenged 
in terms of section 25(1) will be limited. Only regulatory deprivations that “go further” than 
the “normal restrictions” will qualify as a deprivation in this regard. For example, in terms of 
the narrow interpretation, restrictions on the subdivision of agricultural land may be regarded 
as normal restrictions in an open and democratic society and will accordingly, not be 
regarded as a deprivation for purposes of section 25. However, if the preferred wide 
definition, as proposed in FNB and Opperman is followed, then any regulatory restriction 
can be tested and must meet the requirements in section 25(1). Despite the lack of uniformity 
in the various approaches followed by the Constitutional Court, it seems that a wide 
interpretation of the term “deprivation” is preferred. Any legally significant interference with 
property rights, in other words not de minimus, can accordingly be tested against the 
requirements in section 25(1).73  
A deprivation in itself is not unconstitutional – only where the deprivation amounts to an 
unauthorised or arbitrary deprivation will property rights be infringed. Consequently, the test 
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as set out in FNB for determining whether a deprivation amounts to an arbitrary deprivation 
is discussed below.  
2 4 If there has been a deprivation, is such a deprivation consistent with the provisions of 
section 25(1)?  
Once it has been determined that the imposition of a regulatory measure amounts to a 
deprivation the investigation is not concluded as the court, in line with the FNB-methodology, 
must consider whether the deprivation complies with the requirements of section 25(1).74 In 
terms of section 25(1) a regulatory deprivation must be effected in terms of law of general 
application and a deprivation may not be arbitrary.75 These two requirements are accordingly 
discussed below.  
2 4 1 Law of general application 
Section 25(1) states that no person may be deprived of property, except in terms of law of 
general application. This phrase ensures that deprivations are legitimately authorised by the 
common law, customary law or legislation.76 Furthermore, the interpretation of the phrase 
“law of general application” is wider than merely legislation that provides for State regulation. 
It may also include legislative regulations; subordinate legislation; municipal by-laws;77 rules 
of court; international conventions and the rules of the common law and customary law.78 
The deprivation is thus the result of law that authorises certain actions or effects.79 
Furthermore, courts must consider whether the authorising law, in fact authorises the 
specific deprivation (and outcome) in question.80 
The law must also apply generally. This means that the law may not single out an individual 
or select a group of individuals in a legally unjustifiable manner.81 If the regulatory 
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mechanism constitutes a law of general application the next question is whether the law 
permits an arbitrary deprivation of property.  
2 4 2 Substantive and procedural arbitrariness  
Section 25(1) of the Constitution states that no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of 
property. This subsection does not distinguish between substantive and procedural grounds 
for a deprivation being arbitrary.82 However, the Constitutional Court in FNB determined that 
“a deprivation of property is ‘arbitrary’ as meant in section 25 when the ‘law’ referred to in 
section 25(1) does not provide sufficient reason for the deprivation in question or is 
procedurally unfair”.83 While the rest of the FNB decision proceeds to analyse how 
substantive non-arbitrariness is to be established,84 the judgment does not elaborate on the 
meaning of the phrase “or is procedurally unfair”.85 Notwithstanding the fact that procedural 
unfairness is not defined or further discussed in FNB, it seemingly constitutes an 
independent ground for finding that a deprivation of property is arbitrary.86 Consequently, a 
deprivation can be arbitrary on substantive or procedural grounds.  
2 4 2 1 Substantive arbitrariness 
In FNB, Ackerman J provided a list of considerations to establish whether there is sufficient 
reason for the deprivation:87  
“(a) It is to be determined by evaluating the relationship between means employed, namely the 
deprivation in question and ends sought to be achieved, namely the purpose of the law in 
question. 
(b) A complexity of relationships has to be considered.  
(c) In evaluating the deprivation in question, regard must be had to the relationship between the 
purpose for the deprivation and the person whose property is affected.  
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(d) In addition, regard must be had to the relationship between the purpose of the deprivation and 
the nature of the property as well the extent of the deprivation in respect of such property.  
(e) Generally speaking, where the property in question is ownership of land or a corporeal 
movable, a more compelling purpose will have to be established in order for the depriving law to 
constitute sufficient reason for the deprivation than in the case when the property is something 
different and the property right is something less extensive. This judgment is not concerned at all 
with incorporeal property.  
(f) Generally speaking, when the deprivation in question embraces all the incidents of ownership, 
the purpose for the deprivation will have to be more compelling than when the deprivation 
embraces only some incidents of ownership and those incidents only partially.  
(g) Depending on such interplay between variable means and ends, the nature of the property in 
question and the extent of the deprivation, there may be circumstances when sufficient reason is 
established by, in effect, no more than a mere rational relationship between means and ends; in 
others this might only be established by a proportionality evaluation closer to that required by s 
36(1) of the Constitution. 
(h) Whether there is sufficient reason to warrant the deprivation is a matter to be decided on all 
the facts of each particular case, always bearing in mind that the enquiry is concerned with 
arbitrary in relation to deprivation of property under s 25.”88 
Invariably the factors that a court must take into account and the level of scrutiny will vary 
according to the circumstances of the case.89 Importantly, the application of the arbitrariness 
test is contextual and variable. Accordingly, the appropriate test is located on a continuum 
between thin rationality review90 and thick proportionality review.91  
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In some instances, the combination of factors enunciated in FNB will require or justify a 
lower level of judicial scrutiny, closer to rationality review.92 The test for rationality, at the 
lower end of the continuum, merely requires that there must be a rational connection 
between the means (the regulatory deprivation) employed by the State and the legitimate 
purpose it seeks to achieve93 and requires “nothing more than the absence of bias or bad 
faith”.94 In other words, for a deprivation to satisfy this test, it must simply be capable of 
achieving the State’s legitimate purpose. Arguably, the test imposes very few restrictions on 
the State’s power to regulate and interfere with private property.  
In other instances, something closer to full proportionality review may be required.95 Despite 
the casuistic manner in which courts may approach the arbitrariness question, there seems 
to be a fair amount of consensus among academic authors96 on the elements of 
proportionality.97 These elements, in a case where something closer to full proportionality 
review is required, may be considered to determine whether a regulatory measure provides 
sufficient reason for the deprivation. The elements of proportionality may be categorised as 
follows: (a) legitimacy;98 (b) suitability;99 (c) necessity;100 and (d) fair balance.101 Each of the 
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elements may be translated into questions: (a) Does the regulatory measure in question 
pursue a legitimate aim?; (b) is the regulatory measure in question capable of achieving the 
legitimate aim?; (c) is the regulatory measure the least intrusive means of realising the 
legitimate aim?; and (d) does the regulatory measure represent a net gain when the 
reduction in enjoyment of rights is weighed against the level of realisation of the legitimate 
aim? These elements or inquiries are also considered when the court applies the concept 
“arbitrary” in the provision in section 25(1) of the Constitution. Accordingly, each of these 
questions may be considered during the arbitrariness test, if the standard of review amounts 
to something similar to proportionality review.  
The test for proportionality, located at the high end of the continuum, provides that there 
must be a proportional relationship between the burden imposed by the State and the 
legitimate purpose it seeks to achieve. In this regard, the court will undertake a contextual 
investigation and take into account the nature of the right, the person(s) whose property is 
likely to be affected, the purpose of the deprivation and whether there is an appropriate 
relationship between the means employed and the ends sought to be achieved. Essentially, 
the court will consider the effect or impact of the deprivation on the affected owner.102 The 
authorising law in this regard, must “not impose an unacceptably heavy burden upon or 
demand an exceptional sacrifice from one individual or a small group of individuals for the 
sake of the public at large”.103 Consequently, a law that authorises an excessive burden 
being placed on one individual or a small group of individuals could be arbitrary and invalid 
even though it serves a legitimate and important public purpose or public interest.104 In other 
words, for a deprivation to satisfy this test, it must be the least restrictive method of achieving 
the State’s purpose.105 This test thus imposes much greater restrictions on the State’s power 
to regulate and interfere with private property.106  
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Roux provides two points of critique on the arbitrariness test.107 Firstly, Roux argues that the 
test for arbitrariness leaves too much scope for judicial discretion.108 While the Court in FNB 
provides for a list of factors to consider whether a deprivation is arbitrary, it seems that the 
Court retained an almost absolute discretion to decide future constitutional property 
cases.109 According to Roux, the test is context-sensitive and it is a judge that will determine 
whether a mere rationality test or more proportionality-like approach will be applied. The 
level of scrutiny will accordingly depend on the court’s view of the effect of the deprivation 
on the owner.110 Accordingly, the test for arbitrariness lacks predictability.111  
Secondly, Roux argues that the test for arbitrariness has the effect of “telescoping” or 
“sucking” all property issues into what is framed as the “arbitrariness vortex”.112 In short, he 
argues that all the questions of the FNB-methodology113 are “sucked into” the question 
whether there is sufficient reason for the deprivation in question.114  
Each of these factors needs to be considered to determine whether there is sufficient reason 
for the interference with property rights115 by way of restrictions on subdivision; the 
imposition of land ceilings116 and the limitations of foreign ownership.  
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2 4 2 2 Procedural arbitrariness  
Although the Court in FNB did not elaborate on “procedural fairness as an independent 
ground for finding that a deprivation is arbitrary”,117 subsequent case law alludes to a 
definition.  
In Mkontwana, the Court regarded the notion of procedural fairness as a flexible concept 
that should be determined with reference to all the circumstances.118 Van der Walt states 
that the decision in Mkontwana creates the impression that procedural fairness, in terms of 
section 25(1), will be assessed on the same basis as the test for just administrative action 
under section 33 of the Constitution and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 
2000 (“PAJA”). 119  
The Constitutional Court in Reflect-All120 simply referred to the definition of procedurally 
unfair deprivation in Mkontwana121  without expanding the notion of procedural fairness.122 
In the subsequent Constitutional Court case, the Court in Offit likewise did not expand on 
the definition of procedural unfairness followed in Mkontwana and Reflect-All. However, in 
accordance with the FNB-methodology,123  it was not necessary to decide the arbitrariness 
question in Offit, because the Court found that the action complained of did not constitute a 
deprivation of property. The Constitutional Court also considered the requirements for 
procedural fairness in Opperman. The Court held that where a statutory provision affords a 
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court “judicial oversight” but does not afford the court a discretion when making its decision 
or order, the provision will remain procedurally arbitrary.124 
Judging from these decisions and the lack of clarity on the definition of procedural fairness 
as an indication of arbitrariness in the context of section 25(1), Van der Walt questions 
whether the notion of procedural fairness has any meaning at all.125 While the Constitutional 
Court in subsequent case law to FNB has drawn a distinction between substantively and 
procedurally arbitrary deprivation,126 the Court did not provide clarity on when a deprivation 
will be procedurally unfair or how procedural unfairness in terms of section 25(1) should be 
distinguished from procedural unfairness in terms of section 33 of PAJA.127 
Van der Walt argues, in line with subsidiarity principles,128 that the notion of procedurally 
unfair deprivation of property in terms of section 25(1) only makes sense to the extent that 
it refers to deprivation of property that does not result from administrative action.129 
Importantly, a deprivation of property brought about by administrative action should, in the 
first place, be adjudicated in terms of the provisions of PAJA and not in terms of section 
25(1).130 In other words, where an administrative action amounts to a deprivation of property, 
and the deprivation is alleged to be procedurally unfair, section 25(1) will not be applicable 
and a litigant will have to rely on the remedies provided by the appropriate legislation, in this 
case PAJA.131 Only a deprivation of property that occurs outside the sphere of PAJA should 
                                            
124 National Credit Regulator v Opperman 2013 2 SA 1 (CC) para 69. This point was confirmed in Chevron SA 
(Pty) Ltd v Wilson t/a Wilson’s Transport 2015 10 BCLR 1158 (CC) paras 22-24.  
125 Van der Walt (2012) Stell LR 89. 
126 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services; First 
National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC); Mkontwana v Nelson 
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128 Van der Walt Property and Constitution 35-37, 40-48; Van der Sijde Reconsidering the relationship between 
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129 Van der Walt (2012) Stell LR 93-94; Van der Sijde Reconsidering the relationship between property and 
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to challenge the matter under PAJA. However, when a law provides for a deprivation of property in a 
procedurally unfair matter, section 25(1) of the Constitution will be applicable.  
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Reconsidering the relationship between property and regulation chapter 4.2. 
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be adjudicated in terms of section 25(1).132 This would be the case where a deprivation of 
property was caused directly by legislation133 and not administrative action.134 However, as 
Van der Walt argues further, the test for procedural unfairness in the context of section 25(1) 
will probably resemble procedural fairness principles developed in administrative law, simply 
because other suitable principles do not exist outside of administrative law.135  
In administrative law, the right to procedurally fair administrative action involves the 
possibility to influence the outcome of an administrative decision that might have a negative 
impact on a person’s rights.136 This principle entitles a person to be heard during the 
decision-making process and proscribes bias.137 With regard to the latter aspect of the 
principle, a deprivation caused directly by legislation already embodies the rule against bias 
in the requirement that the deprivation must be authorised by law of general application.138 
Accordingly, this aspect of procedural fairness will most likely not find much application in 
the context of section 25(1) where legislation that directly causes deprivation of property is 
challenged.  
With regard to the principle which entitles a person to be heard during the decision-making 
process, procedural fairness would probably only have two applications in cases where a 
deprivation of property is caused directly by legislation.139 The first possibility is where a 
deprivation would only be procedurally fair if the legislation provides for judicial oversight.140 
The second possibility would be where a “deprivation would only be procedurally fair if the 
legislative scheme causing the deprivation provides for a review procedure to ensure that 
                                            
132 Van der Sijde Reconsidering the relationship between property and regulation 124 avers that this approach 
was confirmed in Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape  2015 6 SA 125 (CC) paras 20, 30 although the constitutional 
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134 Van der Walt (2012) Stell LR 93. 
135 93-94. 
136 J Klaaren & G Penfold “Just Administrative Action” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional 
Law of South Africa 4 2 ed (OS 2008) ch 63-81. See further Hoexter Administrative Law 363; Van der Walt 
(2012) Stell LR 93. 
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the deprivation does not become arbitrary purely because of its duration”.141 In other words, 
a statutory deprivation of property may be procedurally arbitrary if the legislation “does not 
provide for either judicial oversight or periodic review of the legislative framework that allows 
or brings about the deprivation”.142  
2 5 Can the arbitrary deprivation of property be justified under section 36 of the Constitution?  
If it is found that the deprivation did not take place in terms of law of general application or 
the law authorising the deprivation is arbitrary, then section 25(1) is infringed. However, 
theoretically, and in accordance with the FNB-methodology,143 the State could seek to justify 
such an infringement under the general limitation clause, section 36 of the Constitution. The 
Court in FNB therefore foresaw that section 36 could possibly have a role to play in 
constitutional property disputes in terms of section 25(1). However, the Court did not 
expressly decide on the matter.144 
Despite this step or question, there has been speculation by many authors whether section 
36 has, or will ever have, any role to play in constitutional property disputes in terms of 
section 25(1).145 Roux argues that the application of section 36 to infringements of section 
25(1) is riddled with “conceptual difficulties”.146 A deprivation that does not meet the 
requirements of section 25(1) is unlikely to be justified in terms of section 36(1) because the 
requirements in terms of the two sections are very similar.  
Firstly, a deprivation that is not authorised by law of general application in terms of section 
25(1) will also not be justifiable under section 36(1) because it likewise requires a law of 
general application.147 Secondly, if a law permits the arbitrary deprivation of property, it is 
unlikely to be “reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society” as required by 
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144 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services; First 
National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) paras 58, 110.  
145 Van der Sijde Reconsidering the relationship between property and regulation 126. Van der Walt AJ 
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section 36(1).148 Furthermore, the factors considered in terms of section 36 to determine 
whether a limitation is justifiable and those in section 25(1) to determine whether there was 
sufficient reason for the deprivation, are similar.149  
According to the FNB-methodology, the arbitrariness test operates on a sliding scale that 
varies from mere rationality to something almost (but apparently not quite) as substantive 
as the proportionality test in section 36.150 However, the Constitutional Court has not yet 
explained how the proportionality-type test during the first stage of the section 25-inquiry 
would differ from a full-blown proportionality test used during the second stage section 36(1) 
analysis.151 Roux explains further that: 
“In cases where the test for arbitrariness approximates rational basis review rather than 
proportionality, the conceptual case for the non-compliance of s 36 is strongest: a law that 
infringes s 25(1) for lack of means-end rationality will never be capable of justification under the 
general limitation clause. At the other end of the scale, where the test for arbitrariness approaches 
a test for proportionality, the application of s 36 can at best confirm a conclusion already reached 
under s 25(1)…”.152 
In these circumstances, it is difficult to imagine a situation where a deprivation fails to meet 
the non-arbitrariness requirement under section 25(1), but is still capable of being saved by 
section 36(1). In this light it is not necessary to apply the section 36 limitation analysis for 
purposes of the dissertation, because it will arguably render the same result as discussed 
under the arbitrariness requirement.  
2 6 Does the deprivation amount to an expropriation in terms of section 25(2) of the 
Constitution?  
Where a deprivation passes scrutiny under section 25(1) and/or under section 36(1), the 
next step in the FNB-methodology is to determine whether the deprivation amounts to an 
expropriation of property. As the property clause is currently formulated, the determination 
whether an interference with property is regarded as a deprivation or expropriation is 
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151 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 244-245.  
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significant because there may be additional requirements that have to be fulfilled for an 
expropriation to be valid. Marais explains as follows:  
“As only expropriation carries the obligation to pay compensation, there is an incentive for 
property holders to label any infringement with their property as expropriation. For this reason, it 
is crucial to have a principled distinction between these forms of limitation, especially in view of 
the dangers that uncertainty in this regard could hold for land reform initiatives in the South African 
context, where legitimate (but burdensome) regulatory measures could be challenged as 
amounting to expropriation which requires compensation.”153 
Generally, expropriation is defined in contrast with deprivation.154 Van der Walt points out 
that: “[T]his distinction is neither entirely clear nor consistent”.155 Realistically, there may be 
numerous grey areas where it may not be easy to regard the State action limiting private 
property as either a deprivation or an expropriation.156  
The distinction between deprivation and expropriation was first dealt with in Harksen v Lane 
NO (“Harksen”).157 The Constitutional Court distinguished between deprivation and 
expropriation categorically, regarding them as distinct notions with characteristics that are 
distinguishable from each other clearly and exhaustively.158 According to the Court in 
Harksen the main characteristics that distinguish deprivation from expropriation are twofold: 
(a) that the effect of (and intention with) the expropriation is to divest the former owner of 
the property; and (b) to vest the property in question in the expropriating authority 
permanently. It follows that if the property is not acquired by the State, or if the acquisition 
is not permanent, then there is no expropriation.159 Van der Walt criticises the Court in this 
regard because permanence is not in itself a reliable basis to distinguish between 
deprivation and expropriation. For example, where agricultural land is transferred to land 
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155 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 335. 
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the new constitutional order: Critical comments on Harksen v Lane NO” (1998) 12 South African Public Law 
17-41 19-26.   
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reform beneficiaries, it cannot be said that the property will permanently vest in the State. 
However, Van der Walt acknowledges that the Court possibly has finality, rather than the 
permanence of the expropriation in mind.160 Furthermore, the approach in Harksen does not 
allow for any overlap at all between deprivation and expropriation.161  
The Court in FNB effectively abandoned the categorical distinction between deprivation and 
expropriation set out in Harksen. In accordance with the FNB-methodology, expropriation is 
regarded as a form or subset of deprivation.162 The Court described these notions as two 
distinct categories of interference with property, where expropriation as a narrower category 
is included in the wider category of deprivations.163 In other words, all expropriations are 
deprivations, but not all deprivations are expropriations.164 Accordingly, all expropriations 
must also comply with the requirements for a deprivation, namely (a) law of general 
application and (b) it may not be arbitrary.165  
An expropriation is usually regarded as (a) an intrusive limitation which only affects a 
particular property or owner; (b) where the State acquires private property for a public 
purpose or public interest; (c) against compensation.166 According to Van der Walt, a specific 
redistribution programme or legislation that affects all agricultural land can be categorised 
as an expropriation.167 There are exceptions to this rule. For example, if all agricultural land 
                                            
160 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 340.  
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National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) paras 57-58. See also 
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is expropriated, then it would most likely take the form of nationalisation rather than 
expropriation,168 with the result that compensation is excluded or limited.169 As mentioned 
above,170 the State acquisition requirement is set out in Agri SA.171 The Court held that the 
claimant must establish that the State has acquired the substance or core content of what 
the claimant was deprived of. However, the rights acquired by the State do not have to be 
exactly the same as the rights that were lost.172 Marais argues that State acquisition of 
property should be regarded as a consequence of the expropriation, rather than a 
requirement for expropriation.173 Furthermore, Van der Walt states that State acquisition 
“cannot be regarded as a single defining characteristic, although it may be one of the factors 
to be considered”.174 Despite this critique, it seems that deprivation and expropriation are 
viewed as two distinct categories of interference, with State acquisition as a requirement for 
expropriation.175 This means that, if the property is not acquired by the State, then the 
interference will be regarded as a deprivation. With the requirement of State acquisition in 
mind, it has to be considered whether the restrictions on subdivision and the imposition of 
land ceilings amount to expropriation of property.176  
2 7 If so, does the deprivation comply with the requirements of sections 25(2)(a) and (b)? 
Furthermore, if the deprivation amounts to an expropriation, it must comply with the 
requirements in section 25(2)177 and section 25(3).178 In short, the expropriation (a) must be 
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undertaken in terms of a law of general application; (b) must serve a public purpose or public 
interest; and (c) may only take place against just and equitable compensation.179 If the 
deprivation does not comply with these requirements, the expropriation will be invalid and 
unconstitutional. Each of these requirements will be discussed briefly below.  
2 7 1 Law of general application  
Section 25(2) of the Constitution states that property may be expropriated in terms of law of 
general application.180 Similarly, section 36(1) of the Constitution provides that the rights in 
the Bill of Rights may only be limited in terms of law of general application. Accordingly, 
many of the same considerations apply in the various stages of the FNB-methodology. If the 
FNB-methodology is followed, and if Roux’s prediction about the “vortex” effect realises, it 
is unlikely that property cases would be subjected to this requirement, because it will in all 
likelihood be dealt with conclusively during the deprivation analysis.181 In essence, there 
must be legislation that authorises the expropriation of property.182 
2 7 2 Public purpose/interest   
Section 25(2) of the Constitution provides that property may be expropriated for a public 
purpose or in the public interest.183 Furthermore, section 25(4)(a) of the Constitution explains 
that the public interest includes “the nation’s commitment to land reform and to reforms to 
bring about equitable access to all South Africa’s natural resources”. Again, it is unnecessary 
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to discuss this requirement further, because it is unlikely that the public interest requirement 
in section 25(2) will be interpreted so narrowly as to frustrate or impede expropriation for 
purposes of land reform.184 Furthermore, this requirement will play a relatively insignificant 
role in light of Roux’s predication about the telescoping or vortex effect of the FNB-
methodology, as explained.185 
2 7 3 Compensation  
As the property clause is currently formulated,186 section 25(3) provides for a framework 
within which the duty to compensate, the manner and time of payment and the amount of 
compensation for expropriation should be determined.187 Specifically, the section provides 
that compensation in cases of expropriation has to be just and equitable.188 Courts are thus 
enjoined to consider all of the factors listed in section 25(3)(a)-(e), namely: (a) the current 
use of the property; (b) the history of the acquisition and the use of the property; (c) the 
market value of the property; (d) the extent of direct State investment and subsidy in the 
acquisition and beneficial capital improvement of the expropriation; and (e) the purpose of 
the expropriation. Accordingly, the Constitution does not make provision for compensation 
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at market value. Instead, it makes provision for “just and equitable” compensation in cases 
of expropriation189 of which market value is only one factor.190  
Therefore, in terms of sections 25(3)(a)-(e) it may possible, in suitable cases, that the 
expropriation may be just and equitable without any compensation.191 However, it is clear 
that it would not be sufficient to consider one factor, such as the purpose of the expropriation, 
on its own to justify the absence of compensation.192 Instead, all the relevant circumstances, 
including but not limited to those considerations listed in the Constitution, should be taken 
into account to determine what would constitute just and equitable compensation.193 
2 8 If not, is the expropriation justified under section 36? 
If the expropriation does not comply with one of the requirements discussed above, then the 
next step of the FNB-methodology is whether the expropriation can be justified under section 
36 of the Constitution. As explained, Roux opines that this stage of the constitutional inquiry 
will only be reached in exceptional cases, if at all.194 For example, a law providing for 
expropriation of property that is not aimed at achieving a public purpose or public interest 
will in all likelihood fail the arbitrariness test in section 25(1) and section 36 during the 
deprivation analysis.195 Accordingly, it is not necessary to consider this step further.  
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3 The constitutionality of mechanisms for the regulation of agricultural land 
3 1 Introduction 
In line with the FNB-methodology set out above, the constitutionality of SALA and the 
Regulation Bill is analysed forthwith. Importantly, the focus of this section falls on the 
substantive and procedural arbitrariness of the regulatory provisions in SALA and the 
Regulation Bill in relation to (a) the restriction on subdivision of agricultural land; (b) the 
imposition of land ceilings; and (c) (i) the prohibition on foreigners to acquire any agricultural 
land; and (ii) the restrictions placed on foreigners in relation to the disposal of agricultural 
land.  
3 2 Does that which is taken away or interfered with amount to property for purposes of 
section 25?  
In terms of SALA and the Regulation Bill, the object is land, specifically agricultural land, 
which clearly constitutes property and enjoys protection under section 25.196 Furthermore, 
SALA and the Regulation Bill specifically limit the rights of an agricultural land owner. The 
nature of the right affected in this regard is a real right in land, namely ownership.197 
Ownership entitlements (or incidents of ownership) constitute an interest in property for 
purposes of section 25 and therefore enjoys protection under the property clause.198 Having 
established that both SALA and the Regulation Bill limit a property interest protected under 
section 25 of the Constitution, the next step of the FNB-methodology emerges.  
3 3 Has there been a deprivation of such property?  
In line with the wide definition in FNB and Shoprite Checkers, it is clear that the restrictions 
on the subdivision of agricultural land; the imposition of land ceilings on agricultural land; 
the prohibition against foreigners to acquire any agricultural land; and the restrictions 
imposed on foreigners with regard to the disposal of agricultural land amount to a deprivation 
of property. As SALA (and when promulgated, the Preservation Bill) prohibits the subdivision 
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of agricultural land without ministerial consent, it restricts the owner’s right to freely use and 
dispose his or her property.199 Accordingly, irrespective of whether the Minister provides 
consent for the subdivision, the deprivation occurs by virtue of the legislation that restricts 
the owner’s ability to subdivide his/her agricultural land. Likewise, land ceilings in terms of 
the Regulation Bill and restrictions such as the right of first refusal granted to the State in 
cases where a foreign owner wishes to dispose of his or her property, limit the owner’s right 
to freely use and dispose of his or her property.  
In other words, the existence of these regulatory mechanisms clearly amount to legally 
significant interferences, because they restrict or interfere with a property holder’s right to 
use, enjoy, exploit and dispose of  property freely. However, a deprivation in itself is not 
unconstitutional – only where the deprivation amounts to an unauthorised or arbitrary 
deprivation will property rights be infringed. Consequently, the test as set out in FNB for 
determining whether a deprivation amounts to an arbitrary deprivation is applied below.  
3 4 If there has been a deprivation, is such a deprivation consistent with the provisions of 
section 25(1)?  
Having established that both SALA and the Regulation Bill limit a property interest protected 
under section 25 of the Constitution, the next step of the FNB-methodology emerges. In 
terms of section 25(1) a regulatory deprivation must be effected in terms of law of general 
application and may not be arbitrary.200 These two requirements are discussed forthwith. 
3 4 1 Law of general application  
The nature of SALA as original legislation applies generally and does not single out an 
individual or group of individuals, but rather applies to all agricultural land owners. 
Accordingly, SALA constitutes, and the Preservation and Regulation Bills constitutes “law of 
general application”.  
Once promulgated, the Regulation Bill will, in principle, also apply to all agricultural land 
owners.201 However, while the Regulation Bill applies to private and public agricultural land, 
it can be argued that the Regulation Bill will impact primarily on white agricultural land 
owners (citizens and foreigners), given the aim to redistribute agricultural land to Black 
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persons in particular. Accordingly, the regulatory deprivations embodying the restrictions on 
subdivisions or the imposition of land ceilings on agricultural land, will be authorised in terms 
of legislation.  
3 4 2 Substantive and procedural arbitrariness  
Whether a sufficient reason for the deprivation exists will depend on the interplay of the 
factors or considerations and relationships identified by the Court in FNB.202 These 
considerations should result in a determination of whether the reason for the deprivation 
would require a rational relationship between the means and end or whether a more 
burdensome and proportionate relationship between the means and ends should exist for 
the deprivation not to be arbitrary.203 Accordingly, the provisions of SALA and the 
Preservation Bill must provide sufficient reason for their imposition and must be procedurally 
fair. Likewise, if the provisions of the Regulation Bill do not provide sufficient reason or are 
procedurally unfair, then the deprivation will be arbitrary and consequently unconstitutional. 
For this section, the restrictions on subdivision in terms of SALA; the imposition of land 
ceilings in terms of the Regulation Bill; and the prohibition or restrictions placed on foreigners 
to acquire and dispose of agricultural land will be discussed separately.  
3 4 2 1 The constitutionality of restrictions on subdivision  
3 4 2 1 1 Substantive arbitrariness 
The first consideration is the relationship between the means employed and the ends sought 
to be achieved by SALA. As mentioned, SALA aims to prevent the fragmentation of 
agricultural land into uneconomic units in order to preserve prime agricultural land.204 In 
determining whether the means are justified in achieving the aim, the way in which SALA is 
implemented must be taken into consideration. The mere existence of the prohibition on 
subdivision constitutes a deprivation of property. However, SALA does not impose an 
absolute prohibition on subdivision, as it attaches an application process which ensures that 
a proposed subdivision does not result in the uneconomic fragmentation of agricultural land. 
It may also be necessary, at this stage of the enquiry to consider whether the aim could be 
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achieved in an alternative way or whether the regulation of subdivision is the only way in 
which agricultural land can be preserved and conserved.  
The second consideration is the relationship between the purpose and the person affected. 
The provision which places a prohibition on subdivision of agricultural land only affects the 
owner of agricultural land. Only the owner can make an application for subdivision to the 
Minister.  
The next consideration is the relationship between the purpose of the deprivation, the nature 
of the property in question and the extent of the deprivation. The nature of the property is 
immovable and the nature of the right affected by SALA is a real right in land, namely 
ownership. In this regard, Ackerman J stated that if the property in question is ownership of 
land, “a more compelling purpose will have to be established in order for the depriving law 
to constitute sufficient reason for the deprivation”.205 According to Frantz, the fact that the 
deprivation affects ownership of agricultural land would require a proportionate, rather than 
a rational, relationship between the means employed and the ends sought to be achieved.206 
Where the purpose is land reform as envisaged in section 25(4) of the Constitution, then the 
relationship between the means employed and the ends achieved would require a rational, 
instead of a proportionate, relationship. 
The extent of the deprivation and the effect of the prohibition on subdivision on the incidents 
of ownership of the land owner also have to be considered. SALA limits the right of disposal 
(specifically the right to subdivide and then sell, or to register a long-term lease; to register 
certain servitudes or to bequeath property). However, the deprivation does not limit all the 
incidents of ownership. The provisions of SALA only affect the right of disposal. Arguably, 
this consideration will not require a more compelling reason, because the deprivation only 
requires the owner to apply for subdivision before exercising the right to dispose of the 
agricultural land. Based on this consideration, the scale between rationality and 
proportionality may shift back to mere rationality.  
Accordingly, based on the analysis of and interplay between the factors established in FNB, 
it can be concluded that a mere rational relationship between the means employed and the 
ends achieved would establish a sufficient reason. Arguably, the purpose of SALA is 
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compelling enough to establish a rational nexus between the regulation of subdivision and 
the preservation of agricultural land. In conclusion, the effect of the prohibition on subdivision 
in terms of section 3 of SALA on the right of disposal is not substantively arbitrary and 
therefore constitutionally permissible. 
3 4 2 1 2 Procedural arbitrariness 
Having regard to the flexible-circumstance based standard laid out in Mkontwana,207 and 
the relevant circumstances in Reflect-All,208 SALA prohibits or limits the right to subdivide, 
subject to the application process set out in section 4. As explained above,209 a decision 
taken by the Minister cannot be challenged in terms of procedural fairness under section 25, 
but should be approached in accordance with administrative law, specifically PAJA. In short, 
the decision (administrative action),210 by the Minister to decline an application for 
subdivision will have to be reviewed internally211 or be subjected to judicial review under 
section 6 of PAJA. Therefore, the imposition of restrictions on subdivision of agricultural land 
is not substantively or procedurally arbitrary, and thus constitutional.  
3 4 2 2 The constitutionality of land ceilings   
3 4 2 2 1 Substantive arbitrariness 
The Regulation Bill regulates agricultural land by setting caps on the amount of agricultural 
land a person may own.212 The parameters for determining the land ceiling are provided for 
in the Regulation Bill. Any holdings in excess of those ceilings will be regarded as 
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“redistribution agricultural land”.213 The owner of the redistribution agricultural land, 
irrespective of whether the owner is a foreigner or a citizen, must first offer the “redistribution 
agricultural land” for sale to Black persons214 and thereafter to the Minister. In this regard, it 
is questioned whether the imposition of land ceilings in terms of the Regulation Bill amount 
to an arbitrary deprivation of property. Phrased differently: Would the Regulation Bill pass 
constitutional muster?  
 
To determine whether there is sufficient reason for the deprivation of agricultural land, the 
relationship between the imposition of land ceilings (the means) and the redistributive aim 
(the ends) needs to be evaluated.215 Whether a test for rationality or something closer to 
proportionality is required to determine whether a regulatory measure provides sufficient 
reason for the deprivation, will depend on the circumstances of the case. Again, the 
considerations listed in FNB emerge here.  
 
In accordance with section 25(5) and 25(8) of the Constitution, the purpose or aim of the 
regulatory measure constituting a deprivation, as explained, is inter alia to obtain agricultural 
land for redistribution;216 to redress the past imbalances in access to agricultural land;217 
and to promote food security.218 The people affected by the imposition of land ceilings are 
all agricultural land owners219 including natural or juristic persons (which include trusts). 
However, institutional funds220 that own portions of agricultural land holdings which amount 
to “redistribution agricultural land” may apply for exemption from the Minister.221 
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The Regulation Bill affects immovable property, specifically all agricultural land. Accordingly, 
this requirement requires that a more compelling purpose will have to be established for a 
sufficient reason to exist.222 Roux argues that one of the main exceptions to this rule may 
be the most controversial, namely “the deprivation of ownership rights in land in pursuit of 
land reform”.223 He furthermore argues that the:  
“normative force of the declaration in s[ection] 25(4)(a) that the public interest includes the nation’s 
commitment to land reform; together with the attempted immunisation of land reform from 
constitutional impediment in s[ection] 25(8), may have the effect of lowering the level of scrutiny, 
even though the property in question is ownership of land” (my emphasis).224 
 
In other words, where the purpose is land reform, the level of scrutiny may be lowered. 
Moreover, all the other factors also need to be considered to determine the level of scrutiny 
and to determine whether there is sufficient reason for the deprivation. Clearly, the nature 
of the property in question and the extent of the deprivation will have to be considered as 
well. Land reform programmes and regulatory measures have the potential to increase or 
decrease agricultural production.225 Given the importance of agriculture and accordingly, the 
nature of the property, for food security, economic growth,226 employment and poverty 
alleviation, the level of scrutiny may require something more than a simple rational 
connection between the means employed by the Regulation Bill and the land reform oriented 
goal envisaged by the Bill.  
 
The extent of the deprivation will depend on a number of factors, including the size of the 
agricultural land holding (which will vary from district to district) and the ceiling imposed in 
terms of clause 25 of the Regulation Bill. Depending on the circumstances, it is possible that 
only a small portion of land becomes “redistribution land”. While the exact size of the portion 
of the land that will be deprived of is uncertain at this point, it is clear that the agricultural 
land owner will be deprived of all of his, her or its ownership entitlements in relation to the 
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relevant parcel of land. In other words, the deprivation, regardless of the size of the land 
holding, will embrace all the incidents of ownership. Arguably, this shifts the level of scrutiny 
required towards proportionality. 
 
In light of the fact that the imposition of a land ceiling impacts primarily white agricultural 
land owners (although it is applicable to private and public agricultural land owners in 
principle); deprives the owner of immovable property, (specifically agricultural land which is 
important for food security and economic growth); and deprives the owner of all the incidents 
of ownership and having regard to the aims of the Regulation Bill, it may be argued that 
something more than a rationality analysis is required to determine whether there is 
sufficient reason for the deprivation. Accordingly, depending on the particular circumstances 
of each case, a rational or proportional connection between the imposition of land ceilings 
and the aim of the Regulation Bill may be required. 
 
In other words, in some cases, depending on the size of the land and the ceiling imposed 
per district, it may be sufficient for the evaluation to focus on rationality, while in other cases 
a proportionality analysis may be required. If, for example, an agricultural land owner is 
deprived of (almost) all his or her agricultural land, then it will have to be determined whether 
there is a proportional relationship between the means employed and the ends sought to be 
achieved. If this is the case, then the elements of proportionality, namely (a) legitimacy;227 
(b) suitability;228 (c) necessity229 and (d) fair balance230 need to be considered.  
 
Firstly, with regard to the element of legitimacy, it is clear that the Regulation Bill pursues a 
legitimate (and constitutional) aim, namely to bring about equitable access to land in line 
with the mandate in the Constitution231 by redressing the past imbalances in access to 
agricultural land and promoting food security. Secondly, with regard to the element of 
suitability, it may be questionable whether the Regulation Bill is capable of achieving its 
aims. In this regard, it is highly unlikely that the Bill would be able to redistribute land and 
ensure food security. The aims of the Regulation Bill may be regarded as “overreaching”, 
because there are no mechanisms in the Regulation Bill that provide for the support of 
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beneficiaries once the agricultural land has been redistributed. Nor are there specific 
provisions in the Bill that promote and ensure food security. Thirdly, with regard to the 
element of necessity, it is questionable whether the imposition of land ceilings is the least 
intrusive (and most effective) means of realising these legitimate aims. Instead, it may be 
necessary to explore other redistributive regulatory mechanisms. Lastly, given the analysis 
of the suitability and necessity of the regulatory measure, the realisation of the aim of the 
Regulation Bill may outweigh the complete deprivation of all ownership incidents.  
 
Accordingly, a law that authorises an excessive burden on one individual or a small group 
of individuals (white agricultural land owners) could be arbitrary and invalid, even though it 
serves a legitimate, important and even constitutionally enshrined public purpose or public 
interest.232 To illustrate, a distinction can be drawn between cases where the aim of the 
regulatory measure is land reform and where it is not. On the one hand, where a law places 
an excessive burden on the owner or completely deprives the owner of all his or her rights 
in land and is not effected in pursuit of land reform or other reforms aimed at broadening 
access to land, it is unlikely to pass constitutional muster. In such cases, Roux argues that 
the deprivation will amount to an expropriation.233 On the other hand, where a law places an 
excessive burden on the owner or completely deprives the owner of all his or her rights in 
land in pursuit of land reform, then the law is unlikely to be found unconstitutional.234 In this 
regard, Bezuidenhout argues that: 
“Deprivation that results in an excessively harsh regulatory burden for one or a small group of 
property owners will probably be substantively arbitrary and in conflict with section 25(1). Courts 
generally declare unconstitutional regulatory interferences with property rights invalid. However, 
invalidating legitimate regulatory measures that are otherwise lawful purely because they impose 
a harsh and excessive burden on some property owners may not always be justified if the 
regulatory measure fulfils an important regulatory purpose”.235 
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In conclusion, the imposition of land ceilings may in some cases, depending on the size of 
the agricultural land holding and the ceiling imposed per district, may cause a harsh and 
excessive regulatory burden on agricultural land owners which will result in an arbitrary 
deprivation of property. In other cases, it may be that the deprivation is rational or 
proportionate. However, as the aim of the Regulation Bill is to promote land reform and 
broadening access to land, it will according to Roux, be unlikely to be found 
unconstitutional.236 He argues that this aim will in all likelihood outweigh the protection of 
private property rights. In such cases, Roux argues that the excessive regulatory measure 
should be transformed into and expropriation which requires the State to pay compensation 
to the affected owner.237  
However, in view of the FNB-methodology and the wording of section 25 it seems unlikely 
that the court will adopt constructive expropriation as a solution. Therefore Bezuidenhout 
suggests that, where it is not suitable to declare legislation invalid in light of the important 
regulatory purpose i.e. land reform that it aims to fulfil, land owners should be compensated 
for the deprivation.238   
Accordingly, it may be better, in accordance with Van der Walt’s adjusted or amended FNB-
methodology, to consider from the outset whether the imposition of the land ceiling amounts 
to a deprivation or an expropriation.239 Depending on the circumstances of each case, the 
imposition of land ceilings per district may be substantively arbitrary. The constitutionality of 
land ceilings will have to be determined on a case-by-case basis, district per district, having 
regard to all the factors, criteria and circumstances of the case.  
3 4 2 2 2 Procedural arbitrariness 
Clauses 25(1) and 25(3) of the Regulation Bill provides that the Minister must not only 
consult with the Land Commission and the Minister responsible for agriculture before 
determining the ceilings for each district, but he or she must also publish a draft of the 
proposed ceiling determination in the Government Gazette and in the media circulating 
nationally and in the relevant district. Such a notification must also call upon interested 
persons (such as agricultural land owners) to comment on the draft in writing. Interested 
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persons must make comments within a period not less than 30 days from the date of 
publication of the notice. Because land owners are afforded the opportunity to be heard 
during the decision-making process,240 it is likely that the Regulation Bill is procedurally fair.  
However, if the land owner wishes to challenge the administrative decision (the 
determination of the ceiling itself), made by the Minister, he or she will have to rely on the 
remedies available in PAJA.241 Interestingly, the Bill does not prima facie provide for periodic 
review of the legislative framework. For example, it is unclear whether it is possible to adjust 
the ceiling in light of changing criteria and factors periodically. It seems quite drastic to 
establish a ceiling once-off, without providing for adjustments in future. In this regard, the 
Bill may be procedurally unfair. However, this concern can easily be addressed if the Minister 
has the power to change a ceiling by notice in the Gazette, which he or she arguably has. 
Accordingly, the Regulation Bill is prima facie procedurally fair and is therefore 
constitutionally sound in this respect. Despite being procedurally fair and constitutional, it is 
questionable whether the complexity of such a framework with corresponding and fluctuating 
parameters will be effective in light of the aims of the redistribution programme.242  
3 4 2 3 The constitutionality of restrictions on the acquisition and disposal of agricultural land 
by foreigners   
3 4 2 3 1 Substantive arbitrariness 
Globally, laws on foreign ownership of agricultural land vary widely, ranging from prohibiting 
foreign ownership outright, to restrictions on the size of land a foreigner may hold, to no 
restrictions at all.243 As mentioned in Chapter 3,244 South Africa, at the start of the new 
constitutional dispensation, followed an approach to land where access is possible, for all 
persons, in principle.245 This approach can by characterised as an open, unlimited market 
approach, which does not prescribe the amount of (agricultural) land a citizen or foreign 
person or entity may own.246 In principle, access to land is unrestricted, but subject to the 
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imperative set out in section 25(5) of the Constitution in that the State has a duty to take 
necessary steps to broaden access to land for citizens specifically.247 Therefore, the 
regulation of access to land for non-citizens is in principle constitutionally based. In line with 
this duty, the State aims to broaden access to land for citizens by (a) restricting the amount 
of agricultural land any person, citizen or foreigner, may own by way of land ceilings;248 (b) 
restricting foreigners from acquiring ownership of agricultural land in future as provided for 
in the Regulation Bill;249 and (c) restricting the disposal of agricultural land by foreigners.250  
The constitutionality of land ceilings on citizens and foreign persons were already dealt with 
above.251 It is questioned whether the restrictions on foreigners to (a) acquire; and (b) 
dispose of agricultural land in terms of the Regulation Bill amount to an arbitrary deprivation 
of property. The prohibition to acquire agricultural land is dealt with first. 
Section 25(1) only protects existing property rights252 and does not guarantee private 
property as such. Instead, it sets out the parameters within which the government can 
interfere with private property rights, as explained. In terms of the Regulation Bill, foreign 
persons253 will not be able to own land in freehold “from the time the policy is passed into 
law”,254 i.e. the proposed Bill will not apply retrospectively and those who have already acquired 
ownership (freehold) will not have their tenure changed by the passing of the proposed 
legislation. While current foreign persons will still have ownership over agricultural land, their 
ownership will still be restricted in terms of the amount of agricultural land they may own.255  
After the promulgation of the Regulation Bill, foreign persons will not be allowed to acquire 
agricultural land. Instead, foreign persons will be eligible for long-term leases, which must be 
registered,256 for the duration of 30 to 50 years.257 Accordingly, those foreign persons who 
acquired agricultural land before the commencement of the Act will enjoy the protection 
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afforded in section 25(1), whereas foreign persons wanting to acquire agricultural land after 
the commencement of the Act will not.258  
Therefore, the Regulation Bill does not aim to deprive or extinguish a foreign person’s 
ownership of agricultural land. The prohibition on the acquisition of agricultural land by 
foreigners does not infringe the right to property and therefore section 25(1) is not applicable. 
Accordingly, the constitutionality of the prohibition against the acquisition of agricultural land 
by foreigners cannot be tested against section 25(1) of the Constitution and the 
considerations in the FNB analysis do not have a role to play here.  
The Regulation Bill does however restrict the disposal of agricultural land by foreign persons 
specifically.259 It provides that a foreign person disposing of ownership of an agricultural land 
holding, must first offer the land to the Minister. In this regard, the Minister has a right of first 
refusal to purchase the agricultural land. Where the Minister does not wish to acquire the 
land, the foreign person must make the land available for acquisition to citizens. The test set 
out in FNB will be used to determine whether the restriction on the disposal of agricultural 
land is constitutional, by considering each step. This requires an evaluation of the 
relationship between the means employed, the disposal restrictions and the ends sought 
(broadening access to land) to be achieved.260  
It is clear that the restriction to dispose of agricultural land applies to all foreign owners. 
Furthermore, the nature of the property is immovable, specifically agricultural land, which is 
significant for, inter alia, promoting food security and economic growth.  Again, where the 
property in question is ownership of land, a compelling purpose will have to be established 
in order for the depriving law to constitute sufficient reason for the deprivation.261 In this 
regard, the regulatory measures aim to broaden access to land for land reform or 
redistribution purposes as envisaged in the Constitution. In this light the level of scrutiny will 
probably amount to something closer to rationality.  
Furthermore, with regard to the extent of the deprivation, the deprivation does not deprive 
the foreign owner of all of his rights in land. The restriction only affects the foreign owner’s 
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right to dispose of his property as he wishes. The Regulation Bill specifically sets out the 
process for disposal of agricultural land by a foreigner.262 Therefore, the restriction only 
proscribes how the owner is to dispose of his property. The owner is thus only prevented 
from disposing of his property, to a buyer of his choice. Because only one incident of 
ownership is affected by the Regulation Bill, the evaluation will only require a rational 
relationship between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised. The 
restrictions imposed on the foreigner to dispose of his property, i.e. to grant the Minister a 
right of first refusal, seem rational. The more land the Minister can acquire, the more land 
will be available in principle to realise the constitutional mandate to broaden access to land 
for citizens. Inevitably these actions are endorsed by and aligned with section 25(4)(a) of 
the Constitution. 
Accordingly, where only one entitlement or some entitlements only are affected and the 
impact of the law does not impose a disproportionate burden on those affected when 
weighed against the purpose sought to be achieved, especially where the purpose of the 
law is land reform, then the law will in all likelihood be found to be constitutional.263 In this 
light, there is seemingly sufficient reason for the deprivation. Therefore, the restriction on 
the disposal of agricultural land by foreigners is non-arbitrary and constitutional.  
3 4 2 2 2 Procedural arbitrariness 
Similar to the argument for procedural fairness in terms of SALA,264 the Regulation Bill does 
not place an absolute prohibition on the disposal of agricultural land. Instead, the foreign 
person is only restricted in his choice of buyer, as explained above. Where the State does 
not intend to or does not in fact acquire the agricultural land from the foreigner, the foreign 
person will be free to sell his or her property to any Black South African citizen.265 The 
process in the Regulation Bill serves as a procedural safeguard, similar to the application 
process for subdivision in SALA.266 Therefore, the imposition of restrictions on the disposal 
of agricultural land by a foreign person in terms of the Regulation Bill is neither substantively, 
nor procedurally arbitrary and therefore constitutional. Hence, all the regulatory mechanisms 
discussed are constitutional. It is therefore not necessary to determine whether the 
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deprivation is justified in terms of section 36 of the Constitution in accordance with the FNB-
methodology. 
3 5 Does the deprivation amount to an expropriation in terms of section 25(2) of the 
Constitution?  
Despite passing scrutiny under section 25(1) and/or under section 36(1), it still needs to be 
determined whether the provisions in terms of SALA and the Regulation Bill amount to an 
expropriation. If it does, the deprivation must also comply with the requirements of section 
25(2)(a) and (b) of the Constitution. Each of the regulatory measures will be dealt with briefly 
below.  
Based on the requirement of State acquisition, it is clear that the prohibition to subdivide 
agricultural land in terms of SALA at no point provides for or results in the acquisition of said 
agricultural land by the State. Accordingly, the restriction on subdivision does not amount to 
an expropriation.  Depending on the acquisition method used by the State, the “redistribution 
agricultural land” acquired by the State may result in an expropriation.267 Furthermore, the 
prohibition on the acquisition of agricultural land by foreign persons is clearly a regulatory 
measure and does not allow for the expropriation of agricultural land owned by foreigners.  
Interestingly, in terms of the Regulation Bill, a foreigner disposing of ownership of agricultural 
land must first offer the Minister a right of first refusal to acquire ownership thereof.268  In 
this regard, the right of first refusal offered to the Minister means that the State will have to 
make use of market-led approaches to acquire the property. However, in cases where an 
offer to purchase is not accepted by the foreign person, the State may still, in principle, 
expropriate the property.   
Moreover, a foreign person or citizen wanting to dispose of any redistribution agricultural 
land, must first offer it to Black persons.269 Only where no Black person acquires the 
redistribution agricultural land, shall the Minister acquire the land.270 In this regard, the 
Regulation Bill makes provision for expropriation specifically, if the owner of the 
redistribution agricultural land and the Minister are unable to reach an agreement on the 
purchase price.271 Accordingly, in such cases the expropriation of agricultural land will have 
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to comply with the requirements set out in section 25(2)(a) and (b) of the Constitution.272 
Expropriation as an approach to acquiring agricultural land, and the requirements for an 
expropriation, are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.273 
4 Reflection  
Upon reflection of the FNB-methodology, it is clear that it may be difficult, in some cases, to 
determine whether the imposition of a land ceiling amounts to an arbitrary deprivation of 
property. Depending on the specific ceiling and the corresponding size of the agricultural 
land holding it may seem like the deprivation (in the form of the implementation of a land 
ceiling) places an excessively harsh regulatory burden on a small group of persons, namely 
agricultural land owners. Where this is the case, the regulatory measure may be 
substantively arbitrary and in conflict with section 25(1). Bezuidenhout points out that in such 
cases: 
“invalidating legitimate regulatory measures that are otherwise lawful purely because they impose 
a harsh and excessive burden on some property owners may not always be justified if the 
regulatory measure fulfils an important regulatory purpose”.274  
Some regulations, such as land ceilings, should arguably be saved from invalidity in light of 
the constitutional mandate to broaden access to land. In such cases, as Bezuidenhout 
argues, compensation should be given to soften the effect of the excessive regulation.275 
Alternatively, Roux suggests that the deprivation should be treated as an expropriation for 
which compensation is payable.276  
As the Regulation Bill is currently formulated, it may be unclear whether the regulatory 
measure constitutes a deprivation or expropriation of property, since the regulatory measure 
(the imposition of land ceilings) may, in some cases, require the State to acquire the 
“redistribution agricultural land” by way of expropriation.277 To avoid confusion, Van der Walt 
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has proposed an adapted form of the FNB methodology.278 The adapted version of the FNB 
methodology provides for the following steps or questions:  
“1. Beneficiaries: Is the complainant a beneficiary of section 25 protection? 
2. Property: is the alleged property interest constitutional property for purposes of section 25? 
3. Deprivation or expropriation: is the alleged interference with the protected property interest: 
a. a deprivation of property covered by section 25(1)? 
b. an expropriation of property covered by section 25(2)-(3)? 
4a. Deprivation: if the interference is a deprivation of property, is it: 
a. authorised by law of general application? 
b. if it is authorised by law of general application, does the law permit arbitrary deprivation of 
property? 
4b. Expropriation: if the interference is an expropriation, is the expropriation: 
a. authorised by law of general application? 
b. for a public purpose or in the public interest? 
c. accompanied by provision of just and equitable compensation? 
5. Justification: if the law of general application 
a. permits arbitrary deprivation of property [or] 
b. authorises expropriation without providing for just and equitable compensation is, it justifiable 
in terms of section 36(1)?”.279   
In terms of Van der Walt’s suggested methodology it is determined from the outset whether 
the measure constitutes a deprivation or expropriation of property. While it may be that the 
same conclusion is reached, when analysing whether the imposition of a land ceiling 
amounts to a deprivation or an expropriation, it shortens the inquiry considerably. The 
adapted FNB-methodology also avoids Roux’s arbitrariness vortex to a certain extent. The 
stages of the original FNB-methodology dealing with whether the mechanism in question is 
a law of general application and the limitation analysis in terms of section 36 under both the 
determination of a deprivation and an expropriation, is dealt with only once in terms of the 
adapted FNB-methodology. Accordingly, Van der Walt’s adapted version of the FNB-
methodology may be more appropriate to deal with the constitutionality of regulatory 
mechanisms such as the restrictions on subdivisions; the imposition of land ceilings; and the 
restrictions on foreigners to acquire and dispose of agricultural land.  
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5 Conclusion  
This Chapter set out to determine whether the imposition of regulatory measures, 
specifically (a) restrictions on the subdivision of agricultural land; (b) limiting the amount of 
land any person may own; and (c) restrictions imposed on foreigners in relation to the 
disposal and acquisition of agricultural land, is constitutional. The constitutionality of the 
mechanisms is evaluated in light of the FNB-methodology. While it is acknowledged that the 
FNB-methodology has not been without critique, it is still regarded as authoritative precedent 
for determining whether there has been a constitutional infringement of property rights in 
terms of section 25 of the Constitution. Each step or question of the methodology is set out 
and discussed. Subsequently, each regulatory measure is analysed to determine whether it 
complies with the requirements of the FNB-methodology to establish whether it is 
constitutional.   
With regard to the first step (or question), it was found that the object in terms of all the 
regulatory mechanisms is land, specifically agricultural land, which clearly constitutes 
property and enjoys protection under section 25. In terms of the second question, whether 
there has been a deprivation of property, it was found that the implementation of the 
regulatory measures amounted to a deprivation of property, regardless of whether a wide or 
narrow interpretation of deprivation is followed. Consequently, the next step, requires one 
to determine whether the deprivation complies with the requirements of section 25(1). In this 
regard, it must be determined whether the deprivation took place in terms of law of general 
application and whether the deprivation amounts to an arbitrary deprivation. It was accepted 
that the SALA and the Regulation Bill constitute law of general application. The 
Constitutional Court in FNB determined that “a deprivation of property is ‘arbitrary’ as meant 
in section 25 when the ‘law’ referred to in section 25(1) does not provide sufficient reason 
for the deprivation in question or [it] is procedurally unfair.”280 The considerations to 
determine substantive and procedural arbitrariness were consequently outlined. However, 
the determination of the arbitrariness of each regulatory mechanism necessitated a separate 
exploration because of the extensive analysis in terms of the substantive and procedural 
arbitrariness question. 
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The question whether the arbitrary deprivation of property can be justified under section 36 
of the Constitution was not discussed, because it was accepted that the same 
considerations (or factors) considered under the arbitrariness question will come into play 
when dealing with this question. In order to avoid repetition, this step was thus not elaborated 
on and applied. 
Where the deprivation is not arbitrary, it still needs to be considered whether the deprivation 
amounts to an expropriation of property. In this regard, expropriations are regarded as a 
subset of a deprivation. It was found that the restrictions on subdivision and the restrictions 
on the acquisition and disposal of agricultural land by foreigners did not amount to an 
expropriation. However, when dealing with the imposition of land ceilings, the Regulation 
Bill expressly provides for the expropriation of “redistribution agricultural land” in some 
cases. In such cases, the expropriation of the agricultural land will have to comply with the 
requirements set out in the next step of the FNB-methodology. The expropriation must be 
effected in terms of law of general application; it must serve a public purpose or public 
interest; and it must provide for the payment of just and equitable compensation. Again, for 
the same reasons mentioned above, the question whether the expropriation was justifiable 
under the limitation clause of the Constitution, was unnecessary.   
Once all the steps of the FNB-methodology were discussed, the focus fell on the 
determination of the substantive and procedural arbitrariness of the regulatory measures. In 
terms of the analysis of the substantive arbitrariness of the restrictions on subdivision, it was 
concluded that the level of scrutiny amounted to rationality. In this regard it was established 
that the restrictions were rationally connected to the aim of the legislation. This concludes 
that there is sufficient reason for the deprivation. Furthermore, with regard to the procedural 
arbitrariness, the restrictions imposed on the agricultural land owner’s right to dispose of his 
or her property were found to be procedurally fair. In this light the implementation of 
restrictions on subdivision does not amount to an arbitrary deprivation of property and is 
therefore constitutional.  
Given the analysis of the considerations listed in FNB,281 the substantive arbitrariness 
analysis for the imposition of land ceilings may require a level of scrutiny that resembles a 
proportionality analysis. The elements of proportionality, namely legitimacy; suitability; 
necessity; and fair balance were considered in this regard. It was argued and established 
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that in some cases, given the size of the agricultural land holding and the ceiling imposed 
thereon inter alia, the implementation of the regulatory mechanism may amount to an 
arbitrary deprivation of property, because there would not be a proportional balance between 
the regulatory measure and the aim sought to be achieved. However, in light of the fact that 
(a) land reform is constitutionally mandated; and (b) that land reform may be immunised 
from constitutional impediment in section 25(8), the implementation of the Regulation Bill is 
likely to pass constitutional muster. Because the Regulation Bill will be promulgated to give 
effect to section 25(5) of the Constitution, it will in all likelihood be found to be substantively 
non-arbitrary. Furthermore, it was also found that the determination and consequently the 
implementation of land ceilings, are procedurally fair. Accordingly, the implementation of 
land ceilings in all likelihood does not amount to an arbitrary deprivation of property and is 
therefore constitutional. 
Whether the restrictions on foreigners to (a) acquire and (b) dispose of agricultural land, 
amount to an arbitrary deprivation of property was dealt with separately. In terms of the 
prohibition to acquire agricultural land once the Regulation Bill is promulgated, it was 
established that the protection of section 25 does not apply, because it only protects existing 
property rights. The prohibition against the acquisition of agricultural land could therefore 
not be tested against any of the stages of the FNB-methodology. In terms of the restrictions 
on the disposal of agricultural land by foreigners it was found that the level of scrutiny, given 
the considerations listed in FNB, was something closer to rationality. The extent of the 
deprivation only affects the foreign owner’s right to dispose of his or her property partially. 
The owner can still dispose of the property, but to whom he or she can dispose the property 
is determined by the Regulation Bill. Weighed against the constitutional mandate in section 
25(5), the deprivation was found to be substantively non-arbitrary, because sufficient (and 
a constitutional) reason is specifically provided. In other words, there is a rational connection 
between the implementation of the restriction and the aim of the Regulation Bill. The 
restrictions were also found to be procedurally fair. Consequently, the restriction on 
foreigners to dispose of agricultural land is constitutional.  
Where the regulatory measures do not amount to an arbitrary deprivation of property, they 
may amount to an expropriation of property. The approach to acquiring agricultural land by 
way of expropriation and the requirements for a valid expropriation are dealt with in Chapter 




Chapter 5: Approaches to the acquisition of agricultural land 
in South Africa 
1 Introduction  
Since embarking on an all-encompassing land reform programme, one of the most 
contentious issues that confronted the South African government was the acquisition and 
transferral of sufficiently suitable land, on a large scale, in an affordable and sustainable 
manner.1 In this regard, both State-owned and privately owned land may be available for 
redistribution. However, the manner of acquiring the land, specifically agricultural land, may 
differ depending on whether it is State-owned land or private land. For example, where 
State-owned land is already in the hands of the State to redistribute, land may have to be 
transferred from one department or Minister to another before it may be redistributed to the 
intended beneficiaries. Such a process will not involve market-led approaches or 
expropriation. However, where privately owned land has to be acquired for redistribution 
purposes, different acquisition approaches, including market-led approaches and 
expropriation, may be used. The focus, for purposes of this Chapter, falls on the different 
ways of acquiring private agricultural land for redistribution.  
In South Africa, the basic approach to the acquisition of private land was directly linked to 
the peaceful political transition which resulted in negotiated, market-led or market-assisted 
land reform, founded on the willing-buyer-willing-seller (“WBWS”) principle.2 This was 
reflected in section 25 of the Constitution in terms of which existing property rights were 
protected but embedded within a constitutional land reform programme.3 Coupled with these 
considerations, was the importance of international investment confidence in a new 
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democratic South Africa.4 Inevitably, a market-led approach to land acquisition, which 
underpinned the redistribution programme was chosen and followed.5 To the extent that the 
WBWS principle may have caused price hikes, making a market-based approach to land 
reform expensive and potentially unaffordable and  unsustainable,6 the political pressure7 
necessitated an increase in the rate of making land available for land reform purposes, of 
better quality, at a faster rate and at affordable prices.8 Subsequently, the Policy Framework 
for Land Acquisition and Land Valuation published in 20129 proposed, inter alia, that the 
South African government should abolish the WBWS principle, while making more use of 
expropriation as a means or approach of acquiring land.10  
Despite adjusting the expropriation paradigm to bring it in line with the Constitution and the 
objectives linked to land reform,11 by way of, inter alia drafting a new Draft Expropriation 
Bill,12 the State may have neglected to use its expropriation powers stringently. However, in 
light of recent developments,13 which may result in an amended property clause that 
authorises expropriation without compensation,14 the State may be poised to utilise these 
powers more in future.  
Accordingly, in light of these developments there are various approaches to acquiring private 
agricultural land, including (a) market-led approaches (based on the WBWS principle); (b) 
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expropriation (with or without compensation); and (c) confiscation. This Chapter provides an 
overview of each of these approaches with the aim of establishing which approach or 
approaches may be regarded as the most suitable for the acquisition and redistribution of 
agricultural land in light of land reform imperatives. The suitability of the approach is 
discussed in Chapter 6 below.15 In this regard, suitability encompasses a number of factors 
or criteria, including (a) the constitutionality; (b) the efficacy; (c) the affordability and (d) the 
outcome of the approach.16  
2 Market-led approaches 
2 1 Introduction  
Since embarking on the land reform programme, the South African government opted for a 
market-based17 or market-assisted approach18 for the acquisition of land,19 which was also 
actively promoted by the World Bank.20 The market-based approach advanced by the World 
Bank in the early 1990’s21 essentially promoted State-assisted land purchase and transfer 
of title to beneficiaries as key elements for acquisition and redistribution of land.22 This 
approach was based on the WBWS principle23 as confirmed in the White Paper on South 
African Land Policy24 (“White Paper”) which specifically provided that:   
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“Redistributive land reform will be largely based on willing buyer willing seller arrangements”.25 
Essentially, Act 126 forms the legal basis for redistribution.26 In terms of the Act, the Minister 
may acquire and designate land and develop such land for purposes of small-scale farming, 
residential, public, community and business or similar purposes 27 and provide funds for land 
purchase.28 The details of the redistribution programme are found in various policy 
documents, which set out either demand-led29 or supply-led30 approaches to the acquisition 
of land. Both approaches are founded on the WBWS principle. With a demand-led approach, 
the initiative to acquire land lies with potential buyers or more specifically, with the potential 
beneficiaries of the redistribution programme and not with the State.31 In other words, the 
beneficiaries are regarded as the willing buyers in terms of the demand-led approach. In this 
regard, the role of the State is limited to screening applicants, approving and supplying 
grants to them, subsidising the land transfer and planning land use.32 In terms of a supply-
led approach to the acquisition of land, the State purchases land upfront from the land 
owners (willing sellers) and later identifies beneficiaries to whom the land can be transferred 
in terms of lease or title.33 In other words, the State is regarded as the willing buyer in terms 
of the supply-led approach.  
Accordingly, a market-based approach to agrarian reform can follow a demand-led (as 
proposed by the White Paper) or supply-led model. The South African government has 
followed both models, under different leadership over the years.34 It is noteworthy that the 
WBWS principle functions within both models.35  
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Initially, State-assisted, demand-led land purchase took the form of small grants to poor 
households to buy land for settlement and small-scale farming.36 However, from 2000 under 
the leadership of Former President Thabo Mbeki, a new policy, which provided for larger 
grants in favour of the poor and Black capitalist farmers emerged.37 From 2011, under 
Former President Jacob Zuma, the State moved away from State-assisted land acquisition 
to State-led purchase.38 Under this supply-driven approach, the State became the purchaser 
of land (the willing buyer) which did not always result in the transfer of title to the 
beneficiaries.39 Instead, such land acquired by the State was usually leased to the 
beneficiaries. 
These market-led approaches are explored to ascertain whether they are suitable for the 
acquisition of agricultural land for redistribution purposes.  
2 2 The WBWS principle  
The WBWS principle describes (a) how land can be identified and acquired for redistribution; 
and (b) how land prices can be determined.40 Each of these aspects will be discussed briefly.  
Generally, the WBWS principle provides that land be acquired by way of a voluntary 
transaction involving the purchase of land from land owners (willing sellers) willing to sell 
their land to willing buyers, either to the beneficiaries of the redistribution programme or to 
the State.41 However, the land owner will always be regarded as the willing seller, regardless 
of whether the demand-led or supply-led approach is followed.42 The WBWS principle 
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essentially provides land owners with discretion over their participation in the land reform 
programme.43 
In practice, the WBWS principle usually works as follows: The potential buyer searches for 
and identifies land which he or she wishes to acquire. Much like a private transaction, a 
written agreement has to be entered into between the seller and the buyer after the land has 
been identified and the seller is willing to sell the land. The agreement includes an agreed 
price, which an independent valuer has to confirm as being “market-related”.44 Furthermore, 
the written agreement has to be accompanied by a farm plan (or business plan). In this 
regard, the identification of the land and the drafting of the required document alone could 
take any time period between two months and two years.45 Accordingly, the procedure 
restricts the potential buyer from participating in public auctions or concluding a private 
transaction within the usual timeframe demanded by the market, which excludes them from 
the majority of land sales.46 In the meantime, the willing seller who made his or her farm 
available for acquisition is required to wait for an extended period for confirmation of the 
sale.47 During this time, there was no guarantee that the State would agree to the sale.48 
The State could turn down the transaction on technical grounds or on the basis of insufficient 
funds.49 Essentially, the process left both the seller and the buyer in limbo. The buyer could 
not begin with the farming process and the seller could not exploit his or her farm in light of 
the pending sale agreement.50 
As mentioned above, the price for the land in question has to be market-related,51 which 
usually amounts to market value. In this regard, the WBWS principle can also be used as 
an approach to determine the price for the land on the open market.52 Accordingly, it has to 
be determined what a willing seller would be willing to accept for his or her property and 
what a willing buyer would be willing to pay for the property in question.53 Apart from more 
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elaboration on the determination of market value below,54 it is important to note that this 
issue does not form the main focus of this Chapter. 
2 3 Demand-led approach 
With a demand-led approach, the initiative to acquire land lies with potential buyers or more 
specifically, with the potential beneficiaries of the redistribution programme and not with the 
State.55 In this regard, the role of the State is limited to screening applicants, approving and 
supplying grants to them, subsidising the land transfer and planning land use.56 This 
demand-led model was confirmed in the White Paper where it is stated that:  
“Government will assist in the purchase of land, but will in general not be the buyer or the 
owner”.57  
Accordingly, from the outset, South Africa decided on a demand-led market approach based 
on the WBWS principle.58 Pienaar points out that the underlying idea was that it would serve 
as a kind of “sifting process”, because only those persons who were really interested in 
farming and who had the capacity to become productive farmers, would enter into the 
programme and would be provided with agricultural land.59 It was also argued that the costs 
of the programme would be limited, because the beneficiaries would have to select the land 
themselves.60 Coupled with the WBWS principle, various grant assisted programmes were 
established over the years to allow beneficiaries to acquire land. Each grant system is briefly 
discussed below.  
2 3 1 Settlement / Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG)  
Until 2000, the redistribution policy centred on the provision of the Settlement/Land 
Acquisition Grant (SLAG).61 This grant was proposed in the White Paper62 as a key element 
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of the redistribution programme.63 This grant, in line with the White Paper, was aimed at the 
provision of financial assistance to the rural poor64 and was available to households with an 
income of less than R1500 per month.65 The policy provided for a flat grant of R16 000 per 
household (later raised to R17 500) for the acquisition of land and start-up capital.66 The 
land was purchased mainly for settlement and agricultural production.67 The application for 
a grant also had to include a business plan.68 Essentially, SLAG provided fixed grants to 
self-selected beneficiaries.69 
This phase (1995-2000)70 of the redistribution programme in South Africa is generally 
described as targeting the poorest of the poor, which it appears to have done with some 
success.71 However, it was also criticised, amongst other aspects, for locating large groups 
of poor people on former commercial farms without providing them with the skills or 
resources to engage and excel in agricultural production.72 Furthermore, beneficiaries also 
had to pool their funds in order to be able to purchase unproductive land at high prices.73  
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A range of weaknesses in implementation and quality of the group projects created in SLAG 
were identified.74 This included the size of the grant which was inadequate to purchase 
suitable land and therefore perpetuated the forming of larger groups for acquiring farming 
units. The grant was furthermore too minimal to also finance the required production 
inputs.75 
2 3 2 Land Redistribution and Agricultural Development (LRAD)  
In 2001, the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD)76 effectively replaced 
SLAG.77 The LRAD embodied a move away from a focus on the landless poor towards 
agricultural production,78 aimed at creating a new class of black commercial farmers.79 In 
this regard, the new policy offered higher grants, which were paid to individuals rather than 
to households. The policy also made greater use of loan institutions such as the State-
owned Land Bank.80 Whereas SLAG was designed for multiple land use purposes, including 
both residential and agricultural purposes, LRAD was exclusively for agricultural purposes.  
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The LRAD programme was expected to enhance "commercial" agricultural production for 
the market rather than subsistence production.81 LRAD differed from SLAG in that 
beneficiaries did not have to be poor to qualify for a grant.82  
Moreover, the income ceiling as set out in SLAG, which determined whether a person 
qualified for a grant, was removed. This meant that the grant was not restricted to the poorest 
of the poor, but was rather accessible to a variety of beneficiaries, including the poorest of 
the poor.83  In terms of this policy, beneficiaries could access LRAD grants from R20 000 to 
R100 000,84 depending on the contribution he or she made in cash, labour and / or kind.85 
In this regard, the size of the contribution determined the value of the grant for which the 
person could qualify.86 This meant that those who were better-off would get more support.87 
The increased size of the grant and the allocation to individuals meant that in practice, 
multiple adult members of the same household could apply for LRAD grants with the 
intention of pooling the grants together to buy bigger parcels of land.88   
However, in 2005 at the National Land Summit, opposition was voiced against the market-
based WBWS redistribution policy in general and against the LRAD in particular.89 The land 
purchase grants in terms of LRAD were deemed to be insufficient.90 Furthermore, delegates 
complained that land owners were able to inflate prices and in some instances elected not 
to sell the land to land reform beneficiaries.91 It was argued that a threat of expropriation and 
the payment of below-market compensation were required to ensure that the land owners 
                                            
81 M Andrew, A Ainslie & C Shackleton “Land use and livelihoods: Evaluating Land and Agrarian Reform in 
South Africa” (2003) Series No 8. Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, University of the Western Cape. 
82 Ranwedzi The potential limits of the proactive land acquisition strategy: Land reform implementation in 
Gauteng Province of South Africa 24.  
83 Pienaar Land Reform 218.  
84 R Hall “Transforming rural South Africa? Taking stock of land reform” in L Ntsebeza & R Hall (eds) The Land 
Question in South Africa (2007) 87-106, 90-91.  
85 Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, Integrated Program of Land Reform and Agricultural 
Development in South Africa ‘Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development: A sub-programme of the Land 
Redistribution Programme’ <http://land.pwv.gov.za/redistribution/lrad.htm> (accessed 26-06-2018).  
86 Hall “Who, what, where, how, why? The many disagreements about land redistribution in South Africa” in 
Land Divided, Land Restored 136.  
87 Hall “Who, what, where, how, why? The many disagreements about land redistribution in South Africa” in 
Land Divided, Land Restored 136. 
88 Dlamini Taking land reform seriously: From willing seller-willing buyer to expropriation 4, 6-49.  
89 Kepe & Hall “Land redistribution in South Africa” Commissioned report for High Level Panel on the 
assessment of key legislation and the acceleration of fundamental change, an initiative of the Parliament of 






would agree to reasonable offers made by the beneficiaries for the acquisition of the land.92 
Accordingly, a new direction for land redistribution was proposed. 
Essentially, the new strategy required the State to play a more proactive role in the 
redistribution programme, which included the timeous identification and acquisition of land 
by the State. This strategy ran alongside the continued implementation of LRAD and related 
grant-based purchases until 2011, whereafter it was discontinued and replaced by the State-
purchase-and-leasing model.93  
2 4 Supply-led approach 
In terms of a supply-led approach to the acquisition of land, the State purchases land upfront 
from the land owners (willing sellers) and later identifies beneficiaries to whom the land can 
be transferred in terms of lease or title.94 
In 2006, government introduced a new redistribution policy (in line with the proposals made 
at the National Land Summit in 2005), called the Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy, which 
is a supply-driven model that operates within the WBWS principle.  The policy shift from a 
demand-driven to a supply-driven model has brought changes in terms of planning, 
implementation and resource mobilization.95 For example, in terms of resource allocation 
and mobilization the State as the willing buyer (as opposed to the beneficiaries under SLAG 
and LRAD) could spend more or as much as was needed to buy land needed for 
redistribution instead of disbursing grants to beneficiaries.  
2 4 1 Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy (PLAS)  
The Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy (PLAS) commenced in 2006 and from 2011 it 
replaced LRAD and all other grant-based programmes.96 PLAS gives far-reaching 
discretionary powers to officials, rather than disburse grants to enable beneficiaries to buy 
land for themselves. Officials may determine (a) which land should be acquired by the State, 
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(b) whether it should be transferred in title or leased; and (c) if so, to whom and on what 
terms.97 
Despite the State’s objective to increase Black land ownership,98 the strategy entailed the 
State buying farms and leasing the land to beneficiaries for a period of three years. 
Therefore, land was not necessarily registered in the names of Black owners.99 Land would 
only be transferred pending the successful use of the land during the three year trial 
period.100  
The land, which could be acquired for redistribution, was still those farms that were offered 
for sale in light of the WBWS principle. However, because the State was now the willing 
buyer (as opposed to the beneficiaries under SLAG and LRAD), it could spend as much as 
was needed (and available in the national budget) to buy farms that were needed for 
redistribution.101 In other words, the State can purchase land directly, instead of disbursing 
grants to enable beneficiaries to buy land.  
Accordingly, the strategy focuses on the State buying and then leasing out whole 
commercial farms at discounted rates. While this model addressed the problem of buying 
land with small land-purchase grants under SLAG and LRAD, “it does not advance visions 
of agrarian reform”.102 The reason for this is that it does not allow for transfer of land 
ownership to beneficiaries, and in the absence of long-term leases, leaves beneficiaries’ 
land tenure rights insecure.103 Without clear and secure land tenure rights, land redistribution 
beneficiaries struggle to get agricultural production support from State departments.104 
Accordingly, beneficiaries are not equipped with the necessary support to farm. This 
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approach furthermore does not address skewed land ownership patterns as the land 
remains registered in the name of the State. 
2 4 2 State Land Lease and Disposal Policy (SLLDP) 
The model adopted through PLAS was confirmed in July 2013, after the centenary of the 
1913 Black Land Act, when Minister Nkwinti adopted a SLLDP.105 In terms of this policy, 
beneficiaries of land redistribution are not to acquire ownership (title) of the land. Instead, 
beneficiaries will be able to lease the land from the State.106 
The SLLDP applies to farms (agricultural land) acquired through PLAS.107 The Policy 
confirmed that land redistribution will not involve the transfer of land from White to Black 
ownership.108 In this regard, the Policy makes provision for four categories of beneficiaries, 
each with different land rights:109  
“(1) households with no or very limited access to land (2) small-scale farmers farming for 
subsistence and selling part of their produce on local markets (3) medium-scale commercial 
farmers already farming commercially on a small-scale and with aptitude to expand, but 
constrained by land and other resources and (4) large-scale commercial farmers whose 
operations are disadvantaged by location, size of land and other circumstances and with the 
potential to grow”.110  
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Beneficiaries falling in categories 1 and 2 will lease State land111 at a nominal rental of one 
rand per annum, without the option to purchase the land.112 In this regard, the Policy 
assumes that there will only be one lessee per farm and it does not provide for the 
subdivision of large farms to provide for smallholders. The Policy also denies poor Black 
South Africans from owning the land, because it only provides for lessees of the State.113 
Categories 3 and 4 will be allowed to lease State land for a period of 30 years, with the 
option to renew the lease for another 20 years, and with the option to purchase.114 
Accordingly, the SLLDP aims to provide land or to make land available, in the form of a 
lease, to different categories of beneficiaries (specifically famers). The category of farmer 
will also determine whether the option to purchase the land is available.115 The underlying 
goal is therefore to broaden access to land, while not necessarily changing the ownership 
patterns of agricultural land. As explained, the agricultural land would remain vested in the 
State.116 
2 5 New proposed policies  
Since 2013, several new policies have been proposed by the former DRDLR. However, 
these policies have not been finalised or officially confirmed and adopted.117 These policies 
are briefly discussed below.  
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2 5 1 The 50/50 policy   
In 2014, final draft policy proposals on Strengthening the Relative Rights of People Who 
Work the Land (commonly referred to as the “50/50 policy”) were published.118 In essence, 
the 50/50 policy proposes a share equity scheme on privately owned commercial farms.119 
The Policy is based on the relative contribution of farm workers or farm dwellers to the 
development of the farm.120 Accordingly to the Policy:  
“…the historical owner of the land automatically retains 50% of the land, while the labourers of 
the land assume ownership of the remaining 50%, proportional to their contribution to the 
development of the land, based on the number of years they had worked on the land”.121  
The State will buy 50% of the farm from the owner to be shared by the labourers, based on 
the value provided by the Valuer-General.122 However, the money will be channelled through 
the National Empowerment Fund123 (“NEF”) and invested into the New Company, which 
must be established and representative of all equity-holders of the farm.124 In this way the 
owner of the farm enterprise becomes a 50% shareholder. The beneficiaries also obtain 
50% shareholding in the New Company, in accordance with the length of their service on 
the farm. In other words, the workers will acquire equity shares in the farm enterprise 
depending on their length of “disciplined service”.125 In this regard, workers who have been 
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123 The NEF is the central government agency responsible for catalysing Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment by supporting and funding black entrepreneurs and black-owned businesses. 
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Work the Land (21 February 2014); Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, Diagnostic 
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2017) 9-10.  
125 Apart from being linked to the length of service on the farm, it is unclear what “disciplined service” means 
in this context. Department of Rural Development and Land Reform Strengthening the Relative Rights of 




employed for 10 years may receive 10% share-equity on the land. Workers with 25 years of 
disciplined service should be entitled to 25% share-equity on the land and workers with 50 
years of disciplined service should be entitled to 50% share-equity on the land.126 The 
acquisition of equity introduces co-management of the farm, based on the relative equity-
holdings. The farm owners and workers will also benefit from dividends allocated by the New 
Company.127  
The Policy suggests that it deepens security of tenure for farm workers and farm dwellers.128 
However, while the share equity scheme may bring about co-management and co-
ownership of the farm enterprise, it is unclear and doubtful whether the scheme effects 
transfer of the agricultural land from the land owner to the beneficiary. It is argued that the 
farm workers and dwellers are regarded as shareholders in the particular farm enterprise 
and do not become owners of the agricultural land. Instead, as shareholders, the farm 
workers and dwellers will receive an additional income by way of receiving payment in the 
form of dividends. In this regard, it is questionable whether the Policy strengthens security 
of tenure for farm workers, as their rights in relation to the land are unclear. In terms of the 
Policy it is unclear whether the land is registered in the name of the original owner or the 
New Company. If the land remains registered in the name of the original owner, then these 
schemes do not address skewed land ownership patterns. If the land is registered in the 
name of the New Company, it is unclear how this transfer of ownership will be reflected in 
the 30% target to transfer land in white ownership to Black beneficiaries. In other words, if 
registered in the name of the New Company, the agricultural land remains in white 
ownership, although in the form of co-ownership.  
The 50/50 policy envisages a voluntary programme that is demand-driven in that land 
owners (as opposed to the beneficiaries or the State) initiate the process by expressing 
interest to participate in the programme.129 The land owner must submit a proposal to the 
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relevant office of the DALRRD (formerly the DRDLR).130 The State is thus involved in the 
process of selecting eligible and suitable farms for the 50/50 programme. The selection of 
the farms to participate in the programme will be based on the evaluation of several 
criteria,131 including: Firstly, the farm must be a “viable and profitable business that 
generates benefits for farm owners and farm workers”.132 In this regard there must be 
evidence of a profitable agricultural enterprise. Secondly, the project must have a realistic 
business plan to ensure that the land productivity will be sustained.133 Thirdly, beneficiaries 
of the share equity scheme must be South African citizens and farm workers or farm dwellers 
that have occupied the land for an extended period of time134 and they must “demonstrate 
ownership and buy-in to the proposal”.135 According to the Diagnostic Evaluation of 
Strengthening the Relative Rights of People Working the Land: 50/50 Policy Framework, 
this means that:  
“In order to qualify, farmworkers must be South African citizens who have occupied that land for 
an extended period of time and must have fulfilled agreed-upon land-related roles and 
responsibilities. Farmworker beneficiaries have to be screened, categorized and selected in 
accordance with their level of competence and potential to be appointed in specific positions as 
workers, supervisors or even managers.”136 
Fourthly, there must also be a partnership between the farm workers and the farm 
owner(s).137 In this regard, the relationship between the farm workers and the farm owner 
must be conducive for equity sharing and co-management. Fifthly, in order for the farm to 
qualify for the 50/50 programme, the farm must not be subject to a restitution claim under 
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the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994.138 If the farm qualifies for the 50/50 programme 
the land will be valued by the Office of the Valuer-General.139  
Finally, there must be proven skills transfer opportunities in the form of “training, mentoring, 
skills development and coaching of farm workers, which should be aligned to their current 
competency and capacity for potential training.”140 
Although the Department has commenced with the implementation of the equity sharing 
arrangements on various farms, it has not adopted any final Policy to this effect.141  
2 5 2 One Household One Hectare Policy  
Despite the lack of a formalised and adopted policy, such as the 50/50 Policy, another policy 
which was launched in October 2015, is the One Household One Hectare Policy. The 
objectives of the Policy are broadly:  
“a)  To contribute to the reduction of poverty in rural areas; b)  Revive a caliber of highly productive 
black smallholder farmers and food producers; c)  Build security of tenure, access to land, 
increase the involvement of individual households in production activities and minimize 
controversies on CPI lead landed projects; d)  Create sustainable employment in rural 
households; e) Create viable rural small to medium agricultural enterprises; f) To build 
competencies and broaden the skills base for targeted households and communities; g) The 
restoration of the social capital and beauty of ubuntu as the currency that creates social cohesion 
among rural households; and h)  Rebuilding the sanctity and dignity of family life as the most 
critical success factor in the rural socio-economic transformation effort of the state”.142  
In essence the Policy “aims to provide small allotments for vegetable gardening for non-
commercial purposes on state land”.143 Accordingly, the Policy is aimed at beneficiaries in 
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need of agricultural land for purposes of subsistence farming. Importantly, under this Policy, 
there is no need for the government to acquire the land by way of market-led approaches 
as the land is already owned by it and ready to be redistributed. As there is no formal policy 
to analyse, there is a lack of information regarding the qualifying and selection criteria and 
process and the types of rights beneficiaries may acquire under this policy.  
2 6 A move away from market-led approaches  
Despite an active land market in South Africa,144 the key constraint of the market-led 
approach to redistribution is that beneficiaries are faced with substantial difficulties in 
acquiring suitable land on the open market.145 Three reasons can be identified for this 
phenomenon.  
Firstly, the land that was offered up by the land owner (the willing seller) was not always 
suitable for the needs and demands of the beneficiaries in relation to both the quality and 
scale of the land.146 Good quality land in particular, is usually sold either by way of public 
auctions or private contracts, which typically ensure that ownership of the land is transferred 
within a few months of the initial offer to sell.147 In this regard, the funding applications from 
potential land reform beneficiaries generally take longer than this process,148 which means 
that much of the land being transacted is not available to land reform beneficiaries.149 
Furthermore, the size of the farms available for acquisition tends to be larger than what 
would be suitable for the beneficiaries as new entrants to the agricultural sector.150 Lahiff 
explains further that this problem is exacerbated by the official bias against subdivision as 
embodied in SALA.151 Even if all legal obstacles are removed, it is still unlikely that land 
owners will subdivide their properties,152 because subdivision is seen as an “expensive and 
administratively cumbersome process”.153 Accordingly, the size of the land available on the 
market continues to be relatively large holdings. This inevitably means that reform 
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beneficiaries have no choice but to group their individual grants together to purchase (larger) 
pieces of land. If the land is acquired, there is no assistance provided to the beneficiaries 
wanting to subdivide the land in question.154 Arguably, the failure to subdivide land can be 
regarded as a contributor to the failure and general underperformance of the redistribution 
programme in South Africa.155 
Secondly, the prices of the land seemed to be inflated.156 Market-related prices or market 
value is usually paid for the land in question.157 Given the voluntary nature of the market-led 
approach to land reform in general,158 only farmers who are very committed to land reform 
would enter into a land reform transaction. This also means that the farmers, who do enter 
into negotiations for selling land for land reform purposes, have a relatively strong 
negotiation position as there are not many farms in the market for this purpose.159 If the 
valuers estimate a price that is below the perceived market value, they can only make such 
an offer to the farmer who is then free to reject such an estimate. Arguably, the bargaining 
power of the land owner allows such an owner to ask for prices well above market value. 
Accordingly, much of the blame for the inflated land prices, which consequently make the 
acquisition of land unaffordable and potentially unsustainable, was attributed to the lack of 
willingness to sell by white land owners in cases where the  government was involved in 
purchasing.160  
Lastly, bureaucratic delays161 in (a) the administration of grants; or (b) in relation to the 
negotiations between the State (on behalf of the beneficiaries) and the land owners 
frustrated the parties involved in the land transactions.162 With regard to the former, Cousins 
explains that a key constraint to the effective implementation of market-led approaches is 
limited State capacity. He holds that there are various dimensions to limited State capacity 
that may result in the slow pace of redistribution, including “effective political leadership and 
vision, appropriate skills and experience, efficient systems and procedures and sufficiently 
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large budgets”.163 With regard to the latter, the beneficiaries, especially in supply-led market 
approaches, are not directly involved in the negotiation process and must rely on the officials 
of the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform to do the negotiation on their 
behalf.164 Du Plessis explains that “even if there are small differences in price that a willing 
buyer [beneficiary] would have negotiated around, the deal might fall through because the 
officials do not negotiate as a willing buyer would”.165 
The WBWS principle as a method of acquiring land, coupled with all of the above 
considerations, is thus often regarded as the reason for the slow pace of land reform in 
South Africa.166 In this light, this particular approach to acquire land for redistribution has 
failed.167 However, Pienaar notes further that the problematic aspect was perhaps not the 
WBWS principle itself, but rather the way in which it was moulded and applied in South 
Africa specifically.168 Although the WBWS principle is regarded as an obstacle to effectively 
implement land redistribution169 it is important to note that this principle is not contained in 
section 25 of the Constitution.170  
Increasingly, the shortcomings resulted in calls for the abolishment of the market-based 
approach at the 2005 National Land Summit and again at subsequent ANC conferences in 
2007171 and 2012.172 However, the concerns raised did not immediately result in any official 
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policy or legislative amendments.173 In light of the shortcomings, the Policy Framework for 
Land Acquisition and Land Valuation published in 2012174 proposed that the South African 
government should abolish the WBWS principle, while making more use of expropriation as 
a means of acquiring land.175 Expropriation as an alternative to market-led approaches for 
the acquisition of land is accordingly explored.  
3 Expropriation  
3 1 Introduction  
Despite the fact that there are various pieces of legislation that provide for expropriation for 
land reform purposes,176 and that it is aptly suited for the acquisition of agricultural land,177 
the State has underutilised their expropriation powers in redistribution cases.178 To date, 
expropriation has only been used as a mechanism of last resort in cases where 
unreasonable objections or delays have prevented the acquisition of land for redistributive 
purposes by way of market-led approaches.179 The State may be poised to utilise its 
expropriation powers more in future in light of recent developments,180 which may result in 
an amended property clause that authorises expropriation without compensation.181 
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Accordingly, expropriation (with our without compensation) is explored as a suitable 
approach for the acquisition of agricultural land for redistribution purposes.  
3 2 Definition and elements of an expropriation  
Expropriation is an original mode of acquisition of property182 and can be described as:  
“A unilateral act by the state which, based on the operation of law and sanctioned by the 
Constitution, acquires private property, where the loss of property by the former owner is usually 
total and permanent. The property is ordinarily acquired by or on behalf of the state for a public 
purpose or in the public interest and compensation is payable”.183 
In South Africa, expropriations are governed by sections 25(1), 25(2) and 25(3) of the 
Constitution.184 In terms of the FNB-methodology discussed in Chapter 4, a deprivation is a 
subset of an expropriation,185 which means that expropriation must also comply with section 
25(1) of the Constitution. The requirements for a non-arbitrary deprivation of property were 
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discussed in Chapter 4 and need not be repeated here.186 Sections 25(2) and 25(3) of the 
Constitution set out the elements for a valid expropriation.187 In this regard, section 25(2) 
does not protect private property per se. Instead, it simply provides for the circumstances 
under which the State can lawfully expropriate property,188 as follows:  
“Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application — (a) for a public 
purpose or in the public interest; and (b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the 
time and manner of payment of which have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or 
approved by a court.”189 
Accordingly, in cases where the land owner refuses to sell his or her property to the State 
voluntarily, the State does not need to continue negotiating with the owner. In such cases, 
the State can summarily expropriate property, provided that the requirements in the 
authorising legislation and the Constitution are adhered to.  
Section 25(3) pertains to the calculation of compensation for the expropriation, namely:   
“The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment must be just and 
equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those 
affected, having regard to all relevant circumstances, including — (a) the current use of the 
property; (b) the history of the acquisition and use of the property; (c) the market value of the 
property; (d) the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial 
capital improvement of the property; and (e) the purpose of the expropriation.”190 
It is somewhat contentious whether the payment of just and equitable compensation is a 
pre-requisite for a valid expropriation or whether it is merely the consequence of a valid 
                                            
186 See Chapter 4, 2 4 above.  
187 Sections 25(2), (3) and (4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Apart from the 
requirements for an expropriation set out in section 25(2) of the Constitution, an expropriation must also meet 
the requirements of a deprivation in section 25(1) of the Constitution, because all expropriations are treated 
as a subset of deprivations. In other words, if a deprivation of property passes scrutiny under section 25(1) of 
the Constitution, then the question arises whether the deprivation amounts to an expropriation. If the 
deprivation amounts to an expropriation, then it must pass scrutiny under section 25(2)(a) and make provision 
for compensation under section 25(2)(b). See First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for 
the South African Revenue Services; First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 
2002 4 SA 768 (CC) paras 57-59. See Chapter 5, 3 2 in this regard.  
188 Mostert “The poverty of precedent on public purpose/interest” in Rethinking Expropriation Law I: Public 
Interest in Expropriation 59; BV Slade The Justification of Expropriation for Economic Development LLD, 
Stellenbosch University (2012) 48 (relying on Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality 2011 1 SA 601 (KZP) para 82); 
and Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 459.  
189 Section 25(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
190 Section 25(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; Du Plessis “How the determination 
of compensation is influenced by the disjunction between the concepts of ‘value’ and ‘compensation’” in 




expropriation.191 If payment of compensation is not a pre-requisite for a valid 
expropriation,192 the validity of the expropriation cannot be challenged by the land owner on 
the basis that the compensation is not sufficient. The validity of the expropriation can then 
only be challenged if it is not authorised in legislation, adopted in a procedurally unfair 
manner or not undertaken for public purpose or a public interest.193 However, this issue will 
not be investigated further for purposes of this dissertation.194  
Accordingly, the elements of an expropriation under South African law will be discussed. 
The expropriation (a) must be undertaken in terms of a law of general application; (b) must 
serve a public purpose or public interest; and (c) is subject to the payment of 
compensation.195 Each of these elements will be discussed in turn. 
3 2 1 The law of general application 
Expropriation is a State action which is always carried out in terms of statutory 
authorisation.196 While there may be different methods of expropriation,197 the process 
                                            
191 JM Pienaar “Onteiening sonder vergoeding: voorvereiste vir suksesvolle grondhervorming of populisme?” 
LitNet (18 January 2018) <http://www.lintnet.co.za/onteiening-sonder-vereiste-vir-suksesvolle-
grondhervorming-populisme> (accessed 30-05-2018) 4; Mostert “The poverty of precedent on public 
purpose/interest” in Rethinking Expropriation Law I: Public Interest in Expropriation 59. See also Du Plessis 
“How the determination of compensation is influenced by the disjunction between the concepts of ‘value’ and 
‘compensation’” in Rethinking Expropriation Law III: Fair Compensation 192-193.   
192 However see, Haffejee and NO v eThekwini Municipality 2011 6 SA 134 (CC) para 14 where the Court 
held that: “The obligation to pay compensation is a condition of expropriation, but not a prerequisite for its 
operation.” 
193 Mostert “The poverty of precedent on public purpose/interest” in Rethinking Expropriation Law I: Public 
Interest in Expropriation 59. 
194 See BV Slade “The ‘law of general application’ requirement in expropriation law and the impact of the 
Expropriation Bill of 2015” (2017) 50 De Jure 346-362; BV Slade, JM Pienaar, ZT Boggenpoel & T Kotzé 
“Submission to Parliament on the review of section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996” 
(15 June 2018) 
<https://www.sun.ac.za/english/PublishingImages/Lists/dualnews/My%20Items%20View/Submission%20to%
20Constitutional%20Review%20Committee%20_%20Slade%20Pienaar%20Boggenpoel%20Kotze%20003.
pdf> (accessed 15-08-2019).  
195 Section 25(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See also Van der Walt Constitutional 
Property Law 335, 452-485. Du Plessis “How the determination of compensation is influenced by the 
disjunction between the concepts of ‘value’ and ‘compensation’” in Rethinking Expropriation Law III: Fair 
Compensation 189 also highlights that the expropriation must be effected in a way that is procedurally fair in 
terms of section 33 of the Constitution and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000.  
196 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 453. See also T Roux “Property” in MH Cheadle, DM Davis & 
NRL Haysom (eds) South African constitutional law: The Bill of Rights (2002) 429-472; Gildenhuys 
Onteieningsreg 9-11, 93 where the author explains that the right to expropriate cannot take place in terms of 
the common law. See also Du Plessis “How the determination of compensation is influenced by the disjunction 
between the concepts of ‘value’ and ‘compensation’” in Rethinking Expropriation Law III: Fair Compensation 
190. Furthermore, see in general Slade (2017) De Jure 346-362; Slade The Justification of Expropriation for 
Economic Development in general. See Chapter 4, 2 7 1.  
197 Du Plessis “How the determination of compensation is influenced by the disjunction between the concepts 
of ‘value’ and ‘compensation’” in Rethinking Expropriation Law III: Fair Compensation 191-192; Gildenhuys 
Onteieningsreg 13-15 where the author explains that there are different methods of expropriation: (a) the 
judicial method of expropriation and (b) the administrative method of expropriation. In terms of the former, the 




usually takes the form of a discretionary administrative action198 in accordance with a 
particular authorising statute.199 The most important measure, while not the only piece of 
legislation,200 that provides for the authority to expropriate or expropriating powers for land 
reform purposes, is the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 (“Expropriation Act”).201 The 
Expropriation Act provides that the expropriating administrator is usually the Minister of 
Public Works,202 although other laws may also authorise other bodies to expropriate 
property.203 For example, the Regulation Bill provides that the Minister of Rural Development 
and Land Reform has the authority to expropriate land.204 
The Expropriation Act inter alia, grants the relevant expropriator the authority to 
expropriate;205 it sets out the procedure for expropriation;206 and it determines how 
compensation for an expropriation should be determined.207 However, the current 
Expropriation Act predates the Constitution by more than 40 years. Accordingly, the 
                                            
of expropriation can be found in chapter 13 of the National Water Act 36 of 1998 or where land is acquired by 
a labour tenant in terms of chapter 3 of the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996. In terms of the latter, 
the expropriator acquires the property by way of an administrative action.   
198 Since expropriation is an administrative action, it also needs to comply with the provisions of the Promotion 
of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000.  
199 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 456; Hoops The Legitimate Justification of Expropriation 376-
378; Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 13-15, 49.   
200 As mentioned above, authorising legislation includes sections 10, 10A and 12 of the Land Reform: Provision 
of Land and Assistance Act 126 of 1993; section 26 of the Extension of Security Tenure Act 62 of 1997; part 
4, section 9 of the Housing Act 107 of 1997; section 2 read with the definition of “acquire” in the definition list 
of the Eastern Cape Disposal Act 7 of 2000; sections 22, 35, 42A, 42C and specifically section 42E of the 
Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994; section 3 of the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996; and 
clause 26 of the Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill.  
201 Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 51. 
202 Section 2(1) of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975. Clause 3 of the Draft Expropriation Bill B-2019 also 
provides that the Minister of Public Works may expropriate property. 
203 Du Plessis “How the determination of compensation is influenced by the disjunction between the concepts 
of ‘value’ and ‘compensation’” in Rethinking Expropriation Law III: Fair Compensation 191; Southwood The 
Compulsory Acquisition of Rights 36-46, where the author lists examples of expropriating authorities and the 
corresponding legislation that authorises the expropriation. See for example, section 15 of the Broadcasting 
Act 73 of 1976; section 79 of the Post Office Act 44 of 1958; section 19 of the Electricity Act 41 of 1987; section 
27 of the Nuclear Energy Act 131 of 1993; sections 3 and 39 of the National Parks Act 57 of 1976; section 14 
of the Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act 43 of 1983; section 64 of the National Water Act 36 of 1998. 
See also Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 456; Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 51-57; H Mostert 
“Revising the procedure for expropriation in South Africa: 2015 Bill and 1975 Act compared” (2016) 5 European 
Property Law Journal 170-205.  
204 Clause 26(2)(3) of the Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill. 
205 Sections 2-5 of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 and clause 3 of the Draft Expropriation Bill B-2019. Both 
the Act and the Bill provide that the Minister of Public Works may expropriate property. 
206 Sections 6-11 of the Expropriation Act and chapters 3-5 of the Expropriation Bill B4-2015 in general. For an 
explanation of the procedure under the Expropriation Act, see Southwood The Compulsory Acquisition of 
Rights 49-74; Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 111-136. For an explanation of the procedure under the 
Expropriation Bill, see J van Wyk “Compensation for land reform expropriation” (2017) 1 Tydskrif vir Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg 21-35, 22-23.   
207 Sections 12, 13 and 14 of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975. See also Southwood The Compulsory 




Expropriation Act is only valid insofar as it complies with the constitutional provisions of 
sections 25(2) and 25(3) of the Constitution.208  
A series of legislative attempts209 aimed at bringing the pre-constitutional legislation on 
expropriation in line with the provisions of the Constitution have been drafted. The most 
recent Expropriation Bill210 was published in December 2018. 
Once promulgated, expropriations will be subject to the provisions of the 2019 Expropriation 
Bill. In this regard, Mostert postulates that: 
“even if a…[Expropriation Act]… enters into force, the power of existing precedent may influence 
[the] understanding of  [the] new and adapted provisions”.211  
Accordingly, the elements of an expropriation will be discussed in accordance with both the 
Expropriation Act and the 2019 Expropriation Bill.  
The Expropriation Bill proposes, like the Expropriation Act, that the authorising body should 
be the Minister of Public Works.212 Again, other laws may also authorise other bodies to 
expropriate property.213 Even though the Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform 
has the authority to expropriate land,214 in terms of the Regulation Bill, it is more than likely 
that the procedure set out in the Expropriation Act215 or the Expropriation Bill (when 
                                            
208 Mostert (2016) EPLJ 173 where the author argues that it is not problematic per se that the Expropriation 
Act still prevails because “the Expropriation Act is subject to mechanisms of interpretation (reading in, reading 
down, severance, etc) that must ensure that these statutes align with the Constitution”. See I Currie & J de 
Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 58-59, 185 and AJ van der Walt Property and Constitution 
(2012) 20, 121; Mostert “The poverty of precedent on public purpose/interest” in Rethinking Expropriation Law 
I: Public Interest in Expropriation 63. The aim of the Expropriation Bill in this regard is to ensure consistency 
with the Constitution and uniformity of procedure for all expropriations.  
209 There have been numerous attempts to repeal the 1975 Expropriation Act. See Expropriation Bill B16-2008 
in GG No 30963 of 11-04-2008; Expropriation Bill GN 234 in GG 36269 of 20-02-2015; the Expropriation Bill 
B4-2015 in GG 34818 of 26-01-2015 and the Draft Expropriation Bill B-2019 in GG No 42127 of 21-12-2018. 
See also Slade (2017) De Jure 346-362, 348 in this regard. 
210 B-2019 in GG No 42127 of 21-12-2018.  
211 Mostert ““The poverty of precedent on public purpose/interest”” in Rethinking Expropriation Law I: Public 
Interest in Expropriation 63.  
212 Clause 3-4 of the Draft Expropriation Bill B-2019. See also Mostert (2016) 5 EPLJ 182-183.  
213 Southwood The Compulsory Acquisition of Rights 36-46, specifically See also Van der Walt Constitutional 
Property Law 456; Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 51-57; Mostert (2016) 5 EPLJ 170-205.  
214 Clause 26(2)(3) of the Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill. 
215 For an indication of the procedure see Southwood The Compulsory Acquisition of Rights 49-74; Gildenhuys 




promulgated),216 will be followed for the expropriation of agricultural land (specifically 
“redistribution agricultural land”).217  
3 2 2 Public purpose or public interest 
Section 25(2) of the Constitution states that expropriations may only be effected for a public 
purpose or in the public interest.218 An expropriation that satisfies either the public purpose 
or public interest requirement will constitute a valid expropriation as long as all of the other 
requirements are also met.219 
In this regard, the Constitution does not provide for a definition of public purpose.220 
However, the Expropriation Act states that public purposes includes “any purposes 
connected with the administration of the provision of any law by an organ of State”.221 
Generally, “public purpose” includes purposes such as the building of public roads, hospitals 
and schools.222 Presently, the Expropriation Act only provides for expropriation for public 
purposes.223  
Likewise, the Constitution refrains from providing a definition of public interest. However, 
some indication of the meaning of public interest is provided for in section 25(4)(a) of the 
Constitution. “Public interest”, as determined by section 25(4)(a) of the Constitution “includes 
                                            
216 The procedure set out in the Draft Expropriation Bill B-2019, comprises of three phases: (a) the 
investigation, gathering of information and valuation of property; (b) the notice of intention to expropriate; and 
(c) the notice of expropriation, before property may be expropriated. However, it is not the purpose of this 
dissertation to analyse the expropriation procedure in terms of the Expropriation Bill. For a discussion of the 
procedure set out in the Expropriation Bill B4-2015, which is similar to the procedure set out in the Draft 
Expropriation Bill B-2019 see Van Wyk (2017) TSAR 31-34 and Mostert (2016) EPLJ 188-203. For a 
discussion on the procedure set out in the Draft Expropriation Bill B-2019 see JM Pienaar “Land Reform: 
October to December” (2018) Juta Quarterly Review 1-8, 1-5.  
217 In terms of the definition list in the Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill ''Redistribution agricultural 
land'' means all agricultural land that falls between or exceeds any category of agricultural land holdings 
contemplated in section 25. See Chapter 3, 3 3 3 1 8 above for a discussion on “redistribution agricultural 
land”.  
218 See in general BV Slade “Public purpose or public interest and third party transfers” (2014) 17 
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 167-206 and XH Nginase The meaning of ‘public purpose’ and ‘public 
interest’ in section 25 of the final Constitution LLM thesis, Stellenbosch University (2009). See further E (WJ) 
du Plessis “The public purpose requirement in the calculation of just and equitable compensation” in B Hoops, 
EJ Marais, H Mostert, JAMA Sluysmans, LCA Verstappen (eds) Rethinking Expropriation Law I: Public Interest 
in Expropriation (2015) 369-387; Du Plessis “How the determination of compensation is influenced by the 
disjunction between the concepts of ‘value’ and ‘compensation’” in Rethinking Expropriation Law III: Fair 
Compensation 196-197 where the author states that the public purpose requirement in section 25(2)(a) should 
not be confused with the role that public purpose plays in determining compensation under section 25(3)(e) of 
the Constitution. 
219 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 462; Mostert ““The poverty of precedent on public 
purpose/interest”” in Rethinking Expropriation Law I: Public Interest in Expropriation 59.  
220 Slade (2014) PELJ 171.  
221 Section 1 of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975.  
222 See Harvey v Umhlatuze Municipality 2011 1 SA 601 (KZP) paras 124-125.   




the nation’s commitment to land reform and to reforms to bring about equitable access to all 
South Africa’s natural resources”.224  
The Expropriation Bill defines both public purpose and public interest.225 Interestingly, the 
definition of public purpose is exactly the same as the definition provided for in the 
Expropriation Act and the definition of public interest is a replica of the wording of section 
25(4)(a) of the Constitution.226 Slade points out that there is thus no clearer indication of 
what would qualify as an expropriation for a public purpose or an expropriation in the public 
interest, especially when it involves a third party transfer.227  
“Expropriation for land reform purposes constitutes an expropriation for the benefit of 
another private person or a group of persons”.228 In this regard, the constitutionality of 
transferring expropriated property to third parties for land reform purposes has not yet been 
challenged.229 Where the property is expropriated and transferred to a third party for the 
third parties’ own use and benefit, it would ordinarily not pass the public purpose or public 
interest requirement.230 Nevertheless, the expropriation and transfer to third parties for land 
reform purposes would still be deemed to be in the public interest because it serves a valid 
State goal, such as redistribution of agricultural land, which is in the public interest.231 
Mostert notes that:  
                                            
224 Section 25(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; Mostert ““The poverty of precedent 
on public purpose/interest”” in Rethinking Expropriation Law I: Public Interest in Expropriation 64-65. See also 
Du Plessis “The public purpose requirement in the calculation of just and equitable compensation” in 
Rethinking Expropriation Law I: Public Interest in Expropriation (2015) 369-387. 
225 The long title of the Draft Expropriation Bill B-2019 in GG No 42127 of 21-12-2018 provides for the 
expropriation of property for a public purpose or in the public interest. The preamble of the Bill also contains 
the whole of section 25 of the Constitution. Although “public interest” is defined in the preamble of the Bill, the 
definition list in clause 1 of the Draft Expropriation Bill B-2019 only provides for a definition of “public purpose”.  
226 Compare section 25(3)(a)-(e) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 with clause 12 of the 
Draft Expropriation Bill B-2019.  
227 See in particular Slade (2014) PELJ 171-172 where the author explains “in certain instances the state is 
justified to transfer expropriated property to third parties, and these expropriations may be for a valid public 
purpose or in the public interest. Whether the expropriation and third party transfer is classified as being either 
for a public purpose or in the public interest may play an important role in signalling the level of scrutiny that 
the courts should apply in their evaluation of whether the expropriation is justified or not”. 
228 Mostert ““The poverty of precedent on public purpose/interest”” in Rethinking Expropriation Law I: Public 
Interest in Expropriation 64.  
229 Slade (2014) PELJ 191; Mostert ““The poverty of precedent on public purpose/interest”” in Rethinking 
Expropriation Law I: Public Interest in Expropriation 64-65.  
230 Mostert ““The poverty of precedent on public purpose/interest”” in Rethinking Expropriation Law I: Public 
Interest in Expropriation 64-65; AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis 
(1999) 340.  
231 Section 25(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See also Slade (2014) PELJ 192; 
Mostert ““The poverty of precedent on public purpose/interest”” in Rethinking Expropriation Law I: Public 
Interest in Expropriation 91-92 where the author notes that “[t]he role of public interest…is to enable the 




“The role of public interest…is to enable the execution of social restructuring; to reverse unjust 
patterns of land-holding”.232  
For purposes of this dissertation it is assumed that expropriation for land reform purposes, 
such as redistribution of agricultural land, involves third party transfers and is usually 
regarded as in the public interest.233 Accordingly, it is not necessary to discuss this element 
further.  
3 2 3 Compensation  
3 2 3 1 Compensation for expropriation under the Expropriation Act  
As mentioned, pre-1994 legislation is still valid insofar as it is reconcilable with the provisions 
of the Constitution.234 This is also true for the determination of compensation for an 
expropriation.235  
Under the Expropriation Act, market value played a central role in calculating compensation 
for an expropriation.236 Section 12 of the Expropriation Act specifically provides that 
compensation for property is awarded in terms of: (a) market value;237 (b) actual financial 
loss238 and; (c) a solatium amount.239 Each of these elements are briefly discussed below.  
Although the Act does not provide for a definition of market value it provides that 
compensation should be calculated as the “amount which the property would have realized 
                                            
232 Mostert ““The poverty of precedent on public purpose/interest”” in Rethinking Expropriation Law I: Public 
Interest in Expropriation 91-92.  
233 Slade (2014) PELJ 190-192. See for example, section 42E of the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 
which is specifically aimed at authorising the expropriation of land for restitution purposes. It provides that 
"[t]he minister may purchase, acquire in any other matter or… expropriate land, a portion of land or a right in 
land" in respect of a claim that has been lodged in terms of this Act. The property expropriated in terms of this 
Act is to be transferred to the private parties who lodged a claim for restitution in terms of this Act. See also 
Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 307;  PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and 
Schoeman’s The Law of Property 5 ed (2006) 567; DL Carey Miller & A Pope Land Title in South Africa (2000) 
301-302; Mostert ““The poverty of precedent on public purpose/interest”” in Rethinking Expropriation Law I: 
Public Interest in Expropriation 64-65, 91-92. 
234 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 121, 269.  
235 503.  
236 Du Plessis “How the determination of compensation is influenced by the disjunction between the concepts 
of ‘value’ and ‘compensation’” in Rethinking Expropriation Law III: Fair Compensation 193-1295 explains that 
although “the Constitution referes to ‘compensation’, the Expropriation Act largely treats it as ‘value’, 
particularly market value. However, ‘compensation’ and ‘value’ are two distrinct concepts. Du Plessis (2015) 
PELJ 1728, 1730; Du Plessis (2014) PELJ 801-807.  
237 Section 12(1)(a) of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975. See also Du Plessis “How the determination of 
compensation is influenced by the disjunction between the concepts of ‘value’ and ‘compensation’” in 
Rethinking Expropriation Law III: Fair Compensation 199-202; Van Wyk (2017) TSAR 23-24.  
238 Section 12(1)(b) of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975.  Van Wyk (2017) TSAR 23-24. 
239 Section 12(2) of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975. See also Du Plessis “How the determination of 
compensation is influenced by the disjunction between the concepts of ‘value’ and ‘compensation’” in 




if sold…in the open market by a willing seller to a willing buyer”,240 which is commonly 
referred to as market value.241 Du Plessis explains that there are various problems with 
calculating market value.242 For one, she regards the WBWS method for determining market 
value as illusory, because the negotiation process between the willing buyer (the State or a 
beneficiary) and the willing seller (the land owner) is constrained by a compulsory sale.243 
Linked hereto is the problem that market value can be regarded as nothing more than an 
informed guess:244 
“…the market is a relatively unrestrained phenomenon where sellers and buyers bargain until 
they reach an acceptable price level, and such bargaining is usually done without any artificial 
constraints. The problem thus lies in the fact that one must imagine compensating a compulsory 
purchase in terms of exactly the opposite, namely a free market transaction where the price level 
is determined by the relatively free will of the buyer and the seller.” 245 
Furthermore, market price is not static, which makes it difficult to accurately pinpoint the 
compensation amount.246 Changes over time may influence the market price.247 For 
example, inflation, fluctuations in the demand and supply of property and changes regarding 
the zoning of the property,248 may all impact the market price of the property. Furthermore, 
the choice of valuation method may also influence the market value of the property.249 
Different valuation methods can be used to determine market value within the parameters 
                                            
240 Section 12(1)(a) of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975. In this regard, Du Plessis (2014) PELJ 804 explains 
that the WBWS approach with regard to compensation for expropriation refers to one (of many) methods to 
determine market value. See also 3 2 3 5 below where the definition of “market value” under the Property 
Valuation Act 17 of 2014 and the regulations to the Act is discussed.  
241 WJ du Plessis “Valuation in the constitutional era” (2015) 18 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1726-
1759, 1728. However, the court in Wollach No v Government of the Republic of South Africa [2018] ZALCC 1, 
15 January 2018 (unreported judgment) <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZALCC/2018/1.html> para 21 
provides that there is no universal definition for market value. See however 3 2 3 5 below where the definition 
of “market value” is defined in the Property Valuation Act 17 of 2014 and the regulations.  
242 Du Plessis (2015) PELJ 1729-1730.  
243 Du Plessis (2015) PELJ 1730; Du Plessis (2014) PELJ 805.  




248 Msiza v Director General for the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform 2016 5 SA 513 (LCC); 
Uys v Msiza 2018 3 SA 440 (SCA) where the primary issue related to the market value of the land in question 
and whether such land had residential development potential or whether it was agricultural land as the 
respective valuations differed substantially in worth.  
249 Du Plessis (2015) PELJ 1748. See also the regulations under the Property Valuation Act 17 of 2014, which 




of section 12.250 In Wollach No v Government of the Republic of South Africa251 the Court 
identified (a) the comparative or market data approach; (b) the income investment or 
economic approach; 252 (c) the land residual technique;253 and (d) the cost method254 as 
different valuation methods to determine fair market value.255 In terms of the comparable 
sales or market data approach, the property in question is compared with other similar 
properties in terms of inter alia size, condition, location and improvements. Based on this 
comparison, the valuer then draws a conclusion on the probable selling price.256 In terms of 
the income capitalisation approach, the valuer values the property by capitalising its net 
rental income.257 Other variables, such as the value of the improvements to the land and the 
depreciation of the improvements are taken into account under the cost approach.258 
Accordingly, the consideration of different variables influences the determination of market 
price. While the comparable sales method or the market data approach is the most common 
method used to determine market value,259 the other valuation methods listed above, are 
generally speaking, not applicable where agricultural land is at stake.260 
                                            
250 Wollach No v Government of the Republic of South Africa [2018] ZALCC 1, 15 January 2018 (unreported 
judgment) paras 25-26. See also Du Plessis (2015) PELJ 1737; Van Wyk (2017) TSAR 23. See furthermore, 
Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 207-244 for an exposition of the different valuation methods for determining market 
value. See also 3 2 3 2 below where the role of the Office of the Valuer-General, in determining the “value” of 
property identified for land reform purposes is discussed. See further Moloto Community v Minister of Rural 
Development and Land Reform, unreported, case no LCC 204/2010, 4 February 2019, Land Claims Court, 
Randburg <http://www.justice.gov.za/lcc/jdgm/2019/2019-lcc-204-2010.pdf> (accessed 11-09-2019) and 
Emakhasaneni Community v Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform, unreported, case no LLC 
03/209, 6 March 2019, Land Claims Court, Durban <http://www.justice.gov.ze/lcc/jdgm/2019/2019-lcc-03-
2009.pdf>(accessed 11-09-2019) on the interpreting and applying the Property Valuation Act 17 of 2014 and 
the role of the Office of the Valuer-General.  
251 [2018] ZALCC 1, 15 January 2018 (unreported judgment). 
252 Van Wyk (2017) TSAR 23; Du Plessis (2015) PELJ 1740-1741. See also A Gildenhuys & GL Grobler 
“Expropriation” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) The Law of South Africa 2 ed (RS 31-08-2012) paras 73-82 for 
the different methods to determine market value. See further the considertations taken into account in 
determining “value” and “market value” under the regulations to the Property Valuation Act 17 of 2014 at 3 2 3 
5 below. 
253 Van Wyk (2017) TSAR 23.  
254 Du Plessis (2015) PELJ 1741-1742. For alternative methods of determining market value, see Du Plessis 
(2015) PELJ 1743-1747; Gildenhuys & Grobler “Expropriation” in LAWSA paras 73-82.  
255 Wollach No v Government of the Republic of South Africa [2018] ZALCC 1, 15 January 2018 (unreported 
judgment) paras 25-26.  
256 Van Wyk (2017) TSAR 23; Du Plessis (2015) PELJ 1737-1740; Southwood The Compulsory Acquisition of 
Rights 81-82. See furthermore, Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 207-244 for an exposition of the different valuation 
methods for determining market value. 
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“market value” under the regulations to the Property Valuation Act 17 of 2014 at 3 2 3 4 below.  
258 Du Plessis (2015) PELJ 1741-1742.  
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Apart from market value, the Act also makes provision for actual financial loss. Actual 
financial loss is regarded as the amount for any direct financial loss that is caused by the 
expropriation.261 This amount may include expenses or costs relating to the acquisition of a 
new property; relocation; loss of income while relocating and loss of goodwill.262  
The Expropriation Act also provides for a solatium amount.263 A solatium is a symbolic 
consolation amount additional to the market value amount, but not additional to the actual 
financial loss.264 In this regard, solatium must be added to the total amount of compensation 
payable to the expropriatee.265 
3 2 3 2 Compensation for expropriation under the Constitution  
While the Constitution provides a framework for determining compensation,266 it is important 
to note that the provisions of the Constitution dealing with the determination of 
compensation267 may change drastically, if the proposed amendments to the Constitution, 
allowing for expropriation without compensation are realised.268 However, in light of 
international and foreign law, it may be argued that there is a general duty to compensate 
an owner for giving up his/her property for the benefit of the broader society.269 
“Compensation is required for expropriation in most constitutional property clauses in foreign 
law”.270 Van der Walt notes that there is a “general duty to pay compensation for 
                                            
261 Van Wyk (2017) TSAR 23; Gildenhuys & Grobler “Expropriation” in LAWSA paras 98-103.  
262 Gildenhuys & Grobler “Expropriation” in LAWSA paras 98-103.  
263 Section 12(2) of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975. The Act provides: “Notwithstanding anything to the 
contrary contained in this Act there shall be added to the total amount payable in accordance with subsection 
(1), an amount equal to - (a) ten per cent of such total amount, if it does not exceed R100 000; plus (b) five 
per cent of the amount by which it exceeds R100 000, if it does not exceed R500 000; plus (c) three per cent 
of the amount by which it exceeds R500 000, if it does not exceed R1 000 000; plus (d) one per cent (but not 
amounting to more than R10 000) of the amount by which it exceeds R1 000 000”. See also Gildenhuys & 
Grober “Expropriation” in LAWSA para 106.  
264 Van Wyk (2017) TSAR 24. See Farjas (Prop) Ltd v Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs 2013 2 SA 263 
(SCA) para 26 where the court stated that “solatium awards are by no means automatic”. See also Florence v 
Broadbeat Investments (Pty) Ltd, Government of the Republic of South Africa and City of Cape Town (LLC 
148/08) [2012] ZALCC 11 (5 June 2012) para 40 where the court confirmed that the purpose of a solatium is 
not financial as such, but symbolic in that it appreciated that the plaintiffs had suffered hardship. In this regard, 
awarding solatium is by no means automatic. Evidence had to be tendered of the hardship caused. See 
Pienaar Land Reform 538-543.  
265 Van Wyk (2017) TSAR 24. 
266 Section 25(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See also Du Plessis “How the 
determination of compensation is influenced by the disjunction between the concepts of ‘value’ and 
‘compensation’” in Rethinking Expropriation Law III: Fair Compensation 192; Du Plessis (2014) PELJ 811. 
267 Section 25(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
268 See 3 3 below.  
269 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 505. See also Slade et al “Submission to Parliament on the review 
of section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996” (15 June 2018). 




expropriation, even in the absence of an explicit constitutional provision to that effect” 271 in 
foreign case law. Therefore, “if there is no express authorisation from the legislation to 
compensate, the [South African] courts could create such a duty”272 in future.  
The proposed 2019 Expropriation Bill also makes provision for circumstances under which 
it may be just and equitable to pay nil compensation for land expropriated in the public 
interest.273 These developments are discussed below.274  
As the Constitution is currently formulated, it provides for “just and equitable” 
compensation,275 reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the 
interests of those affected.276 “Just and equitable” is not defined,277 but the Constitution 
provides that all relevant circumstances278 must be taken into account, including the factors 
listed in section 25(3)(a)-(e) to determine “just and equitable” compensation. These factors 
include “the current use of the property”;279 “the history of the acquisition and use of the 
property”;280 “the market value of the property”;281 “the extent of direct State investment and 
                                            
271 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 505; C Treeger “Legal analysis of farmland expropriation in 
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<https://www.nid.org.na/images/pdf/analysis_views/Legal_analysis_of_farmland_expropriation_in_Namibia.p
df> (accessed 05-02-2019). 
272 Du Plessis Compensation for expropriation under the Constitution 34. 
273 Clause 12(3) the Draft Expropriation Bill B-2019.  
274 See 3 3 below. 
275 Du Plessis “How the determination of compensation is influenced by the disjunction between the concepts 
of ‘value’ and ‘compensation’” in Rethinking Expropriation Law III: Fair Compensation 193-198. See also Msiza 
v Director-General, Department of Rural Development and Land Reform 2016 5 SA 513 (LCC) para 32. In this 
decision, the Land Claims Court awarded compensation that was less than market value. However, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in Uys NO v Msiza 2018 3 SA 440 (SCA) overturned the ruling of the Land Claims 
Court and awarded compensation equal to market value compensation, as it was of the opinion that it was not 
justified in the circumstances to make a downward adjustment. This decision may point towards a tendency 
by courts to award market value-related compensation.  
276 Du Plessis (2014) PELJ 811-812.  
277 Pienaar Land Reform 625, 651. See in general Du Plessis “How the determination of compensation is 
influenced by the disjunction between the concepts of ‘value’ and ‘compensation’” in Rethinking Expropriation 
Law III: Fair Compensation 189-220.  
278 Du Plessis “How the determination of compensation is influenced by the disjunction between the concepts 
of ‘value’ and ‘compensation’” in Rethinking Expropriation Law III: Fair Compensation 194-198; Case-specific 
considerations or factors may impact the amount of compensation payable. For example, the removal of a 
fence was considered in the Mhlanganisweni Community v Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform 
[2012] ZALCC 7 (19 April 2012) paras 74-76 as a factor or circumstance that may impact the amount of 
compensation payable. The court in In re: KookFontein Trading Company (Pty) Ltd (37/2008) 2012 ZALCC 21 
(30 November 2012) para 74 also took financial loss into account to determine the amount of compensation 
payable. 
279 Section 25(3)(a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See also Du Plessis (2015) PELJ 
1734-1735; Du Plessis (2014) PELJ 816-817.  
280 Section 25(3)(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See also Du Plessis (2015) PELJ 
1735; Du Plessis (2014) PELJ 817.  
281 Section 25(3)(c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See also Du Plessis (2015) PELJ 




subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital improvement of the property”;282 and “the 
purpose of the expropriation”.283 Importantly, market value is but one of the considerations 
to be taken into account to determine just and equitable compensation.284 In light of the 
listed factors to be considered to determine “just and equitable” compensation,285 it is clear 
that the Constitution envisages a move away from the centrality of market value, as 
cemented in the Expropriation Act.286  
The expropriator and the expropriatee can either agree on the amount of compensation by 
way of negotiation or it can be decided and approved by a court.287 Interestingly, the WBWS 
principle for determining compensation may still be applicable in cases where the parties 
involved in the expropriation can agree on the compensation amount.288 In cases where 
there is no agreement, courts are left to determine the compensation amount. For purposes 
of this dissertation the focus falls on the determination of compensation for an expropriation 
in the public interest, namely for land reform purposes. In this context, the role of the Office 
of the Valuer-General (“OVG”) is important. As elaborated on below,289 where any property 
is identified for purposes of land reform, the OVG must value the property “having regard to 
the prescribed criteria and guidelines”.290 However, it is unclear to what extent the 
determination of value by the OVG may assist the court in determining just and equitable 
compensation for an expropriation for land reform purposes.291 Arguably, the determination 
                                            
282 Section 25(3)(d) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See also Du Plessis (2015) PELJ 
1736; Du Plessis (2014) PELJ 817-818. 
283 Section 25(3)(e) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Du Plessis “How the determination 
of compensation is influenced by the disjunction between the concepts of ‘value’ and ‘compensation’” in 
Rethinking Expropriation Law III: Fair Compensation 196-197. See also Du Plessis (2015) PELJ 1736; Du 
Plessis (2014) PELJ 818-819.  
284 Du Plessis “How the determination of compensation is influenced by the disjunction between the concepts 
of ‘value’ and ‘compensation’” in Rethinking Expropriation Law III: Fair Compensation 196. See for instance 
Msiza v Director-General, Department of Rural Development and Land Reform 2016 5 SA 513 (LCC) para 29 
where the court specifically held: “Market value is not the basis for the determination of compensation under 
section 25 of the Constitution … The departure point for the determination of compensation is justice and 
equity”. 
285 Van Wyk (2017) TSAR 35.  
286 Section 12 of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975. See however, Du Plessis “How the determination of 
compensation is influenced by the disjunction between the concepts of ‘value’ and ‘compensation’” in 
Rethinking Expropriation Law III: Fair Compensation 198-199.   
287 Section 25(2)(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; Van der Walt Constitutional 
Property Law 509.  
288 In such cases, the determination of “value” made by the Valuer-General may guide the parties in 
determining a compensation amount. See Emakhasaneni Community v Minister of Rural Development and 
Land Reform, unreported, case no LLC 03/209, 6 March 2019, Land Claims Court, Durban 
<http://www.justice.gov.ze/lcc/jdgm/2019/2019-lcc-03-2009.pdf>(accessed 11-09-2019) in this regard.  
289 See 3 2 3 5 below.  
290 Section 12(1)(a) of the Property Valuation Act 17 of 2014.  
291 See Moloto Community v Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform, unreported, case no LCC 
204/2010, 4 February 2019, Land Claims Court, Randburg <http://www.justice.gov.za/lcc/jdgm/2019/2019-lcc-
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of the value of the property could be used by the court, and by the State, as a guideline for 
determining just and equitable compensation where property is acquired for land reform 
purposes.292 In light of the uncertainty regarding the relationship, duties and responsibilities 
of courts, vis-á-vis the OVG, courts are inevitably guided by the principles and factors set 
out in the Constitution to determine compensation for an expropriation for land reform 
purposes.293  
Currently, despite possible developments linked to the amendment of section 25 of the 
Constitution elaborated on in more detail below,294  the central principle is that the amount 
of compensation must reflect an equitable balance between the public interest and the 
individual interests of the private land owner.295 Courts must establish this balance by taking 
into account the relevant circumstances, including those listed in section 25(3), mentioned 
above.296 Du Plessis notes that this requires the court to look at each case individually, while 
taking into account: 
“the individual property interest that might stem from the pre-constitutional era, and the 
constitutional framework and its legitimate land reform efforts”. 297  
However, the courts find the determination of compensation for expropriation for land reform 
purposes, such as for redistribution, rather challenging.298 The challenge lies in quantifying 
                                            
<http://www.justice.gov.ze/lcc/jdgm/2019/2019-lcc-03-2009.pdf>(accessed 11-09-2019). The question arises 
whether the Property Valuation Act 17 of 2014 and the determination of value by the Valuer-General ousts the 
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á-vis the Office of the Valuer-General and Property Valuation Act are.  
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297 Du Plessis (2014) PELJ 812. See also Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 272, 509.  
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certain factors299 and finding a way of applying the different factors and their content300 in 
relation to one another.301 Accordingly, a two-step approach for calculating compensation 
was formulated in Ex parte Former Highland Residents; in re: Ash v Department of Land 
Affairs.302 In terms of this two-step approach, Gildenhuys J envisaged market value as the 
starting point in the application of section 25(3) of the Constitution, because it is one of the 
few factors that is actually quantifiable.303 In general, once market value is established, an 
amount may be added or subtracted as may be required by the other factors to determine 
just and equitable compensation.304  
Furthermore, section 25(3) does not provide an exhaustive list of considerations for a court 
to take into account.305 For example, Gildenhuys points out that the authorising legislation, 
in principle, may also provide for relevant factors to be taken into account for the calculation 
of compensation.306 Interestingly, the 2019 Draft Expropriation Bill307 provides for a list of 
factors that should not be taken into account generally to determine the amount of 
compensation for an expropriation.308 Some of these factors include: (a) whether the 
property has been taken without consent of the expropriatee;309 (b) the special suitability or 
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214-219; G Budlender “The constitutional protection of property rights” in G Budlender, J Katsky & T Roux 
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considered. See also Du Plessis (2014) PELJ 813; Van Wyk (2017) TSAR 21-35 in general.  
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usefulness of the property for which it is required, provided that it would have been unlikely 
that the property would have been purchased for that purpose in the open market;310 and 
(c) improvements made to the property after the date on which the expropriation notice was 
served on the expropriatee.311 
3 2 3 3 Compensation for an expropriation in land reform cases  
Importantly, in suitable cases, it is also possible that expropriation may be just and equitable 
without any compensation or extremely low compensation.312 Van der Walt explains that this 
may be the case where:  
“…the property was acquired in an inequitable manner in the first place, or where the state funded 
or subsidised the acquisition and development of the property to such an extent that it would be 
inequitable to require compensation”.313  
It is furthermore questioned whether an expropriation undertaken for land reform purposes 
will justify the absence of compensation in all cases.314 Even where property is expropriated 
for land reform purposes, all the relevant circumstances and factors, including those listed 
in section 25(3) of the Constitution should be considered holistically to determine whether it 
would be just and equitable to pay no compensation or extremely low compensation.315 In 
this regard Van der Walt explains that in the context of section 25 of the Constitution as a 
whole:  
“…one factor, such as the purpose of the expropriation, should not be sufficient on its own to 
justify the absence of compensation, just as one factor (like the market value of the property) 
should not be sufficient on its own to determine the necessity or amount of compensation”.316 
Du Plessis notes that case law shows that courts tend to conflate the public purpose or 
public interest requirement, under section 25(2) of the Constitution, with the purpose of the 
expropriation as a factor to be taken into account when determining just and equitable 
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312 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 506-508. See for example, Nhlabhati v Fick 2003 7 BCLR 806 
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compensation.317 In particular, it is questioned whether the “purpose of the expropriation” 
factor justifies expropriation without compensation merely because the expropriation is 
aimed at constitutionally legitimate public purpose or public interest such as land reform.318 
For example, in Du Toit v Minister of Transport319 the High Court reasoned that the public 
purpose, namely building of roads, would be frustrated if the full market value of the gravel 
being expropriated were to be paid to the owner.320 The market value compensation was 
reduced markedly because it was argued that “a fairer balance between the public interest 
and the interest of the expropriated owner” would be struck,321 even though the case had no 
bearing on land reform or greater access to land rights. Van der Walt explains that, where 
the section 25(2)(a) public purpose requirement justifies the expropriation in the first place, 
it should not also justify a reduction of the compensation amount in terms of the section 
25(3)(e) factor, “unless there is a special reason such as land reform involved.”322 This 
statement supports Du Plessis’s argument that section 25(3)(e), the purpose of the 
expropriation factor, should only have an influence on the amount of compensation in 
circumstances that deal with social transformation and equitable access to resources.323  
Accordingly, it is important to distinguish between the justification or purpose of the 
expropriation as a requirement for a valid expropriation in terms of section 25(2)(a) of the 
Constitution and the purpose of the expropriation as a factor to consider in the determination 
of the amount of compensation to be paid for an expropriation in terms of section 25(3) of 
the Constitution.324 The interpretation325 and application of the various factors may influence 
the calculation of compensation. These factors, in relation to agricultural land specifically, 
are thus discussed briefly below. Importantly, the regulations to the Property Valuation Act 
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17 of 2014 (“PVA”), elaborated on and discussed separately below,326 also provide some 
content to each factor by providing for the determination of the “value” of each factor.327  
3 2 3 3 1 Current use of the property 
Current use of the property328 should be distinguished from historical use of the property329 
and from its future use.330 Generally, this factor requires a determination of the use of the 
property on the date of expropriation.331  
It is argued that this factor may be significant to justify expropriation of scarce resources 
such as agricultural land for the establishment of emerging commercial black farmers, if the 
land is not used in a productive manner.332 However, this factor cannot be used as a punitive 
measure, because doing so would not constitute a public purpose or be in the public 
interest.333 A land owner “cannot be punished for using the land in a certain way”.334 For 
example, if an owner is not using agricultural land for agricultural purposes, this should not 
justify a downward adjustment of compensation per se. Instead, it remains necessary to 
balance the interest of those affected with the public interest.335  
3 2 3 3 2 The history of the acquisition and use of the property 
It is not only the current use of the property that can influence the compensation amount, 
but also the historical use and the acquisition of the property. This factor entails a 
determination of when the property was acquired; from whom; for what price; on what terms 
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333 G Budlender “The constitutional protection of property rights” in G Budlender, J Latsky & T Roux Juta’s 
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and how the acquisition was financed.336 For example, in cases where the apartheid 
government expropriated property and sold (or rented) it to white commercial farmers, 
usually at a price below market value, it may justify a downward adjustment of 
compensation.337 Accordingly, in such cases it would be unfair to offer full market value to a 
land owner, because it would allow the land owner to benefit twice from the apartheid 
regime.338 
3 2 3 3 3 Market value 
Although market value is no longer the main consideration to take into account when 
calculating compensation,339 it can still be determined by traditional valuation methods.340 
Accordingly, the jurisprudence developed to determine market value under the Expropriation 
Act is still applicable.341 Where agricultural land is at stake, the comparable sales method 
will generally be used to determine the market value of the land, as the other valuation 
methods listed above342 are ordinarily not applicable in relation to agricultural land.343 With 
respect to where the concept of “market value” had been defined by way of legislation, these 
particular measures have to be interpreted and applied where relevant. Arguably this 
particular factor should therefore not pose any new challenges apart from weighing it up in 
relation to the other factors.344 
                                            
336 Van Wyk (2017) TSAR 28-29. Regulation 5 under the Property Valuation Act 17 of 2014 R 1321 GG 42064 
(30 November 2018) for determining the “historical value” of the property.  
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60.See further Du Plessis (2015) PELJ 1735; Southwoord The Compulsory Acquisition of Rights 79-80; Van 
Wyk (2017) TSAR 29. 
339 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 513. 
340 See 3 2 3 1 above where the different valuation methods or approaches are briefly listed. See section 12 
of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975. See also Van Wyk (2017) TSAR 28; Du Plessis (2014) PELJ 817; Du 
Plessis (2015) PELJ 1736; Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 513; Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 174-
176.  
341 See 3 2 3 1 above. See also, regulation 5 under the Property Valuation Act 17 of 2014 R 1321 GG 42064 
(30 November 2018) for the determination of the “market value” of the property.  
342 See 3 2 3 1 above.  
343 Wollach No v Government of the Republic of South Africa [2018] ZALCC 1, 15 January 2018 (unreported 
judgment) para 26; JM Pienaar “Land reform: January to March” (2018) 1 Juta Quarterly Review 1-4, 1.  
344 Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 174-176; Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 513. See also regulations 
5 and 6 under the Property Valuation Act 17 of 2014 R 1321 GG 42064 (30 November 2018) for calculating 




3 2 3 3 4 Direct State investment/ subsidy 
The history of the acquisition and the use of the property may overlap with this factor.345 The 
extent of direct346 State investment and subsidy in the acquisition and/or beneficial capital 
improvement in the property refers to instances or the practice where the apartheid 
government directly assisted white farmers with grants and subsidies, through institutions 
such as the Land Bank,347 to acquire and develop land expropriated in terms of apartheid 
land legislation.348  
Another example of former State investment, which may be regarded as controversial, is the 
development and consolidation of homeland349 and rural areas.350 Coka explains that: 
“According to the [Tomlinson] Commission’s 1954 report, the reserves were incapable of 
supporting South Africa’s black population without significant enlargement and state investment; 
therefore, homeland consolidation was a way of improving agricultural conditions in them”.351 
(own emphasis)   
                                            
345 Van Wyk (2017) TSAR 29. 
346 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 513-514. Indirect investments through tax benefits are probably 
excluded because they are too difficult to calculate. See also regulation 5 under the Property Valuation Act 17 
of 2014 R 1321 GG 42064 (30 November 2018) for determining the value of “direct state investment and 
subsidies”.  
347 The Land and Agricultural Development Bank of South Africa is a government-owned juristic person, 
established in terms of the Land and Agricultural Development Bank Act 18 of 1912, as repealed by the Land 
Bank Act 13 of 1944 which in turn was repealed by the Land and Agricultural Development Bank Act 15 of 
2002. Despite the repeal of the earlier Acts the Bank established in 1912 continues to exist. It is the leading 
agricultural financier in South Africa since its inception in 1912. It offers financial services to establish emerging 
farmers and to provide financial assistance to farmers in general. See also section 3 which sets out the 
objectives of the Act.   
348 For example, the Group Areas Act 41 of 1950; 77 of 1957 and 36 of 1966 and Black Land Act 27 of 1913 
and the Development Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936 created black and white areas where people were 
statutorily prevented from owning and using land in an area that was assigned to another group. See Van der 
Walt Constitutional Property Law 513; Van Wyk (2017) TSAR 29; Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 176-177; 
Southwoord The Compulsory Acquisition of Rights 89; Budlender “The constitutional protection of property 
rights” in Juta’s New Land Law 48-55, 60. See also chapter three of Pienaar Land Reform in general. 
349 Z Coka “Homeland consolidation: A forerunner for land reform?” (2018) Farmer’s Weekly 6-7 defines 
“homeland consolidation” as “the process through which the reserves (territories set aside for black South 
African and South West African inhabitants as part of the policy of apartheid) were expanded” by way of 
legislative means and State investment. See further Pienaar Land Reform 115-124. White land owners also 
lost their land for purposes of homeland consolidation. However, these owners where able to lodge restitution 
claims unde the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994. See Department of Land Affairs v Witz, In re Various 
Portions of Grassy Park 2006 1 SA 86 (LCC) and Randall v Minister of Land Affairs, Knott v Minister of Land 
Affairs 2006 3 SA 216 (LCC) which were the first reported cases dealing with restitution claims lodged by 
persons belonging to the White group.  
350 Coka (2018) Farmer’s Weekly 6-7 provides that “homeland consolidation was called for by the Tomlinson 
Commission, which was appointed by the South African government to study the economic viability of the 
reserves (later Bantustans) in which the government intended to confine the black population”. 
351 Coka (2018) Farmer’s Weekly 6-7. See also Pienaar Land Reform 114-115; W Beinhart Twentieth century 




Coka further explains that, although the consolidation of the homeland areas played an 
important role in the process of dispossession, “the reality is that it made some commercial 
farmland available to black people”.352 In this regard, it would be unfair to compensate the 
land owner at full market value for land that was acquired and/or subsequently developed 
with the financial and other assistance of the apartheid government.353 
3 2 3 3 5 The purpose of the expropriation  
As is evident from the case law discussed below, public purpose or public interest is not only 
a requirement for a valid expropriation,354 but it is also a factor that can influence the amount 
of compensation to be paid.355 The purpose of the expropriation, as a requirement for a valid 
expropriation, is complemented by section 25(4)(a) of the Constitution, which provides for 
the nation’s commitment to land reform. In this regard, section 25(4)(a) circumscribes the 
content of public interest, while section 25(3)(e) deals with the role the purpose of the 
expropriation plays in compensation. This should also be distinguished from section 25(2), 
which provides for the public purpose or public interest requirement for a valid 
expropriation.356  
As mentioned above, case law shows that the courts tend to confuse the public purpose or 
public interest requirement, under section 25(2) of the Constitution, with the purpose of the 
expropriation as a factor to be taken into account when determining just and equitable 
compensation.357 For example, as mentioned above, the Court in Du Toit v Minister of 
Transport358 attached too much weight to the public interest consideration and too little to 
the affected owner, without a special justification such as land reform,359 for doing so in the 
                                            
352 Coka (2018) Farmer’s Weekly 6-7. See also Pienaar Land Reform 114-115; Beinhart Twentieth century 
South Afica 224. 
353 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 513; Du Plessis (2015) PELJ 1736; Du Plessis (2014) PELJ 818.  
354 See 3 2 2 above.  
355 Du Plessis “The public purpose requirement in the calculation of just and equitable compensation” in 
Rethinking Expropriation Law I: Public Interest in Expropriation 376-377. See however regulation 5 under the 
Property Valuation Act 17 of 2014 R 1321 GG 42064 (30 November 2018) which merely states that the valuer 
must record the “purpose of the acquisition”.  No guidance is given regarding the extent to which this factor 
should influence the determination of the value of the property.  
356 See 3 2 2 above.  
357 Du Plessis “The public purpose requirement in the calculation of just and equitable compensation” in 
Rethinking Expropriation Law I: Public Interest in Expropriation 376-377. 
358 2003 1 SA 586 (C); Minister of Transport v Du Toit 2005 1 SA 16 (SCA) and Du Toit v Minister of Transport 
2006 1 SA 297 (CC), which followed the approach for determining compensation as set out in Khumalo v 
Potgieter 2000 2 All SA 456 (LCC). See 3 2 3 3 above.  
359 Du Plessis “The public purpose requirement in the calculation of just and equitable compensation” in 
Rethinking Expropriation Law I: Public Interest in Expropriation 380 explains that section 25(3)(e) of the 
Constitution should only apply where there is a “unique” purpose, such as the realization of social justice, 




specific case.360 Accordingly, market value was reduced markedly because of the purpose 
of the expropriation.  
Conversely, in Mhlanganisweni Community v Minister of Rural Development and Land 
Reform,361 (“MalaMala”) which serves as an example of an expropriation for land reform 
purposes,362 the Court noted that some legal writers have argued that the intention of making 
the purpose of an expropriation a factor to be considered in the determination of just and 
equitable compensation, is to decrease the amount of compensation by relying on section 
25(8) of the Constitution.363 On the one hand, it can be argued that the amount of 
compensation required for an expropriation may fall outside the State’s available resources 
and therefore constitute a fundamental impediment to land reform.364 In such circumstances, 
a reduction in terms of the amount of compensation to be paid may be justified in terms of 
section 25(8) of the Constitution. However, on the other hand, the purpose of the 
expropriation is already taken into account when justifying the expropriation under section 
25(2)(a) of the Constitution, and should therefore not override other factors in determining 
the amount of compensation.365 However, the Court found that there is: 
“[N]o logical reason why a land owner whose property is expropriated for purposes of land reform, 
should receive less compensation than a land owner whose property is expropriated for a more 
mundane purpose, such as a storage dam; a school or a hospital…Land reform in the public 
interest does not rank superior to any other legitimate purpose for which property may be 
expropriated, and the determination of compensation in cases of land reform must not be 
different”.366  
                                            
360 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 514-517 where the author criticises the court’s determination of 
compensation in the Du Toit cases. See also AJ van der Walt “Reconciling the state’s duties to promote land 
reform and to pay ‘just and equitable’ compensation for expropriation” (2006) 123 South African Law Journal 
23-40.  
361 [2012] ZALCC 7 (19 April 2012) (commonly known as the MalaMala case) para 73. The MalaMala case 
was set down for hearing in the Constitutional Court in 2014. However the matter was withdrawn, because the 
State settled it outside of court. The State paid full market value. Du Plessis “The public purpose requirement 
in the calculation of just and equitable compensation” in Rethinking Expropriation Law I: Public Interest in 
Expropriation 379 notes that this shows that the State prefers market solutions above other solutions when it 
comes to acquiring land for land reform purposes.  
362 Du Plessis “The public purpose requirement in the calculation of just and equitable compensation” in 
Rethinking Expropriation Law I: Public Interest in Expropriation 377.  
363 Mhlanganisweni Community v Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform [2012] ZALCC 7 (19 April 
2012) paras 71-72. See Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 507.  
364 Mhlanganisweni Community v Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform [2012] ZALCC 7 (19 April 
2012) para 72.  
365 Para 72. 
366 Mhlanganisweni Community v Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform para 73; Du Plessis “The 
public purpose requirement in the calculation of just and equitable compensation” in Rethinking Expropriation 




The Court held that the fact that land is expropriated for land reform purposes cannot by 
itself warrant a smaller amount of compensation than would have been payable to the land 
owner if it was expropriated for any other purpose.367 Accordingly, the Court held that full 
market value compensation be paid to the land owner.368 Based on this decision, it would 
mean that the determination of compensation in land reform cases should not be treated 
differently from determining compensation for any other expropriation.369 However, this 
judgment was handed down before regulations were issued under the PVA.  
Accordingly, in light of the misconstrued interpretation and application of section 25(3)(e) in 
case law, Du Plessis provides for an alternative interpretation of the purpose of the 
expropriation factor.370 She postulates that, when determining compensation, a better 
approach would be to consider the purpose of the expropriation only in circumstances that 
deal with “social transformation and equitable access to resources”,371 such as land reform 
cases. She explains that: 
“The reference to the context and history in Section 25(3)(b) makes it clear that there is a specific 
aim that compensation must fulfil, a specific Apartheid wrong that must be made right, a 
precaution against allowing the beneficiaries of Apartheid land law to benefit twice (by payment 
of full compensation).”372  
She argues that where an expropriation is effected for “run-of the-mill”373 public purposes, 
or non-land reform purposes,374 such as building a road, railway, school or parking, then 
“market value would probably be just and equitable since that would struck the balance 
                                            
367 Mhlanganisweni Community v Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform [2012] ZALCC 7 (19 April 
2012) paras 73, 77.  
368 Mhlanganisweni Community v Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform [2012] ZALCC 7 (19 April 
2012) para 77. 
369 Du Plessis “The public purpose requirement in the calculation of just and equitable compensation” in 
Rethinking Expropriation Law I: Public Interest in Expropriation 378 where the author notes that ironically, this 
would mean that a lower amount of compensation, as was awarded in the Du Toit case, should also be possible 
in cases of land reform.  
370 Du Plessis “The public purpose requirement in the calculation of just and equitable compensation” in 
Rethinking Expropriation Law I: Public Interest in Expropriation 379-308.  
371 Du Plessis “The public purpose requirement in the calculation of just and equitable compensation” in 
Rethinking Expropriation Law I: Public Interest in Expropriation 380; Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 
514; Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 178. 
372 Du Plessis “The public purpose requirement in the calculation of just and equitable compensation” in 
Rethinking Expropriation Law I: Public Interest in Expropriation 380.  
373 Du Plessis “The public purpose requirement in the calculation of just and equitable compensation” in 
Rethinking Expropriation Law I: Public Interest in Expropriation 380.  




between the public interest and the interests of those affected”.375 Conversely, when 
property is expropriated for land reform purposes, Du Plessis argues that the purpose of the 
expropriation may be allowed to play a bigger role in the reduction of market value 
compensation.376 Despite being overturned by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Uys v 
Msiza,377 the reasoning of the Land Claims Court in Msiza v Director-General, Department 
of Rural Development and Land Reform378 is still relevant for purposes of this section. The 
Court held that the section 25(3)(e) factor exists primarily to further the objectives of land 
reform, particularly when read with section 25(8) of the Constitution.379 Accordingly, the court 
and academic authors380 support an interpretation that compensation below market value 
may be paid in land reform cases,381 especially in cases where land reform may be impeded 
by the payment of compensation,382 provided that all the factors are carefully considered in 
a holistic, all-encompassing fashion.383 
Even before the current thrust to amend the property clause to enable expropriation without 
compensation, the question was raised whether an expropriation undertaken for land reform 
purposes, would justify the absence of compensation.384 As mentioned above, a contextual 
reading of section 25 allows for the interpretation that compensation below market value can 
be paid in land reform cases, in light of section 25(8) of the Constitution, on condition that 
all the relevant factors are considered holistically.385 Van der Walt explains: 
“The fact that the purpose of the expropriation is land reform should…not on its own imply that 
compensation is not required or that it can be calculated at a special discounted rate, although 
                                            
375 Du Plessis “The public purpose requirement in the calculation of just and equitable compensation” in 
Rethinking Expropriation Law I: Public Interest in Expropriation 380; Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 
514-517. 
376 Du Plessis “The public purpose requirement in the calculation of just and equitable compensation” in 
Rethinking Expropriation Law I: Public Interest in Expropriation 380. 
377 2018 3 SA 440 (SCA).  
378 2016 5 SA 513 (LCC).  
379 Msiza v Director-General, Department of Rural Development and Land Reform 2016 5 SA 513 (LCC) para 
66.  
380 Du Plessis “The public purpose requirement in the calculation of just and equitable compensation” in 
Rethinking Expropriation Law I: Public Interest in Expropriation 380; Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 
518; Van Wyk (2017) TSAR 29.  
381 Van Wyk (2017) TSAR 29.  
382 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 276 explains that if section 25(3)(e) is read together with section 
25(8), where the Constitution mandates the State to promote land reform, then such an interpretation would 
be plausible, especially in cases where land reform may be impeded by the payment of compensation. 
383 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 506-507.  
384 506.  




this conclusion could indeed follow, in individual cases, upon consideration of all the relevant 
circumstances”.386 (own emphasis) 
Accordingly, if section 25 is read as a whole, it can be concluded that one factor, such as 
the purpose of the expropriation, should not be sufficient to justify the absence of 
compensation.387 This position might change in light of the proposed amendment to the 
Constitution that provides for expropriation without compensation.388 
3 2 3 4 Compensation for expropriation under the Expropriation Bill  
The 2019 Draft Expropriation Bill,389 is the most recent development in a long line of 
legislative attempts390 intended to repeal and replace the current Expropriation Act.391 
Pienaar provides that:  
“Essentially, a new Expropriation Act has been on the table since the commencement of the final 
Constitution, as the extant Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 (still in use) was not aligned with the basic 
premises and concepts of the property clause, s 25 of the final Constitution. This was the case 
because the 1975 Act only provided for expropriation for public purposes, whereas s 25 also 
authorises expropriation in the public interest. Furthermore, the factors listed in s 25(3) to be taken 
into account regarding the time, manner and amount of just and equitable compensation were not 
reflected and embodied fully in the 1975 Act”.392 
                                            
386 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 518. 
387 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 506-507. 
388 See 3 3 2 below.  
389 The Draft Expropriation Bill B-2019 in GG No 42127 of 21-12-2018. 
390 There have been numerous attempts to repeal the 1975 Expropriation Act. See Expropriation Bill B16-2008 
in GG No 30963 of 11-04-2008; Expropriation Bill GN 234 in GG 36269 of 20-02-2015; the Expropriation Bill 
B4-2015 in GG 34818 of 26-01-2015 and the Draft Expropriation Bill B-2019 in GG No 42127 of 21-12-2018. 
See also Slade (2017) De Jure 348 in this regard. 
391 JM Pienaar “Land Reform: October to December” (2018) 4 Juta Quarterly Review 1-8, 1.  




The Expropriation Bill provides for the “expropriation”393 of “property”,394 of an “owner”395 
and holder of “unregistered rights396 for a public purpose or in the public interest. 
The extent to which the Expropriation Bill revises the payment of compensation for 
expropriated property may be regarded as the most significant feature thereof. Clause 12(1) 
of the Expropriation Bill, which relates to the calculation of compensation for an 
expropriation, is similar to section 25(3) of the Constitution in that it provides that: 
“the amount of compensation to be paid to an expropriated owner or expropriated holder must be 
just and equitable reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the interest of 
the expropriated owner or expropriated property holder, having regard to all relevant 
circumstances…”.397 
The same factors as listed in section 25(3) of the Constitution have to be taken into account 
when considering all the relevant circumstances. Despite the fact that the Expropriation Bill 
does not provide further clarity on the interpretation and application of the factors found in 
section 25(3) of the Constitution, clause 12(2), as mentioned above,398 makes provision for 
factors that should generally not be taken into account, unless there are special 
circumstances in which it would be just and equitable to do so.399  
Given the parliamentary initiative to amend section 25 of the Constitution to enable 
expropriation without compensation, clause 12(3) specifically provides for categories of land 
that may be expropriated in the public interest for nil compensation, and is thus of particular 
importance.400 The provision reads as follows:  
                                            
393 Clause 1 of the Draft Expropriation Bill B-2019. 
394 Clause 1 of the Draft Expropriation Bill B-2019. “Property” is defined as contemplated in section 25 of the 
Constitution. This coincides with the definition of property provided for in the First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a 
Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services; First National Bank of SA Limited t/a 
Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 51. The court in FNB opted for a wide definition of 
property without providing a comprehensive definition. The meaning of property has to be determined in each 
individual case. Cross reference to chapter 4 where you discuss property for purposes of section 25(1)? 
395 The definition refers to the person in whose name the property or right is registered. See the definition of 
“owner” in the Draft Expropriation Bill B-2019. 
396 Clause 1 of the Draft Expropriation Bill B-2019. An unregistered right is defined as “a right in property, 
including a right to occupy or use land, which is recognised and protected by law, but is neither registered nor 
required to be registered”.  
397 Clause 12(1) of Draft Expropriation Bill B-2019 replicates section 25(3) of the Constitution.  
398 See 3 2 3 2 above.  
399 Clause 12(2) of the Draft Expropriation Bill B-2019. 




“It may be just and equitable for nil compensation to be paid where land is expropriated in the 
public interest, having regard to all relevant circumstances, including but not limited to:   
(a) where land is occupied or used by a labour tenant, as defined in the Land Reform (Labour 
Tenants) Act 3 of 1996;  
(b) where the land is held for purely speculative purposes; 
(c) where the land is owned by a state-owned corporation or other state-owned entity; 
(d) where the owner of the land has abandoned the land;  
(e) where the market value of the land is equivalent to, or less than, the present value of direct 
state investment or subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital improvement of the land”.401 
Importantly, the circumstances under which payment of nil compensation may be paid relate 
only to land (and not property in general) expropriated in the public interest, namely for land 
reform purposes.402 Pienaar notes that “land”, although integral in many parts of the 
Expropriation Bill,403 is not defined.404 Furthermore, the list is not finite, but rather a list of 
possible situations in which it may be permissible for the State to pay nil compensation. 
Accordingly, it will not always be just and equitable for the State to pay nil compensation for 
the listed categories of land.405 At first glance the listed categories provide more clarity 
regarding the categories of land that may be considered for expropriation without 
compensation. However, the Bill is still vague in relation to “(a) the scope of the categories 
and (b) the result, in that some compensation may even be paid”.406 In relation to the 
vagueness surrounding the scope, each category listed above will be briefly explained.  
The first category of land, is limited to land occupied by “labour tenants”407 specifically, and 
does not include land occupied by other tenants. The process for a labour tenant to become 
an owner of a parcel of land is provided for in the Labour Tenants Act.408 To date, the 
process has been cumbersome in relation to the implementation, administration and 
                                            
401 Clause 12(3) of the Draft Expropriation Bill B-2019. 
402 Pienaar (2018) JQR 2.  
403 Compare clause 5(1) where the object is property, in comparison to clauses 5(2) and 12(3) of the Draft 
Expropriation Bill B-2019 where the object is land. 
404 Pienaar (2018) JQR 1-2.  
405 2. 
406 2. (Pienaar’s emphasis).  
407 See section 1 of the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996. Clause 12(3)(a) of the Draft Expropriation 
Bill B-2019 where the object is land. 




processing of labour tenancy claims.409 Accordingly, it is possible that this category of land 
may impact a large number of labour tenancy claims. In this regard, the Expropriation Bill is 
unclear in cases where labour tenancy claims have not been finalised.410  
In relation to the second category, where land is held for purely speculative purposes,411 it 
is unclear how and by whom the land will be identified and what criteria for establishing “land 
held for speculative purposes” will entail.412 It is also not clear whether rural or urban land 
will be targeted first under this category.413 
In terms of the third category, and in light of the State acquisition requirement laid down in 
Agri SA,414 State-owned land cannot be acquired by way of expropriation, because the land 
in question already vests in the State.415 In other words, State-owned land does not have to 
be expropriated because expropriation is a power that vests with the State alone, and has 
the effect that the State becomes the owner of the property being expropriated. Pienaar 
notes that while this category is technically challenging in light of the concept of 
expropriation, it makes sense if this “category of land is singled out to be put to better use in 
the public interest”,416 for example, where State-owned land is used for redistribution 
purposes. There may be cases where the land will have to be transferred from one State 
department to another. Such a transfer will not constitute an “expropriation” in the strict 
sense of the word.  
The fourth category deals with abandoned land. In this regard, more clarity regarding the 
type of land, namely urban, rural or agricultural land is required. While there are numerous 
examples of abandoned buildings on urban land,417 agricultural land is generally not 
                                            
409 Pienaar (2018) JQR 3. See for example, Mwelase v Director-General, Department of Rural Development 
and Land Reform 2017 4 SA 422 (LCC) where the Land Claims Court ordered the appointment of a Special 
Master to ensure that labour tenancy claims are processed more effectively. The order of the court was 
replaced by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Director-General, Department of Rural Development and Land 
Reform v Mwelase; Mwelase v Director-General, Department of Rural Development and Land Reform 2019 2 
SA 81 (SCA) in terms of which the Court directed the Department to deliver an implementation plan to deal 
with outstanding labour tenancy claims. Recently however, the Constitutional Court in Mwelase v Director-
General for the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (CCT 232/18) [2019] ZACC 30 (20 August 
2019) confirmed the appointment of a Special Master.  
410 Pienaar (2018) JQR 3.  
411 Clause 12(3)(b) of the Draft Expropriation Bill B-2019.  
412 Pienaar (2018) JQR 3. 
413 3. 
414 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) para 48. See also Marais (2015) PELJ 2983-3031; Marais (2015) PELJ 3033-2069; 
Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg 26-27.  
415 Pienaar (2018) JQR 3. 
416 3. 
417 See for example, City of Johannesburg v Changing Tides 74 (Pty) Ltd 2012 6 SA 294 (SCA). See further 
R Cramer “The abandonment of landownership in South African and Swiss Law” (2017) 134 South African 




abandoned by the owner. In the case of agricultural land, the land or parts of the land may 
appear to be abandoned, but is instead “fallow due to seasonal and planting requirements 
and schedules”.418 Other difficulties arise regarding the legal position or the status of 
immovable property once it is abandoned. In this regard, commentators disagree about the 
classification of land where it is abandoned. There is no consensus on whether the land 
becomes a res nullius or whether it becomes the property of the State (res publicae).419 
Furthermore, it is also extremely difficult to prove that property has indeed been 
abandoned.420 Again questions arise relating to how and by whom this category of land will 
be identified.421 
The fifth and final category of land requires a determination of (a) the market value of the 
property and (b) the value of State investment or subsidy in the land.422 As mentioned above, 
there are different methods and approaches to determining market value.423 Importantly, 
where land is acquired in the public interest (for land reform purposes), “the approach to 
market value has already been adjusted by way of the Property Valuation Act 17 of 2014”424 
and the corresponding regulations. Accordingly, the provisions of the PVA will play a role in 
determining the market value of the land in question.425 Synergy between the PVA and the 
Expropriation Bill is therefore required in relation to the determination of market value.   
3 2 3 5 Compensation for expropriation under the Property Valuation Act 17 of 2014 
Although the 2019 Expropriation Bill was drafted, it had not yet been enacted. This lacuna 
is, however, momentarily filled by another piece of legislation that may be pivotal for 
determining compensation426 for expropriations for land reform purposes specifically: The 
PVA and the Regulations under the PVA.427  
                                            
418 Pienaar (2018) JQR 3. 
419 Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert The Law of Property 26, 33, 140-141. See also GJ Pienaar “The effect of 
original acquisition of ownership of immovable property on existing limited real rights” (2015) 18 Potchefstroom 
Electronic Law Journal 1483-1482 and Pienaar (2018) JQR 3. 
420 Cramer (2017) SALJ 870-906. Van der Merwe Sakereg 227; Mostert & Pope (eds) The Principles of the 
Law of Property 141.  
421 Pienaar (2018) JQR 3. 
422 3-4. 
423 See 3 2 3 1 above.  
424 Pienaar (2018) JQR 4.  
425 4. 
426 See however, Du Plessis “How the determination of compensation is influenced by the disjunction between 
the concepts of ‘value’ and ‘compensation’” in Rethinking Expropriation Law III: Fair Compensation 210-213 
who argues that the Property Valuation Act provides for “value” which is not the same as “compensation”.  
427 Regulations under the Property Valuation Act 17 of 2014 R 1321 GG 42064 (30 November 2018). Valuation 
for land reform purposes was first introduced in the Green Paper on Land Reform (2011) 5-7 followed by the 




The overarching aim of the PVA is to give effect to the constitutional imperative of land 
reform and to facilitate land reform by way of regulating the valuation of property which has 
been identified for land reform purposes.428 Ultimately, the PVA may facilitate and accelerate 
land reform.429 It aims to do so by prescribing the manner in which the price of land is 
determined for the acquisition thereof. Pivotal and integral in this process is the 
establishment of the OVG.430    
Under the new Act, the price of land will be determined by the OVG.431 The OVG may take 
into account various considerations for determining the “value”432 of the land, including the 
“market value” of the land, which is defined as: 
“the estimated amount for which the property should exchange on the valuation date between a 
willing buyer and a willing seller in an arm’s length transaction after proper marketing and where 
the parties had each acted knowledgeably, prudently and without compulsion”.433  
The other considerations, similar to those listed in section 25(3) of the Constitution,434 
include the history of the land, its use and the purpose of the acquisition. Arguably, these 
considerations tend to mitigate for a value lower than market value435 and presumably this 
approach will prevent government paying inflated prices for land and that the delays 
associated with protracted negotiations over price will be obviated. The regulations under 
the PVA provide for guidelines in calculating market value.436  
The regulations promulgated to give effect to the PVA, set out the criteria and/or procedures 
for the valuation of property identified specifically for purposes of land reform.437 These 
criteria include: (a) the current use value; (b) historical value; (c) market value; (d) direct 
State investment and subsidies and (e) the purpose of the acquisition.  
                                            
of the Office of the Valuer-General (21 November 2012), which ultimately resulted in the Property Valuation 
Act 17 of 2014. See Pienaar Land Reform 249-254; Van Wyk (2017) TSAR 31. 
428 Section 12 of the Property Valuation Act 17 of 2014.  
429 Section 2 of the Property Valuation Act 17 of 2014.  
430 Chapter 2 of the Property Valuation Act 17 of 2014. 
431 Section 6(a) of the Property Valuation Act 17 of 2014.  
432 Section 1 of the Property Valuation Act 17 of 2014 specifically provides for a definition of “value” and “market 
value” and which considerations may be taken into account for determining the value. 
433 Section 1 of the Property Valuation Act 17 of 2014. 
434 Pienaar Land Reform 363.  
435 Kepe & Hall “Land redistribution in South Africa” Commissioned report for High Level Panel on the 
assessment of key legislation and the acceleration of fundamental change, an initiative of the Parliament of 
South Africa (28 September 2016) 13. JM Pienaar “Land Reform: April to June” (2013) 2 Juta Quarterly Review 
1-5, 2-3. 
436 Regulation 5(5) under the Property Valuation Act 17 of 2014. 




The regulations define “current use value” as:  
“the net present value, as at the date of valuation, of cash inflows and outflows, or other benefits 
or costs that the subject property generates for the specific owner in perpetuity or, in the case of 
a lease, to lease expiry, under lawful use, and without regard to its highest and best use, or the 
monetary amount that might be realised upon its sale”.438 
When determining the historical value, the regulations provide that the value will “establish 
the historical value of any acquisition benefits, and escalate the value of these benefits to 
the valuation date”.439 In this regard, “acquisition benefits” are defined as:  
“any benefits that accrued to the owner of, and the subject property, because of the manner of 
acquisition, including that they did not acquire the property at market value and from a willing 
owner, and where such acquisition and benefit was due to, aided by, or a consequence of past 
discriminatory laws and practices, or unlawful conduct”.440 
In determining market value, the valuer shall take into account “any realisable potential and 
assuming it highest and best use”.441 Both “realisable potential”442 and “highest and best 
use”443 are defined in the regulations. Under the determination of market value, there is also 
a list of considerations which a valuer must not take into account:  
“(a) The fact that the property is the subject of an acquisition or expropriation; (b) the special 
suitability or usefulness of the property for which it is required by the acquiring authority, if it is 
unlikely that the property would have been purchased for that purpose on the open market; (c) 
any enhancement in the market value of the property, if such enhancement is the consequence 
of the use of the property in a manner which is unlawful; (d) any diminution in the market value of 
the property, if such diminution is a consequence of being encumbered by a mining right, permit 
or permission, and where such encumbrance took place subsequent to assumption of ownership 
by the owner of the subject property; (e) anything done with the object of obtaining compensation 
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440 See regulation 1 under the Property Valuation Act 17 of 2014 for a definition of “acquisition benefits”.  
441 Regulation 5(5) under the Property Valuation Act 17 of 2014. 
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and (f) the value of any movable property, annual crops or growing timber on the subject property, 
and belonging to the owner, that have not yet been harvested as at the date of valuation”.444 
The valuer may also, in determining the market value of the property, “take into account 
prices paid by the state”.445 Furthermore, in determining direct State investment and 
subsidies that can be attributed to specific improvements to the property, value of the direct 
State investment must be established on “the basis of the replacement cost of those 
improvements”.446 Where the value of the direct State investment cannot be attributed to 
specific improvements, the “valuer shall determine the historical cost of state investments 
and subsidies and escalate the said cost”.447 
Regarding the purpose of the acquisition, the valuer must merely record whether the 
acquisition of the property is in the public interest or for a public purpose.448 No value is 
attributed to this factor.  
Once the individual values of these factors are established, the value of the property should 
be calculated using the formula provided for in the regulations.449 The formula differs 
depending on whether the immovable property is acquired with or without movable property, 
annual crops or growing timber.  
If the immovable property is to be acquired with the movable property, annual crops and/or 
growing timber that have not been harvested, the value should be determined as follows:450 
The value of the movable property, annual crops and growing timber should first be added 
to the market value. Once this is done, the current use value and market value should be 
added together and divided by two. The acquisition benefits, the value of the direct State 
investment and subsidy, and the beneficial capital improvement on the property should then 
be subtracted from this figure, which will result in the determination of the value of the 
property.451  
However, if the immovable property is to be acquired without the movable property, annual 
crops and/or growing timber that have not be harvested, then the value should be calculated 
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as follows:452 The value of the movable property, annual crops and/or growing timber must 
first be subtracted from the current use value of the property. Thereafter, the same formula 
is followed, namely the current use value and market value are added together and divided 
by two, followed by a subtraction of the acquisition benefits, the value of the direct State 
investment and subsidy, and the beneficial capital improvement on the property.453 
Accordingly, the PVA, read with the regulations, provides more legal certainty and clearer 
guidelines regarding value generally, and market value specifically,454 where property is 
acquired for land reform purposes.455 Although the PVA is useful, “the obligatory valuation 
of property for land reform purposes may still be complex and time-consuming”.456 In this 
regard, it is questionable whether the Act, in its present format, will indeed expedite land 
reform as envisaged.457 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the PVA does not do away with the WBWS principle 
and the concept of market value per se.458 Where private individuals enter into the land 
market by way of private transactions market value remains that which a buyer and seller 
would willingly agree on.459 It is only where land is acquired by the government for land 
reform purposes that the Valuer-General and the Office become involved.460 Irrespective of 
whether it is a private or State transaction, data compiled and developed by the OVG will 
provide much needed information regarding value of property in South Africa. However, 
overall, there is no clarity regarding when the OVG enters into the expropriation process; 
what the precise role of the OVG is and whether cognisance of the value of the property as 
determined by the OVG has to be taken into account in all cases. For example, as mentioned 
above, it is unclear to what extent the determination of value by the Valuer-General may 
assist the court in determining just and equitable compensation for an expropriation for land 
reform purposes.461 Therefore, the precise impact of the PVA remains unaddressed and 
requires further elaboration, specifically in jurisprudence.   
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455 Pienaar (2015) Scriptura 14. 
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Clearly, synergy between this Act and the Expropriation Bill, when promulgated, is critical 
with regard to the identification of property for market evaluation and expropriation purposes. 
Importantly, the Expropriation Bill does not distinguish between valuation of property for land 
reform and non-land reform purposes.462 In this regard, relevant definitions concerning 
“market value” and “value” as set out in the PVA need to correspond and be aligned with 
what is deemed “just and equitable” in terms of the Expropriation Bill.463 “Value”, as 
mentioned above, corresponds and is aligned with the language for the “determination of 
compensation” under section 25(3) of the Constitution and clause 12(1) of the Expropriation 
Bill.464 However, if the provisions in terms of the valuation of property for land reform 
purposes under the PVA play a “parallel role”465 to the provisions that determine value for 
non-land reform expropriations, then “it is the starting point for a determination of 
compensation for all expropriations in terms of the Expropriation Bill”.466 
The valuation of property in terms of the PVA must also correspond with all the phases 
dealing with the determination of compensation provided for in the Expropriation Bill, namely 
the pre-investigation phase, the post-investigation phase and the post-expropriation 
phase.467 The PVA, similar to the provisions of the Expropriation Bill, provides that an 
authorised person may undertake valuations of the property and may serve the notice on 
the owner of the property.468 Furthermore, Van Wyk notes that the valuation of the property 
in terms of the PVA, falls under the investigation phase of the expropriation procedure in the 
Expropriation Bill.469 She explains that “if this is the case, land reform expropriations are 
subjected to the factors twice, first in the valuation in terms of the PVA and then to determine 
the amount of compensation (later) in the Expropriation Bill”.470  
Van Wyk opines that the procedure in cases of expropriation for land reform purposes is: 
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<http://www.justice.gov.ze/lcc/jdgm/2019/2019-lcc-03-2009.pdf>(accessed 11-09-2019). Unfortunately, these 
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“unclear and unwieldy, particularly the role played by the valuer-general and the possible 
duplication in the application of the factors that influence the determination of compensation”.471  
Apart from the alignment between the provisions in the PVA and the Expropriation Bill, the 
institutional alignment and effective functioning between different officials472 and 
functionaries in terms of these legislative developments are furthermore integral to overall 
efficacy.473 
3 3 Recent developments: Expropriation without compensation  
3 3 1 Introduction 
The increasing cry for expropriation of land in the public interest without compensation474 to 
broaden access to land and to address the skewed patterns of land ownership in South 
Africa is evident from two recent developments in the South African context: (a) the process 
of amending the Constitution to explicitly provide for expropriation without compensation475 
and (b) the Draft Expropriation Bill, which provides for categories of land which may be 
expropriated without compensation.476  
                                            
471 Van Wyk (2017) TSAR 35.  
472 The Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform under the Property Valuation Act 17 of 2014) and the 
Minister of Public Works under the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 and Expropriation Bill B4-2015 in GG 34818 
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473 Pienaar Land Reform 368. See Moloto Community v Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform, 
unreported, case no LCC 204/2010, 4 February 2019, Land Claims Court, Randburg 
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Community v Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform, unreported, case no LLC 03/209, 6 March 
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474 A Constitutional Review Committee has been mandated to explore the options available in this regard. See 
Government of South Africa, Minutes of Proceedings of the National Assembly on Tuesday, 27 February 2018 
[No 3-2018: Fifth session, Fifth Parliament] 8. 
475 Report of the Joint Constitutional Review Committee on the possible review of section 25 of the Constitution 
(15 November 2018) <https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Docs/atc/a3985fff-84d0-4109-80f4-
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24-03-2019); C Ramaphosa “Cyril Ramaphosa: We are going to amend the Constitution on land” Business 
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3 3 2 Amending the South African Constitution  
At the ANC’s 54th National Conference held on 21 December 2017,477 the newly elected 
ANC leader, Cyril Ramaphosa, stated that expropriation of land without compensation 
should be among the mechanisms available to the South African government for the 
redistribution of land.478 Furthermore, he stated that expropriation without compensation 
should be implemented in a way that increases agricultural production and improves food 
security.479 It was decided that the party’s National Executive Committee would start the 
process to amend section 25 of the Constitution480 to provide for expropriation without 
compensation.481 The National Assembly forthwith adopted a motion to review and possibly 
amend section 25 of the Constitution.482 Following this motion, the Joint Constitutional 
Review Committee (“CRC”) was mandated to: 
“embark on a process to establish the views of the public on the possible review of s 25 of the 
Constitution to allow for the State to expropriate land in the public interest without 
compensation”.483 (own emphasis)  
Although section 25(4) of the Constitution makes it clear that “property is not limited to land”, 
the motion to review section 25 presumably does not extend to the expropriation of property 
other than land without compensation. Given that the President stated that expropriation 
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without compensation should be implemented in a manner that does not impede agricultural 
production and food security, clarity with regard to the parameters of what would be qualify 
as “land” is essential. For example, does it refer to rural land (which includes agricultural 
land) and urban land or is it restricted to the former or the latter? What would the impact be 
if land with permanent fixtures like houses or apartment blocks on rural and/or urban land is 
expropriated without compensation? The motion also specifically refers to expropriation of 
land in the public interest. No reference is made to expropriation for public purposes.484 It is 
conceivable that the reference to public interest is limited to an investigation of expropriation 
for purposes of land reform without compensation, while expropriation for public purposes 
would still require payment of compensation.  
Furthermore, expropriation without compensation blurs the boundaries between 
expropriation on the one hand, and confiscation of property,485 on the other, with particular 
implications. Confiscation embodies a punitive element, carried out in the public interest.486 
However, the approach to redress in the South African land reform programme is 
distinctively unique487 and does not incorporate a punitive element. This much was 
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Pazcakavambwa & Hungwe “Land redistribution in Zimbabwe” in Agricultural Land Redistribution: Toward 
Greater Consensus 137; Ntsebeza “Land redistribution in South Africa: The property clause revisited” in The 
Land Question in South Africa 107-109.  Previously capitals, see also below where I highlighted 
486 Confiscation and forfeiture are often used interchangeably. However, confiscation of property should be 
distinguished from forfeiture. Similar to confiscation, forfeiture takes place without any compensation to the 
owner and ownership of the movable or immovable property vests in the State at the moment on which the 
order for forfeiture is made. However, in National Director of Public Prosecutions v Rebuzzi 2002 2 SA 1 (SCA), 
the court held that orders of forfeiture are not aimed at enriching the State, but to deprive criminals of the 
proceeds of their crimes. In this regard, various pieces of legislation make provision for forfeiture, including: 
the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977; the Films and Publications Act 65 of 1886; the Drugs and Trafficking 
Act 140 of 1992; the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1995; and the Proceeds of Crime Act 76 of 
1996. In other words, the loss of property in terms of forfeiture is applicable where a crime was committed 
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public or State interest, without compensation. The underlying motivation for paying no compensation for the 
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Constitutional Property Law 311-314; Ntsebeza “Land redistribution in South Africa: The property clause 
revisited” in The Land Question in South Africa 107, 122; Cliffe (2000) Review of African Political Economy 
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confirmed in various judgments,488 most notably by Justice Moseneke in Florence v 
Government of the Republic of South Africa:489 
“… compensation…is neither punitive nor retributive. It is not to be likened to a delictual claim 
aimed at awarding damages that are capable of precise computation of loss on a “but-for” basis… 
[Compensation is paid] out of public funds in order to find equitable redress to a tragic past. 
Ultimately, what is just and equitable must be evaluated not only from the perspective of the 
claimant but also of the State as the custodian of the national fiscus and the broad interests of 
society, as well as all those who might be affected by the order made.”490 
In this regard, expropriation without compensation (and confiscation) is punitive in nature 
and contrary to the overall constitutional imperative of healing the divisions of the past and 
establishing a free and equal society.491 
It is accepted that it is important to accelerate land reform in order to reach the transformative 
aspirations of the Constitution and to relieve poverty. However, the tools for effective 
implementation of land reform already exist. It is imperative that the tools are employed 
effectively and sustainably, including in an amended or adjusted format.492 In this regard, it 
is postulated that an amendment to section 25 is not necessary to ensure effective land 
redistribution. Instead of amending section 25, it should be exhausted to its full potential, 
which may allow for a minimal amount of compensation.493 Accordingly, it is proposed that 
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the State should use its power to expropriate property for land reform purposes and then 
refrain from paying market value compensation as is currently the practice.494 Instead, the 
boundaries of just and equitable compensation ought to be scrutinised and tested.495 
In response to the mandate the CRC conducted public hearings,496 called for public 
submissions497 and allowed individuals and organisations to make oral presentations.498 
Despite the fact that the majority of written submissions499 and oral submissions500 were 
opposed to amending the Constitution, the final recommendations of the CRC were in favour 
of amending section 25 of the Constitution to provide for expropriation without 
compensation.501 However, this finding must be viewed in light of the announcement made 
by the President as the CRC’s public hearings reached finality.  
On 31 July 2018, before the conclusion of the public participation process and before the 
CRC could make its final recommendations to Parliament, the President announced, without 
reference to the parliamentary process, that the ANC will continue with the constitutional 
amendments to enable the expropriation of land without compensation.502 While the 
President accepted that “a proper reading of the Constitution on the property clause enables 
the State to effect expropriation of land with just and equitable compensation and also 
expropriation without compensation in the public interest”,503 he concluded that the people 
of South Africa want the Constitution to explicitly provide for expropriation without 
compensation.504 The President further elaborated that the goals and intention of the 
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proposed amendment are to (a) promote redress; (b) advance economic development; and 
(c) increase agricultural production and food security.505 Previously, in December 2017, 
these goals were intended as parameters under which expropriation of land without 
compensation may be possible.506 Arguably, this announcement has undermined the 
democratic and public participation process held by the CRC and the parliamentary process 
as a whole. 
Following the CRC’s recommendations and the resolution by both Houses of Parliament 
that the Constitution should be amended, a parliamentary committee was established to 
draft a proposed amendment to section 25 of the Constitution.507 It is unclear what a 
redrafted section 25 of the Constitution will look like when it is changed to facilitate land 
expropriation without compensation. The committee was required to report back by 31 
March 2019, before the elections in May.508 However, in light of the committee’s draft 
schedule,509 it became clear that the issue of amending section 25 of the Constitution will 
be handed over to the next Parliament, after the elections.510 Accordingly, the amendment 
might not be passed if the ANC (and EFF) fail to secure a two-thirds majority between them 
in Parliament after the elections.511  
3 3 3 The Expropriation Bill  
In December 2018, the Minister of Public Works, published a Draft Expropriation Bill512 for 
comment. The Draft Expropriation Bill is believed to give effect to the new expropriation 
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509 According to the committee’s draft schedule, the proposed amendment will be published for public comment 
only during the week of 6 May, two days before the elections. For a summary of the ad hoc committee’s 
programme see C Simkims “The National Assembly’s Ad Hoc committee to amend section 25 of the 
Constitution” (7 March 2019) <https://hsf.org.za/publications/hsf-briefs/the-national-assembly2019s-ad-hoc-
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chairperson of the ad hoc committee confirms that it cannot complete its work in this term of Parliament.  
510 Phakathi “Change to constitution’s property clause unlikely to be completed before elections” Business Live 
(22 February 2019). 
511 Phakathi “Change to constitution’s property clause unlikely to be completed before elections” Business Live 
(22 February 2019). 




regime, envisaged by the amendment of section 25 of the Constitution.513 As mentioned 
above,514 the Bill provides specifically for categories of land that may be expropriated in the 
public interest (for land reform purposes) without compensation.  
The Bill is merely a draft and still has to go through the parliamentary process before it can 
be promulgated. Pending the possible amendment to the Constitution, the Bill may also be 
redrafted in order for it to be aligned better.  
4 Confiscation  
4 1 Introduction  
Confiscation is defined differently, in a variety of legislative measures, for different purposes. 
Generally, property is confiscated for the purpose of protecting public health and safety.515 
However, it is questionable whether property can be confiscated for land reform purposes. 
Confiscation for the purpose of protecting public health and safety is discussed briefly below, 
followed by a determination of whether confiscation can be regarded as a suitable approach 
for the acquisition of agricultural land for redistribution.  
4 2 Confiscation for the purpose of protecting public health and safety   
Various pieces of legislation make provision for confiscation orders.516 Laws that authorise 
confiscation of property usually have a legitimate regulatory purpose,517 such as combatting 
crime or preventing public harm.518 In this regard, confiscation orders may amount to 
criminal or civil forfeiture. Interestingly, “confiscation” and “forfeiture” (criminal or civil) are 
often used interchangeably. For example, in terms of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 
121 of 1998, which provides for criminal and civil forfeiture,519 “confiscation”520 is used to 
describe forfeiture.  
Civil (in rem) forfeiture is distinguished from criminal (in personam) forfeiture by three 
considerations: Firstly, a criminal forfeiture requires prior criminal conviction of the property 
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owner,521 whereas civil forfeiture only requires the State to allege that the property probably 
constitutes illegal contraband or that it was probably used for an illegal purpose. Secondly, 
the onus of proof in civil forfeiture cases is preponderance of probabilities and not the 
criminal requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Thirdly, criminal forfeiture only 
covers property held by the criminal at the time of conviction, whereas civil forfeiture relate 
back to the date of illegal use of the property regardless of whether it is still owned or 
possessed by the criminal. In this regard, civil forfeiture orders ordinarily relate to property 
used as “instrumentalities of crime”, where the owner of the property was not involved with 
the criminal activity.522 This means that civil forfeiture could involve property belonging to 
innocent third parties who had no knowledge of, and who were not involved in, the criminal 
activity.523  
Despite this distinction, confiscation orders (both criminal and civil forfeiture)524 of property 
should be treated as deprivations of property that have to adhere to the requirements of 
section 25(1) of the Constitution.525 Confiscation orders are always authorised in terms of 
legislation,526 but may be defined differently, in different pieces of legislation, for different 
purposes.527 However, as regulatory actions that allow for the deprivation of property, these 
limitations are generally easy to justify in terms of the State’s police power in its core function 
of protecting public health and safety.528 For example, in Director of Public Prosecutions: 
Cape of Good Hope v Bathgate529 the High Court held that confiscation of property (criminal 
forfeiture) in terms of the Proceeds of Crime Act 76 of 1996 and the Prevention of Organised 
Crime Act 121 of 1998 amounts to a deprivation of property in terms of section 25(1).530 
However, such a deprivation would be justified in light of the State’s aim to combat crime.531 
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Accordingly, while confiscation in terms of law of general application would constitute a 
deprivation, such deprivation would not amount to an arbitrary deprivation of property.532  
Ordinarily, criminal forfeiture does not amount to an arbitrary deprivation of property, 
because the deprivation of property would be justified in light of public health and safety 
considerations. However, due to “the lack of criminal prosecution and conviction and [the] 
forfeiture of property belonging to innocent owners”,533 civil forfeiture is scrutinised more 
carefully by courts. For example, owners are provided with an innocent owner’s defence,534 
based on a proportionality test to ensure that the civil forfeiture is fair and does not amount 
to an arbitrary deprivation.535  
The effect of confiscation orders is that the property is forfeited to the State, because it “was 
either proved or suspected to have been involved in a crime”.536 The State becomes the 
owner of the property. Therefore, both confiscation and expropriation allow for the 
acquisition of property by the State. However, confiscation should be distinguished from 
expropriation. Van der Walt explains that:  
“…forfeiture is clearly not intended as a ‘normal’ expropriation for which the affected owner is 
compensated, and its primary purpose is regulatory in the sense that it is employed to regulate 
the use of property for a public purpose (namely to fight crime). However, its effects may appear 
expropriatory in that property owners who are not involved in or even aware of the crime lose their 
property to the state, which acquires the property in a very real sense and often benefits from it 
financially”.537 
Expropriation can be done with or without the consent of the owner and normally requires 
compensation to be paid to the owner,538 whereas confiscation implies no consent of the 
owner and does not require the State to pay compensation to the property owner. 
Furthermore, the procedure for a valid expropriation or a confiscation differs in terms of the 
authorising legislation.539 The context, aim and justification of an expropriation and 
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confiscation also differ. In terms of an expropriation, property is acquired by the State for a 
public purpose or in the public interest, to serve the public as a whole. Ordinarily there is no 
element of criminal activity where expropriation is employed, whereas the confiscation of 
property is linked to criminal activity and is employed to regulate the use of property for a 
public purpose, such as combatting crime or preventing public harm. 
The following section aims to determine whether confiscation can be used to acquire 
agricultural land for land reform purposes.  
4 3 Confiscation for the purpose of land reform   
One radical mechanism available for the acquisition of agricultural land is outright 
confiscation.540 Property (movable or immovable) is confiscated by the State, without 
payment of compensation,541 if it is regarded as being in the public or State’s interest to do 
so.542 In this regard, “confiscation” and “nationalisation” are also often used interchangeably. 
However, confiscation refers to an approach or method used to acquire land, and the 
nationalisation of a particular asset (such as all agricultural land) refers to the possible end 
result which may be achieved by means of confiscation.543 Nationalisation thus amounts to 
government control and management of land, where land is transferred to and owned by 
the State and private ownership of land is eliminated.544 Furthermore, expropriation with or 
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544 However, see O Duru “Nationalisation, Expropriation or Confiscation: A critical overview of the pro and 
contra arguments regarding the effect of the Land Use Act on land in Nigeria” (06-10-2012) SSRN 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=2157273> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2157273> (accessed 29-05-2017) 3-
8 where the author distinguishes further between nationalisation and partial nationalisation: “Nationalisation” 
would mean to bring land under the management and control of the government. It is the taking away of private 
land for public use. The legal effect of nationalisation would be to completely take over land with a view to 
continued exploitation by the State, instead of exploitation by private individuals, families or communities. 
Nationalisation of land amounts to termination of all pre-existing private rights and interests leaving no room 




without compensation may also be used to achieve the nationalisation of certain assets. 
While the end result (nationalisation) may be the same regardless of whether expropriation 
or confiscation is used, expropriation and confiscation differ in a number of ways, 545  
including the procedure which has to be followed in terms of the authorising legislation.546  
There may be some benefits to acquiring land by way of confiscation, including for example, 
no or little direct costs of acquiring land.547 However, employing confiscation as a 
mechanism for acquiring agricultural land for redistributive purposes may also have other 
undesirable consequences, such as “reduced investor confidence and an international 
backlash”.548 Arguably, these consequences can also have a negative knock-on effect as 
the economy as a whole may be impacted detrimentally, devaluating currency, which in turn 
could place additional burdens for the costs of land reform on the South African fiscus and 
citizens.549 At an international level, confiscation of land was historically also linked to 
revolutionary political change, usually characterised by violence,550 which is not reconcilable 
with the constitutional aims and values embodied in the South African Constitution or the 
very particular characteristics of the South African land reform programme.551 Increasingly, 
populist cries support confiscation of land,552 endorsed by various political figures and 
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spokespersons.553 However, the Constitution of South Africa specifically protects existing 
property rights554 and does not allow for the confiscation of land from current owners for 
purposes of land reform.555 The current formulation of the Constitution556 provides for the 
expropriation of property for purposes of land reform.557 As explained,558 the “creative 
tension”559 that exists between the protection of existing rights on the one hand, and the 
transformative thrust embodied in the section 25(4)-(9) on the other, necessitates innovative 
and critical mechanisms.  
Arguably, section 25(8) of the Constitution, which provides that no provision of section 25 
may impede the State from taking legislative and other measures to achieve land reform, 
may in theory support the use of confiscation to acquire land for redistribution. However, 
confiscation needs to be effected in terms of authorising legislation.560 Currently, there is no 
legislative framework (law of general application) for the confiscation of property for land 
reform purposes. Accordingly, if the State wishes to acquire land by way of confiscation for 
redistribution purposes, then legislation is required setting out the parameters for the 
confiscation including: (a) how confiscation is to be defined; (b) from whom the land will be 
confiscated and how such private party will be identified; (c) under which circumstances will 
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confiscation take place; and (d) whether such confiscation will be automatic or discretionary 
if certain circumstances are present.  
Furthermore, if a law is promulgated that allows for the confiscation of property for land 
reform purposes, then the law can still be tested against the requirements of section 25(1) 
of the Constitution. The confiscation of property for land reform purposes may not constitute 
an arbitrary deprivation of property in terms of the FNB-methodology.   
5 Conclusion  
The Chapter set out to discuss the different approaches to acquiring agricultural land for 
redistribution purposes, including market-led approaches, expropriation and confiscation. It 
is trite that the acquisition of agricultural land, at scale and fit for agricultural production, is 
critical for redistribution and equity. However, much controversy exists with regard to which 
approach(es) should be employed or which approach(es) would be most suitable for land 
acquisition in the context of land reform in South Africa specifically.561 In this context, the 
mechanisms available for the regulation of agricultural land in South Africa discussed in 
Chapter 3 and the different approaches to acquiring agricultural land for redistribution 
purposes must contribute to the overall successful implementation of the redistribution 
programme as a whole.  
Accordingly, the following Chapter aims to provide for preliminary conclusions regarding (a) 
measuring the efficacy of the redistribution programme in general; (b) whether the regulatory 
mechanisms contribute to the overall efficacy of the redistribution programme; (c) which 
approach(es) can be regarded as most suitable for acquiring agricultural land for 
redistribution purposes; and (d) the actual redistribution of the agricultural land to 
beneficiaries. 
                                            




Chapter 6: Preliminary conclusions  
1 Introduction 
“Land redistribution has proceeded at a slow and uneven pace over the past 22 [25] years, with 
fluctuations both in budgets and the scale of land being acquired and redistributed”.1  
There is little consensus on what constitutes successful and effective land reform generally 
and more specifically, redistribution.2 It is unclear against what standard, effectiveness and 
subsequently, the success of the redistribution programme should be measured and over 
what period of time it should be assessed. In this regard, the determination of the efficacy 
of the redistribution programme in general is complex.  
One way of measuring the success is through the determination of a national target and 
realising the particular target. However, this raises ancillary questions, such as: Who 
determines the target and how is the target determined and rationalised? Arguably, there is 
criticism against using a target to measure effectiveness of the redistribution programme in 
general. In addition to the establishment of a target, the effectiveness of the redistribution 
programme can also be measured against a set of criteria. While criteria such as the rate of 
implementation; suitable compensation; and support for beneficiaries are identified as some 
of the criteria which could be used to determine effectiveness, it is submitted that additional 
criteria may have to be developed further. Accordingly, the first part of this Chapter 
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discusses targets and criteria for determining the success of the redistribution programme 
in general.  
The Chapter then aims to determine whether the regulatory mechanisms, as set out in 
Chapter 3 above, are effective to the extent that they promote or contribute towards the 
redistribution process as a whole or the redistribution target. It is also notable that the 
effectiveness of the regulatory mechanism itself is linked to the successful implementation 
thereof, which in turn, is again dependent on the efficacy of government departments and 
corresponding functionaries, as well as governmental management structures and systems. 
It is thus acknowledged that it may also be necessary to develop a management framework 
or system that will ensure the effectiveness of the implementation of the regulatory 
mechanisms. The enquiry into such a management framework or system is however not 
explored in depth, due to the particular focus of this dissertation.  
Furthermore, the Chapter aims to determine which approach to acquiring agricultural land 
for redistribution purposes may be regarded as most suitable. Suitability encompasses a 
number of factors or criteria, including (a) the constitutionality; (b) the efficacy; and (c) the 
affordability of the approach.3 
2 Efficacy of redistribution programme in general 
2 1 Introduction  
One aspect of the success of a redistribution programme is measuring the efficacy thereof. 
However, measuring the efficacy of the redistribution programme is a difficult and complex 
task. In this regard, it may be necessary to (a) impose targets; or (b) develop criteria to 
determine whether a measure is or has been effective. Each of these methods of measuring 
effectiveness is discussed below.  
2 2 Targets  
A redistribution programme may be effective if an aim or target is set and that aim or target 
is realised. Critically, there is a difference between the various aims or goals of the overall 
redistribution programme and the particular targets of the programme.4  
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The White Paper on Land Policy5 “formulated the main [and initial] goal of the redistribution 
programme as providing the poor with land for residential and productive purposes in order 
to improve their livelihoods”.6 However, there was a gradual shift in the aim of the 
redistribution programme. Where the focus was initially on the poorest of the poor, a gradual 
shift occurred in favour of more resourced and more competent beneficiaries i.e. emerging 
black commercial farmers.7 Nevertheless, the overarching aim of the redistribution 
programme remained broadening access to land. Accordingly, aims may change over time. 
In this regard, policy and regulatory mechanisms aimed at broadening access to land may 
also need to be adjusted in line with the changed aims.  
While the broad aims include broadening access to agricultural land, the South African 
government set a specific target of redistributing 30% of privately owned agricultural land8 
in white ownership to beneficiaries in the redistribution programme.9 The initial date for the 
realisation of this target was 1999.10 In 1994, the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme target was to transfer 30% of white commercial agricultural land held in private 
ownership to poor black South Africans within the first five years of the programme.11 
However, by 1999, “less than one per cent of commercial farmland had been made available 
to black South Africans”.12 Accordingly, the initial date was extended to 2014.13 After 25 
                                            
5 Department of Land Affairs, White Paper on South Africa Land Policy (April 1997).  
6 Pienaar Land Reform 274; Department of Land Affairs, White Paper on South Africa Land Policy (April 1997) 
60.   
7 Pienaar Land Reform 275; R van den Brink, G Thomas & H Binswanger “Agricultural redistribution in South 
Africa: towards accelerated implementation” in L Ntsebeza & R Hall (eds) The Land Question in South Africa 
(2007) 152-201, 154.  
8 C Walker & A Dubb “Fact Check 1: The Distribution of Land in South Africa: An Overview” PLAAS        
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However, this target was also not reached. See Pienaar Land Reform 346; C Walker “Redistribution land 
reform: For what and for whom?” in L Ntsebeza & R Hall (eds) The Land Question in South Africa (2007) 132-
151.  
10 Kepe & Hall “Land Redistribution in South Africa” Commissioned report for the High Level Panel on the 
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11 Reconstruction and Development Programme (1994) 
<https://www.sahistory.org.za/sites/default/files/the_reconstruction_and_development_programm_1994.pdf> 
(accessed 15-08-2019); Kepe & Hall “Land Redistribution in South Africa” Commissioned report for the High 
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the Parliament of South Africa 13. 
12 Report of the High Level Panel on the Assessment of key legislation and the acceleration of fundamental 
change (November 2017) 
<https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Pages/2017/october/High_Level_Panel/HLP_Report/HLP
_report.pdf> (accessed 06-06-2018) 207-208. 
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years of democracy, this target has not been realised and it is unclear whether the target 
has been abandoned.14 
Various points of critique emerge when analysing the 30% target. Firstly, it is unclear where 
the 30% target originates from15 or whether it will be adjusted periodically, if at all, once the 
target is realised. There is also speculation that the target has been abandoned.16 Secondly, 
despite various attempts17 there is still no accurate data on (a) how much land is State-
owned and privately-owned in South Africa; and (b) how much agricultural land has been 
transferred, which makes it impossible to determine whether the 30% has actually been 
realised. It is thus crucial to establish first how much of the land is agricultural land and then 
to establish who owns the land, before it can be redistributed. Furthermore, it is impossible 
to report precisely on the progress of the redistribution programme where data is incomplete. 
Importantly, post-1994 title deeds do not reflect the race of the title holder.18 
Both national land audits conducted in 2017, one by the agricultural lobby group AgriSA19 
and the other by government20 are based on the analysis of information derived from title 
deeds in the national registry. It is problematic that the State land audit does not deal with 
agricultural land specifically. Instead, the audit reflects South Africa’s entire surface area. 
This makes it incomparable to the land audit of AgriSA. For example, the AgriSA land audit 
                                            
14 Kepe & Hall “Land Redistribution in South Africa” Commissioned report for the High Level Panel on the 
assessment of key legislation and the acceleration of fundamental change, an initiative of the Parliament of 
South Africa 13 provide that: “…this target was set for 1999, then deferred to 2014, then to 2025, then 
apparently abandoned, and was in any case based on estimates of affordability rather than any inherent social, 
economic or political logic”. 
15 Pienaar Land Reform 301, 346.  
16 Kepe & Hall “Land Redistribution in South Africa” Commissioned report for the High Level Panel on the 
assessment of key legislation and the acceleration of fundamental change, an initiative of the Parliament of 
South Africa 13.  
17 Thus far two land audits in 2013 and in 2017 were conducted by the Department of Rural Development and 
Land Reform. See Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, Land Audit on State-Owned Land 
(February 2013) <http://www.ruraldevelopment.gov.za/phocadownload/Cadastral-Survey-
management/Booklet/land%20audit%20booklet.pdf> (accessed 15-08-2019); Department of Rural 
Development and Land Reform, Land Audit Report, Phase II: Private land ownership by raced, gender and 
nationality (November 2017) <file:///C:/Users/tinakotze/Downloads/land_audit_report13feb2018.pdf> 
(accessed 15-08-2019). The 2013 Land Audit revealed, among its findings, that most of this state land was 
unsurveyed and unregistered trust land which is occupied by individuals and communities in the former 
homelands. The department has embarked on a process to survey, register and vest that trust land to individual 
and community owners through the Communal Land Tenure Bill. The purpose of the 2017 Land Audit is to 
provide information on private land ownership by race, nationality, and gender as of 2015.  Furthermore, 
another land audit was also conducted by AgriSA and the Land Centre of Excellence. See AgriSA, Land Centre 
of Excellence Land Audit: A transactions approach (November 2017).  
18 Pienaar Land Reform 347.  
19 AgriSA, Land Centre of Excellence Land Audit: A transactions approach (November 2017).  
20 Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, Land Audit Report, Phase II: Private land ownership 




deals with 93.5 million hectares of South African land used for farming,21 whereas the State 
land audit deals with all 111 million hectares of what is categorised as rural and semi-rural 
land, registered as farms.22 Furthermore, it may be that a certain percentage of land has 
been transferred to the beneficiaries of the redistribution programme, but there is no record 
of whether it was effected in terms of private transactions or via land reform programmes.23 
Cousins also points out that:  
“The AgriSA land audit of 2017 argues that the initial target of transferring 30% of agricultural land 
via land reform is close to being met. It concludes that the market is much more effective at 
transferring land than the state. But the market is not redistributing land to black people to the 
extent AgriSA claims. Its methodology and most of its conclusions are fundamentally flawed. For 
example, much of the 4.3 million hectares of land it says were acquired through private purchases 
by previously disadvantaged individuals includes transfers of land as a result of land reform. In 
these cases, government has provided funds and served as an intermediary in the transaction.”24 
Accordingly, these transactions cannot be regarded as private transactions.25  
The State’s land audit is also not particularly useful. While it provides for some evidence of 
continuing patterns of racial inequality in land ownership in urban and rural areas generally,26 
it cannot identify the race, gender or nationality of some 320 000 companies, trusts and 
community based organisations that seemingly own 69% of all privately owned land.27  
Thirdly, if the land is purchased by the State, but ownership is not transferred to the intended 
beneficiaries or land is leased to the beneficiaries without the option to purchase the land,28 
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22 Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, Land Audit Report, Phase II: Private land ownership 
by raced, gender and nationality (November 2017) 5. 
23 B Cousins “Land debate clouded by misrepresentation and lack of data” The Conversation (10-03-2018) 
<http://theconversation.com/south-africas-land-debate-is-clouded-by-misrepresentation-and-lack-of-data-
93078> (accessed 9-04-2018).   
24 Cousins “Land debate clouded by misrepresentation and lack of data” The Conversation (10-03-2018). See 
also AgriSA, Land Centre of Excellence Land Audit: A transactions approach (November 2017) 13, 28.  
25 Cousins “Land debate clouded by misrepresentation and lack of data” The Conversation (10-03-2018). 
26 Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, Land Audit Report, Phase II: Private land ownership 
by raced, gender and nationality (November 2017) 2. The Land Audit reveals that Whites own 26 663 144 ha 
or 72% of the total 37 031 283 ha farms and agricultural holdings by individual landowners; followed by 
Coloured at 5 371 383 ha or 15%, Indians at 2 031 790 ha or 5%, Africans at 1 314 873 ha or 4%, other at 1 
271 562 ha or 3%, and co-owners at 425 537 ha or 1%.  
27 Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, Land Audit Report, Phase II: Private land ownership 
by raced, gender and nationality (November 2017) and Cousins “Land debate clouded by misrepresentation 
and lack of data” The Conversation (10-03-2018). 
28 Pienaar Land Reform 346. See Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, State Land Lease and 
Disposal Policy (25 July 2013). See also Rakgase v Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform 




then the 30% will not be realised as ownership remains vested in the State.29 In this regard 
the Advisory Panel on Agriculture and Land Reform explains that:  
“Since 2011, the state has stopped giving people land purchase grants or subsidies with which to 
buy land. Instead, government buys land and retains ownership, while allocating leases. In terms 
of the State Land Lease and Disposal Policy of 2013, these are meant to be 30-year leases, for 
which lessees are meant to pay 5% of net annual turnover as rent…Beneficiaries are typically 
afforded conditional use rights and in many cases do not have recorded rights – which means 
that even in cases where the State has bought land, it has failed to redistribute land rights”.30   
While these mechanisms may broaden access to land in general, the land ownership 
patterns will not be altered.  
Fourthly, the 30% target is also criticised as being inadequate if it serves as an indicator of 
success when achieved, for sustainable economic development and the reduction of rural 
poverty.31 If the racial profile of farmers is reshaped, it could be argued that land reform has 
been effective and successful.32 However, while targets may be a good starting point, the 
success of the redistribution programme cannot only be measured against the amount of 
land transferred. It should also be measured against the performance of the agricultural land 
in terms of production and what it implies for beneficiaries, inter alia, in terms of jobs, 
livelihood and wealth. In this regard, the effectiveness of the redistribution programme 
should rather be measured against particular criteria and not only on whether the targets 
had been met.33 
Fifthly, the importance and absolute focus on achieving the 30% target may take away from 
the implementation of more effective mechanisms.34 For example, transfer of land may be 
regarded as an effective mechanism because it directly reflects a change in ownership 
patterns and therefore contributes to the 30% target being achieved. However, “share equity 
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29 Walker “Redistribution land reform: For what and for whom?” in The Land Question in South Africa 132-151. 
30 Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture “Final Report of the Presidential Advisory Panel on Land 
Reform and Agriculture” (4 May 2019) 12. See also Chapter 5, 2 4 2 above where the State Land Lease and 
Disposal Policy is discussed. 
31 Pienaar Land Reform 274, 346. See also White Paper on Land Reform (1997) 60; Walker “Redistribution 
land reform: For what and for whom?” in The Land Question in South Africa 142.  
32 Pienaar Land Reform 346.  
33 See 2 2 below.  




schemes can play an important role as redistributive tools”.35 These schemes ensure that 
wealth and income are redistributed, while agricultural production is maintained and even 
improved. However, the use of a share equity scheme does not contribute to the overall 
target being realised, nor does it redress the land ownership patterns. Accordingly, the 
overemphasis on achieving targets may overlook viable share equity schemes.36 
Lastly, reaching the national 30% target does not necessarily mean that regional and local 
targets have been met.37 Kepe and Hall note that there have been substantial differences in 
land redistribution across provinces in relation to how much land has been acquired and 
transferred to beneficiaries.38  In this regard, it is suggested that national land targets need 
to be disaggregated to provincial and district level, to be more responsive to local conditions, 
opportunities and constraints.39 There are substantial differences in land redistribution 
across provinces: in how much land has been acquired; how much of the budget spent; and 
the number of people benefitting.40  Walker suggests further that: 
“While the national target of 30% may be kept as a crude measure of progress towards a de-
racialised commercial farming sector, care needs to be taken that it does not become the primary 
measure of success, nor come to operate as a ceiling on state land acquisition.”41 
Instead of the 30% target becoming the primary indication of success, it is suggested that 
the effective and successful implementation of the redistribution programme be measured 
in terms of particular criteria levelled against main and sub-objectives of the redistribution 
programme.  
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36 Pienaar Land Reform 347. See SL Knight & MC Lyne “Perceptions of farmworker equity-schemes in South 
Africa” (2002) 41 Agrekon 356-374; S Knight, M Lyne & M Roth “Best institutional arrangements for farm-
worker equity-share schemes in South Africa” (2003) 42 Agrekon 228-251. 
37 347.  
38 Kepe & Hall “Land Redistribution in South Africa” Commissioned report for High Level Panel on the 
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South Africa (28 September 2016) 4. 
39 Pienaar Land Reform 347; Walker “Grounding ‘effective land reform’ for 2030: past, present and future 
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2 3 Criteria  
While there is little consensus on what effective redistribution means substantively, criteria 
can arguably be developed to measure effectiveness.  
Given the temporal nature of land reform in general;42 the complexities and interplay 
between different regulatory mechanisms; budget restraints43 and competency issues on 
the part of the State,44 it is suggested that redistribution will be effective if the aim of the 
regulatory mechanism is reached within a reasonable time. Therefore, the first criterion to 
measure the effectiveness of the redistribution programme is the period of time it takes to 
reach the aim(s) of the regulatory mechanism in question. However, there is no precise or 
definite definition of what constitutes a reasonable time in South African law.45 Arguably, it 
is best to determine what constitutes a reasonable time in light of the particular land reform 
context. The reasonableness of the period of the redistribution process may be assessed in 
light of (a) the complexity of the regulatory measure giving effect to the redistribution 
programme; (b) the conduct in the form of transactions between the State and private 
agricultural land owners; and (c) the conduct of the relevant State department and officials.46 
Accordingly, while the meaning of a reasonable time may be vague and lead to uncertainty, 
the time period affixed to the implementation of a redistribution programme should be 
flexible.47 This means that, even though redistribution of land may take decades, that in itself 
is no indication that it will not ultimately be effective.  
While the pace of land reform has been slow,48 it does not necessarily mean that 
redistribution has failed. It means that the redistribution programme must be adjusted and 
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43 Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture “Final Report of the Presidential Advisory Panel on Land 
Reform and Agriculture” (4 May 2019) 13.  
44 See Rakgase v Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform (33497/2015) [2019] ZAGPPHC (4 
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Stellenbosch University (2016) 13.  
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47 14.  
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focused on finding better and more efficient ways of acquiring land at a reasonable cost. 
This leads to a discussion of the second criterion – payment of suitable compensation, 
including below-market compensation.49 The main constraints to payment of low 
compensation are high land prices 50 and budget constraints.51 The decision to pay market 
price means that the available budget determines, and therefore constrains how much land 
can be acquired. What is required in this regard is a move away from the payment of often 
inflated market-related prices towards the payment of just and equitable compensation as 
envisaged by the Constitution in section 25(3).52 Accordingly, the payment of low(er) 
compensation will ensure that more land can be acquired with limited governmental funds, 
which in turn may contribute to the effective implementation of the redistribution 
programme.53  
As mentioned above, targets may be a good starting point, but the success of the 
redistribution programme cannot be measured against the amount of land transferred only. 
Therefore, as a third criterion, the effectiveness of the redistribution programme should also 
be measured against the performance of the agricultural land in terms of production and 
what it implies for beneficiaries in terms of jobs, livelihood and wealth.54 Once the land has 
been transferred to the beneficiaries, there seems to be a lack of post-settlement or post-
transfer support,55 for example in establishing the beneficiaries as viable commercial 
                                            
redistribution-i> (accessed on 09-04-2018); Kirsten Reflections on 25 years of engagement with the land 
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49 WJ du Plessis Compensation for expropriation under the Constitution LLD, Stellenbosch University (2009) 
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50 Kepe & Hall “Land Redistribution in South Africa” Commissioned report for the High Level Panel on the 
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52 Du Plessis Compensation for expropriation under the Constitution iii, 4; E (WJ) du Plessis “The public 
purpose requirement in the calculation of just and equitable compensation” in B Hoops, EJ Marais, H Mostert, 
JAMA Sluysmans, LCA Verstappen (eds) Rethinking Expropriation Law I: Public Interest in Expropriation 
(2015) 369-387. See also Chapter 5, 3 2 3 2 above.   
53 Although the determination of compensation, in land reform cases is an important consideration which may 
contribute to the effective implementation of the redistribution programme, it is an issue which requires greater 
attention and further research. Accordingly, it is not within the scope and focus of this study to explore the 
determination of compensation where agricultural land is acquired for redistribution purposes in depth. See in 
this regard, Du Plessis Compensation for expropriation under the Constitution (2009) iii, 4; E du Plessis 
“Silence is Golden: The Lack of Direction on Compensation for Expropriation in the 2011 Green Paper on Land 
Reform” (2014) 17 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 798-830, 808; Du Plessis “The public purpose 
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Interest in Expropriation 369-387. 
54 TJ Manenzhe Post-settlement support challenges for land reform beneficiaries: Three case studies from 
Limpopo Province M.Phil Thesis, University of the Western Cape (2007). 
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farmers, which also contributes to the poor performance of the redistribution programme.56 
In this regard, investment in education, skills development and mentorship57 are all required 
to ensure the sustainable and productive use of agricultural land for purposes of food 
security and economic development.58  
While government “appears to acknowledge how crucial post-settlement support is to the 
success of land reform,59 increase in food security, sustainable land-based economic 
development and increasing the prosperity of poor people who were previously, and 
sometimes continue to be, marginalized”,60 there are still many challenges.61 Kepe and Hall 
provide that:  
“A combination of factors, including limited staff capacity, weak staff management, and expanding 
mandates for which the DRDLR is not currently equipped, hamper the provision of settlement and 
production support to beneficiaries”.62 
Furthermore, many of the challenges originated at earlier stages of the redistribution 
process, before the implementation of post-settlement support becomes relevant.63 These 
challenges are numerous and relate to various issues, including: 
“…poor beneficiary selection in redistribution projects, staff capacity to deal with the bureaucracy 
involved in helping beneficiaries apply for the support they need, over-reliance on consultants to 
do some of the work, thus leaving many projects without continuity of support, and so forth”.64  
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58 HP Binswanger-Mkhize “From failure to success in South African land reform” (2014) 9 African Journal of 
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59 Department of Land Affairs, The White Paper on South African Land Policy (1997) 9; NS Masoka, Post-
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Land Reform and Agriculture” (4 May 2019) 13.  
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Furthermore, Kepe and Hall also highlight that:  
“[n]o national monitoring and evaluation system is available to determine the extent to which farms 
(agricultural land) acquired by the state for redistribution have (a) been allocated to beneficiaries 
(b) been confirmed through the allocation of long term leases or (c) being beneficially used to 
improve the livelihoods of the recipients.”65  
Accordingly, in light of the discussion above, it may be proposed that successful and 
effective redistribution of agricultural land requires specific attention to three criteria: (a) 
implementation of the regulatory measures within a reasonable time; (b) payment of suitable 
compensation; and (c) extended support for the beneficiaries to ensure the necessary 
agricultural production for food security purposes.66 If these criteria are met, then the 
redistribution of agricultural may be regarded as effective.  
3 Efficacy of the regulatory mechanisms for redistribution purposes 
3 1 Introduction  
While the regulatory measures may be constitutional,67 it still needs to be determined 
whether they are effective or whether they contribute toward the successful and effective 
implementation of the redistribution programme in general. In this regard it is questioned 
whether the regulatory measures discussed in Chapter 3 above are effective to realise the 
aim and mandate in section 25(5) of the Constitution, namely to broaden access to 
(agricultural) land.  
3 2 Restrictions on subdivision of agricultural land 
The restrictions on subdivision in terms of SALA and the Preservation Bill are regarded as 
a major impediment to land reform, and to changing farming systems through land reform.68 
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Hall identifies two situations where subdivision is needed for land reform purposes.69 Firstly, 
Hall highlights that it is: 
“…needed to divide portions of existing farms for redistribution, so as to offer a variety of land 
parcel sizes. This is also essential if underutilised land is to be targeted. In conjunction with a land 
tax, which raises the costs to landowners of retaining ownership of large tracts of unutilised or 
underutilised land, subdivision can assist in making land available in smaller parcels suited to the 
needs of potential beneficiaries”.70  
Secondly, it is needed “where large properties are acquired for redistribution and then 
divided into smaller portions for allocation to beneficiaries”.71 
Kirsten and Van Zyl point out that the longevity of SALA may have less to do with the law 
than with a mistaken belief that part-time or small-scale farming is inefficient.72 In this regard 
it is often suggested that the repeal of SALA73 would be a practical and cost-free way of 
making vast quantities of land rapidly available in principle. As discussed in Chapter 2 
above,74 the argument whether subdivision of agricultural land is regarded as a constraint 
to land reform and redistribution purposes, turns on the debate whether small or large-scale 
farms are more productive. Accordingly, depending on whether one argues that small or 
large-scale farming is more viable or productive, it can be argued that subdivision may or 
may not speed up the redistribution process and therefore may or may not contribute 
towards the effective and successful implementation thereof.75  
The promotion of subdivision of agricultural land must also be weighed up against other 
concerns such as protecting and preserving agricultural land and agricultural uses in light of 
food security concerns for the benefit of present and future generations. 76 As mentioned in 
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Chapter 1,77 in the process of redistribution, agricultural productivity, development and food 
security may not be compromised.78 Arguably, as set out in the Preservation Bill, land 
identified as “high quality agricultural land” should not be available for redistribution 
purposes, unless the potential beneficiaries under the redistribution programme have the 
necessary skills and capital to ensure that the quality of land remains the same. 
Furthermore, as already discussed above,79 where the redistribution of agricultural land 
flows directly from the operation of the Act 126, the general restrictions on subdivision of 
agricultural land do not pose a constraint to land reform and the redistribution process.  
3 3 Agricultural land ceilings  
The Regulation Bill is a regulatory measure that is intended to contribute to the effective and 
successful realisation of the 30% target, alluded to above. The establishment of the Land 
Commission80 and the provisions dealing with disclosures of (a) present ownership, 
specifically those provisions requiring all agricultural land owners to disclose their race, 
gender and nationality81 and (b) acquisition of ownership82 are particularly helpful to provide 
accurate data on who owns the land and how much land is theoretically available for the 
redistribution of agricultural land. Once the registry is established and constantly updated it 
will, in principle, be easier to determine whether the 30% target will be achieved and whether 
it is necessary to adjust the target upwards or downwards.  
As set out in Chapter 3,83 the imposition of land ceilings will provide for ceiling-surplus land 
(“redistribution agricultural land”) which may be acquired by the State for redistribution 
purposes. In this way, the imposition of land ceilings in terms of the Regulation Bill may 
speed up the redistribution process by making more land available for citizens, and thereby 
broadening access to land and contributing to the realisation of the redistribution target. In 
terms of the Regulation Bill, ceiling-surplus land, defined as “redistribution agricultural land” 
must first be offered to Black South African citizens.84  In this way, if a Black South African 
citizen exercises the right of first refusal in respect of the “redistribution agricultural land”, 
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79 See Chapter 2, 3 2 3 - 3 2 4 above.  
80 Clause 4 of the Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill in GN 229 GG 40697 of 17-03-2017. 
81 Clause 15(2)(a) of the Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill. 
82 Clause 16 of the Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill. 
83 See Chapter 3, 3 3 above.  




ownership will be transferred to him or her, and thereby not only broadening access to land, 
but also contributing to the redistribution target and adjusting land ownership patterns.  
3 4 Restrictions on foreign ownership of agricultural land 
The restrictions pertaining to foreign ownership, namely (a) placing restrictions on a foreign 
owner’s right to dispose of his or her property 85 and (b) restricting foreigners from acquiring 
ownership of agricultural land in future86 also make more agricultural land available for 
citizens in principle.   
In terms of the former restrictions, agricultural land is either redistributed to the beneficiaries 
from the Minister once it is acquired or it is directly redistributed to citizens on the open 
market. However, other concerns arise when dealing with land redistributed directly to 
citizens on the open market. While this avenue broadens access to land to citizens in 
principle, it is unclear if the land will be transferred to beneficiaries of the redistribution 
programme or to any citizen. If the land is transferred to any South African citizen, the 
constitutional mandate to broaden access to land to citizens is technically met, as there is 
no policy or law stipulating precisely what this constitutional right entails or who it is aimed 
at. In other words, where the citizen who acquires the agricultural land in question on the 
open market, is not a beneficiary of the redistribution programme, namely a Black citizen at 
the very least, the restrictions on foreigners disposing of their agricultural land will not 
contribute towards the redistribution target.  
The latter restriction, namely the prohibition on foreigners acquiring ownership of agricultural 
land in future, in principle promotes the aim of section 25(5) of the Constitution as the 
acquisition of agricultural land in future will be the prerogative of citizens only.  However, 
such a development may impact negatively on foreign investor confidence and direct 
investment in South Africa, which in turn may impact the economy, food production and 
security in South Africa. Arguably, there may be less restrictive means to regulate foreign 
ownership of agricultural land as explored further in Chapters 7 and 9.  
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4 The suitability of the approaches in acquiring agricultural land for redistribution 
purposes 
4 1 Introduction  
Having provided an exposition of the different approaches to acquiring agricultural land for 
redistribution purposes in Chapter 5, a pertinent question that remains to be answered is 
which approach is most suitable for acquiring agricultural land.87 In this regard, suitability 
encompasses a number of factors or criteria including, (a) the constitutionality; (b) the 
efficacy; and (c) the affordability of the approach. 
The constitutionality is linked to the parameters provided for in the Constitution, already dealt 
with in detail in Chapter 4 above.88 As mentioned,89  the requirements for an expropriation 
are that it should take place in terms of a law of general application, in the public interest or 
for a public purpose, against payment of just and equitable compensation. It should be noted 
that the requirements for a valid expropriation may change in future. In light of recent 
developments,90 the Constitution may be amended to provide for expropriation without 
compensation. Such a change may thus also impact the affordability of the approach where 
agricultural land is concerned. The constitutionality of the approach acts as a threshold 
requirement for the particular approach to be considered suitable. Accordingly, if the 
approach to acquiring agricultural land for redistribution is not constitutional, considerations 
of efficacy and affordability do not arise.   
The efficacy of the approach may be linked to the length and intricacy of the process followed 
under each approach. The complexity of phases required to acquire the land and the number 
of role players involved, such as the government officials and different State departments, 
land owners and beneficiaries may impact the efficacy of the approach.  
The affordability of the approach is associated with the costs to acquire the agricultural land 
in question. This includes costs, such as the payment of compensation, if any compensation 
is justifiable at all. Except for the guidelines provided for in the 2018 regulations and the 
overarching application of the PVA, there is no integrated approach for the calculation of 
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compensation in land reform cases.91 As explained, the exact role of the OVG is as yet 
unclear.92 The principles set out in the Constitution for calculating the amount of 
compensation may also be altered in future if the Constitution is amended to provide for 
expropriation without compensation. Other considerations would include the impact the 
acquisition will have on farm workers and tenants who rely on the land for their livelihood. 
Other costs, such as the cost of relocation or resettlement may also play a role in 
determining whether the acquisition approach is affordable and ultimately suitable.   
Pienaar aptly suggests that in the pursuit of achieving effective land reform, “a more 
nuanced or dualistic approach [should be adopted] where the success of the [land reform] 
programme is not locked into one single [acquisition] mechanism or approach”.93 Each of 
the approaches will be considered to determine which is the most suitable for acquiring 
agricultural land for redistribution. However, arguably a combination of approaches may be 
used to acquire agricultural land for redistribution. 
4 2 Market-led approaches 
Market-led approaches, founded on the WBWS principle, are not constitutionally embedded. 
Instead the use thereof is a policy choice. With regard to the efficacy of the approach, 
depending on whether a demand-led or supply-led approach is followed, there may be 
multiple parties involved in identifying agricultural land for acquisition, negotiating or 
determining the price for the land in question and redistributing the land to the beneficiaries. 
Thus, it is difficult to pinpoint exactly how many phases or how long each phase may take, 
given that there is no legislative framework which provides for the procedure which has to 
followed. Furthermore, even if this approach is constitutional and efficient, it may not be 
affordable.  
With regard to the affordability of this approach, the cost of acquiring land may be too high 
if this approach is followed. As explained,94 acquiring property at market value or at an 
inflated price makes the cost of acquiring agricultural land too high,95 which in turn would 
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make the acquisition of land unsustainable. The main problem with market-led approaches 
is that it is too costly for the government to sustain, given the budget allocated for land 
reform96 and the other demands on the fiscus.97 Accordingly, while market-led approaches 
are constitutional, they may be regarded as unaffordable and therefore unsuitable for the 
acquisition and redistribution of agricultural land. However, while it is clear that there must 
be a move away from only using market-led approaches or the WBWS model, it may still 
have a role to play where the State is not a party to the acquisition transaction. Accordingly, 
where a land owner on his or her own accord decides to sell agricultural land to a beneficiary, 
market-led approaches may still be relevant. One way to reduce the costs associated with 
market-led approaches is for the government to rely on its expropriation powers embedded 
in the Constitution.  
4 3 Expropriation  
Currently, as explained above,98 the Constitution allows for the expropriation of property for 
a public purpose or in the public interest, against the payment of just and equitable 
compensation. Despite the fact that the government’s expropriation powers are embedded 
in the Constitution, the State has failed to utilise its powers readily. However, the 
constitutionality of this approach is not enough for this approach to be regarded as the most 
suitable. The approach also needs to be effective, affordable and the outcome of the 
redistribution process must be clear.  
The efficacy of expropriation as an approach to acquiring agricultural land for redistribution, 
relates to whether the procedure for a valid expropriation set out in the expropriation 
legislation99 can be completed within a reasonable time. In this regard, different government 
officials and departments may be involved in the expropriation process, including the 
DALRRD; the Department and Minister of Public Works; the OVG; the land owners and 
where relevant, the courts, all need to function effectively in finalising the expropriation 
process within a reasonable time.  
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With regard to affordability of the approach, namely the costs associated with acquiring 
agricultural land by way expropriation, retired Justice Sachs notes that:  
“[The Constitution] contains no willing seller, willing buyer principle [for the calculation of 
compensation], the application of which could make expropriation unaffordable”.100 
As mentioned above, despite legislation and the OVG, there is no integrated approach for 
the calculation of compensation in land reform cases.101 In this regard, a distinction needs 
to be drawn between expropriation for land reform and non-land reform purposes. The 
approach may be more affordable if a value lower than market value is payable for 
expropriation in the public interest (for land reform), if it is just and equitable to do so in the 
circumstances. There may even be cases where no compensation for the expropriation is 
justified, as explained.  
Although the regulations under the PVA provide for a method of quantifying and applying 
the section 25(3) factors in relation to one another, it is still unclear when the OVG enters 
into the picture in assisting the court and/or the State in determining compensation for an 
expropriation for land reform purposes.102 As mentioned above,103 the determination of the 
value of the property could be used by the court, and by the State, as a guideline for 
determining just and equitable compensation where property is acquired for land reform 
purposes.104 Further clarification is needed regarding the exact scope of the Act; when the 
                                            
100 The quotation is set out in the Report of the High Level Panel on the Assessment of key legislation and the 
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103 See Chapter 5, 3 2 3 2 above.  
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Act must be used and at what stage of the expropriation process; and what the relationship, 
duties and responsibilities of courts vis-á-vis the OVG and PVA are. 
Intervention to clarify the position may be in the form of (a) a policy on redistribution, which 
supports an interpretation that compensation below market value should be paid in cases of 
expropriation for land reform;105 and/or (b) coordinated utilisation of regulations under the 
PVA; and/or (c) an amendment to the Expropriation Bill or the provision of a compensation 
policy which expands on the categories of land which may be acquired for nil 
compensation106 and which sets out the factors and circumstances under which nil 
compensation may be payable. In this regard, alignment between the Expropriation Bill and 
the PVA is required.  
In summation, the simplest solution to make expropriation as an approach more affordable 
would arguably be to acquire land for land reform purposes with government funds at a value 
which is just and equitable, namely lower than market value.107 Furthermore, the boundaries 
of just and equitable compensation ought to be scrutinised and tested.108  
Once the State has acquired the land through expropriation, it must still redistribute the land 
to the beneficiaries. Depending on the aim of the redistribution programme which needs to 
be set out clearly in policy, there are various options available. For example, if the aim is to 
change ownership patterns, the transfer ownership to the beneficiaries is necessary. 
However, if the aim of the redistribution programme is to broaden access to land and provide 
security of tenure, the State can lease the land to the beneficiaries, with or without the option 
to purchase the land, while making post-settlement support readily available. Apart from the 
rights awarded to beneficiaries, other questions pertaining to who the beneficiaries should 
be and how they should be selected should also be addressed in policy.  
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4 4 Confiscation  
Confiscation of agricultural land is not constitutionally permissible109 and is therefore not a 
suitable option for acquiring land for redistribution. Unless the State amends the 
Constitution, particularly the property clause,110 or promulgates legislation which makes 
provision for confiscation of agricultural land for redistribution purposes (which may still 
amount to an arbitrary deprivation of property in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution) 
such an approach is not an option. In fact, it is highly questionable whether confiscation 
would ever be acceptable as a general tool in a democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom. As mentioned above,111 the nature of confiscation is punitive and 
contrary to the overall constitutional imperative of healing the divisions of the past and 
establishing a free and equal society.112  
4 5 Reflection  
It is trite that the acquisition of agricultural land, at scale and fit for agricultural production, is 
critical at an overarching level for redistribution and equity. Different approaches are 
available for the acquisition of agricultural land for land reform purposes. These approaches 
include market-led approaches, expropriation and confiscation. However, much controversy 
exists with regard to which approach or approaches should be employed or would be most 
suitable for land acquisition in the South African context of land reform.113 This was the main 
focus of this Chapter.    
Market-led approaches, founded on the WBWS principle, can either be demand-led or 
supply-led. Although market-led approaches were constitutionally sound, it was found to be 
an unaffordable and unsustainable approach, because of the cost of acquiring agricultural 
land.  
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Expropriation for land reform purposes is provided for in the Constitution. In principle, this 
approach may be affordable if just and equitable compensation (which may be lower than 
market value or in some cases may be very low) is provided for. The affordability of this 
approach directly correlates to the sustainability thereof. If the land can be acquired and 
redistributed at a constant rate or level, because of the affordability thereof, then the land 
reform programme is sustainable in the long run. Accordingly, expropriation can be regarded 
as an affordable and sustainable approach for acquiring land.  
While confiscation may be affordable it may, in light of the current formulation of the 
Constitution be regarded as unconstitutional and therefore not a suitable approach for the 
acquisition of agricultural land. Furthermore, it is also not sustainable because it may result 
in violent and polarised responses, which is contrary to the reconciliatory aim of the 
Constitution.  
Having regard to all the approaches, it is postulated that both market-led approaches and 
expropriation may be suitable for acquiring agricultural land for redistribution. To redistribute 
as much agricultural land as possible, a combination of approaches, should be employed.114  
5 The redistribution of agricultural land 
Once agricultural land is acquired by way of market-led approaches or by way of 
expropriation, the land needs to be redistributed. In this regard, at an overarching level, it is 
clear that there is no coherent framework, policy or law that provides for the redistribution of 
agricultural land in South Africa. The lack of a clear national redistribution policy also 
contributes to the difficulty in measuring the effectiveness or the success of the redistribution 
programme as a whole. Accordingly, it is proposed that the following aspects be addressed 
in policy:  
Firstly, content should be given to section 25(5) of the Constitution. In other words, from the 
outset, the outcome of the redistribution programme should be clear and set out in a national 
policy. Secondly, the manner in which agricultural land is identified for acquisition and 
redistribution should also be provided for in policy. Thirdly, the policy should provide for the 
identification and selection of beneficiaries. Qualifying criteria, selection criteria and the 
selection process should be provided for in this regard. It is also important to differentiate 
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between the different land needs and demands of beneficiaries. Depending on the different 
land needs and demands, the quantity and quality of agricultural land redistributed should 
be determined accordingly. In this regard, a fourth aspect that needs to be addressed in 
policy is the amount of agricultural land to be redistributed to each beneficiary. Lastly, the 
type of land rights the beneficiaries will receive should also be stipulated in policy. This last 
aspect also relates to the determination of the concept of redistribution in South Africa. For 
example, if the aim of the redistribution programme is to diversify ownership patterns, then 
it will not be sufficient or effective to provide beneficiaries only with limited real rights or 
equity shares in relation to the land. Accordingly, it is submitted that a comparative 
perspective may provide insights on addressing these aspects and formulating a national 
redistribution policy or law.  
6 Conclusion  
The difficulty in measuring the effectiveness or the success of the redistribution programme 
as a whole stems from the lack of (a) a coherent framework, policy or law that gives content 
to section 25(5) of the Constitution; (b) accurate data regarding (i) the question of who owns 
what land in South Africa and (ii) how land is identified for redistribution purposes; and (c) 
relevant questions pertaining to the redistribution process, specifically: (i) who the 
beneficiaries ought to be; (ii) how they ought to be selected; (iii) what quantity of agricultural 
land they ought to receive and; (iv) what type of rights the beneficiaries of the redistribution 
programme ought to receive. Accordingly, it is proposed that a legal framework for 
redistribution, namely a National Redistribution Policy or Redistribution Bill should be 
developed to address these aspects. 
This Chapter has highlighted that the success of the redistribution programme may be 
measured against national targets or criteria. This in turn, raises ancillary questions, 
including: Who determines the target or criteria? How is the target or criteria determined and 
rationalised? Within what time should the target or criteria be realised? Furthermore, in 
relation to the determination of criteria, it is submitted that better and even more suitable 
criteria would have to be further developed and provided for in policy. 
With regard to the effectiveness of each regulatory mechanism, it was established that the 
restrictions on subdivision may impede the realisation of the aim and the target of the 
redistribution in general and should therefore be reconsidered or repealed, despite the fact 




land are ineffective with respect to the realisation of land reform objectives, specifically 
redistribution. However, with respect to the regulatory mechanisms in the Regulation Bill, it 
was found that these contribute towards the aim and objectives of the redistribution 
programme. In this regard, the mechanisms may be regarded as effective, although not in 
isolation. Therefore, the implementation of the regulatory mechanism is directly linked to the 
efficacy of relevant government departments and corresponding management structures 
and systems. This inevitably means that a suitable management framework or system would 
have to be developed to ensure or contribute to the effectiveness of the regulatory 
mechanisms. 
In relation to the most suitable approach, it is suggested that the State combine both market-
led approaches and expropriation as means of acquiring agricultural land for redistribution 
purposes. However, further aspects, such as the manner in which agricultural land is 
identified for redistribution purposes and the issue of compensation should be explored 
further.  
Finally, the Chapter highlighted that the following questions pertaining to the redistribution 
of the agricultural land arise: Who are the beneficiaries under the redistribution programme? 
What are the qualifying criteria to be regarded as a beneficiary? What are the selection 
criteria and what process is followed to identify suitable beneficiaries? How many 
beneficiaries will benefit from the land being redistributed? How much land will each 
beneficiary obtain? What type of rights will the beneficiary obtain in relation to the land? It 
should be clear whether the South African government is trying to transfer ownership of land 
or whether other types of rights may be awarded to beneficiaries. These questions are 
considered in more detail from the Namibian and Indian perspective in Chapters 7 and 8 




Chapter 7: Namibia  
1 Introduction 
At independence in 1990, Namibia had “one of the most unequal distributions of agricultural 
land in the world”.1 Despite independence, ownership of agricultural land remains unfairly 
distributed in Namibia.2 The unequal distribution of agricultural land in Namibia and the need 
for redistribution thereof result from the former German colonial rule3 and South African 
apartheid land control systems.4 The colonial apartheid rules5 created a “parallel agricultural 
                                            
1 E Hongslo & TA Benjaminsen “Turning Landscapes into ‘Nothing’: A Narrative on Land Reform in Namibia” 
(2002) 29 Forum for Development Studies 321-347, 321; SK Amoo & SL Harring “Post-independence land 
reform jurisprudence in Namibia and its relevance for social development” (2018) 10 Namibian Law Journal 3-
40, 5.  
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I, South Africa was granted a mandate over the territory. See AN Kamkuemah A comparative study of black 
rural women’s tenure security in South Africa and Namibia LLM thesis, Stellenbosch University (2012) 140-
161.  
4 Amoo & Harring (2018) Namibian Law Journal 4. Hongslo & Benjaminsen (2002) Forum for Development 
Studies 321-347, 322 explains that: “After the First World War, German South West Africa became a League 
of Nations South African mandated territory and was henceforth administered basically as a South African 
province. Under South African rule and reinforced by the apartheid policy from 1948, the two land tenure 
systems - freehold for white farmers, and communal tenure under state authority for Africans - continued to 
develop in isolation from each other until independence”. See also Kamkuemah A comparative study of black 
rural women’s tenure security in South Africa and Namibia 151-161; Amoo Property Law in Namibia 13-16, 
224-226; D Shriver “Rectifying land ownership disparities through expropriation: Why recent land reform 
measures in Namibia are unconstitutional and unnecessary” (2006) 15 Transnational Law and Contemporary 
Problems 419-455, 422-425; M Tong “Decolonialisation and comparative land reform with a special focus on 
Africa” (2014) 9 International Journal of African Renaissance Studies 16-35, 17-20; P Mufune “Land reform 
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Journal of Rural Management 1-31, 8-19; S Kariuki “Political compromise on land reform: A study of South 
Africa and Namibia” (2007) 14 South African Journal of International Affairs 99-114, 99-103.  
5 Amoo Property Law in Namibia 17 where the author explains: “The legal mechanism that was used by the 
colonial powers in South-West Africa was legislation that was primarily geared at dividing the land on the basis 
of the settler-native dichotomy. This was done by the initial declaration of the territory as crown land, followed 
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legislative measures creating crown and state land see the Transvaal Crown Land Disposal Ordinance of 
1903, made applicable to South-West Africa by virtue of the Crown Land Disposal Proclamation 13 of 1920. 
See also the Reservation of State Land for Natives Ordinance 35 of 1967. For legislative measures creating 
reserves, trusts and communal land see the Native Administration Proclamation 11 of 1922; the Native 
Administration Proclamation 15 of 1928; the Native Reserve Regulation 68 of 1924; the Development Trust 
and Land Act 18 of 1936; the Development of Self-Government for Native Nations in South-West Africa Act 
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system”6 comprising (a) large commercial farms established for the white minority in 
Namibia and (b) communal or home lands for the black population.7 Furthermore, these 
rules prohibited Black people from gaining or having access to commercial agricultural land.8 
Under apartheid, white people could hold land title, whereas black people held land, but their 
rights to the land were not legally recognised.9 Consequently, at independence, the majority 
of arable and viable agricultural land was held by white land owners, while the rest of the 
land largely formed part of the communal areas.10 Accordingly, a legal framework for land 
reform in Namibia was required.11    
 
South Africa and Namibia are not only neighbouring countries.12 For purposes of this 
dissertation, South Africa and Namibia are unique choices for comparative study because 
they share a history of colonialism and race-based minority rule under apartheid,13 
characterised by extensive land appropriation,14 which resulted in skewed patterns of 
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Republic of Namibia, 1990. Furthermore, article 16(1) of the the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, 1990, 
which maintains the status of private property, affirms the fundamental right to acquire, own and dispose of 
property. Article 102(5) of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, 1990 and the promulgation of the 
Communal Land Reform Act 5 of 2002 indicates that the status of communal land has also been maintained. 
12 Pienaar (2018) Namibian Law Journal 41. 
13 Amoo & Harring (2018) Namibian Law Journal 4-5; Pienaar (2018) Namibian Law Journal 41.  
14 Kamkuemah A comparative study of black rural women’s tenure security in South Africa and Namibia 20-
21. See generally Amoo Property Law in Namibia 13-16, 224-226; Shriver (2006) Transnational Law and 
Contemporary Problems 422-425; Tong (2014) International Journal of African Renaissance Studies 17-20; 
Mufune (2010) 6 International Journal of Rural Management 8-19; S Kariuki “Political compromise on land 
reform: A study of South Africa and Namibia” (2007) 14 South African Journal of International Affairs 99-114 
99-103; Pazcakavambwa & Hungwe “Land redistribution in Zimbabwe” in Agricultural Land Redistribution 137; 
R Hall “A comparative analysis of land reform in South Africa and Zimbabwe” in MC Lee & K Colvard (eds) 




ownership in both countries.15 Both countries also experienced negotiated settlements16 
whereby new political dispensations were established in terms of which respective 
Constitutions provide for the protection of property rights in principle.17 In this regard, South 
Africa undertook an overarching land reform programme consisting of three inter-connected 
pillars namely: redistribution, restitution and tenure reform, embedded in section 25 of the 
Constitution.18 A variety of complex statutory land reform measures emerged to give effect 
to the land reform programme in general.19  
Unlike the South Africa Constitution, the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia does not 
explicitly entrench its land reform programme. Instead, article 16(1), read with article 22, 
provides for the acknowledgement and protection of existing private property rights,20 
whereas article 16(2) allows for the expropriation of property in the public interest, subject 
to the payment of just compensation, in accordance with requirements and procedures to 
be determined by an Act of Parliament.21 Article 16 of the Namibian Constitution consists of 
two sections. Article 16(1) provides that:   
 
“All persons shall have the right in any part of Namibia to acquire, own and dispose of all forms 
of immovable and movable property individually or in association with others and to bequeath 
their property to their heirs or legatees: provided that Parliament may by legislation prohibit or 
regulate as it deems expedient the right to acquire property by persons who are not Namibian 
citizens”.22 
 
                                            
15 Amoo Property Law in Namibia 13-16, 224-226; Shriver (2006) Transnational Law and Contemporary 
Problems 422-425; Tong (2014) International Journal of African Renaissance Studies 17-20; Mufune (2010)  
International Journal of Rural Management 8-19; Kariuki (2007) South African Journal of International Affairs 
99-103. 
16 Amoo & Harring (2018) Namibian Law Journal 9; C Mapaure “Land reform needing more reform(s): Issues 
in Namibian land reform process” (2018) 10 Namibian Law Journal 85-97, 86.   
17 Section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 and section 16 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Namibia, 1990. See JM Pienaar Land Reform (2014) 815-831; Amoo Property Law in Namibia 
224-234; Shriver (2006) Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 419-455; Tong (2014) International 
Journal of African Renaissance Studies 17-20; Mufune (2010) International Journal of Rural Management 8-
19; Kariuki (2007) South African Journal of International Affairs 99-103; Pazcakavambwa & Hungwe “Land 
redistribution in Zimbabwe” in Agricultural Land Redistribution 137; Hall “A comparative analysis of land reform 
in South Africa and Zimbabwe” in Unfinished Business: The Land Crisis in Southern Africa 256. 
18 Sections 25(5)-25(9) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa; Pienaar (2018) Namibian Law 
Journal 41. See Chapter 1, 2 1 above.    
19 Pienaar Land Reform chapters 7-9 in general.   
20 Amoo & Harring (2018) Namibian Law Journal 9; AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses 1 ed 
(1999) 313.  
21 These articles are similar to the provisions dealing with the protection of private property rights in section 
25(1) and the expropriation of property in section 25(2) of the South African Constitution. See Amoo Property 
Law in Namibia 4; Amoo & Harring (2018) Namibian Law Journal 9.  




Article 16(2) furthermore provides that:  
 
“The State or a competent body or organ authorised by law may expropriate property in the public 
interest subject to the payment of just compensation, in accordance with requirements and 
procedures to be determined by [an] Act of Parliament”.23  
 
Accordingly, there is no constitutional impediment to land reform in Namibia.24 The State 
may legally expropriate land for land reform purposes and redistribute the land in 
accordance with any land reform scheme.25 The ways in which complex land reform issues 
are to be resolved are left to Parliament.26 
 
Furthermore, article 100 of the Namibian Constitution also impacts property ownership.27 It 
provides that the ownership of natural resources of Namibia vests in the State, if they are 
not otherwise lawfully owned.28 These resources constitute communal lands, in terms of 
which Black people have no legally recognised right.29  Accordingly, article 100 vests 
ownership of communal lands in the Namibian government.  
 
In 1991, a year after the Constitution was adopted, a National Land Conference on Land 
Reform and the Land Question was held to decide on the course of the land reform 
programme in general.30 Generally, the land conference resolved to compensate for the 
dispossession of land, and that government would focus on the inequity of land ownership 
in the commercial agricultural areas.31 For example, it was resolved that abandoned and 
underutilised commercial agricultural land will be reallocated and used productively;32 that 
land owned by absent landowners, primarily foreign national land owners, would be 
                                            
23 Article 16(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, 1990.    
24 Article 16(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, 1990; Amoo & Harring (2018) Namibian Law 
Journal 9. 
25 Article 16(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, 1990; Amoo & Harring (2018) Namibian Law 
Journal 9. 
26 Amoo & Harring (2018) Namibian Law Journal 9. 
27 Mapaure (2018) Namibian Law Journal 88.  
28 Article 100 of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, 1990 provides that land, water and natural 
resources below and above the surface of the land and in the continental shelf and within the territorial waters 
and the exclusive economic zone of Namibia belong to the State if they are not otherwise lawfully owned.   
29 Amoo & Harring (2018) Namibian Law Journal 5; Mapaure (2018) Namibian Law Journal 88. 
30 Ministry of Land Reform, The National Land Conference on Land Reform and the Land Question (June/July 
1991) 30-40 for the main topics of discussion at the conference.   
31 Ministry of Land Reform Part 1, Section 2 of the National Land Conference on Land Reform and the Land 
Question (June/July 1991) 30-35.  
32 Ministry of Land Reform, The National Land Conference on Land Reform and the Land Question (June/July 




expropriated33 and that very large farms and multiple ownership of farms would not be 
permitted.34 By way of contrast, Namibia’s land reform programme did not include a 
restitution programme.35 Instead, the Namibian land reform programme focused on 
broadening access to land and resettling the landless.36  In this regard, both the South 
African and Namibian governments were compelled to broaden access to land, to 
redistribute land and to provide resettlement.37 
 
The main focus of the land reform programme in Namibia is therefore on acquiring 
commercially viable agricultural land for resettlement.38 The resettlement of the landless is 
a voluntary process in terms of which eligible citizens purposefully decide to apply to be 
resettled at their preferred resettlement destination.39 While there is no accepted definition 
of resettlement, it may be defined as a process of land allocation which aims to ensure the 
fair and equitable distribution of State acquired agricultural (commercial) land to previously 
disadvantaged persons and communities. This encapsulates Namibian citizens who do not 
own or otherwise have the use of agricultural land or adequate agricultural land.40  
 
While South Africa and Namibia are comparable given the shared historical backgrounds 
and consequent need for redistribution of agricultural land,41 other factors, such as the vast 
difference in population numbers in South Africa and Namibia; the amount of arable 
agricultural land; climate and rainfall given the two jurisdictions’ topography, must be kept in 
mind.42 
 
                                            
33 Ministry of Land Reform, The National Land Conference on Land Reform and the Land Question (June/July 
1991) 31-32.  
34 32.  
35 Ministry of Land Reform, The National Land Conference on Land Reform and the Land Question (June/July 
1991) 31; Pienaar (2018) Namibian Law Journal 42. See Mufune (2010) International Journal of Rural 
Management 20 where the author explains that “a restitution programme was deemed too complex as 
ancestral rights to land of various ethnic groups had been super-imposed on one another, making 
disentanglement of the various rights and rights holders extremely difficult”. See also Kariuki (2007) South 
African Journal of International Affairs 107.  
36 Pienaar (2018) Namibian Law Journal 42; Amoo Property Law in Namibia 224; Kariuki (2007) South African 
Journal of International Affairs 107; Mufune (2010) International Journal of Rural Management 20; Hongslo & 
Benjaminsen (2002) Forum for Development Studies 321-347, 322. 
37 Pienaar (2018) Namibian Law Journal 42.  
38 Ministry of Land Reform, Revised National Resettlement Policy 2018-2027 (March 2017) 16. See the 
Commercial (Agricultural) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995.  
39 Ministry of Land Reform, Revised National Resettlement Policy 2018-2027 (March 2017) 16. 
40 See Ministry of Land Reform, Revised National Resettlement Policy 2018-2027 (March 2017) 8, 16-17.  
41 Pienaar (2018) Namibian Law Journal 43.  




The aim of this Chapter is not to provide for an in-depth analysis of the respective land 
reform programmes conducted in South Africa and Namibia. Instead, for purposes of the 
chapter, the legal position regarding (a) the concept of agricultural land in Namibia; (b) 
mechanisms for the regulation of agricultural land and (c) approaches and/or mechanisms 
for the acquisition of agricultural land in Namibia are explored. The Chapter then concludes 
with a reflection in respect of the three identified focae above. Later in the study, Chapter 9 
will provide for a comparative analysis between South Africa, Namibia and India regarding 
the concept of agricultural land; the mechanisms for the regulation of agricultural land; and 
the approaches and/or mechanisms for the acquisition of agricultural land. This Chapter is 
thus essential in laying the foundational basis for an in-depth legal comparative analysis to 
follow.  
2 The concept of agricultural land in Namibia  
2 1 Introduction  
Post-1920, after occupation by the South African colonial authorities in 1915,43 land in 
Namibia was generally classified as State or crown land,44 private land and communal 
land.45 As mentioned, most of the commercially viable agricultural land set aside for private 
ownership was predominantly owned by white settlers, while the remainder was (and still is) 
held by the indigenous people situated in the communal areas.46 Amoo states that this 
classification is the origin and cause of the skewed land ownership patterns in Namibia.47 
To a large extent, this classification has been maintained under the Namibian Constitution.48   
 
                                            
43 Kamkuemah A comparative study of black rural women’s tenure security in South Africa and Namibia 152-
153.  
44 Amoo Property Law in Namibia 17; Kamkuemah A comparative study of black rural women’s tenure security 
in South Africa and Namibia 153-160. 
45 Amoo Property Law in Namibia 19-20; Kamkuemah A comparative study of black rural women’s tenure 
security in South Africa and Namibia 153-160. Lands were also initially classified as native reserves, native 
trusts and areas for native nations.  
46 Amoo Property Law in Namibia 20, 209. See also Republic of Namibia, National Conference on Land Reform 
and the Land Question Consensus Document (1991); Kamkuemah A comparative study of black rural women’s 
tenure security in South Africa and Namibia 153-160. 
47 Amoo Property Law in Namibia 208; Kamkuemah A comparative study of black rural women’s tenure security 
in South Africa and Namibia 153-160. 
48 The status of crown or state land is affirmed and maintained in Article 100, read with Schedule 5(1) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, 1990. Furthermore, article 16(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Namibia, 1990, which maintains the status of private property, affirms the fundamental right to acquire, own 
and dispose of property. Article 102(5) of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, 1990 and the 
promulgation of the Communal Land Reform Act 5 of 2002 indicates that the status of communal land has also 




Accordingly, at an overarching level, agricultural land in Namibia can be categorised as 
commercial (agricultural) land owned either privately or publically by the State and 
communal (agricultural) land. The distinction between commercial agricultural land and 
communal (agricultural) land is important because two different regulatory schemes deal 
with the respective categories of land. For purposes of this Chapter in general and for 
comparative analysis specifically, this dissertation will not deal with communal agricultural 
land. Instead, the focus falls on the regulation and acquisition of privately owned (or free-
hold) commercial agricultural land. In this regard, there may be various regulatory legislative 
schemes or mechanisms which define agricultural land differently, depending on the 
objectives of the legislative scheme. In order to determine whether a piece of land falls under 
the scope and regulation of a particular piece of legislation, it is therefore necessary to 
determine what constitutes agricultural land under the specific legislative mechanism.  
 
The concept of agricultural land will only be explored within the regulatory scheme(s) 
governing agricultural land in Namibia. In this regard, four pieces of legislative measures are 
specifically aimed at regulating commercial agricultural land in Namibia: (a) the Subdivision 
of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970; (b) the Agricultural Land Act 5 of 1981; (c) the 
Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995; and (d) the Land Bill B19-2016.   
2 2 The Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970 
The Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970 (“SALA”), which regulates the 
subdivision of agricultural land in South Africa49 was brought into force in South West Africa 
on 2 January 1971.50 The administration of SALA was furthermore transferred to South West 
Africa on 2 March 1978.51 This means that none of the amendments to SALA in South Africa 
after the date of transfer and prior to Namibian independence in 1990 is applicable to South 
West Africa (Namibia), unless it is made expressly applicable.52  However, the aims of SALA 
in Namibia and South Africa are identical. Furthermore, the provisions defining “agricultural 
                                            
49 See Chapter 2, 2 and Chapter 3, 3 2 respectively.  
50 The Act was brought into force by way of RSA Proclamation 329 of 1970 (RSA GG 2950).  
51 Transfer Proclamation AG 11 of 1978, dated 2 March 1978.  
52 For example, the following amendments to SALA in South Africa are not applicable to Namibia because it 
was not expressly made applicable: The Subdivision of Agricultural Land Amendment Act 12 of 1979; the 
Subdivision of Agricultural Land Amendment Act 18 of 1981; and the Subdivision of Agricultural Land 
Amendment Act 33 of 1984. Other amendments to SALA in South Africa which have expressly been made 
applicable to Namibia, because the amendments were effected before 2 March 1978 include: the Subdivision 
of Agricultural Land Amendment Act 55 of 1972; the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Amendment Act 19 of 




land” in SALA and regulating the subdivision of agricultural land in Namibia and South Africa 
are practically indistinguishable.  
 
The definition of agricultural land under SALA is discussed in Chapter 2 and need not be 
repeated here. In summation, SALA defines agricultural land a residual category of land in 
South Africa and Namibia. More specifically, SALA defines agricultural land as “any land”,53 
and then lists categories of land that do not form part of the definition.54 While agricultural 
land is defined as a category of land, it is still unclear what agricultural land is. Given the 
topography of Namibia, not all land defined as agricultural land for purposes of SALA will be 
or can be used for agricultural purposes. A strictly technical approach to the categories of 
land set out in SALA is thus insufficient for purposes of actual redistribution.   
2 3 The Agricultural Land Act 5 of 1981 (Rehoboth) 
Despite the repeal of the Rehoboth Self-Government Act 56 of 197655 by the Namibian 
Constitution,56 the operation of the Agricultural Land Act 5 of 1981 (Rehoboth)57 (henceforth 
referred to as “ALA”) remains in force.58  
 
Like SALA, the ALA defines agricultural land as a residual category of land. It also provides 
that agricultural land is any land except (a) land owned by the Government or which is held 
in trust for any person and communities by the Government and (b) land which the Kaptein 
in terms of a decision of the Kaptein’s Council excludes from the provision of this Act.59 This 
wide definition does not provide more clarity on what agricultural land is.  
2 4 The Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995 
The Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995 (“ACLRA”) specifically makes 
provision for the acquisition of private agricultural land for resettlement. It is therefore 
necessary to determine what constitutes agricultural land in terms of ACLRA.  
                                            
53 Section 1 of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970.  
54 Section 1(a)-(f) of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970.  
55 The aim of the Rehoboth Self-Government Act 56 of 1976 was to grant self-government in accordance with 
the Paternal Law of 1872 to the citizens of the "Rehoboth Gebied" within the territory of South West Africa; for 
that purpose to provide for the establishment of a Kaptein's Council and a Legislative Council for the said 
"Gebied"; to determine the powers and functions of the said councils; and to provide for matters connected 
therewith. 
56 Schedule 8 of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, 1990.  
57 The Act repeals the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970 in Rehoboth.  
58 B Bertolini “The Rehoboth Baster land dispute-Attempt by the Rehoboth Baster Community to regain their 
ancestral land” (2018) 10 Namibian Law Journal 189-215, 195.  





ACLRA defines agricultural land as “any land or an undivided share in land”.60 It then lists a 
number of pieces of land not forming part of the definition of agricultural land:  
 
“(a) land situated in a local authority area as defined in section 1 of the Local Authorities Act, 1992 
(Act 23 of 1992);  (b) land situated in a settlement area as defined in section 1 of the Regional 
Councils Act, 1992 (Act 22 of 1992); (c) land of which the State is the owner or which is held in 
trust by the State or any Minister for any person; (d) land which the Minister by notice in the 
Gazette excludes from the provisions of this Act.”61  
 
It seems that any land owned by or situated in an area under the control of the State is 
excluded from the definition of agricultural land and consequently the operation of ACRLA. 
It also seems as if communal land, forming part of the property held in trust by the State 
does not fall within the scope of the definition of agricultural land under ACLRA. Arguably, 
the operation of the ACLRA is limited to privately owned agricultural land. Similar to SALA, 
ACLRA provides that certain areas constitute agricultural land. However, unlike SALA, 
ACLRA provides some guidance on what agricultural land is. The Act refers to “agricultural 
land” and to “agricultural purposes”.62 Agricultural purposes is defined widely and provides 
that it “includes game farming”.63 While ACLRA provides for some guidance on the concept 
of agricultural land, it does not provide for an overarching definition pertaining to all 
agricultural land in Namibia, because it only applies to private commercial agricultural land. 
2 5 Recent developments: The Land Bill B19- 2016 
The 2016 Land Bill64  (“Land Bill”) aims, inter alia,65 to consolidate and amend ACLRA and 
the Communal Land Reform Act 5 of 200266 (“CLRA”) to ensure that “all [agricultural] land 
in Namibia has the same status”.67 Accordingly, once promulgated, the Land Bill will replace 
both ACLRA and CLRA. It is therefore important to take cognisance of the possible 
                                            
60 Section 1 of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995. 
61 Section 1 of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995.  
62 Section 1 of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995. 
63 Section 1 of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995. 
64 The Land Bill B19-2016 <http://www.mlr.gov.na/documents/20541/634529/Land+Bill.pdf/b32aed67-42a1-
40d5-8106-d8ba85661acf> (accessed 28-08-2019).  
65 Also see clause 3 of the Land Bill B19-2016 for a list of all the objectives of the Bill.  
66 W Werner “The 2016 Land Bill: Making law without consultation and policy review” (2017) Democracy Report 
Special Briefing Report No 16 1-18 <https://ippr.org.na/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Briefing_Land2017.pdf> 
(accessed 27-09-2019) 1, 6.  
67 Minister of Land Reform (2016a). Motivation statement by the Honourable Utoni Nujoma, MP, Minister of 
Land Reform on the Land Bill. Ministry of Land Reform / National Assembly; Werner (2017) Democracy Report: 




legislative changes relating to the concept of agricultural land; the regulation of agricultural 
land; and the acquisition of agricultural land throughout. Werner provides that: 
 
“To a large extent, the provisions in the Land Bill 2016 concerning agricultural land, or more 
accurately, freehold land that is targeted for acquisition and redistribution by the state, have 
remained unchanged.”68 
 
With regard to the concept of agricultural land, the Land Bill provides for a new and simplified 
definition of agricultural land. The Land Bill provides that “agricultural land” constitutes:  
 
“[A]ny land or an undivided share in land that is used for agricultural purposes”.69  
 
“Agricultural purposes” is formulated as follows:  
 
“[A]gricultural purposes,” includes game farming and aquaculture”. 70  
 
Any land that is used for agricultural purposes, regardless of where it is situated constitutes 
agricultural land. Agricultural land is not defined as a residual category as it is under SALA 
and ACLRA. Instead, the Land Bill defines agricultural land according to the purpose for 
which the land or a piece of land is used and thus provides for an overarching definition of 
agricultural land.  The provision of an overarching definition on agricultural land may be 
useful for South Africa to consider in formulating a comprehensive legal framework for the 
regulation of agricultural land.  
3 The regulation of agricultural land in Namibia  
3 1 Introduction  
Various direct mechanisms which regulate the use of, and impact agricultural land and the 
ownership thereof are available in Namibia, including: (a) placing restrictions on the 
subdivision of agricultural land and (b) placing restrictions on foreigners to acquire and 
dispose of agricultural land. Each of the mechanisms is accordingly discussed below. 
                                            
68 Werner (2017) Democracy Report Special Briefing Report No 16 10.  
69 Clause 1 of the Land Bill B19-2016.  




3 2 Restrictions on the subdivision of agricultural land  
Subdivision is a process of fragmentation of agricultural land into small parcels or allotments 
owned, leased or managed by individual farmers; families; or households through the 
erection of physical fence boundaries.71 Given the scarcity of arable land in Namibia, the 
rationale for the regulation of subdivision of agricultural land is to protect the economic 
viability of agricultural land.72 The following sections set out the legislative framework and 
policy for subdivision of agricultural land in Namibia. 
3 2 1 Legislative framework 
There are three acts which regulate the subdivision of agricultural land in Namibia: (a) the 
SALA73; (b) the ALA; and (c) ACLRA. SALA is applicable to the entire Namibian territory, 
except for the Rehoboth Gebied. Conversely, the regulation of subdivision of agricultural 
land in Rehoboth is regulated specifically by ALA.74 While SALA and ALA provide for 
restrictions on the subdivision of agricultural land, ACLRA provides for the subdivision of 
agricultural land where agricultural land is acquired for redistribution under ACLRA.  
 
These Acts, inter alia, place a restriction on the subdivision of agricultural land.75 The 
subdivision of agricultural land (as defined) is prohibited unless the consent of the Minister76 
or the Kaptein’s Council77 is obtained in writing.78 Without prior consent to subdivide the 
land, the sale or lease of the agricultural land or portion of agricultural land will be void ab 
intitio.79 The provisions in SALA and ALA relating to the regulation of agricultural land in 
general and the subdivision of agricultural land specifically are similar, if not identical, to 
each other and to the provisions of SALA discussed in Chapter 3 and will accordingly not be 
repeated here.80 
                                            
71 Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Forestry National Policy on Subdivision and Consolidation of Agricultural 
Land (March 2018) v.  
72 Theron v Tegethoff 2001 NR 203 (HC) 205I-206C citing Van der Bilj v Louw 1974 2 SA 493 (C) 499C-499E. 
See also the objectives of the Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Forestry National Policy on Subdivision and 
Consolidation of Agricultural Land (March 2018) 4. This National Policy aims to prevent agricultural land from 
diminishing into uneconomical and ecologically non-sustainable land units.  
73 As amended in South Africa to 2 March 1978.   
74 The Act repeals the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970 in Rehoboth. 
75 Section 3 of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970 and Section 3 of the Agricultural Land Act 5 
of 1981.  
76 Section 3 of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970. 
77 Section 3 of the Agricultural Land Act 5 of 1981. 
78 Section 3 of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970 and Section 3 of the Agricultural Land Act 5 
of 1981.  
79 Theron v Tegethoff 2001 NR 203 (HC) 206E-206H referring to Tuckers Land and Development Corporation 
(Pty) Ltd v Truter 1984 2 SA 150 (SWA).  





While the subdivision of agricultural land by private land owners is prohibited, the Minister 
is allowed to subdivide land acquired for redistribution purposes under ACLRA.81 In 
accordance with ACLRA, the Minister, in consultation with the Minister of Agriculture, Water 
and Rural Development, may:  
 
“(a) direct that any land acquired under this Act be subdivided into holdings for allotment to 
persons for purposes of small-scale farming; and (b) cause each such holding to be surveyed”.82 
The subdivision of land will be carried out in accordance with a partition plan prepared and 
recommended by the Land Commission.83 Accordingly, the Minister of Lands, Resettlement 
and Rehabilitation, together with the Minister of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development 
and Land Commission may effect the subdivision of agricultural land for redistribution 
purposes.  
3 2 2 National policy on subdivision and consolidation of agricultural land  
In light of Namibia’s harsh climatic conditions, smaller land units are not necessarily 
economically viable84 for agricultural enterprises. Furthermore, subdivision of agricultural 
land may also result in land speculation for non-agricultural activities. Both situations may 
pose a threat to national food and nutrition security and indeed to the agricultural sector 
itself. Taking into account the increasing Namibian population and the growing demand for 
food in Namibia, the Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Forestry formulated a national policy 
to curb further subdivision of agricultural land that may pose a threat to food security in 
Namibia.  
 
The 2018 National Policy on Subdivision and Consolidation of Agricultural Land85 serves as 
a framework that safeguards sustainable agriculture for current and future generations in 
Namibia. The ultimate aim is to prevent the unrestricted and continued subdivision of 
agricultural land that will:  
                                            
81 Section 38 of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995.  
82 Section 38 of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995. 
83 Section 38(2) of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995.  
84 “Economic viability” is defined as the “ability of an agricultural land unit area to consistently produce profitably 
or marginally above breakeven point within the realm of inherent natural climatic variability and sustain farming 
operations and afford owners a reasonable living standard without adversely affecting natural resources, land 
productive capacity and ecological resilience” in the Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Forestry National Policy 
on Subdivision and Consolidation of Agricultural Land (March 2018) v.  
85 Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Forestry National Policy on Subdivision and Consolidation of Agricultural 





“lead to the reduction in size of agricultural land into small ecologically and economically non-
viable farming units. Such subdivision undermines the capacity of agricultural land users to 
sustainably derive decent living standards from agricultural land and contribute meaningfully to 
the national economy while preserving natural resources in Namibia”.86  
 
The ultimate goal proposed by the Policy is to ensure that agricultural land, which is not 
fragmented, will lead to socio-economic and ecologically sustainable land units. In light of 
this goal, four key policy objectives have been identified by the Ministry, namely:  
 
“(a) to serve as an instrument for the conservation of natural rangelands (b) to preserve and 
promote resilience of agricultural lands to natural climatic and manmade shocks such as recurrent 
and frequent droughts or overutilization by maintaining essential ecological processes and 
habitats (c) to prevent agricultural land from diminishing into uneconomical and ecologically non-
sustainable land units [and] (d) to prevent specific high potential soils to be utilized for non-
agricultural purposes”.87  
To achieve these objectives, the Policy provides for five strategies that may contribute to 
the prevention and elimination of uneconomical and ecologically non-sustainable land units 
namely: (a) setting a minimum size of agricultural land units (b) placing restrictions on the 
subdivision of agricultural land; (c) consolidating agricultural land units; (d) evaluating 
agricultural land productivity; and (e) restricting the use of high potential soils for the use of 
non-agricultural activities.88  
The Policy provides for setting a minimum size of agricultural land units to serve as a catalyst 
for the preservation of natural rangelands and rangeland ecosystems. The policy identifies 
livestock production as the most appropriate land use type in Namibia. To this end, “the 
strategy is therefore to base minimum agricultural land unit sizes on the most critical 
agricultural enterprise which is extensive livestock production within the confines of the 
potential land carrying capacity under natural conditions”.89 Alternative agricultural land use 
types, such as aquaculture and horticulture may also be considered in allocating smaller 
agricultural land size in exceptional situations. The Policy furthermore provides that physical 
partitioning of agricultural land into uneconomical land units will be prohibited by an Act of 
                                            
86 Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Forestry National Policy on Subdivision and Consolidation of Agricultural 
Land (March 2018) 2.  
87 4.  
88 5-7. 




Parliament. Although SALA and ALA already provide for such restrictions, the Policy 
suggests the promulgation of a coherent amalgamated law, which will be applicable 
nationally. Accordingly, it proposes SALA and ALA be repealed and replaced with one piece 
of legislation aimed at prohibiting the subdivision of agricultural land, subject to the consent 
of the Minister. Furthermore, the Policy encourages the voluntary and gradual consolidation 
of previously subdivided and uneconomical agricultural land.  
To determine whether agricultural land should be subdivided or consolidated, an evaluation 
of agricultural land productivity is required. In this regard, the Policy provides for the following 
factors to determine the productivity of agricultural land: soil quality, bush encroachment, 
rainfall pattern, topography, natural vegetation, size of the land, land degradation and the 
type of land use. In light of these parameters, different land capability classes will be 
determined and “regular assessments of the productive potential of agricultural land in 
Namibia will be undertaken and maintained in an updated database”.90 Having regard to 
Namibia’s limited fertile soils with high potential for agricultural production, these areas need 
to be protected from being utilised for non-agricultural purposes. In this regard, the Policy 
provides that: 
“non-agricultural developments or encroachment of such developments including the 
incorporation into town lands, establishment of suburbs or settlements and plantation of non-food 
monocultures on valuable high potential fertile soils shall be discouraged”.91  
Furthermore, in cases where high potential soils fall under urban jurisdictions, “subdivision 
shall be allowed for the demarcation of such soils for agricultural purpose only”.92 
3 3 Restrictions on foreign ownership of agricultural land  
3 3 1 Introduction  
The Namibian Constitution recognises the fundamental right of all persons to acquire, own 
and dispose of property.93 However, the Constitution provides for a specific proviso in 
relation to foreigners.94 Parliament may by way of “legislation prohibit or regulate as it deems 
                                            
90 Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Forestry National Policy on Subdivision and Consolidation of Agricultural 
Land (March 2018) 6. 
91 7.  
92 7.  
93 Article 16(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, 1990; Kessl v Ministry of Lands and Resettlement 
and two similar cases 2008 1 NR 167 (HC) para 101. See also Marot v Cotterell 2014 2 NR 340 (SC) para 21. 
94 Article 16(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, 1990; Kessl v Ministry of Lands and Resettlement 
and two similar cases 2008 1 NR 167 (HC) para 101. See also Marot v Cotterell 2014 2 NR 340 (SC) paras 6-




expedient the right to acquire property by persons who are not Namibian citizens”,95 namely 
foreigners. In effect Parliament may prohibit foreigners from acquiring agricultural land in 
Namibia or it may regulate and provide for specific requirements or conditions under which 
foreigners would be able to acquire and own or hold agricultural land.96 However, once a 
non-Namibian has acquired property he or she may not be deprived of it, except by way of 
expropriation.97  
3 3 2 Restrictions on foreign ownership of agricultural land in terms of ACLRA  
The legislation regulating ownership of agricultural land is ACLRA. In terms of ACLRA no 
“foreign nationals”98 may acquire or occupy99 agricultural land without the prior written 
consent of the Minister.100 ACLRA restricts foreign nationals from acquiring agricultural land 
by way of transaction and registration of transfer of ownership101 or by way of a lease for an 
indefinite period or period exceeding 10 years without the prior written consent of the 
Minister.102 In this regard, section 58 regulates, rather than prohibits, the acquisition of 
agricultural land by foreign nationals.103 Accordingly, there is no absolute prohibition against 
foreigners obtaining agricultural land.104 Instead, there is a qualified restriction, namely 
foreigners need to obtain written ministerial consent to acquire agricultural land in Namibia.   
 
Despite the fact that there is no absolute prohibition against foreigners, it appears that there 
has been a number of occasions where parties have tried to circumvent the provisions of 
ACLRA. For example, in Müller v Schweiger105 the parties entered into a lease for a period 
of 9 years and 11 months, with the option to renew the lease for a further 9 years and 11 
months, without obtaining ministerial consent. The Court found that the agreement 
contravened section 58(1)(b) of ACLRA and was therefore illegal and void ab initio.106 The 
finding of the High Court was confirmed on appeal in Schweiger v Müller.107  
                                            
95 Article 16(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, 1990. 
96 Kessl v Ministry of Lands and Resettlement and two similar cases 2008 1 NR 167 (HC) para 101. See also 
Marot v Cotterell 2014 2 NR 340 (SC) paras 6-7, 11. 
97 Kessl v Ministry of Lands and Resettlement and two similar cases 2008 1 NR 167 (HC) para 101. 
98 Section 1 of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995.  
99 Marot v Cotterell 2012 1 NR 365 (HC) para 3.  
100 Section 58 of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995. See Marot v Cotterell 2012 1 NR 
365 (HC) para 3.  
101 Section 58(1)(a) of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995.  
102 Section 58(1)(b) of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995.  
103 Marot v Cotterell 2014 2 NR 340 (SC) para 11.  
104 Kessl v Ministry of Lands and Resettlement and two similar cases 2008 1 NR 167 HC para 102.  
105 2005 NR 98 (HC). 
106 Müller v Schweiger 2005 NR 98 (HC) 106J-107B. 





In Marot v Cotterell108 a Namibian citizen (the seller) entered into a written agreement with 
foreign nationals (the buyers) in terms of which the foreign nationals purchased, inter alia, a 
50% member’s interest in a close corporation.109 The corporation owned certain commercial 
agricultural land.110 The agreement provided that it was in effect a sale of 50% of the 
immovable property, namely the commercial agricultural land.111 Furthermore, the foreign 
nationals were entitled to take possession of the property on signature of the agreement.112 
In this regard, the High Court found that the right of occupation is conferred on the foreign 
nationals by the agreement itself.113 The right of occupation should “not to be derived from 
the fact that the foreigners are members” of the close corporation.114 Furthermore, in finding 
that the agreement is in contravention of section 58 of ACLRA and therefore void ab initio,115 
the High Court stated that the recognition of the agreement would undermine the purpose 
of the ACLRA.116 On appeal,117 the Supreme Court confirmed the rationale of the High Court. 
The Court similarly held that the purchase of shares in a close corporation does not give the 
members rights of occupation of immovable property owned by the close corporation by 
virtue of their membership, but rather by agreement.118 It was also clear that the agreement 
between the parties conferred a right to the occupation or possession of the agricultural land 
upon foreign nationals for an indefinite period.119 On this basis, the Supreme Court found 
the agreement in contravention of section 58(1)(b) of ACLRA and therefore void ab initio.120 
 
In determining whether the prohibition is applicable, it must first be determined if someone 
falls within the definition of a “foreign national”. ACLRA defines a foreign national as:  
 
“(a) a person who is not a Namibian citizen; 
 (b) in relation to a company - 
                                            
108 2012 1 NR 365 (HC). 
109 Marot v Cotterell 2012 1 NR 365 (HC) para 7; Marot v Cotterell 2014 2 NR 340 (SC) para 1.  
110 Marot v Cotterell 2012 1 NR 365 (HC) para 6; Marot v Cotterell 2014 2 NR 340 (SC) para 1. 
111 Marot v Cotterell 2012 1 NR 365 (HC) para 8; Marot v Cotterell 2014 2 NR 340 (SC) para 1. 
112 Marot v Cotterell 2014 2 NR 340 (SC) para 1.  
113 Marot v Cotterell 2012 1 NR 365 (HC) para 25. 
114 Para 25.  
115 Para 26.  
116 Para 27.  
117 Marot v Cotterell 2014 2 NR 340 (SC). 
118 Paras 19, 34.  
119 Para 28.  




(i) a company incorporated under the laws of any country other than Namibia; or 
(ii) a company incorporated in Namibia in which the controlling interest is not held by Namibian 
citizens or by a company or close corporation in which the controlling interest is held by Namibian 
citizens; and 
(c) in relation to a close corporation, a close corporation in which the controlling interest is not 
held by Namibian citizens.”121 
Accordingly, a foreign national may still acquire agricultural land (a) by virtue of marriage in 
community of property to a Namibian citizen; (b) through an interest in a company or close 
corporation that does not amount to a controlling interest; (c) by virtue of succession; or (d) 
by obtaining written consent from the Minister.122 
 
If a foreign national wants to acquire agricultural land, an application must be lodged to the 
Minister for his or her consent,123 which may also be conditional.124 Furthermore, the Minister 
may not grant his or her consent for the acquisition of agricultural land by a foreign national 
unless he or she is “satisfied”125 that (a) the acquisition of the land in question will constitute 
“an eligible investment as contemplated in section 5 of the Foreign Investments Act, 1990 
(Act 27 of 1990)”;126 (b) the land is capable of being used or occupied in a beneficial manner 
for the purpose which the foreigner aims to use or occupy it127and (c) the use or occupation 
                                            
121 Section 1 of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995.  
122 Section 58 of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995. 
123 Section 58(4) of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995. 
124 Section 58(5) of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995. 
125 Apart from the three criteria in section 58 of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995, there 
are no regulations which the Minister must consult and take into account in making a decision regarding the 
acquisition of agricultural land by a foreign national.  See OC Ruppel & K Ruppel-Schlichting (eds) 
Environmental Law & Policy in Namibia: Towards making Africa the Tree of Life 3 ed (2016) which highlight 
that environmental concerns are part and parcel of land use policy in Namibia.  
126 Section 58(6)(a) of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995 read with sections 5 and 7 of 
the Foreign Investment Act 27 of 1990. Under section 5 of the Foreign Investments Act 27 of 1990 an 
investment is regarded as an: “eligible investment” (1)(a) “if it is an investment, or proposed investment, in 
Namibia by a foreign national of foreign assets of a value of not less than the amount which the Minister may 
determine from time to time by notice in the Government Gazette for this purpose; (b) if it is a reinvestment, or 
proposed reinvestment, by a foreign national of the profit or proceeds of sale of an enterprise specified in a 
Certificate, irrespective of the amount of such reinvestment. (2) Where the investment is for the acquisition of 
shares in a company incorporated in Namibia, the investment shall, notwithstanding that the value thereof is 
equal to or exceeds the amount determined under subsection (1) (a), qualify as an eligible investment only if: 
(a) not less than ten per cent of the share capital of the company is held or will, following the investment, be 
held by the foreign national making the investment; or (b) the Minister is satisfied that the foreign national 
making the investment is or will be actively involved in the management of the company”. 




of agricultural land will not have an adverse effect on the environment or that adequate 
measures will be provided for by the applicant to prevent such an adverse impact.128 
 
Furthermore, ACLRA also provides that no person shall acquire or hold agricultural land as 
a nominee owner on behalf of or in the interest of any foreign national without the prior 
written consent of the Minister.129 
 
In the event that agricultural land is acquired by a foreign national (or nominee owner) 
without the necessary consent from the Minister, the Minister may direct that the land be 
sold on the open market, unless he or she decides to acquire the land for purposes of 
resettlement.130 A person who sells or disposes of agricultural land to a foreign national or 
nominee owner in contravention of the Act will also be guilty of an offence and will be liable 
on conviction to a fine not exceeding N$ 100 000 or imprisonment.131 
3 3 3 Restrictions on foreign ownership of agricultural land in terms of the Land Bill  
The proposed Land Bill places a twofold prohibition on the acquisition of agricultural land by 
foreign nationals. The Bill provides that foreign nationals may not:132  
 
“(a) acquire agricultural land through the registration and transfer of ownership in the deeds 
registry; or (b) acquire directly or indirectly a majority interest in a company or close corporation 
that owns, directly or indirectly, agricultural land.”133 
 
In other words, a foreign national will no longer be able to acquire ownership of agricultural 
land, once the Bill is promulgated. However, the Bill makes provision for a few exemptions 
in this regard.134 The prohibition does not apply to the acquisition of agricultural land by a 
foreign national:  
“by virtue of any succession by intestacy or testamentary disposition, if such heir or legatee is 
ordinarily residing in Namibia; is a company in which the controlling interest is held by [a] 
Namibian citizen and such company is doing business in Namibia; or is a close corporation in 
                                            
128 Section 58(6)(c) of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995. 
129 Section 59 of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995. 
130 Section 60 of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995. 
131 Section 60A of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995. 
132 Clause 114 of the Land Bill B19-2016; Werner (2017) Democracy Report Special Briefing Report No 16 13.  
See previous comments on the difference in referencing in this regard. 
133 Clause 114(1) of the Land Bill B19-2016.   




which the controlling interest is held by [a] Namibian citizen and such close corporation is doing 
business in Namibia or who is married in community of property to a Namibian citizen and by 
virtue of such marriage is ordinarily residing in Namibia”.135  
Under the Land Bill foreign nationals will be restricted to acquiring a right to occupy 
agricultural land or a portion thereof by means of lease.136 Such an agreement can only be 
entered into after written approval of the Minister is obtained.137 Furthermore, the lease may 
only be:  
 
“for a period of 10 years at a time renewable or for a fixed period of less than 10 years, but which 
is renewable, and it being a condition of such agreement that the right of occupation of the land 
concerned may not exceed a period of 10 years in total, renewable for another maximum of 10 
years at a time”.138  
 
The Bill does not provide for a limitation on how many times a foreign national may renew 
the lease where the lease is for a period of 10 years. In general, it is unclear for what period 
a foreign national may lease agricultural land.  
 
Similar to the provisions of ACLRA,139 there are also specific conditions which a foreign 
national must fulfil before the Minister may approve the lease.140 The Minister must be 
satisfied that (a) the land is capable of being occupied beneficially for the purpose for which 
the foreign national proposes;141 (b) the use or occupation of the land will not have an 
adverse effect on the environment or adequate measures will be taken to ensure that there 
is no adverse effect on the environment;142 (c) that the holding of the land will contribute 
towards the economic development of Namibia through utilising Namibian resources, 
                                            
135 Clause 115 of the Land Bill B19-2016. 
136 Clause 114(3) of the Land Bill B19-2016. 
137 Clause 114(3) of the Land Bill B19-2016.   
138 Clause 114(3) of the Land Bill B19-2016. Interestingly, “ordinarily residing” should not be equated with 
“permanent residency” in Namibia. In De Wilde v Minister of Home Affairs (SA 48/2014) [2016] NASC 12 (23 
June 2016) the Supreme Court made a ruling on the term “ordinarily resident” in article 4(1) of the Constitution 
of the Republic of Namibia, 1990. The Court concluded that the framers of the Namibian Constitution intended 
the phrase “ordinarily resident” to have a meaning distinct from “permanent residence”. In determining whether 
a person is ordinarily resident for the purposes of Namibian citizenship, each case must be considered on the 
facts.  
139 Section 58(6) of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995.  
140 Clause 114(6) of the Land Bill B19-2016.  See also Werner (2017) Democracy Report Special Briefing 
Report No 16 13.   
141 Clause 114(6)(a) of the Land Bill B19-2016. 
142 Clause 114(6)(b) of the Land Bill B19-2016. See Ruppel & Ruppel-Schlichting (eds) Environmental Law & 
Policy in Namibia: Towards making Africa the Tree of Life which highlights that environmental concerns are 




increasing employment opportunities, providing training to Namibian citizens; earning or 
saving foreign exchange or generating development in the less developed areas of 
Namibia;143 and (d) that the holding of the land is not inconsistent with other legislative 
measures or policies aimed at redressing economic imbalances or the equal distribution of 
land in Namibia.144  
4 The acquisition of agricultural land in Namibia  
4 1 Introduction  
The legislative framework dealing specifically with the acquisition and redistribution of 
agricultural land in Namibia is the ACLRA. The purpose of ACLRA is to provide for the 
acquisition of agricultural land by the State for the purposes of land reform and for the 
allocation of such land to Namibian citizens145 who do not own or otherwise have the use of 
any or of adequate agricultural land.146 The circumstances under which the Minister of 
Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation may acquire agricultural land are threefold: (a) 
where agricultural land is offered for sale to the Minister;147 (b) where agricultural land is 
held by a foreign national;148 or (c) where the Minister considers the agricultural land to be 
appropriate for land reform.149 In this regard, ACLRA provides for two methods of acquiring 
agricultural land for redistribution and resettlement: (a) market-led approaches; and (b) 
expropriation.150 Each of these methods are discussed below.  
4 2 Market-led approaches for the acquisition of agricultural land  
During the first 15 years after independence (1990-2005) agricultural land was almost 
exclusively acquired by way of market-led approaches based on the WBWS principle.151 
                                            
143 Clause 114(6)(c) of the Land Bill B19-2016.   
144 Clause 114(6)(d) of the Land Bill B19-2016.   
145 For a definition of “Namibian citizen” see article 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, 1990, read 
with section 1 of the Namibian Citizenship Act 14 of 1990.  
146 Preamble and section 14 of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995; Amoo Property Law 
in Namibia 82. See 3 3 2 below, for an exposition of the order of preference for beneficiaries acquiring 
agricultural land under the different policies and schemes.  
147 Section 14(2)(a) of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995.  
148 Section 14(2)(b) read with sections 58 and 59 of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995.  
149 Section 14(2)(c) of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995.  
150 Amoo Property Law in Namibia 82-84, 90-92; Kessl v Ministry of Lands and Resettlement and two similar 
cases 2008 1 NR 167 (HC) para 8.  
151 B Fuller “A Namibian path for land reform” in J Hunter (ed) Who should own the land? Analyses and views 
on land reform and the land question in Namibia and Southern Africa (2004) 83-86 83; Pienaar (2018) 




The acquisition process is regulated by ACLRA.152 This process is accordingly discussed 
below.  
4 2 1 The process under ACLRA: The State’s preferential right 
Where a land owner (citizen or foreign national) wants to dispose of his or her agricultural 
land, he or she must make an offer to sell agricultural land to the State.153 In this regard, 
ACLRA grants the State a preferential right in acquiring agricultural land.154 This means that 
any agricultural land has to be offered to the State first, before it enters the open market.155 
Only when the State waives its interest, by issuing a certificate of waiver,156 may the land 
thereafter be offered to private buyers. Accordingly, two avenues for acquiring agricultural 
land are created. Firstly, where the State does not issue a certificate of waiver and wishes 
to acquire the land and secondly, where a “certificate of waiver”157 is issued and the land is 
made available on the open market to Namibian citizens only.  
 
Where the State intends to acquire the agricultural land for redistribution, the role of the Land 
Reform Advisory Commission158 (henceforth referred to as “the Commission”) becomes 
important.159 The Commission consists of two officers from the Ministry of Lands, 
Resettlement and Rehabilitation; two officers of the Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural 
Development; two persons nominated by the associations or bodies involved in agricultural 
affairs; one person nominated by the Agricultural Bank of Namibia and five persons (of 
whom at least two have to be women) who in the opinion of the Minister are suitably qualified 
                                            
152 Part 2, read with part 3 of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995.  
153 Section 17(1) of the Agricultural (Commerical) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995. In terms of section 17(4) of 
ACLRA the offer of sale must be in writing. Currently, the offer is made on an official offer form provided by the 
Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation. The offer must also specify the price the owner is willing 
to accept; it must be accompanied by a “true copy” of the title deed and the owner must include particulars as 
required by the Ministry. The form provides for three main sections in this regard: (1) Section 1 requires the 
provision of personal details and details pertaining to the farm, such as the size and the selling price per 
hectare; (2) section 2 provides for the details of the land and all improvements and; (3) section 3 consists of a 
declaration where the willing seller declares under oath that he or she is offering the land free of any conditions.  
154 Section 17(1) of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995.  
155 Section 17(2) of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995.  
156 Section 16 read with section 17(2)(b) of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995.  
157 Section 16(1) of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995 defines a “certificate of waiver” 
as “a statement in writing made by the Minister certifying that the State waives its preferent right conferred by 
subsection (1) of that section and does not intend to acquire the agricultural land in question at the time of the 
offer. 
158 Part 1 of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995 deals inter alia with the establishment; 
functions; composition; terms of office; vacation of office and filling of vacancies; remuneration and allowances 
and meetings of the Commission.  
159 See in general L Harring & W Odendaal “Kessl: A new jurisprudence for land reform in Namibia?” (2008) 
Land, Environment and Development Project <http://www.lac.org.na/projects/lead/Pdf/Kessl.pdf> (accessed 




for the position having regard to the functions of the Commission.160 The primary functions 
of the Commission are advising and/or making recommendations to the Minister in relation 
to the powers conferred on him/her in terms of ACLRA and to investigate, upon request by 
the Minister or mero motu, any other matter relating to the powers of the Minister under 
ACLRA.161 
 
Once the State has received an offer from a willing seller it must within 60 days refer the 
offer to the Commission for consideration.162 The Commission is then tasked with assessing 
the offer and making recommendations to the Minister of Land Reform and Resettlement 
within 30 days after receiving the offer.163 The Commission is also allowed to inspect the 
agricultural land in order to ascertain whether it is suitable for acquisition.164 Subsequently 
and within 14 days of receiving the Commission’s recommendations, the Minister may 
decline the offer and issue a certificate of waiver165 or decide to acquire the agricultural land 
by either accepting the offer or by making a counter offer.166 Importantly, the land owner 
may withdraw such an offer in writing at any time before the Minister issues a certificate of 
waiver;167 accepts such an offer168 or makes a counter offer.169 Once an offer or counter 
offer is accepted by the Minister or the willing seller, and upon receiving a land tax clearance 
certificate,170 the Registrar shall transfer ownership of the land to the State to redistribute 
the land. The redistribution of the acquired land to beneficiaries, specifically regarding the 
application procedure; criteria for determining who the beneficiaries of the redistributed 
agricultural land should be and the order of preference for selecting beneficiaries are 
discussed further below.171  Where the State does not intend to acquire the land offered by 
the willing seller and issues a certificate of waiver, the land becomes available for acquisition 
on the open market to Namibian citizens only.  
                                            
160 Section 4 of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995.  
161 Section 3 of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995. 
162 Section 17(5) of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995.  
163 Section 3 read with section 17(5) of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995. 
164 Section 15 of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995. 
165 Section 17(6)(a) of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995. 
166 Section 17(6)(b) of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995. 
167 Section 17(5A)(i) read with sections 17(5) or 17(6)(a) of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 
of 1995.  
168 Section 17(5A)(ii) of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995. 
169 Section 17(5A)(ii) read with sections 17(6)(b)(i) or 17(6)(b)(ii) of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform 
Act 6 of 1995. 
170 Section 18 of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995. 




4 2 2 A shift towards expropriation  
The Namibian government experienced similar problems with its market-led approach to 
land acquisition as were experienced in South Africa.172 In general, the land reform process 
was characterised as being too slow.173 In this regard, there is disagreement about the 
reason for the slow pace of land reform.174 On the one hand, the Namibian government 
blames the reluctance of farmers to make their land available for acquisition and the use of 
the WBWS principle under market-led acquisitions. The use of the WBWS principle, in terms 
of market-led acquisitions was subsequently formally abandoned in 2004.175 Furthermore, 
where land was made available it was not necessarily of sufficient quality. On the other 
hand, farmers blame the government’s statutory right of first refusal and the lengthy process 
associated therewith in acquiring agricultural land for the slow progress. Accordingly, there 
was a move away from market-led approaches in acquiring agricultural land for land reform 
purposes early on in Namibia. A gradual shift towards using expropriation for acquisition of 
agricultural land took place from 2004, as a result of the increase public criticism over the 
slow pace of land reform.176 
4 3 Expropriation 
4 3 1 Introduction  
As mentioned above, article 16(2) of the Namibian Constitution provides the legal basis for 
expropriation in Namibia.177 It provides for the expropriation of private property (a) provided 
that it is in the public interest and (b) subject to the payment of just compensation; (c) in 
accordance with the procedure for expropriation set out in ACLRA. These requirements are 
discussed below.  
                                            
172 See Chapter 5, section 2 3 – 2 6 in particular.  
173 M Ingle “Taking stock of land reform in Namibia from 1990-2005” (2011) New Contree: a journal of historical 
and human sciences for Southern Africa 55-70, 65-66; B Fuller & G Eisb “The commercial farm market in 
Namibia: Evidence from the first eleven years” (15 November 2002) Institute for Public Policy Research 
Briefing Paper No 15 1-16.  
174 Ingle (2011) New Contree: a journal of historical and human sciences for Southern Africa 65-66.  
175 Republic of Namibia, “Statement by the right honourable Theo-Ben Guribab, MP, Prime Minister of the 
Republic of Namibia on the acceleration of land reform in the Republic of Namibia”, Windhoek, 25 Feb. 2004; 
Republic of Namibia, “Ministerial statement by honourable Hifikepunye Pohamba, MP, Minister of Lands, 
Resettlement and rehabilitation, on expropriation of agricultural land on the 2nd March 2004, in the National 
Assembly” Windhoek, 2004.  
176 Pienaar (2018) Namibian Law Journal 45.  
177 Amoo Property Law in Namibia 70. Various pieces of legislation provide for expropriation in Namibia 





4 3 2 Public interest  
Public interest is not defined in the Namibian Constitution.178 Instead, Amoo describes it as 
“a legal requirement falling within the sphere of political definition”.179 Accordingly, it is the 
State that has to determine what constitutes public interest or public utility and define it in 
legislation.180 Different pieces of legislation have been promulgated to empower the State 
or any other appropriate body to expropriate private property for various purposes.181 
However, the most prominent piece of legislation is the ACLRA. The meaning of public 
interest, within the context of the Namibian government’s land reform endeavour, is provided 
for in ACLRA: the resettlement of Namibian citizens who do not have any or adequate 
agricultural land, especially those who have been disadvantaged by past discriminatory 
practices.182 This means that, the particular land holding which the government wants to 
expropriate, must be suitable for resettlement of this specific category of people.183 
Numerous factors should be considered when land is targeted for expropriation. A list of 
criteria is therefore required to determine what agricultural land is suitable for expropriation 
and redistribution.184 
                                            
178 Amoo Property Law in Namibia 72; C Treeger “Legal analysis of farmland expropriation in Namibia” (2004) 
<https://www.nid.org.na/images/pdf/analysis_views/Legal_analysis_of_farmland_expropriation_in_Namibia.p
df> (accessed 05-02-2019) 2. South African law sets out more detailed criteria for the definition of public 
interest in the context of expropriation. See specifically section 25(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996.  
179 Amoo Property Law in Namibia 72.  
180 See section 14(1) of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Amendment Act 14 of 2003 which provides 
that “the Minister may, out of moneys appropriated by Parliament…acquire in the public interest…agricultural 
land...” for redistribution purposes. Furthermore, in Kessl v Ministry of Lands and Resettlement and two similar 
cases 2008 1 NR 167 (HC) the judiciary determined that the welfare and interests of farm workers working or 
residing on commercial agricultural land have to be considered as factors to determine what constitutes public 
interest. 
181 Amoo Property Law in Namibia 72. See for example section 29 of Ordinance 18 of 1954; sections 2 and 
3(1) of the Expropriation Ordinance 13 of 1978; section 30 of the Local Authorities Act 23 of 1992; sections 14 
and 20 of the Agricultural Commercial Land Reform Act 6 of 1995 and section 126 of the Water Resources 
Management Act 24 of 2004. 
182 Preamble of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 5 of 1996. See also Kessl v Ministry of Lands 
and Resettlement 2008 1 NR 167 (HC) paras 55-56.  
183 Section 14 of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 5 of 1995; Amoo Property Law in Namibia 72-
73; Glintz (2009) Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America 272. This is in line with Namibian 
government’s national resettlement policy. See Kessl v Ministry of Lands and Resettlement and two similar 
cases 2008 1 NR 167 (HC) paras 55-57 where the court accepted that land reform, in order to alleviate poverty, 
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4 3 3 Just compensation  
According to Namibian law, “just compensation” is required for an expropriation to be 
valid.185 The question in this regard is whether just compensation must reflect the actual 
market value of the expropriated property.186  
 
Section 25 of ACLRA deals with the basis on which the amount of compensation should be 
determined. The section does not provide for a specified amount of compensation to be paid 
for agricultural land that is expropriated, but instead establishes a list of criteria for 
determining the amount of compensation.187 These considerations include inter alia (a) the 
“value” of the enhancement or depreciation of the property;188 (b) improvements made to 
the property;189 (c) costs associated with the maintenance of the property from the date of 
expropriation to the date upon which the State takes possession;190 and (d) the benefit the 
land owner will receive from any structures the State has built or constructed to compensate 
any financial loss a person may suffer in consequence of the expropriation.191 With regard 
to the first criterion, Treeger explains that “the basic consideration for calculating 
compensation should be the actual value of the property, which includes enhancements 
consequent to the usage of the land”.192 Regarding the second criterion, the purpose of 
taking into account the improvements made to the property in calculating an amount of 
compensation, is to prevent improvements being made in the knowledge of impending 
expropriation, with the intention of raising the amount of compensation payable.193  
 
The Act does not stipulate that in determining compensation reference should be made to 
market value.194 However, the Act specifically provides that the amount of compensation 
payable for the expropriation of agricultural land shall not exceed: 
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“the aggregate of the amount which the land would have sold on the date of [the expropriation] 
notice on the open market by a willing seller and a willing buyer and an amount to compensate 
any actual financial loss caused by the expropriation”.195  
 
It is clear that ACLRA contains a reference to the market value “and restricts the amount 
calculated as compensation to an amount that would be realised on the open market in a 
willing-seller, willing-buyer scenario”.196 Contrary to the South African position, this means 
that compensation for an expropriation for the purposes of resettlement under Namibian law 
can never be above market value.197 ACLRA also restricts the amount of compensation to 
an amount required to compensate the actual financial loss. How the actual financial loss is 
to be calculated, leaves room for interpretation. According to Treeger factors such as, the 
use of the land or the amount originally paid for the property may be taken into account to 
determine the actual financial loss.198  
 
Moreover, an amount equal to 10% of the total amount of compensation may be added to 
the total amount payable, if the Commission recommends it.199 The additional amount, in 
the form of a solatium, may not be more than N$ 10 000.200 The solatium, if payable, may in 
effect increase the amount of compensation to a value above market value, but should be 
regarded as an additional amount determined separately from the value of the property 
being expropriated.  
 
Contrary to the South Africa position, where the time and manner of payment must also be 
just and equitable,201 the Namibian Constitution does not prescribe considerations regarding 
the manner and time of payment of compensation for an expropriation.202 Treeger explains 
that although there is no explicit reference in ACLRA to the manner and time of payment of 
compensation, the requirement of “just compensation” should also cover payment in a just 
manner and within a just or reasonable time frame.203 In this regard, the time frame for 
payment of compensation is dependent on the procedure set out in ACLRA. 
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The Act specifically empowers the Minister, subsequent to receiving a recommendation from 
the Commission, to elect to expropriate agricultural land.204 The Minister must then serve 
the owner of agricultural land with an expropriation notice, which may contain an offer of an 
amount of compensation.205 Within 60 days of receipt of the expropriation notice, the owner 
is required to prepare and submit a written statement indicating inter alia whether or not the 
offer of compensation is accepted.206 Where no offer of compensation was made, the owner 
must prepare and submit a claim for compensation to the Minister.207 In this regard, the 
owner must also furnish how the compensation amount is calculated.208 Following an 
inspection of the property, the Minister may also make a counter-offer to the owner’s claim 
for compensation, should the Minister deem the owner’s claim for compensation to be 
excessive.209 If the owner does not accept any offer made by the Minister, then the owner 
may make an application to the Lands Tribunal for the determination of just compensation 
for the expropriated property.210 Accordingly, in cases where owners do not accept the 
compensation offered by the Minister and the amount is left to be determined by the Lands 
Tribunal,211 it may take several months for the owner to receive just compensation for the 
property.  
4 3 4 Procedure  
In terms of ACLRA the Minister responsible for land has the power to expropriate private 
property provided that the power is exercised in terms of the procedures set out in the Act.212 
To prevent the potential abuse of the State’s expropriation powers, it is important that 
procedural safeguards are put in place and followed. Amoo explains that “mere substantive 
rules are not enough; procedural rules are equally important”.213 Accordingly, the procedure 
for the process of expropriation provided for in ACLRA is a legal requirement,214 with the 
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aim of “ensuring procedural justice, transparency, recognition of the rule of law and the 
protection of individual rights”.215 The well-known judgment, Kessl v Ministry of Lands and 
Resettlement and two similar cases216 exemplifies this point.217 The judgment also set out 
the correct procedure for a valid expropriation and is therefore necessary to discuss.  
4 3 4 1 Kessl v Ministry of Lands and Resettlement and two similar cases  
4 3 4 1 1 Facts of the case 
The case concerned the review of the Ministry’s decision to expropriate four farms owned 
by three different foreign land owners. All three applicants are German citizens and reside 
in Germany and have owned the farms in question for many years.218 The respective owners 
also visit their land holdings regularly.219 Furthermore, several farm workers and their 
families reside on the farms.220  
 
The respondent is the Minister of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation. In 2004, the 
Minister, after consulting the Commission at an extraordinary meeting, made the decision to 
expropriate the applicants’ farms. However, various procedural mistakes ensued during the 
expropriation process. For one, the members of the Commission were not afforded the 
opportunity to discuss the criteria used to (a) select the farms for expropriation; (b) the 
purpose of the expropriation; (c) the identity of potential beneficiaries; or (d) how such 
beneficiaries were to be selected.221 Furthermore, the inspection of the farms only took place 
a year after the extraordinary meeting was held to determine which farms should be 
expropriated. In essence, the Commission could not reach a resolution to justify why the 
farms in question were chosen to be expropriated, because it had no particulars pertaining 
to the owners or the farms. However, and interestingly, the applicants received a letter 
indicating that their farms would be expropriated on the same day the meeting was held. In 
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this regard, the applicants, after receiving the letter, were only afforded the opportunity to 
make representations seven months after the fact.222 The applicants requested documents 
and information regarding the expropriation, but never received such information on which 
to base their representations. In 2005, an expropriation notice was issued and signed by the 
Minister.223 Accordingly, the applicants, alleging that the Minister did not follow the correct 
procedure, instituted action. The Court was asked to review and set aside the decision and 
the corresponding notices of the Minister to expropriate the farms.   
4 3 4 1 2 The legal issues of the case 
While the applicants conceded that the government of Namibia had the right to expropriate 
agricultural land under certain conditions224 two main issues formed the basis of the legal 
challenge:225 Firstly, whether the audi alterem partem principle was relevant in expropriation 
cases and secondly, whether the government of Namibia followed the correct procedure for 
the expropriation to be valid.226 Pienaar notes that it is not the fact that the expropriation was 
resorted to which is questionable, but rather the manner in which the expropriation took 
place.227 Each of these issues are discussed separately.  
 
The first issue is whether article 18 of the Constitution, which guarantees administrative 
justice, is applicable in expropriation cases.228 If the article applies, it would mean that the 
common law principles of natural justice, which include the audi alterem partem principle, 
would be applicable in expropriation cases.  
 
It was argued on behalf of the respondent that the only requirements for a valid expropriation 
are found in article 16(2) of the Constitution, which excludes the audi alterem partem rule.229 
However, it was submitted that this argument is untenable.230 It was argued that the audi 
alterem partem principle under article 18 of the Namibian Constitution231 cannot be excluded 
because:  
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“it provides for the testing of actions of administrative bodies or officials against the requirements 
of fairness, reasonableness and legality, namely compliance with the provisions of the law and 
the relevant legislation…”. 232 
 
The Court agreed with this argument and held that article 16(2) of the Constitution should 
not be “walled in”233 to operate in isolation of other human rights to exclude the principles 
and rules of natural justice.234 In this context the Court held that this means that the Minister 
must apply the rules of natural justice before making a decision to expropriate property.235 
Therefore, the land owner must be afforded the opportunity to be heard and to place all the 
relevant considerations before the decision-maker to persuade him or her not to expropriate 
his or her property.236 In casu, the Minister invited the applicants in a letter to make 
representations. However, the letter did not provide information regarding the basis for the 
Minister’s decision to expropriate the farms. Furthermore, the applicants, after requesting 
more information, did not receive a reply from the Minister. Accordingly, the Court found that 
the Minister had violated the applicants’ right to be heard, because he was obliged to provide 
the applicants with the relevant information, in order for them to make representations on 
the basis of the information received.237  
 
The judgment is important because it directs the government to adhere to the requirements 
of articles 16(2) and 18 of the Constitution during the expropriation process.238 If the land 
owner is not afforded the opportunity to be heard, the expropriation will be regarded as 
invalid and the expropriation process would have to start afresh. It is thus critical that, during 
the expropriation procedure, the rules of natural justice are adhered to. The expropriation 
procedure must also be followed in accordance with the provisions of ACLRA. In other 
words, both the common law (natural law) and statutory requirements set out in ACLRA 
have to be followed for the expropriation to be valid.  
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This leads to the second issue addressed by the Court, namely whether the government 
followed the correct procedure as provided for in ACLRA.239 In this regard, the Court divides 
the discussion of the correct expropriation process the Minister must follow into two 
processes/stages, which it refers to as a “double-barrel process”.240 A number of procedural 
requirements have to be fulfilled for the expropriation to be valid during the first and/or 
second process. These requirements are discussed below.  
 
The first of the two staged expropriation processes is where the Minister informs the land 
owner that the government is interested in purchasing the land, and the parties enter into 
negotiations for the purchase of the farm.241 Importantly, the Court held that the 
expropriation process cannot take place if there was no previous attempt to acquire the land 
by way of market-led approaches.242 It follows that the expropriation process is a method of 
last resort. Accordingly, once it is clear that the Minister and the owner are unable to 
negotiate the sale of the property by way of mutual agreement243 or where the whereabouts 
of the owner cannot be ascertained to negotiate a sale,244 the Minister may expropriate the 
property in accordance with the procedure set out in ACLRA.   
 
During the first stage of the expropriation process, an investigation must be lodged to 
determine whether the particular farm or piece of land is suitable for resettlement.245 The 
Minister must thus acquire adequate information to determine whether the agricultural land 
is suitable.246 The role of the Commission becomes important in this regard.247 The 
Commission is required to carry out investigations and make recommendations to the 
Minister regarding the suitability of the land.248 These investigations have to take place 
before the Minister decides to acquire the property.249 This procedural step allows the 
Minister to come to a well-informed and considered decision as to whether the agricultural 
land is suitable.250 In casu, the Commission did not investigate the farms mero motu or on 
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request of the Minister as required by ACLRA.251 Accordingly, no criteria were identified to 
determine whether the particular farms in question were suitable for expropriation.252 Once 
there has been an investigation with regard to the suitability of the agricultural land and the 
parties are unable to negotiate a sale of the property, then only may the Minister expropriate 
the property.253  
  
The second stage of the process thus entails the expropriation of the property. A number of 
procedural requirements have to be adhered to for the expropriation to be valid. Firstly, the 
Minister is procedurally obligated to inform the land owner of his or her decision to 
expropriate the property by way of service of notice on the particular land owner.254 The 
notice itself must also contain the relevant information as required by ACLRA.255 Secondly, 
at this stage, the Commission has an obligation to consider the interests of any persons 
employed or lawfully residing on the land, as well as the families of such persons.256 Once 
the interests are considered, the Commission may recommend to the Minister, inter alia, 
what to do with the possibly displaced persons.257 In casu, the Commission failed to consider 
the interests of the persons living on the respective farms.258 The Minister could therefore 
not determine whether it would be in the public interest to displace all the persons and their 
families working and/or residing on the farm.259 In fact, information regarding the relevant 
persons who would be affected by the expropriation was non-existent.  
4 3 4 1 3 The judgment and order of the court 
In writing its judgment, the Court provided guidelines and set out the sequence of steps the 
Minister has to take for the expropriation to be valid.260 In essence the guidelines provided 
that: (a) the Minister, acting on the advice or guidance of the Commission, is the only 
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authority who has the power to decide whether to expropriate agricultural land; (b) the 
procedural requirements, including investigations regarding the suitability of the property for 
resettlement and proper consultations with the Commission, must be followed whenever the 
Minister decides to acquire agricultural land; (c) the Minister must observe the principle of 
audi alterem partem by affording the land owner the right to be heard by inviting 
representations and by responding to such representations; and (d) the land owner must be 
notified of the Minister’s decision to expropriate his or her property and such notice must be 
served on the particular land owner.261  
 
In conclusion, the Court found that the cumulative effect of all the mistakes and failures by 
the Minister and the Commission to comply with the Constitution and the procedural 
requirements of the first and second stages of the expropriation process set out in ACLRA, 
resulted in the infringement of fundamental rights.262 The Court had no choice but to set 
aside the decision and notices to expropriate the respective farms.263 The Minister, if the 
constitutional and procedural requirements had been followed, could still decide to 
expropriate the farms, but the expropriation process would have to start anew.   
4 3 4 1 4 Thoughts on the Kessl-judgment  
A well-administered land expropriation model, founded on legality, transparency, and the 
principles of natural justice, is critical in the land reform process.264 Despite the Court’s effort 
to reiterate the importance of the rule of law and to set out the correct procedure to be 
followed for the expropriation process to be valid,265 the case illustrates an array of 
problems, including inter alia (a) a complete disregard for the rule of law; (b) a lack of 
transparency in the Ministry and between the Ministry, land owners and potential 
beneficiaries; and (c) administrative and capacity problems within in the Ministry.266 In fact, 
Pienaar points out that it is still unclear on what basis the farms were expropriated.267 She 
questions whether it was due to the fact that the land owners were foreigners, whether they 
were absentee owners or whether it was because the owners were both foreign and 
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absent.268 Furthermore, the Commission never conducted investigations regarding the 
suitability of the agricultural land for expropriation,269 which resulted in the Minister making 
an ill-informed and unfounded decision to expropriate the farms.270 The lack of criteria for 
determining whether the farms were suitable for expropriation also resulted in the lack of 
information provided to the land owner.  
 
Overall, in order to facilitate and ensure a transparent expropriation process, in line with the 
rules of natural justice and the procedure set out in ACLRA, it is clear that criteria for the 
identification of suitable agricultural land for expropriation are critical.271 Subsequent to the 
Kessl judgment, ACLRA was amended to provide the Minister with the authority to prescribe 
criteria to be used for the expropriation of agricultural land.272 These criteria are discussed 
below. 
4 3 5 Criteria for expropriating agricultural land 
The criteria used for identifying suitable agricultural land for expropriation are provided for 
in regulations.273 The regulations specifically provide that if the Minister decides to 
expropriate property, the Minister is obliged to (a) use the identification criteria in selecting 
agricultural land eligible for expropriation;274 and (b) conduct a suitability assessment to 
determine if the agricultural land is suitable for resettlement.275  
 
For purposes of identifying whether the agricultural land is eligible for expropriation the 
following must be ascertained, inter alia: (a) the ownership of the land with the deeds registry 
as well as any condition imposed on the property;276 (b) whether the agricultural land is 
owned by a citizen or foreign national;277 and (c) whether the agricultural land is owned by 
a natural or juristic person.278 Other considerations also come into play, such as whether 
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the agricultural land is managed and by whom;279 leased;280 abandoned by the owner;281 
neglected or under-utilised;282 and whether it will contribute to the utilisation of adjacent 
State land.283  
 
As mentioned above, the Minister must also determine whether the identified land is suitable 
for resettlement.284 In doing so, the Minister must on the basis of the assessment report of 
the Commission establish and verify (a) the size of the agricultural land;285 (b) the location 
of the land;286 (c) the infrastructure on the land;287 and (d) “the climate, relief and soil of the 
land”.288 Furthermore, each of these considerations have specific factors which have to be 
taken into account and scored.  
 
The agricultural land must also be scored in accordance with the scoring criteria provided 
for in the regulations.289 In this regard, the regulations provide for a checklist and formula to 
determine whether the agricultural land is either highly suitable; suitable; moderately 
suitable; or not suitable. The formula290 provides that the total score is calculated by adding 
the scores pertaining to the identification criteria and the suitability criteria together and 
subtracting the citizenship preference291 criteria. The regulations provide that:   
 
“A score of (a) at least 80 percent is considered as highly suitable for expropriation; (b) 60 percent 
to 79 percent is considered as suitable for expropriation; (c) 40 percent to 59 percent is considered 
as moderately suitable for expropriation; and (d) less than 39 percent is considered not suitable 
for expropriation.”292 
 
                                            
279 Regulation 3(2)(d)(i) on criteria to be used for expropriation of agricultural land. 
280 Regulation 3(2)(d)(ii)) on criteria to be used for expropriation of agricultural land. 
281 Regulation 3(2)(d)(iii) on criteria to be used for expropriation of agricultural land. 
282 Regulation 3(2)(d)(iv) on criteria to be used for expropriation of agricultural land. 
283 Regulation 3(2)(d)(vi) on criteria to be used for expropriation of agricultural land. 
284 Section 14(1) of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995 read with regulation 4 on criteria 
to be used for expropriation of agricultural land in general. 
285 Regulation 4(1)(a) on criteria to be used for expropriation of agricultural land. 
286 Regulation 4(1)(b) on criteria to be used for expropriation of agricultural land. 
287 Regulation 4(1)(c) on criteria to be used for expropriation of agricultural land. 
288 Regulation 4(1)(d) on criteria to be used for expropriation of agricultural land.  
289 Regulation 2(2) on criteria to be used for expropriation of agricultural land GN 209 of 2016 GG 6115 (1 
September 2016).  
290 The regulations provide the following: Scores of identification criteria + suitability criteria – citizenship 
preference criteria = total scores. 
291 In terms of the citizenship preference criteria, the regulations distinguish between agricultural land owned 
by: (a) a Namibian natural person; (b) a Namibian citizen who’s land is adjacent to a resettlement farm or State 
land; and (c) a Namibian juristic person.  





In terms of the scoring system, agricultural land owned by Namibian citizens are less likely 
to be expropriated than foreigners due to the weight attached to the citizenship-component 
of persons.293  
4 4 Policies and schemes for the redistribution of agricultural land 
4 4 1 Introduction  
Once agricultural land is acquired by way of market-led approaches or expropriation under 
ACLRA, the land needs to be redistributed to suitable beneficiaries. ACLRA does not provide 
for an application procedure for redistribution or resettlement, nor does it set out criteria for 
determining who the beneficiaries of the redistributed land should be. A selection process is 
likewise absent. In this regard, different schemes and policies are provided, aimed at 
promoting and/or providing for the redistribution of agricultural land and resettlement of 
beneficiaries on such land. Depending on the scheme or policy, the application procedure 
criteria for determining who the beneficiaries should be and the selection process of the 
beneficiaries, will differ.  
 
However, as a point of departure, ACLRA provides that land available for acquisition on the 
open market, or land acquired by the State through expropriation should be redistributed to 
Namibian citizens only, specifically “Namibian citizens who do not own or otherwise have 
the use of any or of adequate land, and foremost to those Namibian citizens who have been 
socially, economically or educationally disadvantaged by past discriminatory laws or 
practices”.294 Accordingly, regardless of the policy or scheme, the threshold to qualify as a 
beneficiary under the redistribution programme in general is citizenship.  
 
This section provides a brief overview of (a) the Affirmative Action Loan Scheme; (b) the 
National Resettlement Policy and Scheme; and (c) the Revised National Resettlement 
Scheme available to beneficiaries that promote and/or provide for the redistribution of 
agricultural land in Namibia. Under each policy and scheme the selection of beneficiaries 
and the rights obtained in relation to the redistributed land will be discussed. In essence the 
first mentioned scheme focuses on establishing emerging commercial farmers on 
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agricultural land, whereas the latter two schemes and policies focus on the resettlement of 
emerging communal farmers and the landless.  
4 4 2 The Affirmative Action Loan Scheme  
The Affirmative Action Loan Scheme (“AALS”) was introduced by the Agricultural Bank 
Amendment Act 27 of 1991 and the Agricultural Bank Matters Amendment Act 15 of 1992. 
The AALS is a market-based scheme that creates access to agricultural land and contributes 
to the redistribution of agricultural land to emerging Namibian farmers.295 The primary 
objective of the AALS was therefore to resettle well-established and strong communal 
farmers on commercial agricultural land in order to minimise the pressure on grazing in 
communal areas.296 
 
The AALS acts as a mechanism through which formerly disadvantaged Namibian farmers 
can purchase agricultural land with the help of a subsidised loan.297 Importantly, the 
beneficiaries are the purchasers of the agricultural land on the open market, as opposed to 
the State under the other schemes and policies discussed below.  In terms of the AALS the 
Agricultural Bank of Namibia advances funds to previously disadvantaged farmers at 
subsidised interest rates.298 The loans are provided at a low interest rate and payable over 
a long period of time, namely 25 years.299 In this regard, the Agribank offers flexible 
instalments options (monthly, quarterly; biannual; or annual) to suit the financial needs of 
each applicant.  
 
The application process for a loan under the AALS is done in much the same manner as 
when applying for a loan at a commercial bank. To qualify for a loan under the AALS, there 
are certain requirements that an applicant must fulfil. Firstly, the applicant must be a 
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297 Vermeulen A comparative assessment of the land reform programme in South Africa and Namibia 55-56. 
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Namibian citizen.300 Secondly, the person must own a minimum of 150 large livestock units 
(such as cattle) or 800 small livestock units (such as goats and sheep)301 “or own productive 
livestock equivalent to at least 35% of official carrying capacity of the farm which, he/she 
intends purchasing, and /or have the financial capacity to purchase such livestock”.302 
Thirdly, applicants should either be full- or part-time farmers. Fourthly, the applicant must 
have a clean credit record. Lastly, the applicant must provide a purchase contract and a 
business plan.303  
 
As mentioned, the scheme distinguishes between full-time and part-time farmers as 
potential applicants. Initially, only full-time farmers were eligible to apply for a loan under the 
AALS. However, in 1997 the programme was amended to allow part-time farmers to also 
participate under the AALS.304 This change enabled members of the emerging Black middle 
and upper classes to purchase farms.305 Full-time farmers who purchase commercial farms 
under this programme receive an initial three-year exemption from repayment on a 20 year 
loan. The capital amount is then paid over 22 years at an escalating interest rate.306 By way 
of contract, part-time farmers may decide to either (a) repay the interest portion only for the 
first 3 years and pay the outstanding amount over 22 years at the appropriate interest rate 
thereafter;307 or (b) capitalise the interest portion for the first 3 years and thereafter pay the 
outstanding amount over 22 years at the appropriate interest rate.308  
 
Under the AALS beneficiaries (Namibian citizens who are full-time or part-time farmers) 
obtain freehold in commercial farms. In other words, AALS beneficiaries gain ownership and 
all the entitlements associated with ownership, to their land. However, farmers are not 
allowed to sell their farms in the first 10 years of occupation.  
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The AALS has arguably contributed to the redistribution of agricultural land in Namibia by 
providing an avenue for full- or part-time farmers to obtain land. Vermeulen states that 
agricultural land for sale on the open market is acquired at a faster rate by AALS 
beneficiaries than by the State, which may have an adverse impact on beneficiaries under 
the resettlement scheme discussed below.309 
 
Despite the contribution to the redistribution of agricultural land, the AALS scheme is not 
without its problems. For example, notwithstanding the requirement that applicants must 
have a clean credit record, one of the major problems is the number of loan defaults.310 Two 
main reasons are averred in relation to this problem. Firstly, it is averred that farmers with 
minimal cash or capital reserves apply for a loan under the AALS. It may mean that farmers 
drain their cash assets to make the down payment. Fuller argues in this regard that the loan 
defaults are also attributed to cases where farmers are unable to cope with the vagaries of 
farming.311 For example, in a period of drought (which Namibia experiences quite 
frequently),312 productivity is reduced and would require a farmer to sell some of his or her 
original stock to maintain the farm. This is problematic because “loan repayment calculations 
are based on the 3 year grace period providing sufficient time for additions to the livestock 
herd and subsequent ability to generate the income required to meet bond obligations”.313 
In cases of drought such income cannot be regenerated and the farmer accordingly defaults 
on his or her loan. Secondly, it is also postulated that a lack of proper preparation and 
training for the beneficiaries of the loan attribute to loan defaults.314 For example, while 
communal farmers may have large herds, many have very little knowledge of business 
operations and/or what is required to maintain production and profitability of farming 
enterprises.315  
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4 4 3 The National Resettlement Policy and Scheme  
Under the National Resettlement Policy (“NRP”) and Scheme the State buys large-scale 
commercial farms on a WBWS basis for subdivision316 and allocation to small-scale farmers 
or beneficiaries.  
In Namibia, resettlement is directly linked to the distribution of commercially viable 
agricultural land. In 2001, the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation released 
the NRP. Under the 2001 NRP, resettlement entailed a “movement of people from an area 
with insufficient resources to one which is more likely to provide a satisfactory standard of 
living”.317 The overarching aim of the NRP was therefore to redress the past imbalances in 
the distribution of natural resources (in particular land)318 by means of making the landless 
self-reliant, either in terms of food production or self-employment.319  
 
Importantly, not every previously disadvantaged citizen will qualify and be selected as 
beneficiaries under the resettlement programme.320 Accordingly, the Ministry of Lands and 
Resettlement provides for qualifying and resettlement criteria321 to select the most 
appropriate applicants for each farming unit. The main target groups under the NRP were 
members of the San community; ex-soldiers; displaced or destitute and landless persons; 
people with disabilities and people from overcrowded communal areas.322 These groups are 
further divided into (a) people who have neither land; income nor livestock; (b) people who 
have neither land or income, but have livestock; and (c) people who do not have land but 
who have income and livestock and are in need to be resettled.323  
 
These targeted groups first have to meet qualifying criteria in order to be regarded as 
beneficiaries under the resettlement programme.324 These qualifying criteria entail that an 
applicant must (a) be a Namibian citizen; (b) be at least 18 years of age; (c) have no more 
than 150 large stock units or 800 small stock units; and (d) not own any land, other than for 
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residential purposes.325 Importantly, people who have more than 150 large stock units or 
800 small stock units, or the equivalent thereof, will automatically not be eligible for 
resettlement under the NRP. Instead, such persons qualify for a loan under the AALS and 
will be regarded as emerging farmers.326 Accordingly, the AALS is tailored for and aimed at 
emerging black farmers, whereas the resettlement programme is aimed at the poorest of 
the poor. In this regard there is a very distinct synergy between the operation of the AALS 
and the NRP. Applicants can either be regarded at AALS beneficiaries or as NRP 
beneficiaries, but not both.  
 
If a person meets the qualifying criteria, it does not mean that such a person will be resettled 
automatically.327 Once the targeted groups meet the qualifying criteria, various other criteria 
are used to select the most appropriate beneficiary for every farming unit.  
 
To promote the productivity of farms,328 the ability to farm productively is pivotal to the social 
and economic success of the resettlement programme. Accordingly, the primary 
beneficiaries are previously disadvantaged farmers.329 In light of the need of beneficiaries 
to be able to farm productively, the criteria for selection are: (a) agricultural background; (b) 
age; (c) gender; (d) generational farm workers;330 (e) literacy; (f) current agricultural income 
(number of livestock); and (g) applicants from communal areas.331  
 
Based on these criteria, an ideal beneficiary should be a woman332 between the age of 26 
and 60,333 who is a generational worker334 from a communal area;335 and who is solely 
dependent on farming; has experience in agricultural activities or who is trained in agriculture 
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but has no access to land;336 has the necessary basic reading and writing skills (grade 6 
level)337 and who owns less than 150 large stock or 800 small stock units.338  
 
In this context, a “single uniform selection system”,339 namely a point scoring system, is used 
to evaluate and select beneficiaries. This resettlement criteria policy recognises that the 
“scoring system” may not be a sufficient tool for the selection of the most appropriate 
beneficiaries. However, the process refines suitable candidates and adds a measure of 
transparency and consistency to the selection process.340 Each criterium considered is 
appraised by a point system with a scale of between 1 and 5, whereby 5 is the most desirable 
grade.341 The applicant with the highest total score is regarded as the most suitable for 
resettlement.342 Where two or more applicants have the same score, additional factors such 
as provided for in the Affirmative Action (Employment) Act 29 of 1998343 or “regional 
balance”344 can be applied to determine the most suitable applicant for resettlement.345 
 
All applications are considered by the Regional Resettlement Clerks before sending it to the 
Regional Resettlement Committees.346 There are 13 Regional Resettlement Committees 
nation-wide which each select one candidate to be endorsed by the Commission. Out of the 
proposed candidates, the Commission selects and proposes one person and makes a 
recommendation to the Minister for final approval.347 
 
The models proposed under the NRP include individual farming units, often referred to as 
the Farm Unit Resettlement Scheme (“FURS”); group farming units of groups of more than 
one person who cannot form a co-operative but are interested in agricultural production as 
a group and co-operative farming units or other legal entities such as companies and close 
corporations.348 In terms of FURS any Namibian citizen who has been socially, 
                                            
336 Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation Resettlement Criteria 5, 10.  
337 6, 11.  
338 7, 11.  
339 2. 
340 2-3.  
341 3. 
342 3. 
343 Under section 18 of the Affirmative Action (Employment) Act 29 of 1998 such factors include: Racially 
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economically, or educationally disadvantaged by past discriminatory laws can apply for an 
allotment of land acquired for resettlement by the State. Under FURS, successful applicants 
are allotted a small farm, measuring at least 1500 ha for the northern parts of Namibia and 
3000 ha in the more arid southern parts of Namibia.349 Land acquired for 
resettlement/redistribution purposes under ACLRA is allocated to successful applicants in 
terms of the resettlement criteria on leasehold of 99 years.350 The right of leasehold is 
registered under the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937. Accordingly, beneficiaries will not 
become the owner of the agricultural land, but will have legally secure occupational and 
agricultural rights. 351 
4 4 4 A revised National Resettlement Policy    
A revised National Resettlement Policy (2018-2027) has also been released. The revised 
Policy identifies a number of problems stemming from the operation of the NRP which 
should be addressed.352 These problems include: the unfair allocation of acquired land;353 
poor agricultural productivity on allocated resettlement land; an absence of pre- and post-
settlement support; a lack of effective monitoring and evaluation of the resettlement process 
and poor stakeholder involvement and coordination.354 In light of the numerous problems 
identified, the revised Policy “aims to introduce a comprehensive resettlement policy 
instrument for addressing landlessness amongst the multitude of previously disadvantaged 
Namibians in an efficient and effective manner.”355  
 
The same target or beneficiary groups, as under the NRP, are identified under the revised 
Policy. The same criteria as discussed above are also used to select the most suitable 
applicant for resettlement.356 However, the revised Policy categorises the potential 
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beneficiaries, into three main groups, namely (a) commercial farmers; (b) communal 
farmers; and (c) non-farming individuals who are in need of resettlement.357  
 
In line with these categories, the revised Policy makes provision for new resettlement land 
occupation models.358 These resettlement models are tailored to the varying land needs of 
the eligible beneficiary groups and which can accommodate the different farming systems 
in Namibia.359 The models are the (a) High Economic Value (Commercial) Model (“HEVM”); 
(b) Moderate Economic Value (Commercial) Model (“MEVM”) and (c) the Low Economic 
Value (Commercial) Model (“LEVM”). Each of these models are discussed briefly.  
 
In terms of the HEVM landless commercial farmers, farming on privately owned or State 
leased agricultural land, are targeted. The model requires land to be allocated as full 
undivided entities to carefully selected and tried beneficiaries practicing commercial farming 
on land acquired by the State.360 In other words, subdivision or partitioning of land is 
discouraged, because it may limit or impact negatively on the productivity and environmental 
protection of the land.361 Under this model, large farms or parcels of agricultural land are 
distributed to a few beneficiaries. The small number of actual beneficiaries is regarded as a 
major drawback of the Policy.   
 
The lease will be for a maximum of 10 years depending on the proposed agricultural 
venture.362 For a minimum of a three year probation period, the rent of the land will be free.363 
During the probation period, beneficiaries should be able to use the land productively with 
minimum financial or other support from the State.364 Importantly, the beneficiaries will have 
the option to purchase the land at the end of the probation period or at the end of the 10 
year lease period.365 However, the model also proposes that, depending on the farming 
venture, tailored pre- and post-settlement support should be provided from the outset of the 
resettlement process.366 Furthermore, beneficiaries opting to acquire their farms at the end 
of their successful probation period, or at the end of the 10 year lease period may gain 
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financial assistance under the AALS to purchase the land in question.367 Accordingly, 
beneficiaries will have the opportunity to convert their leasehold into freehold title and will 
be provided financial assistance to do so.  
 
The MEVM targets established communal farmers whose farming operations’ success is 
threatened by the limited environmental resources in the area in which they operate.368 For 
example, poorly managed shared grazing may threaten the success of the farming 
enterprise.369 The model will serve as a “bridging model”370 between the beneficiaries 
targeted under the HEVM and the LEVM. Accordingly, the MEVM specifically targets people 
who have demonstrated through their ongoing farming ventures in communal areas that 
they are able to farm commercially, given the opportunity.371 The model also allows for the 
subdivision or partitioning of land into farming units to ensure the distribution to a wider 
spectrum of beneficiaries.372 Such units are then leased to the beneficiaries for a probation 
period. Similar to the HEVM the rent of the land will be free for at least three years.373 
Furthermore, depending on the agricultural venture, tailored pre- and post-settlement 
support should be provided to beneficiaries during the probation period.374 The MEVM 
further provides that beneficiaries who fail to satisfy the probation conditions during or at the 
end of the probation period should be removed in favour of other eligible beneficiaries 
capable of ensuring agricultural productivity. Beneficiaries, who successfully complete their 
probation, will not obtain ownership of the land. Instead, beneficiaries who successfully 
complete their probation may be granted “a maximum of 50 year renewable, inheritable and 
transferable lease”.375 
 
The LEVM targets landless citizens who are not leasing commercial agricultural land or 
farming in communal areas.376 For example, groups of people identified under this model 
are former farm workers; retired professionals; or pensioners who have no income or secure 
place to live.377 Accordingly, some of these landless citizens may have some farming 
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experience. The beneficiaries under this model are those who do not want to farm, at least 
not commercially, but are landless and in need of land or resettlement in the form of access 
to land and basic services such as housing, water and sanitation and social services.378 This 
model recognises that there are people with low or no income with various land needs. In 
this regard, small units of land, not exceeding 50 hectares, are allocated to the beneficiaries 
for subsistence living. These small units of land are leased to the beneficiaries.379 Only 
beneficiaries under the HEVM will have the option to acquire freehold title. Those 
beneficiaries falling under the MEVM or the LEVM will only be entitled to lease the piece of 
land. 
4 5 Recent developments: The 2018 National Land Conference 
In light of the slow pace of land reform in general, the Namibian government held a second 
National Land Conference in October 2018. The primary aim of the 2018 Land Conference 
was to address the structure of land ownership in Namibia.380 In light of this aim, the progress 
made towards the implementation of the resolutions of the 1991 National Land Conference 
was reviewed. A number of resolutions relating to commercial land reform programmes were 
made in particular.  
Firstly, it was resolved that the WBWS principle, as a primary method of acquiring 
agricultural land, would be abolished.381 Instead, expropriation will be used as the primary 
approach of acquiring agricultural land, but within the confines of the Constitution. It was 
also resolved to develop national land valuation models, which would regulate agricultural 
land prices382 and assist in determining what would constitute “just compensation” for 
expropriated commercial agricultural land.383 Secondly, with regard to the expropriation of 
agricultural land, the following resolutions were agreed upon: (a) foreign owned agricultural 
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should be expropriated with just compensation;384 and (b) all underutilised commercial 
agricultural land, including land belonging to Namibian citizens, is eligible for 
expropriation.385 Thirdly, the principle of One-Namibian-One-Farm was agreed upon.386 In 
this regard, the farm size per individual should be regulated taking into account the variance 
of agro-ecological zones, carrying capacity and farm land use.387 This does not mean that 
every Namibian will have a farm, but rather that a citizen cannot own more than one farm.  
Fourthly, regarding the resettlement policy, scheme and criteria it was suggested that all 
related legal instruments,388 should be reviewed, reformed and harmonised for accelerated 
and successful land redistribution.389 It was furthermore resolved that pre- and post-
resettlement support programmes for farmers would be developed.390 Also, the needs of 
target groups under the resettlement programme should be prioritised and taken into 
account when land acquired for redistribution purposes is made available for resettlement. 
Different models should be developed to cater for the different needs of the beneficiaries 
under the resettlement programme.391 
5 Reflection  
5 1 The concept of agricultural land 
While a category of agricultural land exists in terms of SALA and the ALA, it does not 
stipulate what agricultural land is. These Acts only classify agricultural land as a residual 
category of land. However, not all land classified and falling into this residual category may 
be suitable for agricultural enterprises or purposes.  
The 2016 Land Bill provides some guidance on what agricultural land is. It defines 
agricultural land according to the purpose for which it is used i.e. agricultural purposes,392 
although it does not provide an extensive list of what agricultural purposes entail. 
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Accordingly, the Land Bill gives more content to what agricultural land is, as opposed to 
where it may be situated.  
5 2 The regulation of agricultural land  
Various regulatory mechanisms may regulate or impact ownership entitlements. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, the right to dispose of agricultural land is restricted by the provisions 
of SALA to ensure that agricultural land is not subdivided into uneconomical parcels of land 
that may hinder agricultural productivity, and ultimately, food security. While this regulation 
of agricultural land protects agricultural productivity and food security, it may not promote 
the redistribution of agricultural land. In this regard, other mechanisms are available that 
regulate or impact ownership of agricultural land that also promote the redistribution thereof 
in Namibia.  
The restrictions placed on the acquisition of ownership of agricultural land by foreigners in 
terms of ACLRA indirectly seek to promote the redistribution of agricultural land in Namibia. 
While the restrictions do not prohibit foreigners from acquiring land outright, it may be 
cumbersome for foreigners to acquire the consent of the Minister. This means that, the 
restrictions on foreigners act as a deterrent for “foreign nationals” to acquire agricultural 
land. In turn, this arguably allows more land to become available for redistribution to 
Namibian citizens who do not own or otherwise have access to agricultural land or adequate 
agricultural land.393 
Where ACLRA only provides for restrictions on the acquisition of agricultural land by 
foreigners, the new Land Bill places a prohibition on the acquisition of ownership of 
agricultural land by foreigners. Foreigners will only be allowed to gain access to agricultural 
land by way of lease. Arguably, this further promotes the redistribution of ownership of 
agricultural land to Namibian citizens who do not own or otherwise have access to or the 
use of agricultural land or adequate agricultural land.394 
Importantly, ACLRA also makes provision for a preferential right of purchase by the State 
where an owner wishes to dispose of his or her agricultural land. This also places a 
restriction on all owners and their right to dispose of their property and therefore indirectly 
regulates the ownership of agricultural land and promotes the redistribution thereof. 
                                            
393 See Ministry of Land Reform, Revised National Resettlement Policy 2018-2027 (March 2017) 8, 16-17.  




Accordingly, the Land Bill aims to promote both access to agricultural land for a particular 
category of persons and to adjust land ownership patterns in Namibia.  
5 3 The acquisition of agricultural land 
Similar to the South African position,395 Namibia initially undertook a market-led approach 
to the acquisition of land for redistributive purposes. While the acquisition of agricultural land 
is still available by way of market-led approaches in terms of ACLRA, Namibia seems to be 
moving away from this approach towards the acquisition of agricultural land through 
expropriation instead.396 Arguably, this shift towards expropriation as the approach to 
acquiring agricultural land for redistribution took place following the landmark Kessl-
judgment.397 Because, South Africa has not had a similar landmark decision on 
expropriation, the Kessl-judgment provides valuable insights which may be important for 
South Africa’s way forward. The Kessl-judgment not only highlighted the importance of 
following the correct procedure for an expropriation to be valid, but also set out the correct 
procedure in ACLRA, which facilitates and ensures a transparent expropriation process, in 
line with the rules of natural justice.398  
From the outset, and in line with a valid and transparent expropriation process, the 
procedure requires a uniform and clear approach to determining which agricultural land is 
suitable for expropriation for redistribution purposes. It is not enough to establish that land 
or a parcel of land constitutes “agricultural land”. Such land does not automatically become 
suitable for expropriation and available for redistribution. Accordingly, it should be clear why 
and how agricultural land was identified for expropriation for redistribution purposes 
specifically.399 The regulations relating to the criteria for expropriating agricultural land are 
pivotal in this regard.  
6 Conclusion  
While Namibia and South Africa have many things in common, including a territorial border 
and a history of colonialism and race-based minority rule, characterised by extensive land 
appropriation,400 these countries differ greatly in population numbers; the amount of arable 
                                            
395 See Chapter 5, 2 6.  
396 Pienaar (2018) Namibian Law Journal 63.   
397 63. 
398 Harring & Odendaal (2008) Land, Environment and Development Project 13-20.  
399 Pienaar (2018) Namibian Law Journal 62.  
400 See generally Amoo Property Law in Namibia 13-16, 224-226; Shriver (2006) Transnational Law and 




land available; climate and rainfall patterns.401 The respective countries’ land reform 
programmes also differ greatly. As mentioned, South Africa undertook an overarching land 
reform programme consisting of three inter-connected pillars, namely: redistribution, 
restitution and tenure reform, embedded in section 25 of the Constitution.402 Conversely, 
Namibia does not explicitly entrench its land reform programme in the Constitution and 
focuses on redistribution only, specifically excluding a restitution programme. Notably, in 
both countries, land reform is difficult, time-consuming and expensive, but necessary.403 
Pienaar furthermore notes that land reform in general has its limitations regarding what it 
can do and achieve, and that the mechanisms employed to achieve the particular objectives 
also have limitations.404  
 
Despite the differences, and while Namibia faces its own difficulties with its land reform 
programme, South Africa can learn much from Namibia regarding its redistribution 
programme in general and its specific mechanisms for defining agricultural land; regulating 
agricultural land; and acquiring agricultural land for land reform purposes.405     
 
Accordingly, there is room for a comparative analysis between Namibia and South Africa. 
However, as outlined, the aim of this Chapter is not to provide for a comprehensive 
comparative analysis of redistribution in South Africa and Namibia. Instead, this Chapter 
lays the foundation for a detailed comparative excursion to be dealt with in Chapter 9 below.  
In this context, this Chapter set out the legal position regarding (a) the concept of agricultural 
land in Namibia; (b) the mechanisms for the regulation of agricultural land; and (c) 
approaches and/or mechanisms for the acquisition of agricultural land in Namibia. The 
Chapter then concludes with a reflection on these particular matters.  
 
Chapter 9 will provide for a comprehensive and comparative analysis between South Africa, 
Namibia and India regarding the concept of agricultural land; mechanisms for the regulation 
of agricultural land; and approaches and/or mechanisms for the acquisition of agricultural 
                                            
Mufune (2010) International Journal of Rural Management 8-19; Kariuki (2007) South African Journal of 
International Affairs 99-103; Pazcakavambwa & Hungwe “Land redistribution in Zimbabwe” in Agricultural Land 
Redistribution 137; Hall “A comparative analysis of land reform in South Africa and Zimbabwe” in Unfinished 
Business: The Land Crisis in Southern Africa 256.  
401 Pienaar (2018) Namibian Law Journal 63.  
402 Pienaar (2018) Namibian Law Journal 63. See Chapter 1, 2 1.   
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land with the aim of providing some insight and guidance as to the best way forward for the 





Chapter 8: India  
1 Introduction  
India is primarily an agricultural society which, like South Africa, also shares a history of 
British colonial rule.1 At independence in 1947,2 India inherited a semi-feudal legal order and 
an ineffective agrarian structure characterised by: 
“highly inequitable land ownership, chronic insecurity of tenure among farmers, and low 
agricultural productivity. A small percentage of wealthy and politically well-connected individuals, 
owned most of the country’s agricultural land, leaving…[most] of the rural population landless or 
nearly landless”.3  
Importantly, land is not only used for the production of food or a source of livelihood, but 
also a “symbol of social identity, status, power and wealth”.4 Accordingly, India draws a 
strong linkage between access to land and ownership of land on the one hand, and the 
social status of an individual and/or his or her family, on the other.5 In this regard, similar to 
the post-apartheid South African legal order, the new Indian order aimed to guarantee rights 
of freedom, equality and property while also redressing the inequalities in wealth and 
distribution of resources through social and economic transformation.6  
The Constitution of India, which was adopted by the Constituent Assembly on 26 November 
1949, and which came into force on 26 January 1950, specifically provides that India is a 
“sovereign, socialist, secular democratic republic”.7 The Republic of India, governed by the 
Constitution, provides for a parliamentary form of government which is federal in structure.8 
                                            
1 T Hanstad, R Nielsen, D Vhugen & T Haque “Learning from old and new approaches to land reform in India”  
in HP Binswanger-Mkhize, C Bourguignon & R van den Brink (eds) Agricultural Land Redistribution: Toward 
Greater Consensus (2009) 242-243. 
2 15 August 1947.  
3 Hanstad et al “Learning from old and new approaches to land reform in India” in Agricultural Land 
Redistribution: Toward Greater Consensus 242-243; M Sethi “Land reform in India: Issues and challenges” in 
P Rosset, R Patel & M Courville (eds) Promised Land: Competing Visions of Agrarian Reform (2006) 73-92 
73; PS Appu Land Reforms in India: A Survey of Policy, Legislation and Implementation (1996) xviii.   
4 V Bhgat-Ganguly “Special issue on land acquisition, rehabilitation and resettlement in India” (2016) 4 Journal 
of Land and Rural Studies 1-2, 1.  
5 Government of India, Ministry of Rural Development, Department of Land Resources Draft National Land 
Reforms Policy (18 July 2013) 2. 
6 See in general J Murphy “Insulating land reform from constitutional impugnment: An Indian case study” (1992) 
25 Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 129-155; A Jain “Constitutional battles and 
the right to property in India” (2014) 3 Journal of Civil and Legal Services 1-4; J Singh “Separation of powers 
and the erosion of the ‘right to property’ in India” (2006) 17 Constitutional Political Economy 303-324.  
7 Preamble of the Constitution of India, 1950.  




The Constitution provides for two levels of government: (a) a Union or Central government9 
and (b) 2910 individual State governments.11 Further, the Seventh Schedule of the Indian 
Constitution, elaborated on in more detail below, provides for a Union, State and concurrent 
list, which sets out a list of subjects over which the Union or State governments have 
exclusive or concurrent legislative jurisdiction.  
The Constitution also embodies a Bill of Rights, which provides for various fundamental 
rights that enjoy protection in the Republic of India as a whole. The protection of existing 
property rights,12 which entrenched the unequal distribution of existing property entitlements 
at the time of independence, and the aim of achieving a more egalitarian society through 
the redistribution of land, resulted in intense debate in the Constituent Assembly.13 These 
debates, similar to those held in the South African Assembly before adopting the 
Constitution,14 led to a compromise between competing interests.15 The compromise 
resulted in the right to property being recognised as a fundamental right in the Constitution 
of India.16 Initially, the property clause consisted of two parts, namely: Article 19(1)(f) and 
article 31 of the Constitution of India, adopted in 1950.17 Article 19(1)(f), found under the 
right to freedom, held that:  
 “All citizens shall have the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property”.18 
 
                                            
9 Part 5 of the Constitution of India, 1950 read with the Union List in the Seventh Schedule, which provides for 
various subjects in terms of which only the Union or Central government can legislate.  
10 The First Schedule of the Constitution of India, 1950 provides for a list of all the States and their territories. 
The Republic of India has 29 States: Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Goa, 
Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, 
Maharashtra, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Sikkim, Tamil Nadu, 
Telangana, Tripura, Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.  
11 Part 6 of the Constitution of India, 1950 read with the State List in the Seventh Schedule which provides for 
various subjects in terms of which only the individual State governments can legislate.  
12 Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution of India, 1950 before it was repealed by the 44th amendment in 
1978.  
13 AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) 193. See further, Murphy (1992) Comparative and 
International Law Journal of Southern Africa 129-155; Jain (2014) Journal of Civil and Legal Services 1-4; 
Singh (2006) Constitutional Political Economy 303-324. 
14 See Chapter 1, 2 1 above.  
15 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses 193.  
16 Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India, 1950; Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses 193, 203.  
See in general Murphy (1992) Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 129-155; Jain 
(2014) Journal of Civil and Legal Services 1-4; Singh (2006) Constitutional Political Economy 303-324. 
17 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses 192.  




Article 19(5) allowed for reasonable restrictions on the right to acquire, hold and dispose of 
property: 19 
“Nothing in sub clauses (d), (e) and (f) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing 
law in so far as it imposes, or prevent[s] the State from making any law imposing, reasonable 
restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by the said sub clauses either in the 
interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe.” 
Furthermore, article 31(1), which provided for the right to property,20 and which is similar to 
section 25(1) of the South African Constitution, provided that:  
“No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law”. 
Article 31(2), dealing with expropriation, which originally provided that property may not be 
disposed of or acquired for public purposes unless the law in question provides for 
compensation21 was amended and replaced multiple times22 and finally repealed in 1978.23   
The inherent tension between guaranteeing the right to property on the one hand, while also 
endeavouring to achieve social and economic reform through land reform and State-planned 
industrial growth on the other hand,24 resulted in tensions between the legislature and 
executive, which sought to implement its development agenda, and the judiciary, which 
enforced the fundamental right to property of those affected by the reforms.25 In short, the 
judicial enforcement of the property clause often led indirectly26 to the invalidation of a 
number of laws aimed at social and economic reform, including land reform legislation.27 
                                            
19 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses 192.  
20 The sub-heading “Right to Property” was omitted by the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978. 
21 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses 192.  
22 Article 31(2) of the Constitution of India, 1950 was replaced by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act 
1955. It was replaced again by the Constitution (Twenty Fifth Amendment) Act 1971 and repealed in 1978 by 
the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act. 
23 The Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978.  
24 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses 193, 205.  
25 193, 205. 
26 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses 195 notes that the courts “struck down the laws in question 
but did not justify their decisions with reference to the property guarantee as such, preferring to base their 
decisions on either the equality clause in article 14 or the reasonableness provision in article 19 [of the 
Constitution of India, 1950]”. 
27 For example, in Kameshwar Singh v The Province of Bihar AIR (37) 1950 Pat 392 (SB), the Bihar State 
Management of Estates and Tenure Act 21 of 1949 (which was aimed at abolishing the Zamindari system) 
was struck down by the Patna High Court for being ultra vires because it provided for unreasonable and 
unlawful restrictions on property rights and was in conflict with the property guarantee in the Constitution. The 
court in Kameshwar Singh and Others v The State of Bihar AIR (38) 1951 Pat 91 (FB) struck down a similar 
law, the Bihar Land Reforms Act 30 of 1950, which provided for the acquisition by the State of land held by the 
zamindars. This case was later reconsidered on appeal, after article 31 was amended to preclude the 




However, the legislature responded to each decision by the judiciary by amending the 
Constitution.28  
Ultimately the 44th constitutional amendment in 1978 repealed the property clause (articles 
19(1)(f) and 31) from the chapter on fundamental rights in the Constitution.29 Article 300A 
was inserted separately in the Constitution in part 12, titled “finance, property, contracts and 
suits”, which merely provides that:   
“No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law”.  
Accordingly, article 300A creates a constitutional rather than a fundamental right.30 There 
are a number of implications that flow from the status of the right to property as a 
constitutional right. For one, it weakens the protection of the right in question. The right to 
property as a constitutional right “guarantees nothing more than the assurance that 
deprivations of property shall not be effected, simply by administrative decree”.31 At the very 
least this means that any limitation on property rights has to be imposed by a law of general 
application, within the legislative power of each individual State legislature.32 Such 
regulatory provisions imposing limitations on the right to property “should also not violate 
fundamental rights or other constitutional restrictions”.33 An analogy, as an example, can be 
drawn with the South African property clause. If for example, the right to property was 
removed from the Bill of Rights in the South African Constitution, it would weaken the 
protection afforded to the right. Any interference with the right to property would not have to 
be justified in terms of the limitation (section 36 of the Constitution) clause on the grounds 
of reasonableness or proportionality. The only requirement would be for the interference to 
occur in terms of legislation and that the legislation in question does not infringe upon 
fundamental rights. Secondly, the avenue for legal redress and thirdly, the corresponding 
                                            
28 For example, the constitutional assembly introduced the Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1951, which 
inserted articles 31A and 31B into the property clause, while appeal proceedings were still pending in 
Kameshwar Singh and Others v The State of Bihar AIR (38) 1951 Pat 91 (FB). Van der Walt Constitutional 
Property Clauses 195 notes that Article 31B in particular “ousted judicial review of all land reform measures 
listed in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution”. This was confirmed  on appeal in State of Bihar v Kameshwar 
Singh AIR (39) 1952 SC 252 where the Supreme Court conceded that the Bihar land reform legislation was 
protected from judicial scrutiny following the introduction of Articles 31A and 31B of the Constitution. Other 
constitutional amendments include: The Fourth (1955); Seventh (1964); Seventeenth (1964); Twenty-Fourth 
(1971); Twenty-Fifth (1972); Twenty-Sixth (1972); Twenty-Ninth (1972); Thirty-Fourth (1974); and the Thirty-
Ninth (1975) constitutional amendments.  
29 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses 192. 
30 203, 213, 215-216.  
31 203, 213, 215-216.  
32 203.  




remedy available to the person whose right to property has been interfered with, will be 
different. If the right is a fundamental right the affected person may approach the Supreme 
Court of India,34 as opposed to the lower courts.35 The remedies afforded to the affected 
person may also differ in this regard.36 Compared to the South African position where 
reasonableness and proportionality play a role in the protection of property rights and 
interests where a land reform measure imposes a restriction on the right to property,37 the 
status of the right to property in India allows the executive and legislature to implement land 
reforms even if private property rights and interests are adversely affected.38 Accordingly, 
having a right to property embedded in the Bill of Rights specifically, as opposed to any other 
part of the Constitution, has very specific implications.  
Furthermore, unlike the South Africa Constitution,39 the Republic of India does not entrench 
or outline its land reform programme in the Constitution. There is also no overarching 
national legislation dealing with land reform measures. Instead, the Constitution of India 
provides for guiding principles known as the Directive Principles of State Policy in Part 4 of 
the Constitution which is applicable to the Union government and all State governments.40 
Amongst other principles, it provides specifically for the securement of a social order for the 
promotion of welfare of all people:  
“The State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as 
effectively as it may a social order in which justice, social, economic and political, shall inform all 
the institutions of the national life. The State shall, in particular, strive to minimise the inequalities 
in income, and endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities, not only 
amongst individuals but also amongst groups of people residing in different areas or engaged in 
different vocations”. 41 
Redressing the skewed land ownership patterns through land reform is one way to uphold 
this directive. Therefore, both South Africa and India seek to achieve social justice through 
the redistribution of resources, including land.42  
                                            
34 Article 32 of the Constitution of India, 1950.  
35 Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950.  
36 Article 32 of the Constitution of India, 1950.  
37 See Chapter 4 in general.  
38 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses 205. 
39 Sections 25(4) -25(8) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
40 Part IV of the Constitution of India, 1950. 
41 Article 38 of the Constitution of India, 1950.  




Importantly, land reform under the Indian Constitution is a State subject, listed in the State 
list in the seventh schedule of the Constitution.43 The Constitution of India provides explicitly 
that individual States have exclusive legislative power over:  
“Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenures including the relation of landlord and 
tenant, and the collection of rents; transfer and alienation of agricultural land; land improvement 
and agricultural loans; colonization.”44 
In other words, the legislature of each State government has the exclusive power to 
promulgate land reform legislation. The implementation is also the exclusive responsibility 
of each State government.45 In the decades following India’s independence, a significant 
body of land reform legislation was passed, dealing with, inter alia: (a) abolishing 
intermediate interests in land, (b) tenancy reform, (c) imposing land ceilings and 
redistributing the above-ceiling/surplus land; and (d) distributing government wasteland to 
those without agricultural land.46   
While India is an important comparative case study for land reform in general,47 it is their 
experience with land ceiling regulation, primarily aimed at redistributing surplus land to the 
poor, landless and marginal farmers,48 that is specifically relevant for purposes of this 
dissertation. Similar to the envisaged South African framework,49 land ceiling legislation 
adopted and implemented by all the States in India placed limitations (or ceilings) on the 
amount of agricultural land a person or family could own.50 While basic points of departure 
are similar, important differences exist, for example, variations on several key aspects, 
                                            
43 Appu Land Reforms in India xviii.  
44 See entry 18 in the State List in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India, 1950.  
45 Appu Land Reforms in India xviii. 
46 RS Deshpande “Current land policy issues in India” (2003) Land Settlement and Cooperatives: Special 
Edition 1-14, 1 <http://www.fao.org/3/y5026e/y5026e0b.htm#bm11> (accessed 16-04-2019); Hanstad et al 
“Learning from old and new approaches to land reform in India” in Agricultural Land Redistribution: Toward 
Greater Consensus 242; T Besley & R Burgress “Land reform, poverty reduction and growth: Evidence from 
India” (2000) 115 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 389-430. 
47 Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, Agricultural Land Holding Policy Framework: Setting 
upper and lower bands for the ownership and use of agricultural landholdings (July 2013) 13.  
48 Appu Land Reforms in India 17; Besley & Burgress (2000) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 389-430.  
49 See Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, Agricultural Land Holding Policy Framework: 
Setting upper and lower bands for the ownership and use of agricultural landholdings (July 2013); the 
Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill in GN 229 GG 40697 of 17-03-2017. 
50 NC Behuria Land Reforms Legislation in India: A Comparative Study (1997) 166-183; Appu Land Reforms 




including the specifics of the ceiling limits, compensation for above-ceiling land expropriation 
and defining, and prioritising beneficiaries.51  
Apart from a few exceptions, it is evident that the land ceiling legislation in India has not lived 
up to expectations,52 as elaborated on in detail below.53 The imposition of ceilings has 
generally not led to any effective redistribution of agricultural land, but instead, aggravated 
India’s existing problem of uneconomical fragmentised land holdings, which has led to a 
general decline in agricultural productivity.54 Accordingly, the insights drawn from the 
experience of some States in India where land ceiling legislation was implemented 
successfully, will be important for establishing a clearly formulated legal and institutional 
framework for envisaged land ceilings in South Africa.  
Despite the general ineffective and unsuccessful use of land ceilings in redistributing 
agricultural land, the policy was applied with some degree of success.55 Given that India is 
a federal state with 29 States each with their own legislation regulating agricultural land 
ceilings,56 it is not within the scope of this dissertation to discuss every State’s land ceiling 
                                            
51 Hanstad et al “Learning from old and new approaches to land reform in India” in Agricultural Land 
Redistribution: Toward Greater Consensus 246-248; PS Appu Land Reforms in India: A Survey of Policy, 
Legislation and Implementation (1996); CD Deecre & M Leon Empowering Women (2001); G Gopal “Gender 
and economic inequality in India: The legal connection” (1993) 13 Boston College Third World Law Journal 
63-86 for an exposition of key aspects focused on in India. The identified beneficiaries are seemingly women 
and the poor. See further Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill in GN 229 GG 40697 of 17-03-2017, 
where the focus is not only on the poor. The Bill identifies black people as beneficiaries of agricultural land. 
Accordingly, why both India and South Africa’s ceilings legislation and policies focus on the redistribution of 
agricultural land for the poor, the South African perspective differs because the redistribution of agricultural 
land is also linked to race.  
52 Hanstad et al “Learning from old and new approaches to land reform in India” in Agricultural Land 
Redistribution: Toward Greater Consensus 246-248.  
See also Acharya “The Indian Urban Land Ceiling Act: A critique of the 1976 Legislation” 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/631451468750264120/pdf/multi-page.pdf> (accessed 28-05-
2017) 39-51. 
53 See 3 3 below.  
54 Hanstad et al “Learning from old and new approaches to land reform in India” in Agricultural Land 
Redistribution: Toward Greater Consensus 246-248. 
55 According to, T Hanstad & J Brown “Land reform law and implementation in West Bengal: Lessons and 
recommendations” (2001) Rural Development Institute Reports on Foreign Aid and Development, Report No 
112, 1-66 4, West Bengal comprises only 3.3% of the land in India, but it is responsible for 20% of the 
redistribution of surplus-ceiling land. 
56 See the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act 1 of 1973; the Assam Fixation 
of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act 1 of 1957; the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition 
of Surplus Land) Act 12 of 1962; the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act 27 of 1961; the Haryana Ceiling on 
Landholding Act 26 of 1972; the Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holding Act 19 of 1973; the Jammu & 
Kashmir Agrarian Reforms Act 17 of 1976; the Karnataka Land Reforms Act 10 of 1962; the Kerala Land 
Reforms Act 1 of 1964; the Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act 20 of 1960; the Orissa Land 
Reforms Act 16 of 1960; the Punjab Land Reforms Act 10 of 1973; the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on 
Agricultural Holdings Act 11 of 1973; the Sikkim Agricultural Land Ceilings and Reforms Act 14 of 1978; the 
Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act 58 of 1961; the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling 




measures. In this regard, the 2013 APLF57 identifies West Bengal of particular importance 
for the South African position in relation to the formulation and implementation of proposed 
ceilings legislation.58 Accordingly, the focus will fall on the experience in West Bengal, which 
has been identified as one of the States59 that was most effective with its formulation and 
implementation of land ceilings and redistribution of agricultural land.60  
Similar to the previous Chapter, the aim of this Chapter is not to provide for an in-depth 
analysis of the land reform programmes conducted in South Africa and India. Instead, for 
purposes of the Chapter, the legal position regarding (a) the concept of agricultural land in 
India; (b) mechanisms for the regulation of agricultural land for land reform purposes, 
specifically land ceilings; and (c) approaches and/or mechanisms for the acquisition of 
agricultural land in India are explored. The Chapter then concludes with a reflection on these 
three matters. Later in the study, Chapter 9 will provide for a comparative analysis between 
South Africa, Namibia and India regarding the concept of agricultural land; mechanisms for 
the regulation of agricultural land; and approaches for the acquisition of agricultural land. 
This Chapter is thus essential in laying the foundational basis for an in-depth legal 
comparative analysis to follow.  
2 The concept of agricultural land in India 
2 1 Introduction  
The importance of having access to land, including agricultural land,61 to address the 
skewed “inequalities in relation to agricultural land ownership and land use”,62 in India cannot 
                                            
57 Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, Agricultural Land Holding Policy Framework: Setting 
upper and lower bands for the ownership and use of agricultural landholdings (July 2013).   
58 See Chapter 3, 3 3 2 above.  
59 The Government of India, Ministry of Rural Development, Department of Land Resources Draft National 
Land Reforms Policy (18 July 2013) 5 identifies West Bengal, Kerala and Jammu & Kashmir as achieving 
some measure of success with the implementation of its land ceiling policy, although the policy does not set 
out the basis for determining the success of the individual States; Department of Rural Development and Land 
Reform, Agricultural Land Holding Policy Framework: Setting upper and lower bands for the ownership and 
use of agricultural landholdings (July 2013) 14; Hanstad et al “Learning from old and new approaches to land 
reform in India”  in Agricultural Land Redistribution: Toward Greater Consensus 246-247. 
60 See Hanstad & Brown “Land reform law and implementation in West Bengal: Lessons and 
recommendations” (2001) Rural Development Institute Reports on Foreign Aid and Development 4. See further 
D Bandyopadhyay “Land reforms and agriculture: The West Bengal experience” (2003) 38 Economic & 
Political Weekly 879-884; R Ghosh & K Nararai “Land reforms in West Bengal” (1978) 6 Social Scientist 50-
67; A Sarkar “Development and displacement: Land acquisition in West Bengal” (2007) 42 Economic & Political 
Weekly 1435-1442 and V Rawal “Ownership holdings of land in rural India: Putting the record straight” (2008) 
43 Economic & Politcal Weekly 43-47.  
61 Hanstad et al “Learning from old and new approaches to land reform in India” Agricultural Land 
Redistribution: Toward Greater Consensus 242-243. 
62 Government of India, Ministry of Rural Development, Department of Land Resources Draft National Land 




be overstated. The Draft National Land Reforms Policy published in 2013, reiterates this 
point: 
“Land, [particularly agricultural land], is the most valuable, imperishable possession from which 
people derive their economic independence, social status and a modest and permanent means 
of livelihood. But in addition to that, land also assures them of identity and dignity and creates 
condition [sic] and opportunities for realizing social equality.”63  
Accordingly, to implement land reform measures in this context it is necessary to first 
establish what constitutes agricultural land in India. For purposes of land reform in general, 
varied concepts of agricultural land can be found in national policy and legislation and in 
State-specific legislation respectively. Accordingly, in determining the concept of agricultural 
land in India, a distinction may be drawn between national policy and legislation applicable 
to all States64 and State-specific legislation. 
2 2 The concept of agricultural land in national policy and legislation 
In light of the increasing industrialisation and commercialisation of the farming (and 
agricultural) industry65 in India, the National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy (“NRR 
Policy”), 200766 aims to minimize the impact of State acquisitions of agricultural land for 
purposes of inter alia industrialisation on displaced persons and vulnerable citizens.67 The 
NRR Policy provides for a seemingly wide definition of agricultural land. The NRR Policy 
provides for a list of categories of land which are deemed to be agricultural land. It 
specifically provides that agricultural land includes: 
“lands being used for the purpose of (i) agriculture or horticulture; (ii) dairy and poultry farming, 
pisciculture, breeding of livestock or nursery growing medicinal herbs; (iii) raising of crops, grass 
                                            
Tsawu An historical overview and evaluation of the sustainability of the LRAD programme in SA 1-2 and 
Pienaar Land Reform 375.  
63 Government of India, Ministry of Rural Development, Department of Land Resources Draft National Land 
Reforms Policy (18 July 2013) 1. 
64 With the exception of section 1(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, 
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act 30 of 2013 which provides that the Act extends to the whole of India 
except the States of Jammu & Kashmir.  
65 Sethi “Land Reform in India: Issues and Challenges” in Promised Land Competing Visions of Agrarian 
Reform 73-92. 
66 Government of India, Ministry of Rural Development, Department of Land Resource The National 
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy, 2007 (31 October 2007).  
67 Preamble of the Government of India, Ministry of Rural Development, Department of Land Resource The 




or garden produce; and (iv) land used by an agriculturist for grazing of cattle, but does not include 
land used for cutting wood only”.68  
The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and 
Resettlement Act 30 of 2013,69 (“RFTLARRA”) which gives effect to the NRR Policy, 
provides for a similar definition of agricultural land. At first glance it provides for a closed list 
of land tracts which are deemed to be agricultural land.70 The RFTLARRA provides that 
agricultural land means:  
“land used for the purpose of (i) agriculture or horticulture; (ii) dairy and poultry farming; 
pisciculture; sericulture; seed farming; breeding of livestock or nurseries growing medicinal herbs; 
(iii) raising of crops, trees, grass or garden produce; and (iv) land used for cattle grazing”.71  
It is questionable whether a closed list of land constituting agricultural land, as opposed to 
an open list provided for in the NRR Policy, is sensible, given that the climatic conditions 
and types of land differ from State to State. On the one hand, persons who own or hold land 
that do not fall under the definition of “agricultural land” under the RFTLARRA, may become 
displaced through State acquisitions and not qualify as beneficiaries (“affected families”)72 
in need of rehabilitation and resettlement under the Act.73 On the other hand, the rationale 
of the Act may be to limit the number of persons in need of rehabilitation and resettlement 
under the Act, by limiting the application of the Act to specified types of land only.  
Despite the provision of a seemingly closed list of land constituting agricultural land under 
the RFTLARRA, the concept of agricultural land can still be construed widely. The 
                                            
68 Section 3(e) of the Government of India, Ministry of Rural Development, Department of Land Resource The 
National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy (31 October 2007). 
69 See further section 4 of Chapter 8 below. Similarly to the National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy, 
2007, the Act aims to provide for inter alia (a) a humane, participative, informed and transparent process for 
land acquisition for industrialisation, development of essential infrastructural facilities and urbanisation with the 
least disturbance to the owners of the land and other affected families; (b) to  provide just and fair compensation 
to the affected families whose land has been acquired or proposed to be acquired or are affected by such 
acquisition; (c) make adequate provisions for such affected persons for their rehabilitation and resettlement 
and for ensuring that the cumulative outcome of compulsory acquisition should be that affected persons 
become partners in development leading to an improvement in their post-acquisition social and economic 
status. 
70 Section 3(d) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and 
Resettlement Act 30 of 2013. 
71 Section 3(d) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and 
Resettlement Act 30 of 2013. Pisciculture, known as fish farming, involves raising fish commercially in tanks 
or enclosures such as fish ponds, usually for food. Sericulture involves the production of silk and the rearing 
of silkworms for this purpose. 
72 See section 3(c) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation 
and Resettlement Act 30 of 2013. 
73 Chapter 5 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and 




RFRLARRA provides that it is land used for the purpose of agriculture.74 While “agriculture” 
is not defined in the RFTLARRA it is defined in various pieces of State ceiling legislation.75 
If the concept of “agriculture”, as defined by individual States, is read into the RFTLARR 
then the Act applies to a wider selection of land than that provided for in the closed list of 
land constituting agricultural land in the RFTLARRA. Accordingly, if the definition of 
agricultural land in individual State ceiling legislation, if read into the concept of agricultural 
land in the RFTLARRA, then the concept of agricultural land is wide enough to ensure 
protection to potential displaced persons.  
2 3 The concept of agricultural land in ceiling legislation 
There is no national legislation applicable to all Indian States dealing with agricultural land 
ceilings.76 Instead, all Indian States regulate the imposition of land ceilings individually.77 
Despite the varied agricultural production and climatic conditions across the country, there 
seems to be some similarities between the various States’ concept of agricultural land in its 
respective ceiling legislation. Most States provide for a definition of “land” and/or 
“agriculture”, with the exception of the Indian States of Kerala and Uttar Pradesh, which 
provide for specific types of land in the definitions list.78  
Generally, the concept of agricultural land is formulated in one of two ways in the States’ 
respective land ceilings legislation. “Land” is either defined as land held, used or capable of 
being used for (a) “agricultural purposes”,79 followed by a list of uses that may be deemed 
                                            
74 Section 3(d)(i) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and 
Resettlement Act 30 of 2013. 
75 Section 3(j) of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act 1 of 1973; section 
2(f) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act 12 of 1962; 
section 2(3) of the Sikkim Agricultural Land Ceilings and Reforms Act 14 of 1978. 
76 Entry 18 in the State List in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India, 1950. See also Appu Land 
Reforms in India xviii. 
77  See the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act 1 of 1973; the Assam Fixation 
of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act 1 of 1957; the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition 
of Surplus Land) Act 12 of 1962; the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act 27 of 1961; the Haryana Ceiling on 
Landholding Act 26 of 1972; the Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holding Act 19 of 1973; the Jammu & 
Kashmir Agrarian Reforms Act 17 of 1976; the Karnataka Land Reforms Act 10 of 1962; the Kerala Land 
Reforms Act 1 of 1964; the Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act 20 of 1960; the Orissa Land 
Reforms Act 16 of 1960; the Punjab Land Reforms Act 10 of 1973; the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on 
Agricultural Holdings Act 11 of 1973; the Sikkim Agricultural Land Ceilings and Reforms Act 14 of 1978; the 
Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act 58 of 1961; the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling 
on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act 18 of 1978 the West Bengal Land Reforms Act 10 of 1965. 
78 See sections 2(10); 2(11); 2(24); 2(38) and 2 (41) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act 1 of 1964 and sections 
3(8) and 3(11) of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act 18 of 1978. 
79 Section 3(f) of the Assam Fixation of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act 1 of 1957; section 2(10) of the Gujarat 
Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act 27 of 1961; section 3(g) of the Haryana Ceiling on Landholding Act 26 of 1972; 
section 3(f) of the Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holding Act 19 of 1973; section 2(9) of the Jammu & 
Kashmir Agrarian Reforms Act 17 of 1976; Section 2(18) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act 10 of 1962; 




agricultural purposes, or for (b) purposes of “agriculture”80 in that specific State. Most States, 
regardless of the formation used, also provide for a separate definition of “agriculture” in its 
specific ceiling legislation.81  
In light of the varied agricultural production and climatic conditions across the country,82 it is 
not surprising that there is no comprehensive or generally accepted definition of agricultural 
land in land ceilings legislation of individual States. Each State, depending on the types of 
lands (for example, forest, pastures and grazing, crops lands) specific to that State or region 
may have a different definition of agricultural land for the purposes of ceiling legislation. It 
may even exempt some types of lands from the legislation to promote agricultural 
productivity by ensuring that the land is not fragmented into smaller parcels through the 
imposition of a ceiling limit.    
2 4 The concept of agricultural land in West Bengal  
As mentioned above, it is not possible to discuss the concept of agricultural land in every 
State. Instead, the focus falls on the State of West Bengal, because it is regarded as one of 
the States where land ceilings were implemented most effectively.83 Two respective Acts in 
West Bengal provide for a concept of agricultural land.84 
The West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act 1 of 1954, with the aim of effecting land reform 
through the abolition of intermediaries,85 provides for the State acquisition of estates, of 
                                            
Land Reforms Act 16 of 1960; section 3(5) of the Punjab Land Reforms Act 10 of 1973; section 3(22) of the 
Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act 58 of 1961. 
80 Section 3(j) of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act 1 of 1973; section 
2(f) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act 12 of 1962; 
section 2(3) of the Sikkim Agricultural Land Ceilings and Reforms Act 14 of 1978. 
81 Section 3(a) of the Assam Fixation of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act 1 of 1957; section 2(1) of the Gujarat 
Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act 27 of 1961; section 2(1) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act 10 of 1962; section 
2(1) of the Orissa Land Reforms Act 16 of 1960; section 2(b) of the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on 
Agricultural Holding Act 11 of 1973; section 3(1) of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) 
Act 58 of 1961. 
82 K Krishna Kumar, K Rupa Kumar, RG Ashrit, NR Deshpande & JW Hansen “Climate impacts on Indian 
agriculture” (2004) 124 International Journal of Climatology 1375-1393; KS Kavi Kumar & J Parikh “Indian 
agriculture and climate sensitivity” (2001) 11 Global Environmental Change 147-154; S Kumar, T Ramilan, CA 
Ramarao, Ch. S Rao & A Whitbread “Farm level harvesting across different agro climatic regions of India” 
Assessing performance and its determinants” (2016) 176 Agricultural Water Management 55-66.  
83 See Hanstad & Brown “Land reform law and implementation in West Bengal: Lessons and 
recommendations” (2001) Rural Development Institute Reports on Foreign Aid and Development 4. See further 
D Bandyopadhyay “Land reforms and agriculture: The West Bengal experience” (2003) 38 Economic & 
Political Weekly 879-884; R Ghosh & K Nararai “Land reforms in West Bengal” (1978) 6 Social Scientist 50-
67; A Sarkar “Development and displacement: Land acquisition in West Bengal” (2007) 42 Economic & Political 
Weekly 1435-1442 and V Rawal “Ownership holdings of land in rural India: Putting the record straight” (2008) 
43 Economic & Politcal Weekly 43-47.  
84 The West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act 1 of 1954 and the West Bengal Land Reforms Act 10 of 1956.  




rights of intermediaries therein and of certain rights of land owners or land holders (referred 
to as “raiyats” and “under-raiyats” respectively).86 This piece of legislation specifically draws 
a distinction between “agricultural land”87 and “non-agricultural land”.88 Agricultural land is 
defined as: 
“[L]and ordinarily used for purposes of agriculture or horticulture and includes such land, 
notwithstanding that it may be lying fallow for the time being”.89 
Non-agricultural land is defined as a residual category, i.e., lands other than agricultural land 
or other than land comprised in a forest.90  
Interestingly, the ceilings legislation in West Bengal, namely the West Bengal Land Reforms 
Act 10 of 1956 (“WBLRA”), does not provide for a definition of agricultural land per se. 
Instead, ceilings are applicable to “land” which is defined as “land of every description.”91 It 
also includes a list of land of every description. Accordingly, the operation of the ceilings 
legislation includes land used for: 
“tank, tank-fisheries, fishery, homestead, or land used for the purpose of livestock breeding, dairy 
or poultry farming, land comprised in a tea garden, mill, factory, workshop, orchard, hat, buzar, 
ferries, tolls or land having any other sairati interests and any other land together with its interest; 
benefits arising out of land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything 
attached to earth.”92  
The applicability of the ceilings legislation in relation to the concept of “land” and not 
specifically “agricultural land”, is averred as one of the reasons for the success of the 
implementation of land ceilings in West Bengal. 93 While not in conformity with the other 
States’ concepts of agricultural land, this wide definition of land encompassing agricultural 
                                            
86 Furthermore, section 1(10) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act 10 of 1956 defines a raiyat as a person or 
an institution holding land for any purposes whatsoever.  
87 Section 2(b) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act 1 of 1954.  
88 Section 2(j) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act 1 of 1954.  
89 Section 2(b) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act 1 of 1954.  
90 Section 2(j) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act 1 of 1954.  
91 Section 2(7) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act 10 of 1956.  
92 Section 2(7) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act 10 of 1956. Although not defined in the Act, section 1(12) 
of the East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act 18 of 1951 provides that a “hat” or “buzar” refers to “any 
place where persons assemble daily or on particular days in a week primarily for the purposes of buying or 
selling agricultural or horticultural produce, livestock, poultry, hides, skins, meat, fish, eggs, milk, milk products 
or any other articles of food or drink or other necessaries of life, and includes all shops of such articles or 
manufactured articles within such place”.  
93 Hanstad & Brown “Land reform law and implementation in West Bengal: Lessons and recommendations” 




land, ensures that more land is available to impose ceilings on, which in turn makes more 
land available for redistribution.94 The imposition of land ceilings is discussed in the next 
section.  
3 Mechanisms for the regulation of agricultural land in India  
3 1 Introduction  
The distinguishing features of the Indian agrarian economy at independence, included great 
inequality of land ownership; absentee landlords; a high incidence of tenancy and an array 
of uneconomic, fragmented and subdivided agricultural landholdings.95 Importantly, rights in 
land, including ownership, were used to determine social status and economic opportunity 
for different groups in the rural population.96 Accordingly, after independence, it was 
proposed that a progressive agrarian economy requires a reduction in the disparities of 
ownership of agricultural land in India.97  
These objectives of land reform in India, as set out in the Second Five Year Plan (1956-
1961),98 were twofold. Firstly, impediments on agricultural production that arose from the 
agrarian structure under British colonial rule had to be removed.99 Secondly, land reform 
aimed to create conditions for evolving “an agrarian economy with high levels of efficiency 
and productivity”100 timeously. Accordingly, the emphasis was on increased agricultural 
production.101 Despite these objectives, the Second Five Year Plan recommended that:  
“…steps should be taken in each State to impose a ceiling on existing agricultural landholdings. 
The ceilings would apply to owned land (including land under permanent and heritable rights) 
held under personal cultivation, the tenants being enabled to acquire rights of ownership…”.102 
                                            
94 Hanstad & Brown “Land reform law and implementation in West Bengal: Lessons and recommendations” 
(2001) Rural Development Institute Reports on Foreign Aid and Development 65. 
95 Appu Land Reforms in India 188.  
96 Government of India, Planning Commission The Second Five Year Plan (1956) 178.  
97 Government of India, Planning Commission The Second Five Year Plan (1956) 178; Appu Land Reforms in 
India 188.  
98 The First Five Year Plan (1951-1956) did not propose the agricultural land ceilings. Land ceilings were first 
introduced in the Second Five Year Plan (1956-1961).  
99 Government of India, Planning Commission The Second Five Year Plan (1956) 178; Appu Land Reforms in 
India 139.  
100 Government of India, Planning Commission The Second Five Year Plan (1956) 178; Appu Land Reforms 
in India 139. 
101 Appu Land Reforms in India 139. 
102 Government of India, Planning Commission The Second Five Year Plan (1956) 178; Appu Land Reforms 




While the aim of the imposition of land ceilings is to reduce the disparities in ownership of 
agricultural land and wealth, by redistributing land above the imposed ceiling to the poor, 
landless and marginal farmers,103 it was not recognised as a mechanism that would promote 
or increase agricultural production.104 Accordingly, the mechanism was justified because it 
was postulated that it would “promote social justice and provide a congenial environment for 
the development of a co-operative rural economy”.105 Additionally, Appu notes that given the 
already fragmented agricultural landholdings, there was no risk in fragmenting large farms 
when land ceilings were imposed.106 The following section discusses ceilings on agricultural 
landholdings as a measure to regulate agricultural land for land reform purposes.  
3 2 Ceilings on agricultural landholdings  
A land ceiling is a regulatory land reform mechanism that imposes a restriction on the 
amount of (agricultural) land a person may own. Any land above the ceiling becomes 
classified as ceiling-surplus land, which may be redistributed to beneficiaries under the 
State’s land reform policy.107 Ceiling laws were enacted in three phases.108 The first phase 
covered the period 1956 to 1972, before the national guidelines were laid down. The second 
phase, took place after the adoption of national guidelines in 1972. The final phase, still in 
progress, after the adoption of the Draft National Land Reforms Policy109 (“2013 Draft 
Policy”) provided for some measure of uniformity in the land ceiling legislation in general. 
By 1961, all Indian States adopted agricultural land ceiling legislation.110 States were given 
the authority, in light of the local conditions, to determine inter alia (a) the unit of application 
                                            
103 Appu Land Reforms in India 22, 139; Hanstad et al “Learning from old and new approaches to land reform 
in India” in Agricultural Land Redistribution: Toward Greater Consensus 246. See also Department of Rural 
Development and Land Reform, Agricultural Land Holding Policy Framework: Setting upper and lower bands 
for the ownership and use of agricultural landholdings (July 2013) 13.  
104 Appu Land Reforms in India 139. See in general M Ghatak & S Roy “Land Reform and agricultural 
productivity: A review of the evidence” (2007) 23 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 251-269 where the authors 
find that land reform legislation, in particular land ceiling legislation, has and still has a negative impact on 
agricultural productivity.  
105 Government of India, Planning Commission The Second Five Year Plan (1956) 178; Appu Land Reforms 
in India 139. 
106 Appu Land Reforms in India 188. In principle, this means that there are few large farms or large-scale 
farming enterprises in India.  
107 Hanstad et al “Learning from old and new approaches to land reform in India” in Agricultural Land 
Redistribution: Toward Greater Consensus 246; Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, 
Agricultural Land Holding Policy Framework: Setting upper and lower bands for the ownership and use of 
agricultural landholdings (July 2013) in general. 
108 Behuria Land Reform Legislations in India 131.  
109 Government of India, Ministry of Rural Development, Department of Land Resources Draft National Land 
Reforms Policy (18 July 2013).  
110 Appu Land Reforms in India 143. See also K Venkutasubramanian “Land reforms remain an unfinished 
business” (2013) <http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/articles/venka/index.php?repts=m-land.htm> 




of the ceiling;111 (b) the classification of land; (c) exemptions from the ceilings legislation; (d) 
the ceiling limit; (e) payment of compensation for ceiling-surplus land; and (f) who the 
beneficiaries should be and what type of land rights are granted to them once they have 
acquired the ceiling-surplus land.112 This inevitably resulted in wide variations between the 
laws of different States.113 The extent of the availability of ceiling-surplus land largely 
depended on the definitions adopted by the individual States for “family”;114 ceiling area and 
exemptions.115 Furthermore, “the legislative measures in the first phase were full of 
loopholes which were taken advantage of by the big landowners to circumvent the law”.116 
For example, in anticipation of the promulgation of ceiling legislation, land owners resorted 
to reclassifying their land to fall outside the scope of the land ceiling legislation; partitions 
and fictitious transfers in benami117 names on a very large scale.  
To bring about some measure of uniformity in land ceilings legislation and to address the 
loopholes in the legislation, a new policy was evolved in 1971, aimed at inter alia lowering 
ceilings; fixing the unit of application as a family unit or holding and reducing the number of 
                                            
of 1973; the Assam Fixation of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act 1 of 1957; the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of 
Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act 12 of 1962; the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act 27 of 
1961; the Haryana Ceiling on Landholding Act 26 of 1972; the Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holding Act 
19 of 1973; the Jammu & Kashmir Agrarian Reforms Act 17 of 1976; the Karnataka Land Reforms Act 10 of 
1962; the Kerala Land Reforms Act 1 of 1964; the Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act 20 of 
1960; the Orissa Land Reforms Act 16 of 1960; the Punjab Land Reforms Act 10 of 1973; the Rajasthan 
Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act 11 of 1973; the Sikkim Agricultural Land Ceilings and 
Reforms Act 14 of 1978; the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act 58 of 1961; the Uttar 
Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act 18 of 1978; and the West Bengal Land 
Reforms Act 10 of 1965.  
111 The ceiling may be applicable to an individual or a family as a unit.  
112 Appu Land Reforms in India 188; Hanstad et al “Learning from old and new approaches to land reform in 
India”  in Agricultural Land Redistribution: Toward Greater Consensus 246. 
113 Appu Land Reforms in India 145.  
114 See section 3(f) of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act 1 of 1973; 
section 3(d) the Assam Fixation of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act 1 of 1957; section 2(ee) of the Bihar Land 
Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act 12 of 1962; section 2(16) read with 
section 6(2) of the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act 27 of 1961; section 3(f) of the Haryana Ceiling on 
Landholding Act 26 of 1972; section 3(f) of the Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holding Act 19 of 1973; 
section 2(6) of the Jammu & Kashmir Agrarian Reforms Act 17 of 1976; section 2(12) read with section 2(17) 
of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act 10 of 1962; section 2(14) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act 1 of 1964; section 
2(gg) of the Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act 20 of 1960; section 37(b) of the Orissa Land 
Reforms Act 16 of 1960; section 3(4) of the Punjab Land Reforms Act 10 of 1973; section 2(f) of the Rajasthan 
Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act 11 of 1973; section 2(i) of the Sikkim Agricultural Land 
Ceilings and Reforms Act 14 of 1978; section 3(14) of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on 
Land) Act 58 of 1961; section 3(7) of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) 
Act 18 of 1978; and section 14K(c) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act 10 of 1965 for the different definitions 
of “family” under the different States’ ceiling legislation. 
115 Behuria Land Reforms Legislation in India 132.  
116 C Ashokvardhan Ceiling Laws in India (2005) 15.  
117 Benami is essentially an Indian origin word which means holding in someone else’s or a fictitious name to 




exemptions.118 In this regard, national guidelines were issued in 1972119 (“1972-guidelines”). 
The impact of the land reform process in general was re-assessed decades later, which 
resulted in the publication of the 2013 Draft Policy.120 The aim of the guidelines and policy 
is to make more land available for redistribution at a faster pace,121 given the slow and 
unsuccessful redistribution process flowing from the land ceiling measures.122 Accordingly, 
while the scope and application of the land ceilings legislation initially differed widely from 
State to State, the 1972-guidelines,123 followed by the 2013 Draft Policy, provided for some 
measure of uniformity in the land ceiling legislation in general.  
The development of the scope and application of the land ceilings will be discussed below 
having regard to the position under the Second Five Year Plan; the 1972-guidelines and the 
2013 Draft Policy respectively. As mentioned, it is not feasible to discuss each State’s laws. 
Accordingly, specific reference to the legal position in West Bengal regarding the unit of 
application; classification of land; exemptions; ceiling limit; compensation; and beneficiaries 
will be discussed.124  
3 2 1 Unit of application of ceiling  
The Planning Commission, in terms of its Second Five Year Plan, gave a broad suggestion 
that the unit of application should be three family holdings.125 Ultimately however, the 
question whether the determined ceiling should apply to individual units/holdings or family 
                                            
118 See K Venkutasubramanian “Land reforms remain an unfinished business” (2013) 
<http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/articles/venka/index.php?repts=m-land.htm> (accessed 11-01-
2019). 
119 Venkutasubramanian “Land reforms remain an unfinished business” (2013) 
<http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/articles/venka/index.php?repts=m-land.htm> (accessed 11-01-
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120 Government of India, Ministry of Rural Development, Department of Land Resources Draft National Land 
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121 Appu Land Reforms in India 167, 189.  
122 Hanstad et al “Learning from old and new approaches to land reform in India” in Agricultural Land 
Redistribution: Toward Greater Consensus 246-248. See also Acharya “The Indian Urban Land Ceiling Act: A 
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123 See in general W Ladejinsky “New ceiling round and implementation prospects” (1972) 7 Economic and 
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legislation were shaped by a compromise of view of the Central Land Reform Committee; the Ministry of Food 
and Agriculture; the nine member panel appointed by Congress; the Congress Working Committee; and the 
conference of the State Chief Ministers held in March 1972.  
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Agricultural Land Redistribution: Toward Greater Consensus 246-247. See further in general Bandyopadhyay 
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units/holdings was left to the respective Indian States.126 If States decided on family holdings 
as the unit of application, it had to determine the area of land that would constitute a family 
holding in different regions, taking into consideration inter alia the classes of soil and 
irrigation.127 Ancillary to determining what the unit of application for land ceilings should be 
was the determination of what constituted a “family unit” or “family holding”.128 In other 
words, States had to determine what allowance should be made for the size of the family in 
the application of the land ceiling.129 
The 1972-guidelines provided that the ceiling imposed must apply to the family as a unit, 
instead of individual members of the family, as was the case in some States.130 Furthermore, 
the 1972-guidelines determined that the unit of application shall be a family of five members, 
given that the term “family” is defined to include husband, wife and minor children.131 Every 
major son will be treated as a separate unit of application.132 In cases where the number of 
family members exceeds five, additional land may be allowed for each member in excess, 
provided that the total area admissible to the entire family could not exceed double the 
ceiling for a family of five members.133  
The State of West Bengal initially determined that the ceiling should apply to individual 
landholders.134 However, subsequent to the recommendations in the 1972-guidelines, West 
Bengal changed the unit of application to “family” holdings. The ceiling legislation in West 
                                            
126 Behuria Land Reform Legislations in India 166-183; Appu Land Reforms in India 140, 144.  
127 Appu Land Reforms in India 144.  
128 Appu Land Reforms in India 140. See section 3(f) of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on 
Agricultural Holdings) Act 1 of 1973; section 3(d) the Assam Fixation of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act 1 of 
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Bengal provides for a concept of a joint family, limited to five members to constitute a unit.135 
The WBLRA provides for a rather extended definition of “family”, in relation to a raiyat136 
(land holder or owner).137 A “family”, in relation to a raiyat, will be deemed to consist of, but 
limited to five members, including:  
“(i) [the raiyat] himself and his wife, minor sons, unmarried daughters, if any; (ii) his unmarried 
adult son[s], if any, who does [sic] not hold any land as a raiyat; (iii) his married adult son, if any, 
where neither such adult son nor the wife nor any minor son or unmarried daughter of such adult 
son holds any land as a raiyat; (iv) [a] widow of this predeceased son, if any, where neither such 
widow nor any minor son or unmarried daughter of such widow holds any land as a raiyat; [and] 
(v) a minor son or unmarried daughter, if any, of his predeceased son, where the widow of the 
predeceased son is dead and any minor son or unmarried daughter of the predeceased son does 
not hold any land as a raiyat”.138  
No other person shall be regarded as part of the “family”.139 For the purpose of 
completeness, two further clarifications are provided for under the definition of “family”. 
Firstly, an adult unmarried person shall include a man or woman who is divorced and who 
has not remarried thereafter.140 Secondly, references in the clause to “wife”, “son” or 
“daughter” shall, in relation to a female raiyat be construed as references to husband, son 
or daughter of such a woman instead.141  
No recommendations with regard to the unit of application were set out in the 2013 Draft 
Policy. The unit of application in West Bengal is therefore a “family” up to five members.142  
3 2 2 Classification of land 
With regard to the classification of land,143 some States classified their land into different 
classes or according to a “standard acre”. For example, in Andhra Pradesh, before the 1972-
guidelines were imposed, a family holding was defined to be equal to either 6 acres of “class 
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A land”; 8 acres of “class B land”; 10 acres of “class C” land etc.144 As a result, for a family 
of five or fewer members, the actual area varied between a minimum of 27 acres and a 
maximum of 324 acres, depending on the classes of land in the holding.145 The 
determination of different classifications of land took into account inter alia the availability of 
irrigation; the nature of the soil; the climate; and where the land was located.146 Several 
States also adopted the concept of a “standard acre or hectare”.147 In general, a “standard 
acre or hectare” referred to an acre of irrigated land or other land of good quality in a State 
as a whole or in a region thereof.148 In light of the quality of land available, other classes of 
land, for example, non-irrigated, hill or desert land were given corresponding lower values 
in terms of acres or hectares.149 To illustrate, in terms of the West Bengal Land Reform Act, 
a "standard hectare" in relation to agricultural land is, for example, equivalent to (a) 1.00 
hectare in an irrigated area; and (b) 1.40 hectares in any other area.150 In relation to any 
other land, including land comprised in an orchard, a standard hectare is equivalent to 1.40 
hectares.151 
The 1972-guidelines provide for a simplified classification of land. It provides for 3 broad 
classes, namely (a) irrigated double cropped land; (b) irrigated single cropped; and (c) 
dryland,152 whereas the 2013 Draft Policy only provides for a classification of two types of 
land: irrigated and non-irrigated land,153 with corresponding recommend ceiling limits.154 In 
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line with the 1972-guidelines and the 2013 Draft Policy, the WBLRA provides for the 
classification of and the determination of an irrigated area of land.155  
3 2 3 Exemptions 
Initially, the Planning Commission suggested in its Second Five Year Plan that a list of land 
tracts should be exempted from the operation of ceilings legislation, namely plantations of 
tea, coffee and rubber; existing orchards; cattle breeding farms; dairy and wool farms; well 
managed and mechanised farms;156 and sugarcane farms operated by sugar factories.157 
However, State legislatures exempted many more categories of land.158 Some exemptions 
were justified, such as land held by Central and State Governments and small parcels of 
land voluntarily gifted by wealthy landowners to the landless known as Bhoodan and 
Gramdam land.159 Other exemptions were not justified. Appu identifies private forest land; 
land used for grazing cattle or growing trees; hill land and tank fisheries as unreasonable 
and unjustified exemptions.160 States also generally exempted religious, charitable or 
educational institutions or trusts; private and public sector industries and cooperative 
farming industries.161 Appu argues further that it would still be reasonable and justifiable if 
the latter institutions, trusts, industries and societies were allowed to keep a minimum area 
of land to carry out their respective legitimate activities.162 Such a minimum area would have 
to be determined individually, based on the needs of the relevant institution, trust, industry 
or society.  
The 1972-guidelines limited the number of exemptions from land ceiling legislation. It 
provided for the exemption of, inter alia, plantations of tea, coffee, rubber, cardamom and 
cocoa; Bhoodan and Gramdam land; land held by agricultural universities, colleges and 
schools and research institutions.163 Furthermore, State governments may, at their 
discretion, grant exemption to existing religious, charitable and educational trusts and 
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institutions of a public nature.164 In the case of co-operative farming societies exemption 
may be granted on the condition that computing the ceiling area for a member will take into 
account his or her share in the society as well as the other lands held by such a member.165 
It also provided that no exemptions should be granted to sugarcane farms and private trusts 
of any kind.166 As a catch-all recommendation the 1972-guidelines provided that all other 
exemptions should be withdrawn.167 
However, the 2013 Draft Policy suggests that exemptions to religious, charitable, 
educational and research and industrial institutions, trusts or organisations as well as 
plantations and aqua farms should be strictly discontinued.168 It recommends that these 
institutions, trusts, organisations and farms should be restricted to the use of one unit of 15 
acres.169  
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The ceiling legislation in West Bengal, in comparison to other States,170 provides for only a 
few exemptions.171 Firstly, the WBLRA provides that the ceiling limit shall not apply to any 
land owned by central, State or local authorities.172 In other words, the land ceiling does not 
apply to State-owned land. Furthermore, it also provides that trusts or institutions of a public 
nature exclusively for a charitable or religious purpose or both, shall be deemed a raiyat and 
shall be entitled to retain lands not exceeding 7.00 standard hectares, notwithstanding the 
number of its centres or branches in the State.173 Accordingly, while not exempting 
charitable or religious trusts or institutions from the operation of land ceilings, the Act does 
provide for an exception with regard to the ceiling limit. In other words, charitable and/or 
religious trusts and institutions are allowed to hold or own more land than other raiyats. In 
comparison, these types of trusts and institutions are absolutely exempted from the 
operation of the land ceiling legislation in other States.  
Limiting the number of exemptions also makes more land available for redistribution, which 
contributes overall to the effective implementation of the ceiling legislation.  
3 2 4 Ceiling limit 
The ceiling limit also differs from State to State, depending on the quality or the nature of 
the land.174 Each State took into account a variety of factors to determine the land ceiling, 
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including: climate; value of the lands in terms of crop potential; fertility of the soil; size of the 
property or family and production output.175 For example, if the land in question was arid 
with low productivity, the land ceiling was higher in contrast to a lower land ceiling for fertile 
land.176 Similarly, a lower land ceiling was imposed on irrigated land, whereas unirrigated 
land allowed for a higher land ceiling.177 Other factors that impact on determining the ceiling 
limit are the unit of application (including the allowance for the size of the “family”) and the 
classification of land.178 
The 1972-guidelines provided for revised ceiling limits. The recommended ceiling limit for 
best category land in a State with assured irrigation and capable of producing at least two 
crops a year is 10-18 acres.179 In other words, no owner is entitled to hold more than 10-18 
acres of irrigated double cropped lands.180 It also determined that in relation to second class 
land the ceiling limit should range between 18 and 27 acres.181 Furthermore, no person may 
hold more than 54 acres of dry land,182 with the exception of hill and desert areas that may 
have a marginally higher land ceiling.183 
The 2013 Draft Policy proposes that States should revise their ceiling limits where the 
existing limit is more than 5-10 acres for irrigated land and 10-15 acres for non-irrigated 
land.184 Given the different climatic conditions, the crops grown and especially the density 
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of the population in each State, it is reasonable to provide for a small range within which the 
ceiling limit should be fixed, as opposed to introducing a precise and uniform limit for all 
States.185 
Initially, West Bengal imposed a uniform ceiling of 25 acres on individual (as opposed to 
family) holdings.186 However, in line with the 1972-guidelines, the legislation in West Bengal 
was amended to apply to a family unit or holding as mentioned above. The ceiling limit was 
also reduced to 5 hectares (12.4 acres) irrigated land or 7 hectares (17.3 acres) of 
unirrigated land187 for a “family” of five members.188 The 2013 Draft Policy recommendations 
do not apply to West Bengal because the legislation is already in line with the newly 
proposed ceiling limits.189  
Lowering the ceiling limit, while taking into account the operational requirements of the land 
for effective productivity, ensures that more land is classified as ceiling-surplus land, which 
in turn ensures that more land is in principle available for redistribution.  
3 2 5 Payment of compensation  
The Planning Commission left it to the State governments to decide on the principles 
applicable for determining compensation for ceiling-surplus land, in light of local 
conditions.190 Predictably, this resulted in a lack of uniformity regarding the determination of 
the amount of compensation payable, if any, to land holders expropriated of ceiling-surplus 
land. However, given that the States applied and defined factors such as the unit of 
application, the categories of land, exemptions and ceiling limits differently, it is 
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comprehensible that different methods of calculating compensation would inevitably arise. 
The 1972-guidelines also provided that:  
“Compensation payable for the surplus land on the imposition of ceiling laws should be fixed well 
below the market value of the property so that it is within the paying capacity of the new allottees 
mainly comprising the landless agricultural workers who belong to the Scheduled Castes and the 
Scheduled Tribes.”191  
No guidelines on the calculation of compensation for ceiling-surplus land were provided for 
in the 2013 Draft Policy.  
Some States have provided for the determination of an amount of compensation on the 
basis of land revenue while other States determine the amount of compensation on the basis 
of the classification of the land.192 The WBLRA provides that the State shall pay 
compensation for land which vests in the State (ceiling-surplus land).193 The amount of 
compensation shall be equal to fifteen times the land “revenue”194 or its “equivalent 
assessed for such land”.195 However, it is unclear how or when the “equivalent assessed for 
such land” will be calculated. Furthermore, where such land revenue or its equivalent has 
not been assessed or is not required to be assessed, an amount calculated at the rate of 
135 rupees for an area of 0,4047 hectare applies.196 
Regardless of the manner in which the amount of compensation is determined, the amounts 
cannot be challenged in a court of law.197 Behuria explains in this regard that: 
“…all State ceiling laws have been included in the 9th Schedule of the Constitution as per Article 
31-C, as [the laws] are intended to achieve the objectives enshrined in the Directive Principles of 
State Policy in Arts. 39(b) and 39(c) of the Constitution.”198 
Furthermore, Behuria suggests that the amount of compensation paid to land owners for the 
acquisition of ceiling-surplus land is negligible when compared with the market value of the 
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land.199 Notably, the amount of compensation payable to the land owner is generally below 
market value.200 
3 2 6 Beneficiaries  
Once ceiling-surplus land is identified and acquired by the State government, it is necessary 
to determine to whom the land should be redistributed, namely whom the intended 
beneficiaries should be. From the outset, the Second Five Year Plan recommended that 
preference should be given to displaced tenants; landless farm workers; and farmers with 
uneconomic agricultural landholdings.201 However, no guidance pertaining to what 
constitutes an uneconomic agricultural landholding was provided. The 1972-guidelines 
provided that priority should be given to the landless agricultural workers, in particular those 
belonging to the Scheduled Castes (“SCs”) and Scheduled Tribes (“STs”).202 The SCs and 
STs are constitutionally recognised and regarded as officially designated groups of 
historically disadvantaged people in India.203  
Despite the recommendations, the States had to determine who would be eligible to be 
regarded as a beneficiary under the ceilings legislation and what type of land rights would 
be granted accordingly. Most ceiling laws make provision for the distribution of ceiling-
surplus land to landless; agricultural tenants or labourers and/or displaced persons.204 
However, the priority or order of allotment of ceiling-surplus land to the beneficiaries varies 
widely from State to State.205 For example, States may provide for lists of beneficiaries, in 
order of priority. In some States, first priority is given to agricultural tenants, while in other 
States preference is given to agricultural labourers in the SCs or STs.206  
The type of land rights granted to the beneficiaries or the terms of settlement on the ceiling-
surplus land also differs greatly from State to State.207 Some States completely prohibit 
beneficiaries from transferring ownership of the agricultural land once they have acquired 
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it,208 whereas other States prohibit transfer of ownership for a period of time only (ranging 
from 10-20 years).209 The legislation may also require the beneficiary to use the land for a 
particular purpose, such as “personal cultivation”.210 
The WBLRA sets out principles for the distribution of ceiling-surplus land.211 Among eligible 
persons, first priority is given to the bargardar cultivating the land.212 Thereafter preference 
is given to people belonging to the SCs or STs or cooperative societies.213 Furthermore, in 
relation to the eligibility criteria, the Act provides that persons who are local residents where 
the ceiling-surplus land is situated, and who together with other members of their family, 
own no land or less than 0,4047 hectares of land used for the purpose of agriculture,214 
provided that in the case of agricultural land specifically, such a person intends to bring the 
land under “personal cultivation”,215 will be regarded as beneficiaries.216 Accordingly, 
bargardars or persons belonging to the SCs or STs must reside for the greater part of the 
year in the locality where the ceiling-surplus land is situated. The section further provides 
that the principal source of such a person’s income must also be the produce of such land.217 
In this regard, the terms of settlement under the Act also provide that the beneficiary must 
use the land, in the case of agricultural land, for a particular purpose, namely “personal 
cultivation”.218 Under the Act, “personal cultivation” is defined as cultivation by a person of 
his own land on his own account by his own labour; or by the labour of any member of his 
family or by servants or labourers on wages payable in cash and kind.219 Furthermore, a 
person will not be eligible for the redistributed land if he or she or a member of his or her 
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family is engaged or employed in any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture, service or 
industrial occupation.220  
Beneficiaries, once settled, acquire ownership of the ceiling-surplus land and are prohibited 
from transferring or burdening the land,221  
“except by way of a simple mortgage or mortgage by deposit of title deeds in favour of a 
Scheduled Bank, or a Co-operative Society or a Corporation owned or controlled by the Central 
or State Government or both, and for the purpose of obtaining [a] loan for the development of 
[the] land or for the improvement of agricultural production or for the construction of a dwelling 
house”.222   
Accordingly, once the beneficiary has acquired the ceiling-surplus land, the sale thereof is 
prohibited. However, in West Bengal, no time period is attached to this prohibition and 
therefore it is unclear whether the beneficiary or his/her heirs may be allowed to sell the land 
in future once it is acquired.  
The 2013 Draft Policy proposes that land should, in future, be redistributed to marginalised 
women.223 The Policy recognises that 40% of the agricultural workforce consists of women 
and that households are becoming de facto female headed households.224 Furthermore, the 
Policy recognises that “agricultural productivity is increasingly…dependent on the ability of 
women to function effectively as farmers”.225 In this regard, it recommends ensuring effective 
and independent land rights for women.226  
In light of the widely differential approach to land ceilings, it is inevitable that some States 
would be more successful than others.227 In order to formulate and implement effective land 
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ceiling legislation in South Africa, it is necessary to learn from the problems experienced by 
land ceilings legislation and policy in India.228 Accordingly, the reasons for the failure of land 
ceilings are explored in the next section. 
3 3 Reasons for failure of land ceilings in India 
Despite some exceptions,229 the imposition of land ceilings was largely ineffective and 
unsuccessful for redistribution purposes.230 Ray estimates that over a period of 35 years, 
less than 2% of the total operated land has been redistributed.231 According to various 
authors,232 the ineffective use of the land ceiling legislation can be attributed to the following 
considerations: 
Firstly, the specific formulation of legislation allowed land owners to use the various gaps 
and/or loopholes in the laws to their advantage.233 Some States limited the application of 
the land ceiling by restricting or limiting the type of land to which the legislation was 
applicable, which resulted in less land being available for redistribution.234 The inadequate 
definition of (agricultural) land allowed land owners to re-classify their land to fall outside the 
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scope of ceiling legislation, thereby circumventing it.235 In comparison to other States, West 
Bengal adopted a very wide definition of “land”,236 which prevented land owners from 
reclassifying their land to fall outside the scope and application of the ceiling legislation.237 
Apart from the formulation of the definition of land, States also allowed for a number of 
exemptions in the legislation.238 For example, land held for religious, charitable or 
educational purposes and certain types of crops particular to each State are exempted from 
the operation of the legislation.239 These exemptions also made it possible for owners to 
reclassify their land as falling under one of the exemptions, thereby circumventing the 
provisions of the legislation.240 As mentioned above, West Bengal is one of the States with 
the smallest number of exemptions, which resulted in more land (not only agricultural land) 
being available for redistribution.241  
Due to the formulation of the legislation, land ceilings were also set too high in relation to 
the average household operational holdings to have much of an impact on the agrarian 
structure.242 The higher the ceiling, the less land could be identified as ceiling-surplus land, 
which also resulted in less land being available for redistribution.243 In this regard, in 
comparison to other States, West Bengal from the outset provided for a low ceiling which 
may have contributed to more successful and effective redistribution of land.244  
In general, land ceiling legislation did not provide for prohibiting transfers retrospectively.245 
Accordingly, in anticipation of the implementation of land ceiling legislation, land owners 
resorted to partitions and fictitious transfers (known as Benami transactions, which are 
discussed in more detail below) to circumvent the legislation.246 Only the States of Gujarat 
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and West Bengal provided for the retrospective effect of the land ceiling legislation. Other 
States only banned transfers after the implementation of the ceiling law.247 
Secondly, the reluctance of States to implement land ceilings vigorously is also regarded as 
a reason for failure.248 Lack of political will on the part of the States,249 administrative delays 
given the tedious processes set out in the ceiling legislation for acquiring and disposing of 
the ceiling-surplus land and/or land disputes in courts dealing with the classification of land 
and determining whether the land constitutes ceiling-surplus land250 count among some of 
the reasons for the States’ reluctance to implement land ceilings effectively. As mentioned 
above,251 the determination of fair compensation, approached differently by each State, was 
regarded as fixed and could not be challenged in the courts252 and therefore could not 
contribute to the delay in implementation of land ceiling legislation.  
West Bengal is regarded as one of the States that administered and implemented its land 
ceiling legislation effectively.253 In light of the resolution of land disputes by the civil courts 
which follow strenuous procedures and may be time-consuming and costly, the WBLRA 
bars the jurisdiction of civil courts in almost all matters dealt with in the Act.254 Instead, the 
disputes between raiyats or between the raiyats and the government are decided by the 
revenue officers.255 Appeals may be brought before the District Land and Land Reforms 
Officer or any other senior officers appointed or assigned for the purpose of hearing 
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appeals.256  Accordingly, disputes are dealt with by specialised administrative officials 
instead of the judiciary which may in turn speed up the redistribution of agricultural land.  
Coupled with the lack of retrospective effect of the land ceiling legislation, the untimely 
implementation of the ceiling legislation by State governments gave land owners time to 
dispose of land that would fall above the ceiling limit, by resorting to partitions and 
transfers.257 For example, land owners would resort to benami transactions258 to dispose of 
surplus land or gift the land among relations, friends and dependents.259 Before the Benami 
Transactions (Prohibition) Act 45 of 1988 came into force, benami transactions were legal 
in India and there was no bar or punishment under any law for entering into any benami 
transactions.260 In this regard the land ceilings legislation in general did not make provision 
for dealing with benami transfers. The property, which formed the subject matter of the 
benami transactions, was also not liable for confiscation by the government. The 1988 Act, 
as its title indicates, was enacted with the aim of prohibiting benami transactions. However, 
the 1988 Act did not provide for an adequate mechanism to enforce the prohibition against 
benami transactions. The 2013 Draft Policy recommended that the Act be amended for the 
purpose of curbing and monitoring evasions of ceiling legislation through fraudulent, benami, 
land transactions.261 The Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Amendment Act 43 of 2016 
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provides for (a) a wider definition of benami transactions;262 (b) process of confiscation and 
acquisition of benami property by the government against payment of no compensation 
and;263 (c) imprisonment for persons conducting benami transactions.264 The disposal of 
surplus land to relations, friends and dependents, by way of benami transactions, not only 
made less land available for redistribution, but it was also difficult to determine who the true 
owner of the property, specifically (agricultural) land, was. Accordingly, these types of 
transactions also contributed towards one of the reasons for the inaccurate or incomplete 
land records. In this regard, the act of monitoring the type of transactions conducted, is also 
integral in the legislation’s success or not.  
Thirdly, linked to the above, the lack of accurate and updated land records in India is 
regarded as a major constraint to the effective implementation of ceiling legislation.265 The 
lack of accurate and updated land records not only makes it difficult to identify the land 
owners (or raiyats), but it also poses difficulties in calculating or considering whether the 
legislation has been successful.266 In West Bengal, the Land Information System has three 
distinct divisions, i.e. (a) cadastral map;267 (b) record of rights;268 and (c) registration of 
conveyance instruments for transfer of land and mortgages. The cadastral map and the 
                                            
Hanstad et al “Learning from old and new approaches to land reform in India” in Agricultural Land 
Redistribution: Toward Greater Consensus 247. 
262 Section 2(9) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Amendment Act 43 of 2016. See also VP Dalmia 
“India: Benami transactions in India and analysis of the provisions relating to attachment and confiscation of 
property under the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Amendment Act, 2016” (05-01-2018) 
<http://www.mondaq.com/india/x/661234/White+Collar+Crime+Fraud/Benami+Transactions+In+India+And+
Analysis+Of+The+Provisions+Relating+To+Attachment+And+Confiscation+Of+Property+Under+The+Bena
mi+Transactions+Prohibition+Amendment+Act+2016> (accessed 19-01-2019).   
263 Section 27 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Amendment Act 43 of 2016. See also Dalmia “India: 
Benami transactions in India and analysis of the provisions relating to attachment and confiscation of property 
under the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Amendment Act, 2016” (05-01-2018). 
264 Section 53 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Amendment Act 43 of 2016.  
265 Mearns World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2123 (May 1999) 10; Hanstad et al “Learning from old 
and new approaches to land reform in India” in Agricultural Land Redistribution: Toward Greater Consensus 
247, 259; Government of India, Ministry of Rural Development, Department of Land Resources Draft National 
Land Reforms Policy (18 July 2013) 28 suggests that the States should hold inventory of surplus land. See 
also  Government of India, Ministry of Rural Development, Department of Land Resources Report on State 
Agrarian Relations and the Unfinished Task in Land Reforms (2008) 40. 
266 Hanstad et al “Learning from old and new approaches to land reform in India” in Agricultural Land 
Redistribution: Toward Greater Consensus 247, 259; Government of India, Ministry of Rural Development, 
Department of Land Resources Draft National Land Reforms Policy (18 July 2013) 28; Government of India, 
Ministry of Rural Development, Department of Land Resources Report on State Agrarian Relations and the 
Unfinished Task in Land Reforms (2008) 40.  
267 The Bengal Tenancy Act 1885 for the first time provided the legal basis for preparation of revenue village 
maps following the method of cadastral survey. On the basis of such maps, the records of rights were prepared. 
268 LGAF Team, Landesa “Improving land governance in West Bengal” (2014) State Report: Land Governance 
Assessment Framework 14 explains that the record of rights contained particulars relating to each tenant or 
occupant of the land or sharecropper, the name of each tenant’s or occupant’s landlord, classification and 
quantity of land of each tenant etc. The record of rights were revised in the fifties under the West Bengal Estate 
Acquisition Act 1 of 1954. Revision of record of rights was again taken up in 1975 under the West Bengal Land 




record of rights are prepared by the Land and Land Reforms Department, while the 
registration of deeds for transfer of land and mortgages is administrated by the Finance 
Department.269  
The State has the obligation to maintain and update land records in accordance with 
changes as a result of transfer or inheritance.270 The efficacy of the ceiling legislation will be 
improved provided that the State takes appropriate and effective steps in maintaining and 
updating the land records in accordance with the transfer of land to beneficiaries under the 
Act.271 In 1990, West Bengal started digitizing the record of rights272 and is the first State to 
integrate digitized cadastral maps with related record of rights.273 In this regard, the State 
has recently amended the WBLRA to facilitate e-delivery of land records through affixing 
digital signatures.274 This has enhanced speed of service delivery to a great extent and has 
contributed to the effective implementation of the ceiling legislation.  
Fourthly, the inadequate or unfair compensation paid to land owners275 for surplus land, 
made the programme unpopular with land owners, which in turn led to land owners using 
loopholes and gaps in the legislation discussed above.276 It is postulated that the prohibition 
against challenging the manner in which the amount of compensation is determined and/or 
the amounts awarded to land owners in a court of law also contributed to the use of 
loopholes and gaps in the legislation.277 As mentioned above, the WBLRA provides the 
amount of compensation shall be equal to fifteen times the land “revenue”278 or its equivalent 
assessed for such land.279 Furthermore, where such land revenue or its equivalent has not 
                                            
269 LGAF Team, Landesa “Improving land governance in West Bengal” (2014) State Report: Land Governance 
Assessment Framework 13-14.  
270 Section 50 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act 10 of 1956.  
271 LGAF Team, Landesa “Improving land governance in West Bengal” (2014) State Report: Land Governance 
Assessment Framework 14. 
272 Accordingly to the LGAF Team, Landesa “Improving land governance in West Bengal” (2014) State Report: 
Land Governance Assessment Framework 14, the record of rights are completely digitized except those of 
1473 odd revenue villages of three districts. Those records are expected to be completed within a short period 
of time. 
273 LGAF Team, Landesa “Improving land governance in West Bengal” (2014) State Report: Land Governance 
Assessment Framework 14. 
274 Section 50(2) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act 10 of 1956.  
275 Mearns World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2123 (May 1999) 10; Hanstad et al “Learning from old 
and new approaches to land reform in India” in Agricultural Land Redistribution: Toward Greater Consensus 
247.  
276 Hanstad et al “Learning from old and new approaches to land reform in India” in Agricultural Land 
Redistribution: Toward Greater Consensus 246.  
277 Article 31C of the Constitution of India, 1950.  
278 Section 3(11) defines “revenue” as that which is lawfully payable or deliverable in money or in kind or both 
by a raiyat under the provisions of the Act in respect of the land held by him or her. See also Chapter 4 of the 
West Bengal Land Reforms Act 10 of 1956 for other provisions relating to revenue.  




been assessed or is not required to be assessed, an amount calculated at the rate of 135 
rupees for an area of 0,4047 hectare automatically applies.280 It is unclear whether these 
amounts may be higher or lower than the market value of the land. However, generally, the 
amount of compensation is lower than market value.281 
Fifthly, where ceiling-surplus land was identified and acquired, it generally remained in the 
hands of the State government.282 Land can only be regarded as redistributed once it has 
been allotted and transferred to the intended beneficiaries. The lack of redistribution of 
ceiling-surplus land accordingly, also contributed to the success of the implementation of 
the ceiling legislation in different States.  
Finally, a distinction needs to be drawn between the quantity of land redistributed and the 
number of beneficiaries who receive the land on the one hand, and the quality of land 
redistributed to a number of beneficiaries, on the other hand. 
Where land was redistributed, the States distributed the land in relatively large parcels, 
which meant that only a small percentage of landless families benefitted.283 In such cases, 
more ceiling-surplus needs to be available for redistribution to benefit a larger number of 
beneficiaries. To maximise the quantity of land available for redistribution, the 2013 Draft 
Policy proposes that States create a “land pool”284 consisting of inter alia (a) agricultural 
waste land; (b) unutilised land acquired, purchased and/or leased out to industries for 
development purposes; (c) surplus ceiling land; and (d) Bhoodan land unlawfully 
occupied.285 
Unlike most States, West Bengal focused on distributing ceiling-surplus land to as many 
landless families as possible, instead of aiming to provide each beneficiary with a “full-size” 
farm.286 Accordingly, the size of land was smaller, but a bigger percentage of beneficiaries 
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benefitted. However, while the ceiling-surplus land was redistributed in relatively small 
parcels, it is questionable whether the quality of land was of such a nature for the 
beneficiaries to cultivate the land. Appu notes that the poor quality of surplus land available 
for redistribution and the lack of financial assistance to the landless to bring the land under 
cultivation, further reduced the benefits that could have accrued to the beneficiaries.287 It is 
thus not surprising that beneficiaries, once they received some form of land, would want to 
sell and transfer it. As explained, some States, like West Bengal, prohibit beneficiaries from 
transferring the land once acquired.288  
Accordingly, it is opined that the quantity of the land to be redistributed should be determined 
by the quality of the ceiling-surplus land. Where the land is dry or arid, a larger parcel of land 
may be redistributed to a beneficiary. Where the land is irrigated or fertile, a smaller parcel 
of land may be redistributed to the beneficiary. However, regardless of the quality of land, 
financial assistance should be provided to the beneficiaries.  
4 The acquisition of agricultural land in India 
4 1 Introduction  
Different ways of acquiring agricultural land exist in India. India has made use of market-led 
approaches and expropriation to acquire land for land reform purposes.289 This section 
briefly deals with the different ways of acquiring agricultural land in India.  
4 2 Market-led approaches 
Different States adopted different land purchase programmes.290 The nature of land 
purchase programmes in India is voluntary.291 However, the land purchase programmes 
differ from State to State with regard to inter alia (a) who initiates the purchase of land; (b) 
what amount of grant, if any, is provided to the beneficiaries for purchase of the land; (c) 
what the repayment terms are, if any, in relation to the total cost of the land purchased; and 
(d) who should establish a business plan and what should the business plan provide for. 
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Again, it is not possible to consider the different land purchase programmes of all Indian 
States. As explained, the focus remains on the State of West Bengal.  
The land purchase programme in West Bengal focuses on providing house and/or garden 
plots to beneficiaries.292 Beneficiaries under the land purchase programme293 can choose 
whether to use the land allotted to them for housing needs and/or income-generating 
purposes such as farming or keeping livestock.294 The programme in West Bengal is a State-
driven process as opposed to a beneficiary-driven process. In this regard, the State initiates 
the land purchase act; identifies the parcel of land for acquisition; negotiates the price for 
the parcel of land and together with the beneficiary develops a business plan for farming the 
land.295 While South Africa has followed both a demand-led and supply-led approach to 
acquiring agricultural land on the market,296 this approach in West Bengal is similar to the 
supply-led approach followed in terms of the PLAS in South Africa.297 According to Hanstad, 
the direct land purchase from raiyats by the State ensures that the public funds are utilised 
optimally.298 Furthermore, West Bengal initiated a micro-finance programme to provide 
financial support to beneficiaries who acquired land under the land purchase programme.299 
Loans of up to 6000 rupees are available at an annual interest rate of 4%.300 
4 3 Expropriation 
While every Indian State has the authority to appropriate land situated within the limits of its 
jurisdiction for public utility or public purpose,301 land has been subject to competing 
pressures, ranging from national development to food security.302 Since the 1980’s, the 
Indian economy has experienced a shift from small-scale/subsistence farming to large-
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scale/industrialised or commercial farming.303 As a result, less focus is placed on the social 
function of agriculture in rural livelihoods and equality in ownership of land.304 Sethi notes 
that industrialisation or commercialisation places a limit on national development 
programmes such as land reforms, which intensify “already existing inequalities in land 
distribution”,305 but is justified in light of the increases in agricultural output which has 
reduced India’s national food-security concerns, given the ever-growing population.306  
Accordingly, less priority was given to minimising the disparities in ownership of land among 
the landless. Instead, the focus fell on providing food security to the Indian population as a 
whole, through the industrialisation of various sectors, including the agricultural sector. 
However, the need to acquire land for large-scale commercial farming through expropriation, 
without causing large-scale displacement of persons living and/or working on agricultural 
land, had to be taken into account.307 In this regard, the NRR Policy 308 aims to ensure the 
survival of displaced persons, but also to improve their standard of living by providing them 
with opportunities. Accordingly, the creation of job opportunities minimises the impact of the 
expropriation on displaced persons.309  
The RFTLARRA310 also provides for numerous mechanisms to ensure that land acquired 
for a public purpose such as industrialisation does not adversely affect the land owner and/or 
families living or working on the land. Rawat and Narayan explain that the RFTLARRA aims 
to strike a balance between a legitimate public purpose, such as expropriation for 
industrialisation, and appropriate compensation for displaced persons.311 It may thus be 
necessary to look at a few aspects of the RFTLARRA which aims to redress the impact of 
expropriations on persons dependant on the land in question.  
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In line with the NRR Policy, the RFTLARRA provides for a preliminary investigation to 
determine the social impact the acquisition of the land in question will have on the “affected 
family”312 and the purpose of the acquisition.313 The social impact assessment shall include 
(a) an assessment as to whether the proposed acquisition serves a legitimate public 
purpose; (b) an estimation of the affected families and the number of families among them 
likely to be displaced; (c) the extent of (public and private) lands, houses, settlements and 
other common properties likely to be affected by the acquisition; (d) whether the extent of 
land proposed for acquisition is the absolute bare minimum needed to fulfil the public 
purpose; (e) whether land acquisition at an alternate place has been considered and found 
not feasible; and (f) the nature and cost of addressing the impact vis-à-vis the cost of the 
project for a public purpose.314 Accordingly, the impact of the acquisition315 is weighed 
against the purpose of the acquisition,316 before a decision is taken whether the land can or 
should be expropriated. Importantly, in light of the need to safeguard food security, the 
RFTLARRA also prohibits irrigated multi-cropped land from being acquired under the Act,317 
except in exceptional circumstances as a last resort.318  
After a social impact assessment has been done and the decision to expropriate the land in 
question has been made, a preliminary notification with details indicating the land to be 
acquired must be published in the Official Gazette, two newspapers and uploaded to the 
website of the applicable State government.319 The Act does not specify that the land owners 
must receive this notification. To determine the extent of the land to be acquired, the 
government may conduct a survey of the land.320 A person interested in any land that has 
been notified as being required or likely to be required for a public purpose may object to 
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inter alia (a) the area and suitability of land proposed to be acquired; (b) justification offered 
for public purpose; and/or (c) the findings of the social impact assessment.321  
The RFTLARR also provides for the provision of a rehabilitation and resettlement scheme322 
that must include inter alia detail steps proposed to be taken by the State government; the 
amount of compensation payable to the land owner323 and the affected family324 
respectively; the particulars of the house site and the house to be allotted to the affected 
family;325 and details regarding the mandatory employment to be provided to the members 
of the affected family. The inclusion of this compulsory scheme ensures that land acquisition, 
rehabilitation and resettlement are all seen as equally important and inseparable from one 
another.326 The RFTLARRA also provides for a National Monitoring Committee, which will 
be responsible for reviewing and monitoring the implementation of the rehabilitation and 
resettlement schemes.327 
The provision of the social impact assessment, the rehabilitation and resettlement scheme 
and the overarching National Monitoring Committee may be important for the South African 
position where agricultural land is expropriated for land reform purposes to restrict the 
adverse effects of the acquisition on families or persons dependant on the land.    
5 Reflection  
5 1 The concept of agricultural land in India 
India does not only provide for a category of agricultural land, but also stipulates what it is 
at national and State level. At national level agricultural land is defined in accordance with 
the purpose for which it is used. Accordingly, when determining what constitutes agricultural 
land, the focus does not fall on where the land is situated, but rather on the purpose for 
which it is used. Similarly, at State level, agricultural land is formulated in two ways: Either 
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as land used for agricultural purposes or land used for the purpose of agriculture. In light of 
the varied agricultural production and climatic conditions, each State provides for a different 
definition of what constitutes “agricultural purposes” or “agriculture”. The concept of 
agricultural land at both national and State level allows for situations where the nature and/or 
purpose of the land may change over time. For example, land may become arable over time 
due to changing climate conditions. Therefore, land that was previously deemed to be non-
agricultural land, may become agricultural land. However, some States provide that 
agricultural land may also include land lying fallow for the time being. In such cases, only 
land which will never have an agricultural purpose again, may be regarded as non-
agricultural land. For example, where land is acquired and developed to provide for a 
different purpose other than for “agriculture”, the land will constitute non-agricultural land.  
Interestingly, West Bengal does not provide for a definition of “agricultural land”. Instead, for 
purposes of its land ceiling legislation, it provides for a definition of “land”, which may include 
agricultural land. Unlike other States where the legislation is only applicable to agricultural 
land, the aim of the WBLRA is to provide for a wider application of the ceiling legislation. In 
other words, in West Bengal, ceilings may be imposed on any land, including agricultural 
land.  
5 2 The regulation of agricultural land in India  
Ceiling legislation differs from State to State in relation to the (a) unit of application; (b) the 
classification of land; (c) exemptions from the ceiling legislation; (d) ceiling limit; (e) payment 
of compensation; and (f) who the beneficiaries are and what type of land rights are granted 
once they have acquired the ceiling-surplus land. In light of the widely differential approach 
to land ceilings, it is inevitable that some States would be more successful than others. In 
this regard, the reasons for the failure of the land ceilings legislation in some States are of 
particular importance. 
West Bengal is identified as one of the States where the formulation and implementation of 
the land ceiling legislation was effective and successful in relation to the redistribution of 
ceiling-surplus land to beneficiaries. The insights drawn from the experience in West Bengal 
will be important for establishing a clearly formulated legal and institutional framework for 
land ceilings in South Africa. 
The formulation of the legislation in West Bengal allowed for fewer gaps and/or loopholes 




exemptions prevented land owners from reclassifying their land to fall outside the scope and 
application of the ceiling legislation. The ceiling limit was also set lower, which meant that 
more land could be identified as ceiling-surplus land and redistributed. Furthermore, with 
regard to the implementation of the legislation, West Bengal is regarded as one of the States 
which implemented the ceiling legislation strenuously and timeously after the promulgation 
thereof. It was thus less likely for land owners to dispose of land that would be classified or 
identified as ceiling-surplus land by way of partitions and transfers.  
While not completely up to date, the land records in West Bengal are for the most part 
complete. Accurate land records make it easier, in comparison to other States, to identify 
land owners and keep track of how much land has been redistributed. In this regard, the 
technological development linked to electronic land records contributed to expediency and 
accuracy. Without updated land records it would not be possible to measure the efficacy 
and success of the land ceiling legislation. Where land owners and the ceiling-surplus land 
of a particular land owner were identified, adequate and fair compensation was paid. This 
meant that land owners were more likely to participate and to provide or identity relevant 
parcels of land falling above the ceiling limit.  
Once the ceiling-surplus land was obtained, the land in general, did not remain in the hands 
of the West Bengal State government. While other States opted to redistribute relatively 
large parcels of land to only a few families, West Bengal focused on redistributing smaller 
parcels of land to as many landless beneficiaries as possible.  
Despite overcoming many of the failures in the formulation and implementation of the ceiling 
legislation experienced by other Indian States, West Bengal’s post-redistribution support 
(financial and/or educational or otherwise) is problematic. Where the post-redistribution 
support is lacking, the totality of benefits that could have accrued to the beneficiaries are 
reduced.328 
5 3 The acquisition of agricultural land in India  
Different approaches to acquiring land, namely market-led approaches and expropriation, 
are employed in India and South Africa. While the market-led approaches appear to be 
                                            
328 Appu Land Reforms in India 178. See also Government of India, Ministry of Rural Development, Department 
of Land Resources Report on State Agrarian Relations and the Unfinished Task in Land Reforms (2008) 28. 
See further Hanstad et al “Learning from old and new approaches to land reform in India” in Agricultural Land 




similar to some of the market-led approaches adopted in South Africa,329 some aspects 
incorporated into the expropriation legislation in India may become important for formulating 
South Africa’s expropriation measures, particularly where expropriation is used for purposes 
of land reform.  
For example, in India most people are dependent on the land for their livelihood. In this 
regard, where agricultural land is expropriated, the rehabilitation and resettlement of persons 
living and/or working on agricultural land is important to ensure that they are not deprived of 
their livelihood or that they are not rendered homeless. The social impact assessment and 
the creation of a compulsory rehabilitation and resettlement scheme under the RFTLARR 
provide for appropriate steps to ensure that people who are displaced as a result of 
expropriation will still have the necessary tools to support themselves and their families. 
Currently, the South African expropriation legislation does not provide for similar measures, 
as a detailed analysis will show later.330 This may be an important consideration going 
forward. 
6 Conclusion  
While India and South Africa share a history of colonialism, characterised by extensive land 
appropriation,331 which resulted in skewed land ownership patterns, these countries differ 
greatly in a number of respects, including population numbers, the amount of arable land 
available, climate and rainfall patterns. Notably, in both countries, land reform is difficult, 
time-consuming and expensive, but necessary.332 In this regard, the respective countries’ 
land reform programmes also differ greatly. As mentioned, South Africa undertook an 
overarching land reform programme consisting of three inter-connected pillars, namely: 
redistribution, restitution and tenure reform, embedded in section 25 of the Constitution, 
whereas India does not explicitly entrench its land reform programme in its Constitution. 
Furthermore, the Indian Constitution does not provide for the same level of protection of the 
right to property, in comparison to the South African Constitution.333  
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Despite the differences, and while India faces its own difficulties with its land reform 
programme, South Africa can learn much from India regarding its formulation and 
implementation of its land ceiling legislation in particular. In this regard, the 2013 ALPF334 
identifies West Bengal of particular importance for the South African position in relation to 
the formulation and implementation of proposed ceilings legislation.335 Accordingly, the 
focus fell on the experience in West Bengal, which has been identified as one of the States336 
that was most effective with its formulation and implementation of land ceilings and 
redistribution of agricultural land in India.337 
 
Other aspects which may also improve the South African redistribution process are those 
measures found in the expropriation legislation dealing with the rehabilitation and 
resettlement of displaced persons where land is expropriated for a public purpose.  
 
Accordingly, there is room for a comparative analysis between India and South Africa. 
However, as outlined, the aim of this Chapter is not to provide for a comprehensive 
comparative analysis of aspects and dimensions of redistribution in South Africa and India. 
Instead, this Chapter set out the legal position in India regarding: (a) the concept of 
agricultural land; (b) the mechanisms for the regulation of agricultural land, specifically the 
formulation and implementation of land ceiling legislation; and (c) the approaches and/or 
mechanisms for the acquisition of agricultural land. The Chapter then concludes with a 
reflection of the different aspects highlighted above, with respect to West Bengal in 
particular. As the necessary backdrop was provided in previous chapters, the next Chapter 
will provide for a comprehensive and comparative analysis between South Africa, Namibia 
and India regarding the concept of agricultural land, the mechanisms for the regulation of 
agricultural land and the approaches and/or mechanisms for the acquisition thereof. 
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Chapter 9: A Comparative perspective  
1 Introduction 
While previous chapters highlight that the relevant Constitutions and the particular historical 
context of land redistribution programmes may vary greatly from country to country, the 
insights drawn from other jurisdictions’ experiences may expose the difficulties and failures 
in conceptualising, regulating, acquiring and redistributing agricultural land, and therefore 
have the potential to provide recommendations with regard to a proposed framework for the 
regulation, acquisition and redistribution of agricultural land within the South African 
constitutional context. A thematic methodology will be used to compare the legal position(s) 
pertaining to (a) the concept of agricultural land; (b) mechanisms for the regulation of 
agricultural land; (c) mechanisms or approaches for the acquisition of agricultural land; and 
(d) redistribution in South Africa, Namibia and India, as explained.1  
The concept of “agricultural land” in South Africa and its implications for broadening access 
and redistribution is of critical importance. Accordingly, each jurisdiction’s legal position 
pertaining to the concept of agricultural land will be discussed and compared first. Following 
such an exposition and comparison, the mechanisms for the regulation of agricultural land 
will be set out and discussed. As determined in other chapters,2 the discussion is limited to 
the following mechanisms: (a) restrictions pertaining to the subdivision of agricultural land; 
(b) restrictions on the amount of agricultural land a person or entity may own; and (c) 
restrictions pertaining to ownership of agricultural land by foreigners. Importantly, when 
discussing these regulatory mechanisms the study does not aim to provide a fully-fledged 
comparative analysis. Instead, when comparing subdivision restrictions and restrictions on 
foreign ownership of agricultural land, the comparison is limited to the South African and 
Namibian positions. However, when comparing land ceilings, the comparison is limited to 
the South African and Indian positions. While India is an important comparative case study 
for land reform in general, it is their experience with land ceiling legislation and the 
consequent redistribution of surplus land to the poor, landless and marginal farmers that is 
of particular significance for the South African position. In this regard, Namibia does not 
provide for land ceiling legislation and will not contribute to that dimension. The Chapter then 
endeavours to compare and highlight aspects pertaining to the acquisition of agricultural 
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land in Namibia and India which may be relevant for formulating policy and/or legislative 
measures in the South African context. The concluding section thereafter discusses the 
redistribution process and focusses on the following questions, namely: (a) who the 
beneficiaries ought to be; (b) how they ought to be selected; (c) what quantity of agricultural 
land they ought to receive and; (d) what type of rights the beneficiaries of the redistribution 
programme ought to receive. These aspects are accordingly discussed and compared in 
relation to the Namibian, Indian and South African positions. 
2 The concept of agricultural land 
2 1 Introduction  
There is no uniform or single definition of agricultural land in South Africa.3 This section 
explores how agricultural land is defined in Namibia, India and South Africa with the aim of 
developing the technical legal concept of agricultural land in South Africa.  
2 2 Namibia 
In Namibia, there is no statutory measure which provides for a single definition of agricultural 
land at an overarching level. Instead, three pieces of legislation, specifically aimed at 
regulating commercial agricultural land in Namibia, namely (a) SALA; (b) ALA and (c) 
ACLRA provide for different definitions of agricultural land. While it is clear from these pieces 
of legislation that a category of agricultural land exists, content to the concept of agricultural 
land is not provided.   
Both SALA and ALA define agricultural land a residual category of land in Namibia. More 
specifically, SALA and ALA define agricultural land as “any land”,4 and then lists categories 
of land that do not form part of the definition.5 While agricultural land is defined as a category 
of land, it is still unclear what agricultural land is. Given the topography of Namibia, not all 
land defined as agricultural land for purposes of SALA or ALA will be or can be used for 
agricultural purposes. A strictly technical approach to the categories of land set out in SALA 
is thus insufficient for purposes of effective redistribution. The land that beneficiaries receive 
should be of such a quality that allows for large-scale; small-scale; or subsistence farming, 
depending on the needs of the beneficiary in question.  
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ACLRA defines agricultural land as “any land or an undivided share in land”.6 It then, like 
SALA and ALA, lists a number of pieces of land excluded from the definition of agricultural 
land.  It seems that any land owned by, or situated in, an area under the control of the State 
is excluded from the definition of agricultural land and consequently the operation of ACRLA. 
It also seems as if communal land, forming part of the property held in trust by the State, 
does not fall within the scope of the definition of agricultural land under ACLRA. Arguably, 
the operation of the ACLRA is limited to privately owned agricultural land. Similar to SALA, 
ACLRA provides that certain areas constitute agricultural land. However, unlike SALA, 
ACLRA provides some guidance on what agricultural land is. The Act refers to “agricultural 
land” and to “agricultural purposes”7 separately. “Agricultural purposes” is defined widely 
and provides that it “includes game farming”.8 While ACLRA provides for some guidance on 
the concept of agricultural land, it does not provide for an overarching definition pertaining 
to all agricultural land in Namibia, because it only applies to private commercial agricultural 
land.  
 
Following the second National Land Conference held in Namibia in October 2018, there 
have been no recent discussions or developments pertaining to the 2016 Land Bill.9 
However, the Land Bill may still provide insights into the conceptualisation of agricultural 
land. In this regard, the Land Bill aimed, inter alia,10 to consolidate and amend ACLRA and 
the CLRA11 to ensure that “all [agricultural] land in Namibia has the same status”.12 
Accordingly, if ever promulgated, the Land Bill will replace both ACLRA and CLRA. With 
regard to the concept of agricultural land, the Land Bill provides for a new and simplified 
definition of agricultural land. The Land Bill therefore gives more content to what agricultural 
is, as opposed to where it may be situated. It defines agricultural land accordingly to the 
purpose for which it is used i.e. agricultural purposes,13 although it does not provide an 
extensive list of what constitutes agricultural purposes. The Land Bill provides that 
“agricultural land” constitutes:  
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“[A]ny land or an undivided share in land that is used for agricultural purposes”.14  
 
The definition of “agricultural purposes” is formulated as follows:  
 
“‘[A]gricultural purposes,’ includes game farming and aquaculture”.15  
 
This is not a closed list of agricultural purposes. Agricultural purposes may include land used 
for commercial and subsistence farming. Accordingly, agricultural land is not defined as a 
residual category as it is under SALA and ACLRA. The Land Bill provides for a move away 
from the formalistic or inflexible concept of agricultural land as a residual category and 
instead, advances an overarching or national definition of agricultural land.   
2 3 India  
Given India’s federal government structure, a distinction may be drawn between national 
policy and legislation applicable to all States on the one hand,16 and State-specific legislation 
in determining the concept of agricultural land, on the other. Accordingly, for purposes of 
land reform in general, varied concepts of agricultural land can be found in national policy 
and legislation and in State-specific legislation respectively. 
India does not only provide for a category of agricultural land, but also stipulates what it is 
at national and State level. At national level, agricultural land is defined in accordance with 
the purpose for which it is used.17 When determining what constitutes agricultural land, the 
focus does not fall on where the land is situated, but rather on the purpose for which it is 
used. Similarly, at State level, agricultural land is formulated in two ways: Either as land 
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used for “agricultural purposes”18 or land used for the purpose of “agriculture”.19 In light of 
the varied agricultural production and climatic conditions, each State provides for a different 
definition of what constitutes “agricultural purposes” or “agriculture”. The concept of 
agricultural land at both national and State level allows for situations where the nature and/or 
purpose of the land may change over time. For example, land may become arable over time 
due to changing climate conditions. This may mean that land that was previously deemed 
to be non-agricultural land, may become agricultural land, or vice versa. However, some 
States provide that agricultural land may also include land lying fallow for the time being.20 
In such cases, only land that will never have an agricultural purpose again, may be regarded 
as non-agricultural land. This would be the case where land, which was previously arable, 
is acquired and developed to provide for a different purpose other than for “agriculture”. The 
land will consequently be defined as non-agricultural land.  
Interestingly, West Bengal does not provide for a definition of “agricultural land” in its ceiling 
legislation. Instead, it provides for a definition of “land” 21 only, which may include agricultural 
land. In this way the ceiling legislation provides for a wide application, in comparison to other 
States, because ceilings may be imposed on any land, including agricultural land.  
2 4 South Africa 
The Regulation Bill22 specifically states that “there is a need to redistribute agricultural land 
more equally by race and class”23 (own emphasis) to broaden access to agricultural land24 
in order to address the “inequalities in relation to agricultural land ownership and land use”.25 
This necessitates the determination of what constitutes agricultural land in South Africa. 
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section 2(k) of the Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act 20 of 1960; section 2(14) of the Orissa 
Land Reforms Act 16 of 1960; section 3(5) of the Punjab Land Reforms Act 10 of 1973; section 3(22) of the 
Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act 58 of 1961. 
19 Section 3(j) of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act 1 of 1973; section 
2(f) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act 12 of 1962; 
section 2(3) of the Sikkim Agricultural Land Ceilings and Reforms Act 14 of 1978. 
20 Section 2(b) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act 1 of 1954.  
21 Section 2(7) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act 10 of 1956.  
22 The Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill in GN 229 GG 40697 of 17-03-2017.  
23 Preamble of the Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill. 
24 Section 25(5) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; preamble of the Regulation of 
Agricultural Land Holdings Bill.  
25 HJ Kloppers & GJ Pienaar “The historical context of land reform in South Africa and early policies” (2014) 
17 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 677-706, 677. See also S Tsawu An historical overview and 
evaluation of the sustainability of the LRAD programme in SA LLM, Stellenbosch University (2006)  1-2 and 




“Agricultural land” is defined differently in a variety of legislative measures, for different 
purposes, as is evident from the analysis of the SALA, the Preservation Bill,26 read with the 
Draft Preservation Policy27  and the Regulation Bill in Chapter 2 above. Because the 
definition of agricultural land differs within each context, there is the need to provide clarity 
in respect of which land specifically will be affected under which regulatory measure. 
In terms of SALA, agricultural land is not specifically defined. Instead, agricultural land is 
defined as a residual category of land. SALA provides that agricultural land constitutes “any 
land”, except those categories of land listed in the legislation.28 After dealing with various 
conflicting judgments in Chapter 2 pertaining to the interpretation of “agricultural land” in 
SALA,29 it was found that the category of “agricultural land” still exists. However, it is still 
unclear what agricultural land is. Other legislative and policy measures may provide more 
clarity regarding what agricultural land is in South Africa.  
Although under consideration to be redrafted, the Preservation Bill30 and the corresponding 
Draft Preservation Policy may provide some insight into the concept of agricultural land in 
South Africa.31 As mentioned above, if promulgated, it will also repeal SALA. As set out in 
Chapter 2,32 the Draft Preservation Policy33 contains a rather different definition of 
agricultural land to that provided for in the Preservation Bill. The Draft Preservation Policy 
not only defines agricultural land in relation to the purpose for which it is used, but also 
provides for sub-classification of agricultural land, including “unique agricultural land”;34 
“high value agricultural land”;35 and “medium value agricultural land.”36 The sub-
classification is determined with reference to the “land capability”.37 In this regard, the Draft 
                                            
26 GN 984 GG 40247 of 02-09-2016. 
27 GN 210 GG 38545 of 13-03-2015 5. 
28 Section 1 of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970; G Frantz Repealing the Subdivision of 
Agricultural Land Act: A constitutional analysis LLM thesis, Stellenbosch University (2010) 30. The definition 
of “agricultural land” was substituted by section 1 (a) of the Subdivision of Agricultural Amendment Act 55 of 
1972 and also by Proclamation R100 of 31 October 1995.  
29 See Chapter 2, 2 2 above.  
30 Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Bill in GN 984 GG 40247 of 02-09-2016. 
31 The definitions of agricultural land in both versions of the Bills (the Preservation and Development of 
Agricultural Land Framework Bill (draft) in GN 210 GG 38545 of 13-03-2015 and the Preservation and 
Development of Agricultural Land Bill in GN 984 GG 40247 of 02-09-2016) are similar, and almost identical. 
Accordingly it is only necessary to discuss the definition in the 2016 version of the Bill.  
32 See Chapter 2, 3 2 above.  
33 Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Draft Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land 
Policy (2015) in GN 210 GG 38545 of 13-03-2015. 
34 Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Draft Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land 
Policy (2015) 7. 
35 5. 
36 6.  




Preservation Policy makes provision for eight land capability classes.38 While the 
Preservation Bill proposes to update the definition of agricultural land, it still, like SALA, 
defines agricultural land as a residual category.39 Accordingly, the Preservation Bill, like 
SALA, ALA and ACLRA, provides for a category of agricultural land, but does not provide 
content to the concept of agricultural land. In summation, the Draft Preservation Policy 
defines agricultural land in relation to the purpose for which it is used, whereas the 
Preservation Bill defines agricultural land as a residual category of land. The implication of 
this difference in classification for purposes of the redistribution programme is reflected on 
below.  
Interestingly, while “agricultural land” is defined as a residual category of land in the 
Preservation Bill, the Bill also provides for “unique agricultural land”40 and also distinguishes 
between “high potential cropping [or agricultural] land”41 and “medium value agricultural 
land”42 with reference to the different “land capability classes”43 as set out in the Draft 
Preservation Policy. Although the definition of agricultural land in the Draft Preservation 
Policy and Preservation Bill differs substantially, the definitions may still be reconcilable and 
may provide for a clear concept of agricultural land. The Preservation Bill identifies 
geographical areas that constitute agricultural land within South Africa, by excluding certain 
areas from its definition.44 Therefore, the Preservation Bill, like SALA, outlines the 
parameters of agricultural land in South Africa. The Draft Preservation Policy describes 
specifically what these geographical areas of land as demarcated through the operation of 
the definition of agricultural in the Preservation Bill are or may be used for.45 In this light, the 
definitions of agricultural land set out in the Policy and Bill are reconcilable. If revised and 
promulgated, the Preservation Bill, read with the Draft Preservation Policy, may provide for 
a clear and overarching or national concept of agricultural land in South Africa, namely 
certain demarcated land used for agricultural purposes. 
                                            
38Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Draft Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land 
Policy (2015) 6.  
39 Clause 1 of the Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Bill. 
40 Clause 1 of the Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Bill. 
41 Clause 1 of the Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Bill. 
42 Clause 1 of the Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Bill. 
43 Clause 1 of the Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Bill. 
44 Clause 1 of the Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Bill. 
45 Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Draft Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land 




Similarly to SALA, the Regulation Bill defines agricultural land as a residual category of 
land46 but does not provide more clarity on the content of the concept of agricultural land. 
However, the exclusions listed in SALA and the Regulation Bill differ substantially. When 
SALA and the Regulation Bill are compared it is clear that there is no uniform or single 
definition of what constitutes agricultural land. Accordingly, no clear, single definition of 
agricultural land emerges when comparing SALA and the Regulation Bill. However, when 
the definitions of agricultural land as defined in the Preservation and Regulation Bill are 
compared, it is clear that the definitions are similar and almost identical and capable of 
providing a clear and uniform indication of what constitutes agricultural land in South Africa. 
Accordingly, if it is assumed that the Preservation Bill (read with the Draft Preservation 
Policy) will commence and replace SALA, as envisaged, then the definition of agricultural 
land for purposes of this dissertation may constitute the following: Any private or public land 
in South Africa used for agricultural purposes, except (a) land in a township; (b) land zoned 
for non-agricultural purposes in terms of any legislation; and (c) land excluded by the 
Minister by notice in the Government Gazette.  
2 5 Reflection  
Until such time as the Regulation Bill and Preservation Bill are promulgated, the definition 
of agricultural land as set out in SALA remains operational. This definition only provides for 
agricultural land as a residual category of land. In principle, defining agricultural land as a 
residual category means that more agricultural land is available for redistribution. However, 
such a definition does not take into account the purpose for which the land may be used. 
For example, not all land falling into this category may be capable of being used for 
agricultural purposes. Accordingly, in line with the land needs and demands of the 
beneficiaries, the purpose for which the land will be used must also be taken into 
consideration when defining agricultural land for purposes of redistribution.  
Under SALA, agricultural land constitutes certain demarcated areas of land in South Africa. 
Agricultural land is defined in accordance with where it is situated, and not with regard to 
the purpose for which it can or will be used. However, if the Regulation Bill and Preservation 
Bill, read with the Draft Preservation Policy, are promulgated, these legislative and policy 
measures will provide for a wider definition of agricultural land in South Africa, which takes 
                                            




into account the purpose for which the land may be used. This has clear implications for 
extending the scope of land available in principle for redistribution.   
In comparison, in Namibia there is a move away from the concept of agricultural land as an 
inflexible residual category of land. If the Land Bill is promulgated, it will provide for a uniform, 
national definition of agricultural land, namely any land, private or public, used for agricultural 
purposes. Agricultural purposes may be defined widely to include private and public (or 
communal) land used for commercial or subsistence farming or grazing. Similarly, at a 
national level, India’s legislative measures provide for a wide definition of agricultural land, 
such as land used for “agricultural purposes” or land used for the purpose of “agriculture”. 
However, each State, given its specific climatic conditions and land capabilities, provides a 
different list of agricultural purposes or for a definition of “agriculture”.  
If the Regulation Bill and the Preservation Bill (read with the Draft Preservation Policy) are 
promulgated together, agricultural land may be regarded as any private or public land in 
South Africa, used for or capable of being used for agricultural purposes, except for (a) land 
in a township; (b) land zoned for non-agricultural purposes in terms of any legislation; and 
(c) land excluded by the Minister by notice in the Government Gazette. Accordingly, such 
an interpretation provides for a national or overarching concept of agricultural land in South 
Africa. Given South Africa’s topography and current and/or changing climatic conditions, it 
may be further proposed that each province, similar to a State in India, provide in legislation 
or policy, what constitutes “agricultural purposes” for that region.  The details pertaining to 
what constitutes “agricultural purposes” are then left to the relevant provincial legislator or 
policy maker.  
3 Mechanisms for the regulation of agricultural land  
3 1 Introduction  
There are various mechanisms that provide for the regulation of agricultural land. However, 
as mentioned throughout this dissertation, the focus falls on the following regulatory 
mechanisms specifically: (a) subdivision restrictions; (b) land ceilings; and (c) restrictions 
relating to foreign ownership of agricultural land as measures that either restrict or promote 
the redistribution of agricultural land.  
When comparing subdivision restrictions and restrictions on foreigners disposing of or 




and Namibia. As mentioned above, India is an important comparative case study for land 
reform in general. However, it is their experience with land ceiling legislation specifically, 
and the consequent redistribution of surplus land to the poor, landless and marginal farmers, 
that is of particular significance for the South African position. Importantly, as set out in 
Chapter 8,47 the only regulatory mechanism discussed for the regulation of agricultural land 
in India is the use of land ceilings. Because Namibia does not provide for land ceilings it will 
not contribute to the discussion on land ceilings as measures to regulate agricultural land. 
Accordingly, when comparing the imposition of land ceilings, the comparison will be 
restricted to the position in South Africa and India.  
3 2 Restrictions on the subdivision of agricultural land in Namibia and South Africa 
Both South Africa and Namibia use SALA, which prohibits the subdivision of agricultural land 
in principle.48 The prohibition is, however, not absolute. Agricultural land may still be 
subdivided where ministerial consent is obtained. The underlying reason for placing 
restrictions on the subdivision of agricultural land in both countries is to prevent the 
uneconomic fragmentation of agricultural land or to protect the economic viability of 
agricultural land. Where land is fragmented, it poses a risk to the economic viability and 
capacity in relation to the productivity of the land. It is argued that a decrease in the 
productivity of the land as a result of fragmentation could ultimately impact negatively on 
food security.49 
In Namibia, given the scarcity of arable land, a national policy on subdivision of agricultural 
land was also formulated. In this regard, the 2018 National Policy on Subdivision and 
Consolidation of Agricultural Land50 aims to prevent agricultural land from diminishing into 
uneconomical and ecologically non-sustainable land units.51 As mentioned in Chapter 7,52 
the Policy provides for strategies to promote and ensure the sustainable existence of 
agriculture for current and future generations in Namibia, namely: (a) setting a minimum size 
of agricultural land units;53 (b) placing restrictions on the subdivision of agricultural land; (c) 
consolidating agricultural land units; (d) evaluating agricultural land productivity; and (e) 
                                            
47 See Chapter 8, 3 above.  
48 Section 3 of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970. 
49 Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Forestry National Policy on Subdivision and Consolidation of Agricultural 
Land (March 2018) 2, 4. 
50 2, 4.  
51 2, 4. 
52 See Chapter 7, 3 2 2 above.  
53 Interestingly, Namibia thus prosposes “floor” legislation for agricultural land, as opposed to “ceiling” 




restricting the use of high potential soils for the use of non-agricultural activities.54 In other 
words, the Policy advocates for a “floor” limit, as opposed to a “ceiling” limit in South Africa,55  
for the regulation of agricultural land.  
In comparison, there is no national policy on subdivision of agricultural land in South Africa. 
However, the Preservation Bill, which will replace SALA if promulgated, will also prohibit the 
subdivision of agricultural land without prior consent from the Minister.56 The aims of this Bill 
are more complex and encompassing in comparison to the aims of SALA. While the Bill, like 
SALA, aims to prevent the subdivision of agricultural land into uneconomic parcels, it also 
aims to promote the preservation and sustainable development of agricultural land; identify 
protected agricultural areas; put in place measures to promote long-term viable and resilient 
farming units; provide for mitigating measures to counteract the increasing loss of 
agricultural land and set up a National Agricultural Land Registry.57 However, as mentioned 
in Chapter 3,58 the development of other legislative instruments, namely the Regulation Bill, 
resulted in the announcement by the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries that this 
Bill will be reconsidered and redrafted.  
In contrast to SALA and the Preservation Bill, Act 126 provides that agricultural land may be 
subdivided where land is acquired for redistribution purposes. The underlying reason for 
subdivision in this regard is to ensure that it does not act as a constraint to the State’s 
mandate to redistribute agricultural land. Similarly, ACLRA also provides that the Minister of 
Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation may subdivide agricultural land into holdings for the 
redistribution thereof to persons for purposes of small-scale farming.59 Accordingly, where 
agricultural land is concerned, two opposing positions motivated by different legislative aims 
exist.  
                                            
54 Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Forestry National Policy on Subdivision and Consolidation of Agricultural 
Land (March 2018) 5-7. 
55 See Chapter 3, 3 3 above.  
56 Clause 19 of the Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Bill. 
57 Preamble of the Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Bill. 
58 See Chapter 3, 3 2 2 2 above.  




3 3 Restrictions on the amount of agricultural land an owner may own in India and South 
Africa  
Land ceiling legislation adopted and implemented by all the States in India placed limitations 
(or ceilings) on the amount of agricultural land a person or family could own.60 In comparison, 
the Regulation Bill provides for an envisaged framework which also provides for restrictions 
on the amount of agricultural land an individual or entity may own. Given the history of 
dispossession in India, the underlying reason for the imposition of land ceilings is to ensure 
a more equal distribution of agricultural land between the wealthy and the poor. Accordingly, 
there is a need to redistribute land more equally by class. In comparison, as a result of past 
discriminatory practices, the underlying reason for the possible imposition of land ceilings is 
also to ensure a more equal distribution of agricultural land among South African citizens. 
However, where there is no connection with race where redistribution of agricultural land is 
concerned in India, race is a pivotal factor in the South African context when redistributing 
agricultural land. Therefore, as also reiterated by the Regulation Bill, there is the need to 
redistribute agricultural land more equally by race and class.61  
While the underlying reason for the imposition of land ceilings in India is clear, the land 
ceiling legislation generally did not live up to its expectations.62 As mentioned in Chapter 8,63 
the imposition of ceilings has generally not led to any effective redistribution of agricultural 
land, but instead, aggravated India’s existing problem of uneconomical fragmented land 
holdings, which has led to a general decline in agricultural productivity.64 Accordingly, 
insights can be drawn from the reasons for the failure of land ceiling legislation on the one 
hand and implications of such failure, on the other. For comparative purposes, the focus 
falls on the experience in West Bengal, which is identified as one of the States where the 
formulation and implementation of the land ceiling legislation was effective and successful 
in relation to the redistribution of ceiling-surplus land. The insights drawn from the 
experience in West Bengal will be important for possibly establishing a clearly formulated 
legal and institutional framework for land ceilings in South Africa. 
                                            
60 NC Behuria Land Reform Legislations in India: A Comparative Study (1997) 166-183; PS Appu Land 
Reforms in India: A Survey of Policy, Legislation and Implementation (1996) 140, 144. See Chapter 8, 3 2 1 
above.  
61 Preamble of the Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill. 
62 T Hanstad, R Nielsen, D Vhugen & T Haque “Learning from old and new approaches to land reform in India”  
in HP Binswanger-Mkhize, C Bourguignon & R van den Brink (eds) Agricultural Land Redistribution: Toward 
Greater Consensus 246-248.  
63 See Chapter 8, 3 3 above.  
64 Hanstad et al “Learning from old and new approaches to land reform in India”  in Agricultural Land 




3 3 1 Reasons for failure of land ceiling legislation  
Ceiling legislation differs from State to State in relation to the formulation of (a) the unit of 
application;65 (b) the classification of land; (c) exemptions from the ceiling legislation; (d) 
ceiling limit; (e) payment of compensation; and (f) who the beneficiaries are and what type 
of land rights are granted to them once they have acquired the ceiling-surplus land. In light 
of the widely differential approach to land ceilings, it is inevitable that some States would be 
more successful than others. Despite some exceptions,66 the imposition of land ceilings was 
largely ineffective and unsuccessful for redistribution purposes.67 According to various 
authors,68 the ineffective use of the land ceiling legislation can be attributed to various factors 
or considerations, discussed in more detail below. These considerations are of particular 
significance for proposing a clearly formulated legal and institutional framework for land 
ceilings in South Africa. In this regard, the Regulation Bill, in its current form, may require 
further amendments. 
3 3 1 1 The formulation of the ceiling legislation  
The definition of land or agricultural land, the unit of application;69 the classification of land; 
the number of exemptions; the ceiling limit and the retrospectivity of the legislation, are 
important aspects when formulating land ceiling legislation. In essence, the specific 
formulation of ceiling legislation in India allowed land owners to circumvent the provisions 
and application thereof.70 Accordingly, the position in West Bengal and South Africa in 
relation to these aspects will be set out below.  
                                            
65 The ceiling may be applicable to an individual or a family as a unit. 
66 According to, T Hanstad & J Brown “Land reform law and implementation in West Bengal: Lessons and 
recommendations” (2001) 112 Rural Development Institute Reports on Foreign Aid and Development 4, West 
Bengal comprises only 3.3% of the land in India, but it is responsible for 20% of the redistribution of surplus-
ceiling land. The Government of India, Ministry of Rural Development, Department of Land Resources Draft 
National Land Reforms Policy (18 July 2013) 5 policy identifies West Bengal, Kerala and Jammu & Kashmir 
as achieving some measure of success with the implementation of its land ceiling policy. See also Government 
of India, Ministry of Rural Development, Department of Land Resources Report on State Agrarian Relations 
and the Unfinished Task in Land Reforms (2008) 27; Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, 
Agricultural Land Holding Policy Framework: Setting upper and lower bands for the ownership and use of 
agricultural landholdings (July 2013) 14; Hanstad et al “Learning from old and new approaches to land reform 
in India”  in Agricultural Land Redistribution: Toward Greater Consensus 246-247. 
67 Appu Land Reforms in India 178; Government of India, Ministry of Rural Development, Department of Land 
Resources Draft National Land Reforms Policy (18 July 2013) 5; C Ashokvardhan Ceiling laws in India (2005) 
9, 15.  
68 Hanstad et al “Learning from old and new approaches to land reform in India”  in Agricultural Land 
Redistribution: Toward Greater Consensus 246; Behuria Land Reform Legislations in India 132.  
69 The ceiling may be determined with reference to an individual unit or a family unit, depending on the 
particular State’s ceiling legislation. See 3 3 1 1 1 below.  
70 Sethi “Land reform in India: Issues and challenges” in Promised Land: Competing Visions of Agrarian Reform 




3 3 1 1 1 The unit of application  
Land ceiling legislation defines the size of land that an individual or family can own. The “unit 
of application” must thus be understood in relation to the determination of the ceiling limit. 
Depending on the particular State’s ceiling legislation, the ceiling limit may be determined 
and applied in relation to an “individual unit” or a “family unit”.71 Accordingly the unit of 
application refers to the calculation of the ceiling limit relative to an individual or family, as a 
unit.  
In terms of the unit of application, the State of West Bengal initially determined that the 
ceiling should apply to individual landholders.72 However, subsequent to the 
recommendations in the 1972-guidelines, West Bengal changed the unit of application to 
“family” holdings. If the ceiling limit is applied to each family member as an individual unit, 
less land is available for redistribution. In contrast, when the ceiling limit is calculated in 
relation to a family unit instead, more land becomes available for redistribution purposes. 
For example, a family consisting of five members and constituting a unit will be allowed to 
keep less land, than if the ceiling limit is applied in relation to the family members as 
individual units or holders.  
The ceiling legislation in West Bengal provides for a concept of family, limited to five 
members to constitute a unit.73 By way of contrast, the Regulation Bill provides that the 
ceiling should apply to individual private and public land owners, including natural, juristic 
and foreign persons, and not to a family unit or holding. Arguably, it would be too difficult to 
formulate a standardised concept of “family”74 in South Africa or to limit the number of family 
members to five to constitute a unit or holding.  
                                            
71 Before 1972, the basis for determining the ceiling limit was an individual as a unit, as opposed to a family. 
Following the 1972-guidelines, it was recommended that a “family” be considered as the unit of application for 
land ceilings. 
72 K Venkutasubramanian “Land reforms remain an unfinished business” (2013) 
<http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/articles/venka/index.php?repts=m-land.htm> (accessed 11 January 
2019).   
73 Behuria Land Reforms Legislation in India 133. 
74 See for example, Hattingh v Juta 2012 5 SA 237 (SCA) para 17 and Hattingh v Juta 2013 3 SA 275 (CC) 
para 34, referring to Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC) para 31 where the court held that 
families come in different shapes and sizes. These cases highlight the difficulty forming a concept of “family” 




3 3 1 1 2 The classification of land  
With regard to the classification of land,75 some Indian States classified their land into 
different classes76 or according to a “standard acre”.77 In light of the fact that South Africa is 
not a federal state, it would be sufficient to classify agricultural land, as defined by each 
province,78 in accordance with a “standard hectare”.79 To illustrate, in terms of the WBLRA, 
a "standard hectare" in relation to agricultural land is, equivalent to (a) 1.00 hectare in an 
irrigated area and (b) 1.40 hectares in any other area.80 In relation to any other land, 
including land comprised in an orchard, a standard hectare is equivalent to 1.40 hectares.81 
Furthermore, the Regulation Bill provides for the consideration of land capability factors, 
such as different classes of land, including, high, medium and unique agricultural land when 
determining the ceiling limit. This means that the specific classification of land may guide 
and ultimately restrict the ceiling limit.  
3 3 1 1 3 The definition of (agricultural) land  
The inadequate definition of agricultural land allowed land owners to re-classify their land to 
fall outside the scope of ceiling legislation, thereby circumventing it.82 In comparison to other 
States, West Bengal adopted a very wide definition of “land”,83 as opposed to “agricultural 
                                            
75 Behuria Land Reform Legislations in India 166-183. 
76 For example, in Andhra Pradesh, before the 1972-guidelines were imposed, a family holding was defined to 
be equal to either 6 acres of class A land; 8 acres of class B land; 10 acres of class C land etc.See sections 
3(d), 3 (e) and 3(v) of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act 1 of 1973; 
section 12 of the Assam Fixation of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act 1 of 1957; section 4 of the Bihar Land 
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16 of 1960; section 4 of the Punjab Land Reforms Act 10 of 1973; section 4 of the Rajasthan Imposition of 
Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act 11 of 1973; schedule 2 of the Sikkim Agricultural Land Ceilings and 
Reforms Act 14 of 1978; section 2(40) of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act 58 
of 1961; section 2(11) of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act 18 of 
1978 and section 14(K)(f) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act 10 of 1965. 
77 Because an acre is a measure of area, not length, it is defined in square feet. The size of a one “standard 
acre” is equal to 4,840 square yards, which is equal to 4,047 square metres, which in turn is equal to 43,560 
square feet is equal or 0.405 hectares. 
78 As proposed at 2 5 above.  
79 A “standard hectare” is an accepted metric system unit of area equal to a square with 100-metre sides, or 
10,000 m2, and is primarily used in the measurement of land. There are 100 hectares in one square kilometre. 
An acre is about 0.405 hectare and one hectare contains about 2.47 acres. 
80 Section 14K(f)(i) of the West Bengal Land Reform Act 10 of 1956.   
81 Sections 14K(f)(ii) and (iii) of the West Bengal Land Reform Act 10 of 1956.   
82 Hanstad & Brown “Land reform law and implementation in West Bengal: Lessons and recommendations” 
(2001) Rural Development Institute Reports on Foreign Aid and Development 26; T Besley & R Burgress “Land 
Reform, Poverty Reduction and Growth: Evidence from India” (2000) 115 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 
389-430, 394. 




land”, which prevented land owners from reclassifying their land and thus circumventing the 
legislation.84 By way of comparison, the Regulation Bill in South Africa is only applicable to 
agricultural land, defined as a residual category of land.85 Accordingly, the Regulation Bill 
applies to all land, except those areas excluded from the definition of agricultural land, even 
where the land cannot be used for agricultural purposes. Given the wide definition of 
agricultural land in the Regulation Bill specifically, it will be less probable for land owners to 
argue that their land falls outside the scope of the legislation and therefore less likely for 
land owners to circumvent the provisions of the Regulation Bill. This wider definition of 
agricultural land will also ensure that more land is available in principle for redistribution.  
3 3 1 1 4 The exemptions  
Apart from the formulation of the definition of land, Indian States also allowed for a number 
of exemptions in the land ceiling legislation.86 West Bengal is one of the States with the 
smallest number of exemptions, which resulted in more land (not only agricultural land) 
being available for redistribution.87 While there are no listed exemptions in the Regulation 
Bill, the Bill provides that “the Minister may determine special categories of ceilings and 
exempt a particular category of agricultural land holding”88 from the operation of the land 
ceilings. In this regard, the Regulation Bill does not provide for guidelines or criteria for 
determination of special categories or exemptions. The Regulation Bill also specifically 
provides that “institutional funds that own agricultural land holdings portions of which 
constitute” ceiling surplus land, may by way of application to the Minister be exempted from 
the provisions dealing with land ceilings.89 Importantly, the Minister has the discretion to 
exempt particular categories of land or institutional funds from the operation of the ceiling 
legislation, subject to an application procedure.  
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85 See 2 4 above.  
86 See Chapter 8, 3 2 3 above. See also Behuria Land Reforms Legislation in India 132; Appu Land Reform in 
India 154; Government of India, Ministry of Rural Development, Department of Land Resources Report on 
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3 3 1 1 5 The ceiling limit  
Ceiling limits in India were set too high in relation to the average household operational 
holdings to have much of an impact on the agrarian sector.90 The higher the ceiling the less 
land could be identified as ceiling-surplus land, which also resulted in less land being 
available for redistribution.91 As explained, compared to other States, West Bengal from the 
outset provided for a low ceiling, applicable to all land, in its legislation which may have 
contributed to more successful and effective redistribution of land. 
Chapter 7 of the Regulation Bill provides for the categories of ceilings for agricultural land 
holdings. The provisions relating to determining the land ceilings are challenging.  
The wording of the Regulation Bill in its current format in relation to the determination of 
agricultural land ceilings is very clear: Different categories of land ceilings may be 
determined for different districts and regions.92 While the point of departure is thus that 
various regions and areas will be approached differently, there is still no certainty regarding 
precise ceilings. Exact ceilings for each district are to be announced by notice in 
the Government Gazette, by the Minister, after consultation.93 As mentioned above, the 
Minister has the discretion to determine special categories of ceilings and may also provide 
for exemptions of particular categories of land holdings.94 For the determination of ceilings 
for agricultural land holdings for each district, regard must be had to “such criteria and factors 
as may be prescribed”.95 The following criteria and factors are listed: (a) land capability 
factors (essentially high, medium or unique agricultural land,96 matters pertaining to 
production output, variations in physical potential in terms of soil type, and the relationship 
between resources); (b) capital requirements of different enterprises; (c) measure of 
expected household and agro-enterprise income; (d) annual turnover; (e) relationship 
between product prices and price margins; and (f) any other matter as may be prescribed.97  
                                            
90 R Mearns “Access to land in rural India: policy issues and options” World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper 2123 (May 1999) 10; Behuria Land Reforms Legislation in India 132.  
91 See Government of India, Ministry of Rural Development, Department of Land Resources Report on State 
Agrarian Relations and the Unfinished Task in Land Reforms (2008) 28. 
92 JM Pienaar “Land Reform: January to March” (2017) 1 Juta Quarterly Review 1-8, 3; clause 25(1) of the 
Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill. 
93 Clause 25(1) of the Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill. 
94 Clause 25(1)(c) of the Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill. 
95 Clause 25 (2) of the Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill. 
96 These concepts are not defined in the Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill. 




In summation, there is no standard ceiling applicable to all agricultural land in South Africa. 
Instead, the ceiling limit is determined per district or region, having regard to the various 
criteria and factors prescribed above. It remains to be seen what the ceiling limit, per district 
or region will be in South Africa. In line with the approach in West Bengal, the ceiling should 
be low, rather than high, provided that the criteria and factors listed in the Regulation Bill for 
the determination of the ceiling limit allow for it.  
3 3 1 1 6 The retrospective effect  
In general, land ceiling legislation in India did not provide for prohibiting transfers 
retrospectively.98 Accordingly, in anticipation of the implementation of land ceiling legislation, 
land owners resorted to partitions and fictitious transfers to circumvent the legislation.99 In 
this regard, only the States of Gujarat and West Bengal provided for the retrospective effect 
of the land ceiling legislation. Other States only banned transfers after the implementation 
of the ceiling law.100 For example, in West Bengal the legislation provides that land 
transferred by sale, gift or otherwise partitioned by a raiyat after the 7th of August 1969, but 
before the publication of the West Bengal Land Reform (Amendment) Act, 1971 shall be 
taken into account in determining the ceiling area, as if the land had not been transferred or 
partitioned.101 The Act also provides that this provision shall not apply to bona fide transfers 
or partitions and that the onus of proving such a transfer or partition shall lie with the 
transferor.102 Furthermore, the transfer or partition will be deemed to be mala fide if the 
transfer or partition was made in favour of the transferor’s relatives.103  
The Regulation Bill, in its current form, does not provide for prohibiting transfers 
retrospectively. The Regulation Bill only provides that “any agreement to acquire or dispose 
of agricultural land is void, in so far as it purports to exclude, or to limit, any provision of this 
Act”104 from the date of commencement of the Act. It may be pivotal for the effective and 
successful use of land ceilings to include a provision in the Regulation Bill that prohibits the 
transfer of agricultural land retrospectively. The question remains from what date the 
                                            
98 For an exposition of the States which provided for land ceiling legislation with retrospective effect, see 
Behuria Land Reforms Legislation in India 184-211.  
99 Behuria Land Reforms Legislation in India 132.  
100 132. 
101 Section 14P(1) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act 10 of 1956.  
102 Section 14P(2) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act 10 of 1956. 
103 Section 14P(2) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act 10 of 1956 provides that relatives are regarded as 
the transferor’s wife, husband, child, grand child, parent, grandparent, brother, sister, brother’s son or 
daughter, sister’s son or daughter, daughter’s husband or son’s wife, wife’s brother or sister, brother’s wife. 




legislation should operate retrospectively. Other South African land reform legislation may 
provide guidance pertaining to the retrospective date for the operation of the Regulation Bill. 
For example, the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996 was assented to on 22 March 
1996. However, “to protect labour tenants who might have been evicted or who might have 
suffered a reduction of rights in anticipation of the enactment of the Act”105 the Act has 
retrospective effect to allow protection for persons who were labour tenants on 2 June 
1995.106 This date marks the date on which the Labour Tenants Bill was first published for 
comment. Similarly, the Regulation Bill in relation to the operation of land ceilings 
specifically, may provide that it operates retrospectively from the date it was published for 
comment, namely on 17 March 2017. In this way, the land transferred from the date 17 
March 2017 to the date of commencement of the Regulation Bill shall be taken into account 
in determining the ceiling area, as if the land had not been transferred.107  The Regulation 
Bill should also, like the WBLRA, provide for bona fide transfers. This may prevent land 
owners from resorting to mala fide partitions and fictitious transfers of agricultural land, 
before the promulgation and implementation of the Regulation Bill.  
3 3 1 2 The implementation of the land ceiling legislation  
The reluctance of Indian States to implement land ceilings vigorously, is regarded as another 
reason for the failure of land ceiling legislation.108 Various reasons for the States’ reluctance 
may be highlighted, including: (a) lack of political will on the part of the States;109 (b) 
administrative delays given the tedious processes set out in the ceiling legislation for 
acquiring and disposing of the ceiling-surplus land; and/or (c) land disputes in courts dealing 
with the classification of land and determining whether the land constitutes ceiling-surplus 
land.110 However, the determination of fair compensation, which was calculated differently 
                                            
105 M Cowling, D Hornby & L Oettlé Commissioned report for High Level Panel on the assessment of key 
legislation and the acceleration of fundamental change, an initiative of the Parliament of South Africa: 
Research Report on the Tenure Security of Labour Tenants and Former Labour Tenants in South Africa (June 
2017) 
<https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Pages/2017/october/High_Level_Panel/Commissioned_
Report_land/Commissioned_Report_on_Tenure_Security_AFRA.pdf> (accessed 04-08-2019) 5.  
106 Section 3(1) of the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996.  
107 Section 14P(1) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act 10 of 1956.  
108 Sethi “Land reform in India: Issues and challenges” in Promised Land: Competing Visions of Agrarian 
Reform 75; Hanstad et al “Learning from old and new approaches to land reform in India”  in Agricultural Land 
Redistribution: Toward Greater Consensus 246-248. 
109 Hanstad et al “Learning from old and new approaches to land reform in India”  in Agricultural Land 
Redistribution: Toward Greater Consensus 247-248.  
110 Government of India, Ministry of Rural Development, Department of Land Resources Draft National Land 
Reforms Policy (18 July 2013) 25 provides that the absence of a common adjudicatory body and uniform 
procedure is leading to complexities and delays in the settlement of land disputes. See also Government of 
India, Ministry of Rural Development, Department of Land Resources Report on State Agrarian Relations and 




by each State, could not be challenged in the courts111 and therefore could not and did not 
contribute to the delay in the implementation of land ceiling legislation. The amount of 
compensation is also discussed below as a proposed and separate reason for the failure of 
land ceiling legislation in India.112   
As explained, West Bengal is regarded as one of the States that administered and 
implemented its land ceiling legislation effectively.113 Furthermore, in light of the resolution 
of land disputes by the civil courts which follow strenuous procedures and may be time-
consuming and costly, the WBLRA bars the jurisdiction of civil court in almost all matters 
dealt with in the Act.114 Instead, the disputes between raiyats or between the raiyats and the 
government are decided by the revenue officers.115 Appeals may be brought before the 
District Land and Land Reforms Officer or any other senior officers appointed or allocated 
for the purpose of hearing appeals.116 Therefore, the particular forum for disputes is 
prescribed resulting in: (a) a specialised fixed forum; and (b) a less complex and time-
consuming dispute resolution process.  
In light of the above, South Africa requires an effective land administration system 
characterised by (a) a strong political will on the part of the executive, specifically the 
DALRRD to implement and monitor compliance with land ceiling legislation; (b) a clear and 
effective administrative process, governed by a competent body for the acquisition and 
redistribution of ceiling-surplus land; (c) an effective mechanism for resolving land disputes 
timeously dealing with inter alia the classification of land and determining whether the land 
                                            
111 Article 31C of the Constitution of India, 1950.  
112 See 3 3 1 4 below.  
113 According to, T Hanstad & J Brown “Land reform law and implementation in West Bengal: Lessons and 
recommendations” (2001) Rural Development Institute Reports on Foreign Aid and Development, Report No. 
112 1-66 4, West Bengal comprises only 3.3% of the land in India, but it is responsible for 20% of the 
redistribution of surplus-ceiling land. The Government of India, Ministry of Rural Development, Department of 
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and Jammu & Kashmir as achieving some measure of success with the implementation of its land ceiling 
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Government of India, Ministry of Rural Development, Department of Land Resources Report on State Agrarian 
Relations and the Unfinished Task in Land Reforms (2008) 27; Department of Rural Development and Land 
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use of agricultural landholdings (July 2013) 14; Hanstad et al “Learning from old and new approaches to land 
reform in India”  in Agricultural Land Redistribution: Toward Greater Consensus 246-247 Just check, but I think 
this fn appears in two other places 
114 Sections 34 and 61 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act 10 of 1956.  
115 Section 53A of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act 10 of 1956. See also LGAF Team, Landesa “Improving 
land governance in West Bengal” (2014) State Report: Land Governance Assessment Framework 16.  
116 Section 54 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act 10 of 1956. See also LGAF Team, Landesa “Improving 
land governance in West Bengal” (2014) State Report: Land Governance Assessment Framework 16 which 
states that an aggrieved party may approach the Land Reforms Tenancy Tribunal against the decisions of the 
appellate authority and the decision of the Tribunal can be challenged before the Division Bench of the High 




constitutes ceiling surplus land and the determination of just and equitable compensation; 
and (d) sufficient capacity and resources to undergird the relevant mechanisms.  
The Regulation Bill makes provision for a Land Commission, which must oversee the 
administrative process regulating the acquisition and redistribution of ceiling-surplus land.117 
As mentioned in Chapter 3 and below,118 co-operation between the Land Commission and 
other departments and offices, such as the DALRRD;119 the Office of the Registrar of Deeds 
and the OVG will be required to ensure an effective administrative process. However, as 
mentioned already, it is still unclear when and to what extent the OVG will be involved in the 
redistribution process. Currently, the Regulation Bill does not provide for a dispute resolution 
mechanism for resolving land disputes. It is unclear whether the Land Claims Court 
(“LCC”)120 will have jurisdiction to resolve land disputes under the Regulation Bill or whether 
parties may resort to alternative dispute resolution. In the absence of any guidance 
pertaining to dispute resolution mechanisms, land owners will have to approach the courts 
to resolve land disputes which may delay the implementation of land ceiling legislation and 
the overall redistribution process. However, newly appointed Justice Minister Ronald 
Lamola announced that he planned to bring a draft Land Court Bill to Parliament, to help 
govern the adjudication of land restitution claims, expropriation and redistribution.121 At this 
point it is unclear whether the LLC may be transformed into the new “Land Court”.  
Such a newly constituted specialised Land Court could adjudicate on the categorisation of 
agricultural land and whether certain land is exempted from the operation of the Act and the 
determination of compensation for ceiling-surplus land. Accordingly, the Court may deal with 
                                            
117 Chapter 2 of the Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill. 
118 See 3 3 1 2 read with 3 3 1 3 below.  
119 On the 29th of May 2019, President Ramaphosa announced the appointment of a reconfigured national 
executive following the general elections <https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-
announces-reconfigured-departments-14-jun-2019-0000> (accessed 15-08-2019). The Minister of Agriculture, 
Land Reform and Rural Development is responsible for the newly reconstituted Department of Agriculture, 
Land Reform and Rural Development (DALRRD). This is a new department arising from a merger between 
the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) and the Department of Rural Development and 
Land Reform (DRDLR).  
120 There is a Court Bill apparently underway, nit is has not at the time of writing been published for comment 
yet.  
121 G Davis “Modernising SA Courts among Lamola’s top priorities” 
<https://ewn.co.za/2019/07/03/moderinising-sa-courts-among-ronald-lamola-s-top-priorities> (accessed 04-
08-2019). See also Address by Minister Ronald Lamola, MP Minister of Justice and Correctional Services at 
the occasion of the budget debate of the Office of the Chief Justice, July 2019, National Assembly, Cape Town 
(17 July 2019) <https://www.gov.za/speeches/budget-debate-office-chief-justice-17-jul-2019-0000> 




disputes related to the redistribution of agricultural land, which in turn, may ensure that a 
less complex and time-consuming dispute resolution process is followed.  
In general, the inadequate formulation of the land ceiling legislation in relation to its 
retrospectivity and untimely implementation of the ceiling legislation gave land owners time 
to dispose of land that would fall above the ceiling limit, by resorting to partitions and 
transfers as mentioned above.122 For example, land owners would resort to benami 
transactions123 to dispose of surplus land or gift the land among relations, friends and 
dependents.124 The disposal of surplus land to relations, friends and dependents, by way of 
benami transactions, not only made less land available for redistribution, but it was also 
difficult to determine who the true owner of the property, specifically (agricultural) land was. 
Accordingly, the act of monitoring the type of transactions conducted is also integral in the 
legislation’s success or not. These types of transactions also contributed towards inaccurate 
or incomplete land records, which is also regarded as one of the reasons for the failure of 
land ceiling legislation in India.  
As explained, in South Africa, SALA prohibits the subdivision or partition of agricultural land, 
without the written consent of the Minister of Agriculture, Forests and Fisheries. Accordingly, 
the provisions of SALA, read with the Regulation Bill, may restrict owners from subdividing 
and subsequently transferring portions of their agricultural land to relations, friends and 
dependents to circumvent the provisions of the Regulation Bill. Before the reconfiguration of 
the national executive on the 29th of May 2019, co-operation between the different 
departments, namely the DRDLR and the DAFF, would have been required to ensure that 
land owners, before the commencement of the Regulation Bill, did not subdivide and transfer 
ceiling-surplus land to relations, friends and dependents to circumvent the Regulation Bill. 
However, in light of the newly constituted DALRRD (which arises from a merger between 
the DAFF and the DRDLR), it may be more difficult to circumvent the aims of the Regulation 
Bill.  
3 3 1 3 The lack of accurate and updated land records  
The effective delivery of land rights to citizens is absolutely dependent on an efficient, secure 
and cost-effective deeds registry system. The lack of accurate and updated land records in 
                                            
122 Appu Land Reforms in India 154; Government of India, Ministry of Rural Development, Department of Land 
Resources, Report on State Agrarian Relations and the Unfinished Task in Land Reforms (2008) 28, 148.   
123 See Chapter 8, 3 3 above for a discussion of benami transactions.  




India is regarded as a major constraint on the effective implementation of ceiling 
legislation.125 Poor record-holding not only makes it difficult to identify the land owners (or 
raiyats), but it also poses difficulties in calculating or considering whether the legislation has 
been successful.126 In West Bengal, the Land Information System has three distinct 
divisions, i.e. (a) cadastral map;127 (b) record of rights;128 and (c) registration of conveyance 
instruments for transfer of land and mortgages. The cadastral map and the record of rights 
are prepared by the Land and Land Reforms Department, while the registration of deeds for 
transfer of land and mortgages is administrated by the Finance Department.129 The State 
has the obligation to maintain and update land records resulting from transfer or 
inheritance.130 The effectiveness of the ceiling legislation will be improved provided that the 
State takes appropriate and effective steps in continuously maintaining and updating the 
land records when land is transferred to beneficiaries under the Act.131 In 1990 West Bengal 
started digitizing the record of rights132 and is the first State to integrate digitized cadastral 
maps with related record of rights.133 In this regard, the State has recently amended the 
WBLRA to facilitate e-delivery of land records through affixing digital signatures.134 This has 
                                            
125 Mearns “Access to land in rural India: Policy issues and options” World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper 2123 (1999) 10; Hanstad et al “Learning from old and new approaches to land reform in India” in 
Agricultural Land Redistribution: Toward Greater Consensus 247, 259; Government of India, Ministry of Rural 
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129 LGAF Team, Landesa “Improving land governance in West Bengal” (2014) State Report: Land Governance 
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130 Section 50 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act 10 of 1956.  
131 LGAF Team, Landesa “Improving land governance in West Bengal” (2014) State Report: Land Governance 
Assessment Framework 14. 
132 Accordingly to the LGAF Team, Landesa “Improving land governance in West Bengal” (2014) State Report: 
Land Governance Assessment Framework 14, the record of rights are completely digitized except those of 
1473 odd revenue villages of three districts. Those records are expected to be completed within a short period 
of time. 
133 LGAF Team, Landesa “Improving land governance in West Bengal” (2014) State Report: Land Governance 
Assessment Framework 14. 




enhanced speed of service delivery to a great extent and has contributed to the effective 
implementation of the ceiling legislation.  
To ensure the effective implementation of the Regulation Bill in South Africa, accurate and 
updated land records are required. To this end, the Regulation Bill provides for the 
establishment of a Land Commission.135 As mentioned in Chapter 3, the Land Commission 
shall serve as the principal body to oversee the collection and dissemination of all 
information regarding ownership of public and private agricultural land136 and will 
consequently develop and maintain a register of agricultural land holdings in order to monitor 
the distribution and redistribution of agricultural land.137 Chapter 4 of the Regulation Bill 
requires land owners to disclose their present ownership and acquisition of ownership in 
respect of private agricultural land. Similarly, Chapter 5 of the Regulation Bill provides that 
the relevant accounting officer, in relation to public agricultural land, must submit details 
regarding the ownership and acquisition of public agricultural land. These disclosures and 
the land register will enable the government to monitor and evaluate its compliance with the 
constitutional directive to ensure land, tenure and related reforms.138 It will also make it 
easier to determine at what pace and to what extent redistribution of agricultural land has 
taken place in South Africa. Accordingly, in principle, the establishment of a land register is 
pivotal to the successful implementation of the land ceiling legislation. However, various 
concerns arise pertaining to the effective implementation of the Regulation Bill, including 
whether the Land Commission will have the technical ability to administer such a registry 
sufficiently and accurately.  
The creation of the register will be a monumental task equivalent to trying to recreate a 
significant portion of the existing Deeds Registry, while updating the register continuously 
and simultaneously. One reason for this task is to determine how much land the State owns 
and has available for redistribution. Although both the Land Commission and the Office of 
the Registrar of Deeds fall under the newly constituted DALRRD, it is unclear how the 
redistribution process will be reconciled with South Africa’s existing land registration process 
in terms of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937.139 No provision is made specifically for the 
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cooperation between the Office of the Land Commission; the Office of the Registrar of 
Deeds and the OVG140 in the Regulation Bill in relation to the transfer of ownership. For 
example,  it is questioned whether the register created by the Land Commission will replace 
the Deeds Registry wholly, partially or not at all, in light of the fact that the creation of the 
registry will recreate a significant portion of the existing Deeds Registry. It is also unclear 
what the responsibilities of the Land Commission and the Registrar of Deeds are in relation 
to the consolidation or subdivision of agricultural land.  
Recently, in September 2019, the President assented to the Electronic Deeds Registration 
Systems Act 19 of 2019. This Act aims to provide for the development, establishment and 
maintenance of an electronic deeds registration system141 (“e-DRS”) to administer, digitize 
and expedite the registration of deeds to ensure a more efficient and cost effective deeds 
registration process. Apart from the cooperation between the Land Commission and the 
Office of the Registrar of Deeds, cooperation with the Department of Agriculture, Land 
Reform and Rural Development is also required where agricultural land is subdivided and 
transferred.  
3 3 1 4 The lack of adequate or fair compensation  
The amount of compensation paid to land owners in India142 for ceiling-surplus land, made 
the programme unpopular with land owners, which in turn led to land owners using loopholes 
and gaps in the legislation discussed above.143 It is postulated that the prohibition against 
challenging the manner in which the amount of compensation is determined and/or the 
amounts awarded to land owners in a court of law also contributed to the use of loopholes 
and gaps in the legislation.144 As mentioned above, the WBLRA provides that the amount of 
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142 Mearns “Access to land in rural India: Policy issues and options” World Bank Policy Research Working 
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Redistribution: Toward Greater Consensus 246.  




compensation shall be equal to fifteen times the land “revenue”145 or its equivalent assessed 
for such land.146 Furthermore, where such land revenue or its equivalent has not been 
assessed or is not required to be assessed, an amount calculated at the rate of 135 rupees 
for an area of 0,4047 hectare automatically applies.147 Generally, the amount of 
compensation is lower than market value.148 
In terms of the Regulation Bill, the Minister may, in accordance with the legislation regulating 
expropriation, expropriate the ceiling-surplus land if the owner of the ceiling-surplus land 
and the Minister are unable to reach an agreement on the purchase price.149 Compensation, 
in line with the Constitution in its current form, must be just and equitable and may be higher 
or lower than market value, depending on the circumstances of each specific case.150 In 
contrast to the position in India, the amount of compensation may also be challenged in 
court151 which may further contribute to the tedious and time-consuming redistribution 
process and the slow pace of land reform in general. However, recent developments indicate 
that the Constitution may be amended to expressly provide for expropriation without 
compensation in certain cases.152 In this regard, the Draft Expropriation Bill of 2019 
discussed in Chapter 6,153 provides for categories of land which may be expropriated for 
land reform purposes, for nil compensation depending on the circumstances namely: (a) 
land occupied or used by labour tenants; (b) land held purely for speculative purposes; (c) 
land owned by a State-owned corporation or entity; (d) abandoned land; and (e) where the 
“market value of the land is equivalent to, or less than, the present value of direct state 
investment or subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital improvement of the land”. 
In this context, land owners may contest that their land falls outside the scope of such 
categories. Land owners are also entitled to challenge the amount of compensation, by way 
of mediation or in court.154 Importantly, a challenge to the amount of compensation paid to 
the land owner will not affect the vesting of ownership in the expropriating authority.155 
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Accordingly, the redistribution of agricultural land to beneficiaries may continue, regardless 
of whether there is a dispute regarding the amount of compensation paid. While the 
redistribution process may be more affordable in theory and contribute to the overall efficacy 
of the redistribution programme, it does not mean that the process will be less complex or 
more efficient.  
3 3 1 5 The lack of actual redistribution  
Where ceiling-surplus land was identified and acquired in India, it generally remained in the 
hands of the State government.156 Land can only be regarded as redistributed once it has 
been allotted and transferred to the intended beneficiaries.157 The lack of redistribution of 
ceiling-surplus land accordingly, also contributes to the success or failure of the 
implementation of the ceiling legislation in different States.  
In terms of the Regulation Bill, acquired ceiling-surplus land (“redistribution agricultural 
land”) must first be offered to Black persons.158 In this regard, there is a general concern 
that many Black people may not be able to exercise their right of first refusal, because they 
may not have the necessary financial resources.159 It is noteworthy that the Regulation Bill 
does not have any provisions dealing with financial assistance to Black people wishing to 
acquire the ceiling-surplus land. Instead, these provisions are set out in different policies, 
discussed in Chapter 5.160  
Where Black persons fail to exercise their right of first refusal, the redistribution agricultural 
land must be acquired by the State.161 The ceiling-surplus land will thus remain in the hands 
of the State and will still need to be redistributed. However, the Bill is silent on the procedure 
of redistribution once land has been acquired by the State. Presumably, in line with the 
preamble and the aims of the Regulation Bill, the State will acquire the land with a view to 
ultimately transfer the agricultural land to land reform beneficiaries. However, the Regulation 
Bill does not provide for a precise definition of beneficiaries or how the beneficiaries will be 
determined. The determination of the beneficiaries should either be set out in the regulations 
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or in policy.162 Such regulations or policy must provide for (a) the identification of 
beneficiaries; and (b) the types of land rights to be acquired by them. Furthermore, the 
Regulation Bill does not have provisions regulating instances where the Minister does not 
want to acquire the redistribution agricultural land,163 for example, when the land does not 
meet the developmental or planning objectives.164 
Moreover, the Minister is also unlikely to transfer any of it into the ownership of emergent 
Black farmers165 as this would conflict with the SLLDP166 of 2013. Under this SLLDP,167 
emergent Black farmers settled on land acquired by the State for redistribution purposes are 
confined to leasehold tenure and cannot easily obtain individual title. Black subsistence 
farmers are expected to remain perpetual tenants of the government.168 Large-scale Black 
farmers with the capacity for commercial production must lease their farms for 30 years, and 
thereafter for another two decades.169 Only after 50 years have passed may these farmers 
purchase these farms. In the interim, their leases may be terminated at any time for what 
the SLLDP describes as a lack of “production discipline”.170 In this regard, the Regulation 
Bill and SLLDP may not assist in redistributing (in the sense of providing ownership) of 
agricultural land to Black people. The implementation of the Regulation Bill and the SLLDP 
may bring about a system that closely resembles nationalisation.171 
The effective redistribution of agricultural land is therefore dependent on the transfer of 
ownership or land use to identified beneficiaries.172 In this regard, the South African 
government should: (a) provide financial assistance to Black persons wanting to acquire 
ceiling-surplus land in terms of the Regulation Bill; (b) provide guidelines or criteria according 
to which “replacement” beneficiaries may be identified where no Black person exercises 
their right to first refusal to acquire ceiling-surplus land; and (c) transfer ownership of the 
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land, in line with the concept of redistribution,173 to the identified beneficiaries in a timely 
manner. These actions may contribute to the success of the implementation of the 
Regulation Bill in South Africa.  
3 3 1 6 The quantity and the quality of redistributed agricultural land  
A distinction needs to be drawn between (a) the quantity of land redistributed and the 
number of beneficiaries who receive the land on the one hand, and (b) the quality of land 
redistributed and the number of beneficiaries on the other hand. 
Where land was redistributed, the Indian States distributed the land in relatively large 
parcels, which meant that only a small percentage of landless families benefitted.174 In such 
cases, more ceiling-surplus needs to be available for redistribution to benefit a larger number 
of beneficiaries.  
Unlike most States, West Bengal focused on distributing ceiling-surplus land to as many 
landless families as possible, instead of aiming to provide each beneficiary with a large 
farm.175 While the ceiling-surplus land was redistributed in relatively small parcels, it is 
unclear whether the quality of land was of such a nature for the beneficiaries to cultivate the 
land.176 Accordingly, it is unsurprising that many beneficiaries, once they received land of 
questionable quality for cultivation purposes, would want to sell and transfer it. However, 
some States completely prohibit beneficiaries from transferring ownership of the agricultural 
land when acquired,177 whereas other States prohibit transfer of ownership for a period of 
time only (ranging from 10-20 years).178 In West Bengal, no time period is attached to this 
prohibition and therefore it is unclear whether the beneficiary or his/her heirs may be allowed 
to sell the land in future once it is acquired. 
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The Regulation Bill provides that each region must take into consideration, inter alia, the 
land capability factors and climatic conditions to determine the ceiling limit.179 Depending on 
the ceiling limit, a variety of parcels of agricultural land, differing in size; type and/or quality 
will become available for redistribution. However, the Bill is silent on how much land and 
what type and/or quality of agricultural land will be redistributed to the beneficiaries. It is also 
unclear what type of land rights, namely ownership or land use rights, beneficiaries will 
acquire in relation to the agricultural land. Presumably, these details will be canvassed in 
regulations.  
It is opined that the quantity of the land to be redistributed should be determined by the 
quality of the ceiling-surplus land. Where the land is dry or arid, a larger parcel of land may 
be redistributed to a beneficiary, given the particular regional considerations. However, 
where the land is or can be irrigated or is fertile, a smaller parcel of land may be redistributed 
to the beneficiary. Regardless of the quality of land, financial assistance should be provided 
to the beneficiaries in principle. In light of the distinction between “redistribution” and “access 
to land”,180 the type of land right acquired in relation to the ceiling-surplus agricultural land 
also needs to be determined, either in the regulations to the Regulation Bill or in policy.  
3 4 Restrictions related to foreign ownership of agricultural land in Namibia and South Africa  
Ownership of agricultural land by foreign nationals is subject to regulatory restrictions in 
many countries. In this regard, policy objectives associated with such restrictions generally 
include: preventing foreign-based speculation in land; controlling the amount and direction 
of direct foreign investment; ensuring local control over food production and food security; 
promoting local or national interests and endeavours to benefit the local population; and 
indirectly controlling immigration.181 A spectrum of restrictions exist: Restrictions range from 
specific bans on foreign ownership of land to requirements that notice of foreign ownership 
be given to the relevant authority.182  
The Namibian Constitution specifically provides that the legislator may “prohibit or regulate 
as it deems expedient the right to acquire property by persons who are not Namibian 
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citizens”.183 ACLRA provides that no “foreign nationals”184 or nominee185 may acquire or 
occupy186 agricultural land without the prior written consent of the Minister.187   
Given the historical dispossession of agricultural land by foreigners and the consequent 
need to redistribute agricultural land to previously disadvantaged Namibian citizens, the 
primary underlying reason for these restrictions is to ensure that agricultural land is available 
for acquisition by citizens.  A secondary underlying reason would be to prevent foreign-
based speculation in land and controlling the amount and direction of direct foreign 
investment in Namibia.  
Accordingly, the acquisition of ownership of agricultural land by a foreign national is subject 
to an approval process set out in the Act. Importantly, this process does not place an 
absolute prohibition on the acquisition of agricultural by foreigners. Instead, ACLRA provides 
for criteria which must be satisfied for the Minister to grant approval for the acquisition of 
ownership by a foreign national.188  
The proposed 2016 Land Bill places a twofold prohibition on the acquisition of agricultural 
land by foreign nationals. In terms of this Bill, a foreign national will in general not be able to 
acquire ownership of agricultural land,189 unless the foreign national falls within one of the 
exemptions.190 The Bill does not only restrict the acquisition of ownership of agricultural land 
by foreign nationals, but also restricts foreign nationals from acquiring a right to occupy and 
use agricultural land. In terms of the Bill foreign nationals may obtain the right to occupy and 
use agricultural land or a portion thereof by way of lease.191 Accordingly, the Land Bill 
provides for a general prohibition relating to land rights – ownership, occupation or use. 
 
However, the acquisition of such a right is subject to a further restriction, namely written 
approval of the Minister.192 Similar to the provisions of ACLRA,193 there are also specific 
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conditions or criteria which a foreign national must fulfil before the Minister may approve the 
lease.194 Furthermore, the lease may only be:  
 
“for a period of 10 years at a time renewable or for a fixed period of less than 10 years, but which 
is renewable, and it being a condition of such agreement that the right of occupation of the land 
concerned may not exceed a period of 10 years in total, renewable for another maximum of 10 
years at a time”.195  
 
The Bill does not provide for a limitation on how many times a foreign national may renew 
the lease where the lease is for a period of 10 years. In general, it is unclear for what period 
overall a foreign national may lease agricultural land.  
 
In comparison, there are currently no restrictions on foreigners or citizens acquiring or 
disposing of agricultural land in South Africa. However, the operation of the Regulation Bill 
aims to change this position. In this regard, the Regulation Bill provides for (a) restrictions 
on the amount of agricultural land a foreign national or citizen may own; (b) restrictions on 
the disposal of agricultural land by foreign nationals; and (c) a prohibition on the acquisition 
of ownership of agricultural land in future.   
In light of the mandate set out in section 25(5) of the South African Constitution, namely to 
broaden access to land for citizens specifically, the underlying reason for these restrictions 
related to foreign ownership of agricultural land is to ensure that more land is available for 
acquisition by citizens and to ensure that it remains in the hands of citizens. The underlying 
reason for the restrictions on foreigners in South Africa and Namibia is thus the same. For 
this reason, the Regulation Bill provides that where foreigners intend to dispose of their 
agricultural land, it must first be offered to the Minister, in the prescribed manner.196 The 
Minister has a right of first refusal to acquire ownership of the relevant parcel of land for 
redistribution purposes.197 The right of first refusal mechanism in effect and indirectly allows 
the Minister to (a) obtain agricultural land for redistribution in order to support and promote 
productive employment and income to poor and efficient farmers; and to (b) ensure redress 
for past imbalances in access to agricultural land.198 In this regard, the right of first refusal 
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given to the government serves as a mechanism aimed at making more land available for 
acquisition and redistribution purposes. Where the Minister exercises the right of first 
refusal,199 the land should be redistributed to selected Black beneficiaries.200 If the Minister 
does not express an intention to acquire the agricultural land holding or indicates that he or 
she is not going to take up the offer, the foreign person must make the land available for 
acquisition by “citizens” on the open market.201  Accordingly, the agricultural land may not 
be sold to another foreign person on the open market. The Bill does not specify whether the 
agricultural land must be offered to previously disadvantaged citizens. However, the 
Regulation Bill ensures that agricultural land will, at the very least, be transferred to citizens.  
Apart from the restrictions imposed on foreigners pertaining to the disposal of agricultural 
land, the Regulation Bill also prohibits foreigners from acquiring ownership of agricultural 
land once the Bill is promulgated.202 Accordingly, foreign persons who are currently 
agricultural land owners will retain their ownership of the land once the Act commences. 
Importantly, this provision does not aim to extinguish a foreign person’s ownership of 
agricultural land. The Regulation Bill only prohibits foreigners, in relation to future 
acquisitions of agricultural land, from becoming owners thereof. Accordingly, the provision 
prima facie, does not infringe the right to property.203 While the Regulation Bill restricts the 
acquisition of ownership of agricultural land, it does not prevent foreigners from obtaining 
access to agricultural land.204 In future, foreigners may obtain access and use of agricultural 
land by way of long-term leases.205 Ordinarily, the period of a long-term lease (in longum 
tempus)206 is a minimum of ten years or longer.207 However, in terms of the Regulation Bill 
a lease must be entered into between the foreign person and the State for a minimum of 30 
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years, which may be renewed, provided that the period does not amount to more than 50 
years.208  
Therefore, two aspects are important: (a) the Regulation Bill does not aim to extinguish 
existing foreign ownership rights overnight;209 and (b) access to land is retained, but in the 
form of a limited real right (a lease) and not in the form of ownership. The prohibition on the 
acquisition of agricultural land by foreigners in effect provides citizens with an opportunity 
and preference to acquire ownership of agricultural land parcels. 
3 5 Reflection  
3 5 1 Restrictions on subdivision of agricultural land 
In light of the aims of different legislative measures, subdivision of agricultural land is either 
prohibited or allowed. On the one hand, private land owners are restricted from subdividing 
their agricultural land, without the consent of the Minister.210 The aim, as mentioned, is to 
prevent the fragmentation of agricultural land into uneconomic and unsustainable units in 
order to ensure food security for the population. In this regard, it is averred that restrictions 
on subdivision do not contribute towards the redistribution of agricultural land. On the other 
hand, subdivision is allowed where agricultural land is acquired by the State for redistribution 
purposes.211 Therefore, where agricultural land is acquired for redistribution purposes, both 
South Africa and Namibia, allow for the subdivision thereof into small holdings for the 
purpose of small-scale or subsistence farming.212 Pienaar avers that where there is a need 
for small agricultural landholdings for small-scale or subsistence farming, the land market or 
the government should facilitate it, provided that “the financial grant system is structured in 
such a manner that small-scale [agricultural] land parcels may be acquired by way of small 
grants”.213 However, the redistribution of agricultural land for land reform purposes must be 
weighed up against concerns for agricultural productivity, sustainability, development and 
food security.  
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The imposition of land ceilings indirectly results in the subdivision of agricultural land and 
consequently the fragmentation thereof, which may pose a threat to agricultural productivity 
and food security in South Africa. While the Regulation Bill may aim to provide for a register 
of the ownership of all agricultural land in South Africa for redistribution purposes, it may 
also be necessary, as proposed by the Preservation Bill, to make provision for a schedule 
of “protected agricultural areas”214 which may only be subdivided under exceptional 
circumstances or which may not be subdivided to provide for small-scale or subsistence 
farming purposes. Accordingly, such areas of agricultural land may be excluded from being 
used as land for redistribution purposes. This would also mean that land ceilings may not 
be imposed on these identified and listed or scheduled categories of land. This proposal is 
further explored below.215 
3 5 2 Restrictions on the amount of agricultural land a land owner may own 
The insights drawn from the experience of India, where land ceiling legislation was 
implemented successfully in some States specifically, will be important for establishing a 
clearly formulated legal and institutional framework for envisaged land ceilings in South 
Africa. Given the array of problems identified with the formulation, implementation and 
administration of the ceiling legislation in India,216 the South African government should 
consider the following two options in relation to the Regulation Bill: Firstly, the Regulation 
Bill should be scrapped and alternative regulatory measures for redistribution should be 
explored. This would require a focussed effort at exploring methods for identifying, acquiring 
and redistributing agricultural land.217 Secondly, if not scrapped, the Regulation Bill in its 
current form requires further amendments to address the problems identified with the 
formulation of the ceiling legislation, as set out above.218 In this regard, it is also necessary 
to consider the impact of the imposition of land ceilings in the South African context. The 
implementation of land ceilings will in effect fragment, namely subdivide, agricultural land. 
As SALA aims to prevent the fragmentation of commercial agricultural farms or prime 
agricultural land, the subdivision thereof may result in a general decline of agricultural 
productivity, which in turn poses a threat to food security in South Africa. It may be 
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necessary, in light of food security concerns, to exempt certain high value agricultural land 
from the operation of land ceilings, which can accordingly not be subdivided. As suggested 
above, this would entail providing for a list or schedule of agricultural land in the Regulation 
Bill which constitutes a “protected agricultural area”. The Preservation Bill defines “protected 
agricultural areas” as:  
“(a) an agricultural land use zone, protected for purposes of – (i) food production; and (ii) ensuring 
that high value agricultural land are protected against non-agricultural land uses in order to 
promote long-term agricultural production and food security; (b) includes all areas demarcated as 
such in accordance with section 15; and (c) may include high value agricultural land and medium 
value agricultural land”.219 
The Minister of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development may declare an area a 
“protected agricultural area” in the Government Gazette.220 The ceiling legislation in India 
also allows the Minister to exempt certain categories of land, including land held by 
cooperative farming societies, from the operation of the ceiling legislation. It does not 
however make provision for a schedule which exempts these categories of land for the 
purpose of preservation. Interestingly, the RFTLARRA prohibits the acquisition of irrigated 
multi-cropped land.221 It is suggested that irrigated multi-cropped land may only be acquired 
in exceptional circumstances as a last resort.222 Irrigated multi-cropped land may be 
regarded as “high value agricultural land”223 in the South African context which forms part of 
the definition of “protected agricultural areas”. Similarly, the Regulation Bill also provides 
that the Minister may exempt certain categories of land from the operation of the Regulation 
Bill.224 It is in this regard that it may be proposed that the Regulation Bill provide for a 
schedule of agricultural land, defined as “protected agricultural areas” which is exempted 
from the operation of the ceiling legislation. In this way, certain areas of agricultural land, 
which are important for food security, may be excluded from being subdivided.  In principle, 
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all other agricultural land falling outside the definition of “protected agricultural areas” may 
be subdivided. 
3 5 3 Restrictions related to foreign ownership of agricultural land  
As mentioned above,225 restrictions related to foreign ownership of agricultural land are a 
world-wide phenomenon. While there are currently no restrictions on foreign ownership of 
agricultural land in South Africa, legislative redress may be required to broaden access to 
agricultural land, to South African citizens. If it is assumed that a change pertaining to foreign 
land ownership in South Africa is required, then the question remains how or to what extent 
foreign ownership of agricultural land should be regulated. Given the fact that similar 
segregationist history and inequality in relation to land dominated across racial lines in 
Namibia and South Africa, Namibia may provide some insight into the formulation of a legal 
framework to allow for restrictions on foreign ownership in South Africa.  
Importantly, while the Namibian Constitution expressly provides that restrictions may be 
imposed on foreigners, the Constitution does not provide for land reform or the mandate to 
broaden access to land as set out in the South African Constitution. While the constitutional 
basis is not identical, the legal positions in Namibia and South Africa are still comparable 
given the shared historical context. As elaborated on in Chapter 7 and above,226 Namibia 
does not prohibit foreign ownership outright but rather regulates the acquisition of foreign 
ownership of agricultural land by means of an approval process.227 In this way, the Minister 
may approve (also conditionally) or reject an application for the acquisition of agricultural 
land by a foreign national.228 The legislation further provides that the Minister may not grant 
the application for foreign ownership or occupation, if he or she is not satisfied that the 
acquisition of the land: (a) will constitute an eligible investment as contemplated in the 
Foreign Investments Act 27 of 1990; (b) “is capable of being used or occupied beneficially 
for the purpose which the applicant proposes to use or occupy it”; or (c) “the use and 
occupation of the land concerned will not have an adverse effect on the environment or 
adequate measures will be provided for to deal with any adverse environmental 
consequences”.229 The discretion provided to the Minister, guided by these considerations, 
ensures, to an extent, that ownership of agricultural land remains in the hands of Namibian 
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citizens. Furthermore, ACLRA also provides that foreigners (or citizens), when disposing of 
agricultural land must first offer it to the State, before it enters the open market.230 Only when 
the State waives its interest, by issuing a certificate of waiver,231 may the land thereafter be 
offered to private buyers. 
By way of contrast, the proposed Land Bill, outright bans a foreign national from acquiring 
ownership of agricultural land. However, the Bill makes provision for a few exemptions in 
this regard.232 Under the Land Bill foreign nationals will be restricted to acquiring a right to 
occupy agricultural land or a portion thereof by means of lease.233 Such an agreement can 
only be entered into after written approval of the Minister is obtained.234 
The Regulation Bill, in comparison to the Namibian position, provides for more stringent 
restrictions on foreign ownership in light of the constitutional mandate to broaden access to 
land to citizens. When viewed in light of the constitutional mandate, the restrictions on the 
disposal of agricultural land owned by foreign persons and the prohibition on acquiring 
agricultural land in future seems to be a logical step. However, it is possible that this form of 
legal redress may have an adverse impact on foreign investment in South Africa. 
Accordingly, it may be prudent for South Africa to consider amendments to the Regulation 
Bill. In light of the Namibian position, the acquisition of foreign ownership may still be 
prohibited. However, it is suggested that such prohibition is not absolute and should rather 
be subject to an approval process as provided for under ACLRA. In this way, less restrictive 
means may be used to receive the same result, namely to regulate the acquisition of 
agricultural land by foreigners more effectively.  
4 Approaches to acquiring agricultural land  
4 1 Introduction  
The regulation of agricultural land may open up agricultural land to be acquired for 
redistribution purposes. In this regard, different approaches to acquiring agricultural land 
exist, notably, market-led approaches; expropriation; or confiscation. As is evident from 
previous chapters, both market-led approaches and expropriation may be employed in all 
three jurisdictions under investigation to acquire agricultural land for the purpose of 
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redistribution. Accordingly, for comparative purposes, the focus falls on these two types of 
acquisition approaches.  
4 2 Market-led approaches 
Depending on whether a particular government follows a demand235 or supply236 market-led 
approach, the land purchase programmes essentially differs in terms of two aspects: (a) 
who initiates the purchase of the land; and (b) the financial technicalities, namely (i) the  
grant amount, if any, provided to the beneficiaries for the purchase of land; (ii) what the 
repayment terms are, if any, in relation to the total cost of the land purchased; and (iii) who 
should establish a business plan and what the content of such a business plan should be.  
In Namibia, where a land owner (citizen or foreigner) aims to dispose of agricultural land, 
ACLRA provides that he or she must first offer the land to the Minister for acquisition.237 This 
allows the Minister to acquire agricultural land for redistribution on behalf of beneficiaries. 
This approach is in line with the supply-led approach to the acquisition of land, where the 
State purchases land upfront from land owners and later identifies beneficiaries to whom 
the land can be made available in terms of lease or title by way of transfer. The intended 
beneficiaries are defined in policies and schemes. For example, different types of 
beneficiaries, with different means, are identified in terms of the AALS and the National 
Resettlement Policies.238 The grant amount and repayment terms are likewise determined 
by the respective scheme and policy.  
In India, specifically in the State of West Bengal, the State also follows a supply-led approach 
to acquiring agricultural land. The State initiates the land purchase act; identifies the parcel 
of land for acquisition; negotiates the price; and develops, together with the beneficiary a 
business plan, for farming the land.  
The South African government has followed both demand-led and supply-led approaches 
to acquiring agricultural land for redistribution on the market.239 Notably, however, there was 
a shift from a demand-led approach to a supply-led approach in 2006.240 In this regard, as 
highlighted by Chapter 6, different grant schemes with different intended beneficiaries have 
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been employed over the last decade. Accordingly, South Africa, Namibia and India all follow 
a supply-led approach to acquiring agricultural land on the market.  
South Africa, like Namibia, initially followed a market-led approach to acquiring agricultural 
land for redistribution purposes. However, recent populist cries, emphasising the slow pace 
of land reform, and more specifically redistribution, have urged the South African 
government to use its expropriation powers more readily in future so as to accelerate 
redistribution. Accordingly, as mentioned in Chapter 5, the State has proposed to (a) amend 
the Constitution to provide for expropriation without compensation; and (b) drafted a new 
Expropriation Bill.241 Given the lack of experience with expropriating agricultural land for 
redistribution purposes, it may be insightful to consider and learn from the expropriation and 
redistribution processes in Namibia and India respectively. Ultimately, these jurisdictions 
may provide additional guidance on formulating and implementing the proposed 
expropriation legislation in South Africa. 
4 3 Expropriation  
4 3 1 Introduction  
As set out in Chapter 5 above,242 sections 25(1), 25(2) and 25(3) of the South African 
Constitution set out the elements for a valid expropriation.243 In this regard, section 25(2) 
does not protect private property per se. Instead, it simply provides for the circumstances 
under which the State can lawfully expropriate property.244 Similarly, article 16(2) of the 
Namibian Constitution allows property to be expropriated in the public interest. Furthermore, 
every Indian State has the authority to acquire land situated within the limits of its jurisdiction 
for public utility or public purpose.245 Accordingly, the power to expropriate agricultural land 
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for redistribution is part of any State’s power of eminent domain and is thus not questioned. 
However, the manner in terms of which a State exercises its expropriation powers may affect 
the validity of the expropriation. In this light, the Kessl-judgment,246 which highlights the 
procedure which has to be followed by the State for an expropriation to be valid in Namibia, 
may provide some insight into the manner in which a government should exercise its 
expropriation powers. Another important consideration for the expropriation procedure, 
coupled with the determination of the suitability of the agricultural land for redistribution 
purposes, is the impact the expropriation may have on (a) vulnerable persons with land 
interests, for example, farm workers and tenants; and (b) food security. Accordingly, 
legislative mechanisms in India are also considered in this context. Apart from the 
expropriation procedure itself and the considerations pertaining to the suitability of the 
agricultural land for redistribution purposes, another important question that needs to be 
considered is the payment of compensation, if any, for agricultural land expropriated for 
redistribution purposes. These aspects are discussed below respectively.  
4 3 2 The expropriation procedure  
In Namibia’s landmark case dealing with the expropriation of agricultural land, namely the 
Kessl-judgment,247 the Court highlighted the importance of following the correct 
expropriation procedure in terms of the authorising legislation. It held that a clear and 
transparent expropriation process, in line with the rules of natural justice should be followed 
for an expropriation to be valid.248 Where the State does not follow the procedure set out in 
the authorising legislation, like in Kessl, it may result in litigation which may be time-
consuming and costly - not only for the land owner, but also for the State.  
Furthermore, one of the most important aspects highlighted in the Kessl-judgment is that the 
expropriation procedure requires a uniform and clear approach to identifying agricultural 
land suitable for expropriation for redistribution purposes from the outset. In other words, it 
should be clear why and how certain agricultural land was or parcels of agricultural land 
were identified for expropriation. Following the Kessl-judgment, a set of regulations249 were 
promulgated to assist the Namibian Land Commission in identifying suitable agricultural land 
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for redistribution purposes by setting out criteria.250 The regulations specifically provide that 
if the Minister decides to expropriate property, the Minister is obliged to (a) use the 
identification criteria in selecting agricultural land eligible for expropriation;251 and (b) 
conduct a suitability assessment to determine if the agricultural land is suitable for 
redistribution.252 The agricultural land must also be scored in accordance with the scoring 
criteria provided for in the regulations.253 In this regard, the regulations provide for a checklist 
and formula to determine whether the agricultural land is either highly suitable; suitable; 
moderately suitable; or not suitable at all for resettlement purposes.254 Importantly, 
resettlement purposes include the redistribution of the land for residential and agricultural 
purposes. 
 
In South Africa, the Expropriation Act provides that any particular property may be subject 
to inspection to determine whether the property is “suitable for the purposes or use 
contemplated”.255 By way of contrast, the 2019 Expropriation Bill,256 places an obligation on 
the expropriating authority to “ascertain the suitability of the property for the purpose for 
which it is required”257 when considering the expropriation of property. However, currently, 
there is no policy or regulations in South Africa which set out how agricultural land for 
expropriation and redistribution is to be identified and what the criteria to determine suitability 
should be. In other words, there are no prescribed suitability criteria which the expropriating 
authority may use to determine whether the property in question will be suitable for 
redistribution purposes specifically. Whether the land is suitable for redistribution purposes 
is dependent on the differential land needs and demands of the people of South Africa.258 
However, there is also no database which provides for different land needs and demands in 
different regions and for what purpose people seek land. It is also unclear who the potential 
beneficiaries of the redistribution programme ought to be. In this regard, for the sake of a 
transparent, procedurally fair and effective redistribution process in South Africa, guidelines 
regarding objective, non-arbitrary criteria for identifying suitable agricultural land for different 
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land needs and demands should be developed and provided for in regulations or policy. This 
proposal is explored further in Chapter 10 below.   
 4 3 3 The impact of the expropriation  
Apart from the manner in which the government exercises its expropriation powers, the 
impact of the expropriation must also be taken into account. One of the greatest problems 
of expropriating agricultural land, for redistribution purposes, is the possibility that people 
working or living on the land may be displaced in the process. Accordingly, while the 
expropriation may ensure that land is redistributed to one or more beneficiary, the process 
may adversely impact a larger group of vulnerable people in relation to the group that it 
benefits. To minimise the displacement of vulnerable people, India’s expropriation 
legislation, namely the RFTLARRA mandates the State to conduct a social impact 
assessment before making a decision on whether to expropriate the identified land.259 The 
legislation also mandates the creation of a rehabilitation and resettlement scheme in every 
State. These measures ensure that people who are dependent on the land for their 
livelihood, such as farm workers and their dependents, are not displaced or rendered 
homeless. The scheme must include an estimation of the affected families and the number 
of families among them likely to be displaced; steps that will be taken by the State to 
minimise displacement, the amount of compensation payable to the land owner and 
importantly, employment opportunities to be allocated to the affected family.260  
Similarly, in South Africa, there are many non-owners who are also dependent on the land, 
particularly agricultural land, for their livelihood. In order to ensure that vulnerable persons, 
such as labour tenants261 or occupiers,262 are not displaced by an expropriation for 
redistribution purposes, it may be necessary to include, like in India, a social impact 
assessment study when investigating whether the land is suitable for expropriation. 
Alternatively, or in conjunction with the social impact assessment, each province should 
establish a rehabilitation and resettlement scheme in cases where it may be necessary to 
expropriate agricultural land even when displacement ensues.  
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Other considerations should also be taken into account, such as the impact the expropriation 
of agricultural land may have on food security. Interestingly, India’s overarching 
expropriation legislation, the RFTLARRA, also prohibits the State from acquiring prime, 
namely multi-cropped and irrigated, agricultural land for development purposes, in light of 
the need to safeguard food security.263 Irrigated multi-cropped land may only be acquired in 
exceptional circumstances, as a last resort.264 Similarly, it may be argued that “high value 
agricultural land”265 or “protected agricultural areas”266 may not be subdivided by way of land 
ceilings or expropriated for development purposes in South Africa to safeguard food 
security. However, high value (prime) agricultural land and protected agricultural areas may 
still be expropriated and redistributed to competent beneficiaries, provided that the land is 
used for agricultural purposes. In this way, redistribution is still effected without changing the 
quality or size of these types of agricultural land. As mentioned above, it is suggested that 
a register of all agricultural land, which also provides for a scheduled list of protected 
agricultural areas, may be useful in this context.  
4 3 4 Compensation for expropriation   
Apart from the expropriation procedure, and considerations pertaining to the suitability of the 
land for expropriation and redistribution purposes, another important question is the issue 
of compensation.  
The Namibian Constitution provides that expropriation is subject to just compensation.267 
ACLRA, which gives effect to the Constitution, does not stipulate that in determining 
compensation, reference should be made to market value.268 However, it is clear that 
ACLRA refers to the market value “and restricts the amount calculated as compensation to 
an amount that would be realised on the open market in a willing-seller, willing-buyer 
scenario”.269 This means that compensation for an expropriation for the purposes of 
resettlement under Namibian law can never be above market value.270 
                                            
263 Section 10 of the Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy, the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency 
in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act 30 of 2013.  
264 Section 10(2) of the Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy, the Right to Fair Compensation and 
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act 30 of 2013. 
265 Clause 1 of the the Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Bill. 
266 Clause 1 of the the Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Bill. 
267 Article 16(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, 1990.  
268 Vermeulen A comparative assessment of the land reform programme in South Africa and Namibia 51. 





In the context of land ceiling legislation in India, each State government was left to determine 
the amount of compensation, if any, payable to land owners for their ceiling-surplus land. 
Accordingly, while there is no uniformity among States regarding the calculation of 
compensation for ceiling-surplus land, Behuria suggests that the amount of compensation 
paid to land owners is negligible when compared to the market value of the agricultural 
land.271 Notably, and generally, compensation paid for the expropriation of ceiling-surplus 
agricultural land is below market value.272 While this may make the redistribution process 
more affordable for the government, it is important to note that the inadequate, unfair or low 
amount of compensation paid to land owners for ceiling-surplus land is averred as one of 
the reasons for the failure of the ceiling legislation in India.273 The inadequate or low 
compensation paid to land owners274 for surplus land, made the programme unpopular with 
land owners, which in turn led to land owners circumventing the provisions of the land ceiling 
legislation. For example, land owners either transferred or partitioned land to ensure that 
their land fell outside the scope of the ceiling limit or categorised their land to fall outside the 
operation of the ceiling legislation in general. However, where compensation is not fixed well 
below the market value of the property, it may not be “within the paying capacity of the new 
allottees mainly comprising the landless agricultural workers who belong to the SCs and the 
STs”.275  
The South African Constitution currently provides that property may be expropriated subject 
to just and equitable compensation.276 The amount of compensation, time and manner of 
payment, must be “just and equitable”,277 which must reflect an equitable balance between 
the public interest, land reform, and the interests of those affected. As set out in Chapter 
5,278 just and equitable compensation does not have to equal market value. Market value is 
but one factor that may be considered in determining compensation for an expropriation.279 
In this light, it is stated that the Constitution allows for compensation that is below market 
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value, which may even, in certain circumstances amount to nil compensation provided that 
it is just and equitable. 
It is within the government’s power to provide for circumstances under which nil 
compensation may be payable in legislation, as set out in the Expropriation Bill.280 
Accordingly, whether compensation, if any, is payable, as well as the particular amount, is 
dependent on the circumstances of each case. What is clear it that such amount, given the 
circumstances, may be less than market value or even equal to nil compensation.  
4 4 Reflection  
Concerning the acquisition of agricultural land, Pienaar suggests that:  
“Perhaps the answer lies not so much in ‘an either or’ approach, but in a more nuanced or dualistic 
approach where the success of the programme is not locked into one single mechanism or 
approach”.281  
Accordingly, both market-led approaches and expropriation ought to be used to acquire 
agricultural land for redistribution purposes, as is the case in the Namibian context. 
Furthermore, the degree of State involvement in acquiring agricultural land for redistribution 
is determined by whether a demand-led or supply-led model is followed in a particular 
instance.  
Regardless of whether market-led approaches or expropriation is used to acquire 
agricultural land for redistribution, the following questions identified by Kepe and Hall should 
be considered and attended to in either legislation or in policy: Firstly, how should land be 
identified and acquired282 and secondly, how should land be valued?283  
With regard to the first question and in relation to the expropriation procedure as a whole, 
there is currently no policy on identifying suitable (agricultural) land for redistribution 
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purposes specifically. The closest formulation of suitable agricultural land for redistribution 
may be the categories of land identified in the Expropriation Bill for which nil compensation 
may be paid.284 However, it may be necessary to develop a set of criteria which should guide 
the government in determining whether the agricultural land in question is suitable for 
redistribution purposes. The criteria set out in the regulations in Namibia285 may be useful in 
formulating criteria for suitability in the South African context.  
With regard to the second question, there is no integrated approach to determining 
compensation for agricultural land for redistribution purposes.286 In this regard, Kepe and 
Hall identify several sub-questions that the South African government needs to consider, 
namely:  
“What should the state, or beneficiaries, pay for land? Should this be a ‘market’ price, a negotiated 
price, or a price determined on the basis of Section 25(3) of the Constitution? If the latter, how 
should ‘just and equitable’ compensation be defined? How should the history of acquisition, 
market value, past subsidies, current use and purpose of expropriation be defined, and how can 
a formula be developed to clarify this? Should a case be taken to the Constitutional Court 
precisely to get judicial guidance on how to address valuation?”287 
Furthermore, although speculative at this point, the South African government should also 
consider whether compensation for land acquired for redistribution purposes (or in the public 
interest) should be payable at all in light of the possibility that the Constitution may be 
amended to provide for expropriation without compensation. Such a consideration will only 
play a role once it is established to what extent the Constitution will be amended. In this 
regard, the circumstances under which nil compensation is payable should be clearly 
outlined in legislation. The draft provisions of the 2019 Expropriation Bill indicate five 
categories of land which may be expropriated for nil compensation if it is just and equitable 
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to do so.288 The Land Reform Report289 also recommends the following categories of land 
which may be expropriated for nil compensation:  
“(a) abandoned land; (b) hopelessly indebted land; (c) land held purely for speculative purposes; 
(d) unutilised land held by state entities; (e) land obtained through criminal activity; (f) land already 
occupied and used by labour tenants and former labour tenants; (g) informal settlements areas; 
(h) inner city buildings with absentee landlords; (i) land donations (as a form of E[xpropriation] 
W[ithout] C[ompensation]); and (j) farm equity schemes.”290 
Accordingly, the determination of categories of land which may be expropriated for nil 
compensation in the public interest (for land redistribution purposes, inter alia) should be 
clearly formulated in policy or in legislation.  
5 Redistribution of agricultural land  
5 1 Introduction  
Once the land is identified as suitable for acquisition and redistribution and the land is 
acquired by the State by way of a market-led approach or expropriation, the land needs to 
be redistributed. The questions in this regard are (a) who the beneficiaries ought to be; (b) 
how the beneficiaries ought to be selected; (c) how much land the beneficiary ought to 
acquire; and (d) what type of right(s) or benefits the beneficiaries ought to receive under the 
redistribution programme.291 In this regard the beneficiary target groups depend on the 
specific aims of each jurisdiction’s land reform, or specifically redistribution, programme. 
Herewith a discussion of the listed issues in the three relevant jurisdictions.  
5 2 Namibia  
In Namibia, ACLRA provides for a wide category of beneficiaries, namely “Namibian citizens 
who have been socially, economically or educationally disadvantaged by past discriminatory 
laws or practices”.292 However, ACLRA does not provide for a procedure for potential 
beneficiaries to lodge an application; criteria for determining who the beneficiaries are or 
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should be or a selection process in deciding which beneficiaries should acquire the 
agricultural land available for redistribution purposes. Instead, these procedures, criteria and 
selection process are all set out in schemes and policies. Each policy or scheme provides 
for different target groups; qualifying criteria; selection criteria; and a selection process. The 
only threshold requirements in all the schemes and policies are that the applicant must be 
(a) a Namibian citizen; and (b) must have been socially, economically or educationally 
disadvantaged.293 For example, where the AALS294 is tailored for and aimed at emerging 
communal and commercial black farmers, the NRP295 is aimed at the poorest of the poor, 
specifically the San-community; ex-soldiers; displaced, destitute or landless persons; people 
with disabilities and people from overcrowded communal areas. Each scheme and policy 
also provides for different qualifying and selection criteria.  
In accordance with the qualifying selection criteria, an ideal beneficiary or applicant under 
the AALS is a full- or part-time, creditworthy296 communal or commercial farmer with a 
minimum of 150 large livestock units (such as cattle) or 800 small livestock units (such as 
goats and sheep)297 “or own productive livestock equivalent to at least 35% of official 
carrying capacity of the farm which, he/she intends purchasing, and /or have the financial 
capacity to purchase such livestock”.298  
Under the NRP, and in accordance with the qualifying and selection criteria and points 
system,299 an ideal beneficiary will be a woman, between the ages of 26 and 60, who is a 
generational farm300 worker from a communal area, who is solely dependent on farming; 
has experience in agricultural activities or who is trained in agriculture, but has no access to 
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land; has the basic required reading and writing skills and who owns less than 150 large 
stock or 800 small stock.301   
Importantly, while the policy recognises that the “scoring system” may not be a sufficient tool 
for the selection of the most appropriate beneficiaries, it does provide for a single and 
uniform selection system.302 This in turn provides for a measure of transparency, certainty 
and consistency in selecting beneficiaries under the redistribution programme. 303   
The quantity of agricultural land that should be redistributed to the different beneficiaries 
under the scheme and policy is not set out. The type of right a beneficiary acquires under 
the different scheme or policy also differs. Under the AALS, beneficiaries purchase the 
agricultural land with the help of a loan. Accordingly, once the purchase is complete, the 
beneficiary becomes the owner of the land. The beneficiary is also prohibited from selling 
the land in the first 10 years of occupation. Under the NRP the successful applicants will 
acquire the land on a leasehold basis, for a period 99 years.304 The right of leasehold is then 
registered under the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937. Accordingly, beneficiaries will not 
become the owner of the agricultural land, but will have legally secure occupational and 
agricultural rights for the duration of their tenure. 305 
A revised National Resettlement Policy (2018-2027) has also been released. The same 
target or beneficiary groups identified under the NRP are again identified in the revised 
policy. Likewise, identical resettlement criteria as discussed above are also used to select 
the most suitable applicants for resettlement.306 However, the revised policy categorises the 
potential beneficiaries into three main groups, namely (a) commercial farmers; (b) communal 
farmers; and (c) non-farming individuals who are in need of resettlement.307 In line with these 
categories, the revised policy makes provision for new resettlement land occupation 
models.308 These resettlement models are tailored to the varying land needs of the eligible 
beneficiary groups and which can accommodate the different farming systems in Namibia.309 
The models are the (a) HEVM; (b) MEVM; and (c) LEVM.310 Each model targets a different 
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group of beneficiaries, with correspondingly different land needs. The models also provide 
for different (a) quantities of agricultural land that should be distributed; and (b) different land 
rights or benefits to be received by the relevant beneficiary. While complex, this differential 
approach to redistributing land may be very useful when formulating a national policy on 
redistribution in South Africa.  
5 3 India  
In India, the target beneficiaries; the order of preference (or “priority of allotment”);311 the 
rights acquired and the terms of settlement vary under the ceiling-legislation, depending on 
the particular State.312 Generally however, most ceiling laws make provision for the 
redistribution of ceiling-surplus land to the landless, agricultural tenants and labourers and/or 
displaced persons. In West Bengal, first priority is given to the bargardar cultivating the 
land.313 In this regard, under the WBLRA, the locality of the land in relation to where the 
potential beneficiary is situated or resides determines the eligibility of a beneficiary. For 
example, persons who qualify as beneficiaries and are local residents where the ceiling-
surplus land is situated, may be given preference over a person or family not residing in 
close proximity to the land identified for redistribution.314 Conversely, those persons would 
be preferential beneficiaries where land suitable for redistribution is identified in their 
localities. Thereafter, preference is given to people belonging to the SCs or the STs315 or 
groups of people forming “cooperative societies”.316 The Act also obliges beneficiaries who 
obtain agricultural land to use the land for personal cultivation,317 namely subsistence 
farming. Thus, the aim is not so much the promotion of commercial farming. 
In both India and Namibia, the spectrum of land sizes is unclear. The legislative measures 
do not indicate specific land size brackets or the extent of land to be acquired by the 
beneficiary. In West Bengal, beneficiaries, once settled, acquire ownership of the ceiling-
surplus land and are prohibited from transferring the land, except if it is transferred “to [the] 
State Government [or a] Cooperative Society for obtaining a loan for [the] development of 
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land, improvement of agricultural production or for construction of a dwelling house”.318 In 
this regard, many States prohibit transfer of the acquired land for a determined period of 
time. These periods of time differ from State to State.319 However, in West Bengal, no time 
period is attached to this prohibition and therefore it is unclear whether the beneficiary or 
his/her heirs may be allowed to sell the land in future once it is acquired. Accordingly, in a 
way, beneficiaries do not receive full ownership of the land, because the entitlement to 
dispose of the land is excluded.  
5 4 South Africa  
In South Africa, a number of different redistribution schemes and policies have been 
followed under different ministerial leadership over the years, aimed at different target 
groups and beneficiaries, providing for different types of rights to the acquired agricultural 
land.320 In this regard, various grant assisted programmes321 were embarked on to allow 
beneficiaries to acquire agricultural land.  
In general, similar to the Namibian position, beneficiaries of the redistribution programme 
are regarded as Black South African citizens who were previously disadvantaged by past 
discriminatory laws and practices. However, there is no national policy which provides for 
an order of preference (or priority) or selection criteria within this broad category.  The lack 
of such an overarching policy poses difficulties in relation to who should receive the land 
acquired in terms of the redistribution programme, given particular circumstances. 
Furthermore, the different schemes and policies have also provided the beneficiaries with 
different types of rights to the acquired agricultural land.322  
In this regard, Kepe and Hall aver that a number of questions pertaining to the selection of 
the beneficiary or groups of beneficiaries and the type of right beneficiaries should acquire 
                                            
318 Section 49(1A) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act 10 of 1956. See also Behuria Land Reforms 
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321 For example, see the discussion in Chapter 5, 2 above on the different grant programmes: SLAG, LRAD 
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under the redistribution programme, needs to be addressed - either in legislation or in 
policy.323  
The first question they pose is, “who should get the land”?:324 
“Should this be the ‘rural poor’, the experienced, the dispossessed or the creditworthy? Should 
emerging black commercial farmers be the focus? What about farm workers? Or should it be 
urban business people and entrepreneurs with capital to invest? Related to this is how public 
funds should be distributed: should the wealthy get substantially more support than the poor? 
Should women be prioritised or not? What would priority to women and to the poor require in 
terms of policy prescription, and how would this be assessed?”325  
They also question what rights beneficiaries should have:  
“Should they be owners of the land? Or longterm lessees? What is the rationale for leasing, and 
should those who don’t pay lose their land? Does the state have the capacity to enforce leases 
and extract rents – now and in the future when more properties are obtained? Should land be 
held by traditional councils on behalf of communities, or by beneficiaries through communal 
property institutions? Is payment of rent to the state a feasible and workable system, and what 
does the track record of the past decade tell us about this? Should people obtain secure long-
term rights, or contingent rights based on ‘production discipline’ and a ‘use it or lose it’ approach? 
What capacity does the state have to determine effective use of land within people’s available 
resources? And is there a strong political and legal rationale for land reform beneficiaries’ tenure 
to be contingent on ‘production discipline’ while private owners’ tenure is not?.”326  
The target beneficiaries in South Africa have, over the years, shifted from the poorest of the 
poor to emerging commercial farmers, to farm workers and tenants who work or reside on 
the agricultural land.327 Like in Namibia and India, there is again no policy or scheme that 
sets out the quantity of agricultural land each beneficiary or household can obtain under the 
redistribution programme. The type of rights acquired by the beneficiaries under the 
redistribution programmes also vary. Some programmes allow for beneficiaries to acquire 
ownership of the land.328 Other programmes allow beneficiaries to acquire limited real rights, 
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namely leasehold.329 Interestingly, under the 50/50 programme, it seems as if beneficiaries 
do not obtain any type of right to the land as such. Instead, beneficiaries are given shares 
in the farming or agricultural enterprise. The latter model does not broaden access to 
agricultural land, but rather ensures that beneficiaries receive an additional income to 
contribute to their livelihood.330  
5 5 Reflection  
While the jurisdictions’ redistribution programmes discussed above provide for different 
target beneficiaries; application processes; selection criteria and selection processes, it is 
pivotal for the sake of transparency, certainty and consistency in selecting beneficiaries and 
for the administration and implementation of the redistribution programmes as a whole, that 
a “single and uniform” policy is established.331 Depending on the aim of the redistribution 
programme it is also necessary to decide on the type of rights, the beneficiaries will acquire 
under the redistribution programme.332  
In the South African context, the Constitution mandates the State to broaden access to land 
for its citizens, within its available resources.333 In this regard, it is clear that the target 
beneficiaries under the redistribution programme should be Black South African citizens. 
However, as provided for in Chapter 1,334 access to land does not imply a fundamental right 
to land. Moreover, it does not guarantee that everyone, or more specifically every black 
South African citizen, will receive land.335 “Access”, in this context, implies that a person is 
placed in a position to derive some benefit from the land, which may include occupational 
rights; use rights or even ownership.336 In terms of the redistribution programme, questions 
pertaining to who should benefit; how such a person, entity, community or institution may 
qualify to benefit; what the benefits should be and when or in which circumstances the 
benefits would accrue, arise.337 These questions need to be addressed in legislation and 
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policy measures.338 In this regard, the concept of “broadening access to land” and 
“redistribution” are often conflated and mismatched. As highlighted in Chapter 1,339 
redistribution is primarily aimed at altering or diversifying land ownership patterns. While 
“broadening access to land” may include altering land ownership patterns, it is a wider 
concept. For example, granting ownership to beneficiaries of the land reform programme as 
a mechanism to broaden access to land would alter land ownership patterns, whereas 
granting lease or leasehold would not alter land ownership patterns and would thus not 
contribute to the redistribution target. However, it would still broaden access to land.340  
It is proposed that concepts of redistribution and broadening access to land need to be 
aligned, as they are not identical. Once these concepts are aligned, the following questions 
need to be addressed in national legislation or policy dealing with redistribution specifically: 
Firstly, who should qualify as beneficiaries and secondly, how should these beneficiaries be 
selected? This would require the formulation of qualifying criteria; an application procedure; 
selection criteria and a selection process in legislation or in policy. Thirdly, how much land 
should the beneficiaries in question obtain, given their respective land needs and fourthly, 
what type of right or benefit should the beneficiaries acquire in relation to the land? The 
alignment of the concept of redistribution with the concept of broadening access to land 
provides for an array of available options or benefits that may accrue to beneficiaries. The 
benefits or rights may include ownership or co-ownership of the land; specific use and/or 
occupational rights; or even benefits in the form of shares in a farming or agricultural 
enterprise. These recommendations are explored further in the following Chapter.  
6 Conclusion  
This Chapter used a thematic methodology to compare the legal position(s) pertaining to (a) 
the concept of agricultural land; (b) mechanisms for the regulation of agricultural land; (c) 
mechanisms or approaches for the acquisition of agricultural land; and (d) redistribution in 
South Africa, Namibia and India. The insights drawn from the jurisdictions are integral in 
providing guidance and proposals for the way in which South Africa could conceptualise, 
regulate, acquire and redistribute agricultural land, to the extent that it may be 
accommodated within the South African constitutional dispensation. The comparison 
between Namibia, India and South Africa also exposed the difficulties and failures in 
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conceptualising, regulating, acquiring and redistributing agricultural land and the 
corresponding reasons for such failure. These are integral for South Africa’s way forward. It 
is in this light that the following Chapter aims to suggest recommendations pertaining to the 
conceptualisation, regulation, acquisition and redistribution of agricultural land in the South 





Chapter 10: Conclusions and Recommendations 
1 Introduction  
In light of the study as a whole, the aim of this Chapter is to provide conclusions and 
recommendations in relation to the following themes: (a) the concept of agricultural land; (b) 
the regulation of agricultural land; (c) the acquisition of agricultural land; and (d) the 
redistribution of agricultural land in South Africa. Ultimately, the overarching aim of this 
dissertation was to consider the regulation of agricultural land in South Africa from a land 
reform, specifically redistribution, perspective in order to assess whether the mechanisms1 
employed are aligned with the Constitution, whether the approaches to acquiring agricultural 
land, flowing from the regulatory framework are likewise constitutional and whether, 
combined, an effective legal framework for redistribution in South Africa exists. 
2 Summary and conclusions  
Chapter 2 aimed to determine what constitutes agricultural land in South Africa and whether 
a single definition of agricultural land exists. Having regard to the different legislative 
measures discussed in Chapter 2,2 it was found that a category of agricultural land exists in 
South Africa. Most of the legislative measures define agricultural land as a residual category 
of land, without giving content to what agricultural land is. Defining agricultural land as a 
residual category means that more agricultural land is available for redistribution purposes 
in principle. However, not all land falling into this category may be capable of being used for 
agricultural purposes. Accordingly, in line with the land needs and demands of the 
beneficiaries, the purpose for which the land will be used must also be taken into 
consideration when defining agricultural land for purposes of redistribution. Accordingly, the 
concept of agricultural land was further explored as it is defined in Namibia and India in 
Chapters 7 and 8 respectively. When comparing the definitions of agricultural land in 
Namibia, India and South Africa, it was found that instead of defining agricultural land in 
accordance with where it is situated, it should be defined in relation to the purpose for which 
it is used or capable of being used.  
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Chapter 3 provided for an exposition of existing and newly proposed regulatory mechanisms 
in relation to agricultural land in South Africa in view of the land reform programme, 
specifically the redistribution programme.3 The particular mechanisms explored for purposes 
of this dissertation included: (a) provisions relating to the subdivision of agricultural land; (b) 
restrictions on the amount of agricultural land a land owner may own (known as land ceilings) 
and; (c) restrictions pertaining to foreign ownership of agricultural land. It was found that 
these regulatory mechanisms not only impact an owner’s entitlements in relation to 
agricultural land, but may also make more agricultural land available for redistribution 
purposes. While Chapter 3 only provides for an exposition of these regulatory measures and 
the underlying reason for such regulation, the subsequent chapters dealt with the 
constitutionality and efficacy of the mechanisms.  
Consequently, Chapter 4 in line with the methodology set out in FNB aimed to determine 
whether the imposition of regulatory mechanisms discussed in Chapter 3 arbitrarily deprives 
a land owner of his or her property. Where a law of general application arbitrarily deprives a 
land owner of his or her property, such mechanism will be regarded as unconstitutional. In 
particular it was found that the imposition of restrictions on subdivision of agricultural land is 
not substantively or procedurally arbitrary, and thus constitutional. In relation to the 
imposition of land ceilings, it may be concluded that in some cases, depending on the size 
of the agricultural land holding and the ceiling imposed per district, the deprivation may be 
arbitrary and therefore unconstitutional if it is found that the burden is excessive. In other 
cases, it may be that the deprivation is rational or proportionate and therefore not 
unconstitutional. A determination of the constitutionality of the imposition of land ceilings will 
only be determinable once the land ceilings have been established. The constitutionality of 
land ceilings will have to be determined on a case-by-case basis, district per district, having 
regard to all the factors, criteria and circumstances of the case. Interestingly, Roux suggests 
that land reform legislation (such as the Regulation Bill for example) is unlikely to be found 
unconstitutional, as the aim thereof is to promote land reform (and broaden access to land).4 
He argues that where the aim will in all likelihood outweigh the protection of private property 
rights. In such cases, Roux argues that the excessive regulatory measure should be 
transformed into and expropriation which requires the State to pay compensation to the 
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affected owner.5 However, in view of the FNB-methodology and the wording of section 25 it 
seems unlikely that the court will adopt constructive expropriation as a solution. Therefore 
Bezuidenhout suggests that, where it is not suitable to declare legislation invalid in light of 
the important regulatory purpose i.e. land reform that it aims to fulfil, land owners should be 
compensated for the deprivation in the form of “equalisation payments”.6   
In relation to the constitutionality of the restrictions imposed on foreigners owning agricultural 
land in South Africa in terms of the Regulation Bill, a distinction had to be drawn between 
(a) restricting foreigners from acquiring ownership of agricultural land in future; and (b) 
restricting the disposal of agricultural land by foreigners.7 With regard to the prohibition 
against foreigners acquiring ownership of agricultural land in future, it was found that section 
25(1) only protects existing property rights.8 The Regulation Bill does not aim to deprive or 
extinguish a foreign person’s ownership of agricultural land. Those foreign persons who 
acquired agricultural land before the commencement of the Act will accordingly enjoy the 
protection afforded in section 25(1), whereas foreign persons wanting to acquire agricultural 
land after the commencement of the Act, will not. In conclusion, the constitutionality of the 
prohibition against the acquisition of agricultural land by foreigners in future cannot be tested 
against section 25(1) of the Constitution. In relation to the restrictions on the disposal of 
agricultural land by foreign persons,9 it was found that the deprivation does not deprive the 
foreign owner of all of his or her rights in land. The restriction only affects the foreign owner’s 
right to dispose of his or her property as he or she wishes. In particular, the restriction only 
proscribes how the owner is to dispose of property. In this regard, the owner is not wholly 
prevented from disposing of property, but only from selling his or her agricultural land to a 
buyer of own choice. Accordingly, it can be concluded that the restriction on the disposal of 
agricultural land by foreigners is non-arbitrary and constitutional, because the Regulation 
Bill does not impose a disproportionate burden on those affected when weighed against the 
purpose sought to be achieved, especially where the purpose of the Regulation Bill is land 
reform. 
Having established that the regulatory mechanisms were in all likelihood constitutional, the 
following Chapter explored the different approaches to acquiring agricultural land for 
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redistribution purposes. In particular, the discussion was limited to an exposition of the 
following approaches: (a) market-led approaches; (b) expropriation (with or without 
compensation); and (c) confiscation. It was found that while much controversy exists around 
which approach should be used, it is postulated that a both market-led approaches and 
expropriation should be used to obtain as much agricultural land for redistribution purposes 
as possible. The suitability of the approach in acquiring agricultural land was further explored 
in Chapter 6.  
Having set out the legal position pertaining to (a) the concept of agricultural land; (b) the 
regulation of agricultural; and (c) the acquisition of agricultural land in South Africa, Chapter 
6 provided some preliminary thoughts on the efficacy of redistribution as a whole; the extent 
to which the regulatory mechanisms discussed in Chapter 3 may promote or contribute to 
the redistribution process as a whole; the most suitable approach in acquiring agricultural 
land for redistribution purposes; and the redistribution of agricultural land. It was highlighted 
that the efficacy of the redistribution programme as a whole stems from a lack of (a) a 
coherent policy or law that gives effect to the right to have access to land; (b) accurate land 
records and how land is to be identified for redistribution purposes; and clarity of details 
pertaining to who the beneficiaries ought to be, how they ought to be selected a, what 
quantity and quality of land they ought to receive and what type of right they ought to receive 
in relation to the land. Furthermore, it was found that the success of the redistribution 
programme may be measured against targets or criteria. It was argued that all three 
regulatory mechanisms discussed in Chapter 3 may contribute towards the aims and 
objectives of the redistribution programme, provided that a suitable management framework 
or system is developed to ensure or contribute to the effective implementation of the 
regulatory mechanisms. In relation to the most suitable approach, it was found that both 
market-led approaches and expropriation should be used as a means of acquiring 
agricultural land for redistribution purposes. It was also found that a comparative perspective 
may be useful to develop and expand on these preliminary findings.  
Accordingly, the next part of the dissertation provided for a legal comparative analysis. In 
particular, the following chapters provided for an exposition of (a) the concept of agricultural 
land; (b) the regulation of agricultural land and (c) the acquisition of agricultural for 
redistribution purposes in Namibia and India respectively. These chapters laid the 
foundational basis for an in-depth legal comparative perspective in Chapter 9. Similar to the 




pertaining to (a) the concept of agricultural land; (b) mechanisms for the regulation of 
agricultural land; (c) approaches for the acquisition of agricultural land and (d) redistribution 
in South Africa, Namibia and India. The insights drawn from the jurisdictions are integral in 
providing guidance and proposals for the way in which South Africa should conceptualise, 
regulate, acquire and redistribute agricultural land, to the extent that it may be 
accommodated within the South African constitutional dispensation. Accordingly, the 
following section set out the recommendations flowing from the comparative analysis in 
Chapter 9.  
3 Recommendations  
3 1 A proposed definition of agricultural land in South Africa  
The determination of a coherent and technical legal concept of agricultural land is important 
as a starting point for the regulation thereof. It is therefore proposed that there should be 
one, uniform definition for agricultural land in South Africa. The comparative analysis 
provided for in Chapter 9 has provided some insight into formulating or conceptualising a 
uniform definition of agricultural land in the South African context. Currently, “agricultural 
land” is defined as a residual category. However, not all land forming part of this residual 
category is capable of being used for agricultural purposes. Accordingly, where there is a 
need by a beneficiary under the redistribution programme for land for agricultural purposes, 
the beneficiary may not obtain land suitable for agricultural purposes if the definition in SALA 
remains operational. Within the South African context, the concept of agricultural land needs 
to be formulated widely, so as to not limit the application of the regulatory mechanisms aimed 
at promoting or contributing towards redistribution. The definition of agricultural land should 
also allow for situations where the nature and/or purpose of the land may change over time. 
For example, land may become arable over time due to changing climate conditions. In this 
regard, land that was previously deemed to be non-agricultural land, may become 
agricultural land and vice versa.  
 
Similar to the proposed concept of agricultural land in the Namibian Land Bill and under the 
different Indian State land-ceiling legislation, it is proposed that agricultural land in South 
Africa should not be defined as a residual category of land. Instead, it should be defined 
widely, at a national level, as:  Any land that is used for or capable of being used for (a) 





Given South Africa’s topography and current and/or changing climatic conditions, it is 
proposed that each province, similar to a State in India, should provide in legislation or 
policy, what constitutes “agricultural purposes” or “agriculture” for that region. Accordingly, 
a national or overarching concept of agricultural land would exist in South Africa, while it is 
proposed that the details pertaining to what constitutes “agricultural purposes” or 
“agriculture” are left to the relevant provincial legislator or policy maker. Each province, given 
its specific climatic conditions and land capabilities, should provide for a list of “agriculture 
purposes” or for a definition of “agriculture”, as set out in each Indian’s State’s legislation. In 
this way, the focus would not fall on where the land is situated, but rather on the purpose for 
which it is used or can be used.  
 
In line with the proposal that there should be a uniform definition of agricultural land, it is 
also proposed that there should be one piece of legislation regulating agricultural land. This 
proposal is dealt with in the next section.  
3 2 A legal framework for the regulation of agricultural land in South Africa 
3 2 1 Introduction  
As mentioned in Chapter 1,10 in the process of broadening access to land, agricultural 
productivity and food security may not be compromised. It is within this context, that it is 
proposed that an overarching legal framework for the regulation of agricultural land in South 
Africa should be formulated. Given the array of problems identified with the formulation, 
implementation and administration of the ceiling legislation in India, it is proposed that the 
South African government have two options in relation to the Regulation Bill: Firstly, the 
Regulation Bill, or specifically the provisions dealing with agricultural land ceilings, should 
be scrapped and alternative regulatory measures for redistribution should be explored. This 
would require exploring different ways of identifying, acquiring and redistributing agricultural 
land. Alternatively, if it is not scrapped, the Regulation Bill in its current form requires further 
amendments to address the problems identified with the formulation and implementation of 
the ceiling legislation. In this regard, it is furthermore proposed that the regulatory 
mechanisms, and other aspects, proposed by the Preservation Bill11 and the Regulation 
Bill12 be comprised into one Agricultural Land Bill regulating agricultural land for 
redistribution purposes, while taking into account the need to preserve agricultural land for 
                                            
10 See Chapter 1, 1 above.  
11 Under the administration of the former Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. 




present and future generations. Given the newly reconfigured national executive following 
the May 2019 elections,13 both the Preservation Bill and the Regulation Bill will fall under the 
newly formed DALRRD. A new legal framework for the regulation of agricultural land also 
requires an effective land administration system which entails, inter alia, (a) the 
establishment of (i) a National Land Commission; and (ii) nine Provincial Land Commissions, 
monitored by the National Land Commission; (b) strengthening and enhancing the capacity 
of the LLC and (c) clarifying the respective roles between the OVG and the court. See 
Annexure B for an exposition of the different institutions and respective roles in light of the 
proposed legal framework for the regulation and redistribution of agricultural land in South 
Africa. 
3 2 2 An agricultural land register  
Currently, there are two opposing bills that provide for different purposes and different 
mechanisms to regulate agricultural land in South Africa, namely the Regulation Bill and the 
Preservation Bill. The Regulation Bill aims to make more agricultural land available for 
redistribution purposes, while the Preservation Bill aims to preserve agricultural land. In 
short, the Regulation Bill aims to broaden access to agricultural land by imposing land 
ceilings and by placing restrictions on foreign ownership of agricultural land and the 
Preservation Bill, inter alia, prohibits subdivision and allows for the creation of protected 
agricultural areas. While the aims of the Regulation Bill and Preservation Bill differ, both 
allow for the establishment of a national agricultural land register.14  
 
On the one hand, the Regulation Bill proposes that a register be developed and maintained 
to determine the race and gender of all agricultural land owners in South Africa.15 In 
principle, this will allow the South African government to monitor the distribution and 
redistribution of agricultural land in the country. On the other hand, the Preservation Bill 
provides for the establishment of a national agricultural land register to provide data and 
information on, inter alia, “the capability, suitability, potential, status and use” of agricultural 
resources, including land,16 for the preservation, sustainable use and management of 
agricultural land. This register will be useful for the determination of land ceilings which 
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require the consideration of various criteria and factors, including (a) land capability factors 
(essentially high, medium or unique agricultural land, matters pertaining to production 
output, variations in physical potential in terms of soil type, and the relationship between 
resources); (b) capital requirements of different enterprises; (c) measure of expected 
household and agro-enterprise income; (d) annual turnover; and (e) the relationship 
between product prices and price margins.17 In this way, a combined register of ownership 
of agricultural land and the capability and suitability of agricultural land will contribute to the 
effective implementation of land ceilings. While the Regulation Bill proposes that the 
establishment, administration and maintenance of such a register will be the responsibility 
of the National Land Commission, it is proposed instead that nine Provincial Land 
Commissions be created to compile an Argricultural Land Register per province. The 
overarching role of the National Land Commission will then be to oversee and maintain a 
National Agricultural Land Register, comprised out of the nine Provincial Agricultural Land 
Registers.  
3 2 3 The subdivision of agricultural land in South Africa 
Despite the arguments for and against subdivision as a restraint against redistribution of 
agricultural land18 and the proposal by the Land Reform Report that SALA should be 
repealed19 restrictions on subdivision of agricultural land may play a pivotal role in the 
(potential and) successful implementation of land ceilings in South Africa. The prohibition 
against the subdivision of agricultural land in SALA and the Preservation Bill ensures that 
ceiling surplus agricultural land is not transferred to unintended beneficiaries of the 
redistribution programme. In other words, the restrictions against subdivision of agricultural 
land in SALA and the Preservation Bill, do not pose a restraint to redistribution, but rather 
ensure that land owners do not transfer parcels of agricultural land to persons such as 
relatives who are not considered to be beneficiaries of the redistribution programme by the 
South African government. The restriction against subdividing agricultural land and the 
important implications it has for the operation of land ceiling legislation in South Africa is 
discussed further below.  
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3 2 4 Agricultural land ceilings in South Africa  
The imposition of land ceilings in India has generally not led to any effective redistribution of 
agricultural land, but instead, aggravated India’s existing problem of uneconomical 
fragmented land holdings, which has led to a general decline in agricultural productivity20 
and which poses a risk to food security. However, effective mechanisms which are 
formulated correctly and which set lower ceilings thus make more land available for 
redistribution, without compromising agricultural productivity.21 In the process of broadening 
access to land, it is therefore proposed that certain safeguards for the preservation of 
agricultural land be put into place while still providing for the imposition of land ceilings in 
South Africa. As mentioned in Chapter 9 above,22 it may be necessary as proposed by the 
Preservation Bill to make provision for a schedule of “protected agricultural areas”23 in the 
proposed Agricultural Land Bill. In light of the need to preserve agricultural land and ensure 
food security, it is proposed that these areas be exempted from the imposition of land 
ceilings. However, these types of agricultural land may still be expropriated as a whole and 
redistributed to competent beneficiaries, provided that the land is used for agricultural 
purposes. In this way, redistribution is still effected without causing fragmentation of prime 
agricultural land.  
 
The first phase of the implementation of land ceilings in India allowed for various loopholes 
in the formulation of the ceilings legislation. These loopholes allowed land owners, in 
anticipation of the implementation of land ceilings, to circumvent the legislation by either (a) 
reclassifying their land to fall outside the scope of the ceiling legislation; and/or (b) by 
transferring parcels of their land by way of sale, gift or partition (subdivision) to relatives and 
friends. By transferring parcels of their land, the land owner’s land fell within the ceiling limit 
(often set too high), thereby allowing them to circumvent the operation of the land ceiling 
legislation. Only after the proposals in national guidelines in 1972 on the formulation of the 
land ceiling legislation, did the implementation of the legislation contribute to the 
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21 See Chapter 1, 1 above.  
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redistribution of land in India.24 It is accordingly proposed that the provisions of the 
Regulation Bill be amended to prevent such circumvention by South African land owners. 
These concerns are considered below in more detail. Other concerns such as (a) setting the 
ceiling limit too high; and (b) whether the ceiling limit should apply to individual or family 
holdings as a unit are also considered below. While the formulation of compensation was 
considered to be a reason for the failure of the land ceiling legislation in India, it is discussed 
further in identifying a suitable approach for acquiring agricultural land in South Africa 
below.25 Ultimately, as mentioned above, it is recommended that further amendments to the 
land ceiling legislation are required for its effective implementation in South Africa.  
3 2 4 1 The formulation of agricultural land ceiling legislation in South Africa 
To prevent land owners from possibly circumventing the application of land ceiling legislation 
in South Africa, it is proposed that the following amendments be made to the formulation of 
the Regulation Bill: 
 
Firstly, the inadequate definition of agricultural land which allowed land owners in India to 
re-classify their land to fall outside the scope of ceiling legislation, should be addressed in 
the Regulation Bill.26 As mentioned above,27 it is proposed that agricultural land should be 
formulated widely. While the current formulation of agricultural land is formulated widely in 
SALA, it is opined that agricultural land should be defined in accordance with its (potential) 
use and not in relation to where it is situated. It would be ineffective if a land ceiling were 
imposed on agricultural land as a residual category, but the ceiling-surplus land 
(“redistribution agricultural land”) was of a non-arable nature. The wide formulation of 
agricultural land will prevent land owners from reclassifying their land to fall outside the 
scope and application of the ceiling legislation.28  
 
Secondly, and in relation to the first proposal, the large number of exemptions listed in the 
land ceiling legislation in India, which also allowed land owners to reclassify their land to fall 
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outside the scope of the legislation, should be considered.29 While there are no listed 
exemptions in the Regulation Bill, the Bill provides that “the Minister may determine special 
categories of ceilings and exempt a particular category of agricultural land holding”30 from 
the operation of the land ceilings. It is accordingly recommended that the list of exemptions 
be kept at a minimum and that parameters for the Minister’s discretion be formulated. In 
particular, it is also proposed that “protected agricultural areas”31 be exempted from the 
operation of the land ceiling legislation, to address concerns over food security and 
agricultural productivity.  
 
The “protected agricultural areas”32 may include: (a) agricultural land use zones protected 
for purposes of long-term agricultural production and food security which ensures that high 
value agricultural land is protected against non-agricultural land use; (b) areas which are 
declared as a “protected agricultural area” for the purposes of crop or livestock production 
by the Minister by notice in the Gazette; and (c) “high value agricultural land”, defined as:  
 
“land best suited to, and capable of, consistently producing acceptable levels of goods and 
services for a wide range of agricultural enterprises in a sustainable manner, taking into 
consideration expenditure of energy and economic resources”.33  
While the Preservation Bill makes provision for the procedures declaring and reviewing 
protected agricultural areas,34 it does not stipulate the criteria which the Minister must take 
into account in determining “protected agricultural areas”. Arguably, such criteria need to be 
set out in regulations.  
Thirdly, where the land ceiling legislation did not have retrospective effect, land owners in 
India resorted to partitions and fictitious transfers to circumvent the ceiling limits and 
consequently the legislation. However, West Bengal’s land ceiling legislation prohibited 
transfers and partitions retrospectively. In particular, the WBLRA provides that land 
transferred by sale, gift or otherwise partitioned by a raiyat after the 7th of August 1969, but 
before the publication of the West Bengal Land Reform (Amendment) Act shall be taken into 
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account in determining the ceiling area, as if the land had not been transferred or 
partitioned.35 The Act also provides that this provision shall not apply to bona fide transfers 
or partitions and that the onus of proving such a transfer or partition shall lie with the 
transferor.36 Furthermore, the transfer or partition will be deemed to be mala fide if the 
transfer or partition was made in favour of the transferor’s relatives.37 In this regard, it is 
proposed that the land ceiling legislation in South Africa should also provide for prohibiting 
transfers retrospectively.  
The Regulation Bill, in its current form, does not provide for prohibiting transfers 
retrospectively. The Regulation Bill only provides that “any agreement to acquire or dispose 
of agricultural land is void, in so far as it purports to exclude, or to limit, any provision of this 
Act”38 from the date of commencement of the Act. It may be pivotal for the effective and 
successful use of land ceilings to include a provision in the Regulation Bill that prohibits the 
transfer of agricultural land retrospectively. As suggested in Chapter 9, the Regulation Bill 
in relation to the operation of land ceilings specifically, may provide that it operates 
retrospectively from the date it was published for comment namely, 17 March 2017. In this 
way, agricultural land transferred from the date 17 March 2017 to the date of 
commencement of the Regulation Bill shall be taken into account in determining the ceiling 
area, as if the land had not been transferred.39 The Regulation Bill should also, like the West 
Bengal Land Reform Act, provide for bona fide transfers in this regard. This may prevent 
land owners from resorting to mala fide subdivisions and fictitious transfers of agricultural 
land, before the promulgation and implementation of the Regulation Bill. 
As mentioned above,40 restricting the subdivision of agricultural land also plays an important 
role in the implementation of land ceilings. These restrictions ensure that land owners do 
not transfer ceiling-surplus agricultural land to unintended beneficiaries, such as relatives. 
In other words, if subdivision is allowed in principle, as proposed by the Land Reform 
Report,41 then it allows land owners the opportunity to circumvent the ceiling limit, by 
subdividing and transferring ceiling-surplus agricultural land to persons who are not 
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considered to be beneficiaries of the redistribution programme in South Africa. Accordingly, 
in formulating a new Agricultural Land Bill for the regulation of agricultural land, which will 
include the imposition of land ceilings, it is important that restrictions on the subdivision of 
agricultural land as proposed by the Preservation Bill be kept in place. SALA (a pre-
constitutional Act) may be repealed, but the provisions regulating subdivision should be 
revived in the new proposed Bill. In summation, these recommendations will act as a 
safeguard against land owners trying to circumvent the operation of the land ceiling 
legislation in South Africa, which in turn, will contribute towards more land being made 
available for redistribution.  
Other concerns such as (a) setting the ceiling limit too high; and (b) whether the ceiling limit 
should apply to individual or family holdings as a unit should also be considered in 
formulating the land ceiling legislation. In relation to the former concern, the higher the 
ceiling, the less land could be identified as ceiling-surplus land, which also resulted in less 
land being available for redistribution.42 In this regard, the Regulation Bill in its current form 
does not provide for one ceiling limit applicable to all agricultural land in South Africa. 
Instead, the ceiling limit is determined per district or region, having regard to the various 
criteria and factors as discussed in Chapter 3.43 It remains to be seen what the ceiling limit, 
per district or region will be in South Africa. However, in general and in line with the approach 
in West Bengal, it is recommended that the ceiling limit should be low, rather than high, 
provided that the criteria and factors listed in the Regulation Bill for the determination of the 
ceiling limit allow for it. In relation to the latter concern, the Regulation Bill provides that the 
ceiling should apply to individual private and public land owners, including natural, juristic 
and foreign persons, and not to a family unit or holding. As suggested previously, it may be 
too difficult to formulate a standardised concept of “family” in South Africa or to limit the 
number of family members to five to constitute a unit or holding, as is the case in West 
Bengal.44 Accordingly, it is acknowledged that further research and consideration of this 
aspect in formulating land ceiling legislation in South Africa is needed before such legislation 
is promulgated.  
Accordingly, these recommendations in relation to the formulation of land ceiling legislation 
could very well prevent South Africa from making the same mistakes identified by the 1972 
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national guidelines in India. Ultimately, the formulation suggested above may help in 
ensuring that agricultural land is redistributed effectively, without impacting negatively on 
agricultural productivity and ensuring food security for present and future generations in 
South Africa. Importantly, even if agricultural land ceilings are not used as regulatory 
measures to broaden access to land, the criteria used to determine the land ceilings are still 
useful as criteria to identify suitable agricultural land for acquisition.  
3 2 4 2 The implementation of agricultural land ceilings 
Apart from the formulation of legislation regulating agricultural land for redistribution 
purposes in South Africa, the effective use of land ceilings also depends on the South African 
government’s effective implementation thereof.45  
“Policies and laws cannot reach their potential without the political will to implement and a state 
that has the capacity and heart to function and deliver to its people. It is important that the land 
reform process is not captured by individuals or families, monopolies or private sector 
corporations”.46  
 
Section 25(5) of the Constitution mandates the South Africa government, not individuals, 
families, monopolies or private sector corporations, to broaden access to land. It is therefore 
proposed that South Africa requires an effective land administration system characterised 
by (a) a strong political will on the part of the executive, specifically the DALRRD, to 
implement and monitor compliance with land ceiling legislation;47 (b) a clear and effective 
administrative process, governed by a competent body, such as the establishment of a 
National Land Commission and nine Provincial Land Commissions, for the acquisition and 
redistribution of agricultural land; (c) an effective mechanism for resolving land disputes 
timeously dealing with inter alia the classification of land and determining whether the land 
constitutes ceiling-surplus land and the determination of just and equitable compensation;48 
and (d) sufficient capacity and resources to undergird the relevant mechanisms.  
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While each Provincial Land Commission is responsible for determining what constitutes 
“agricultural land” and what the ceiling limit should be in a particular province, disputes may 
arise pertaining to: (a) the categorisation of “agricultural land”; (b) whether certain land is 
exempted from the operation of the land ceiling legislation; and (c) the determination of 
compensation for agricultural land (including ceiling-surplus land) acquired for redistribution 
purposes. A specialised forum, which has the capacity to deal with these matters, is 
required. The LCC specialises in disputes that arise out of laws49 that underpin the South 
African land reform initiative. However, the LCC primarily deals with land restitution or land 
claims and claims or disputes arising out of the Labour Tenants (Land Reform) Act 3 of 1996 
and the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997. In light of the proposed Agricultural 
Land Bill, it is proposed that the LCC should be renamed as the “Land Court”50 to adjudicate 
on redistribution disputes, including (a) matters dealing with the regulation of agricultural 
land for redistribution purposes in general; and (b) disputes related to the imposition of land 
ceilings in particular as listed above. In particular, the role and interplay between the OVG 
and the Land Court in determining compensation for land acquired for land reform purposes 
is discussed below.51 Importantly, the Land Court must have the capacity to deal 
expeditiously with land reform matters. In particular it is proposed that a permanent judge 
president and at least four permanent judges are appointed to the Land Court.52  
3 2 5 Restrictions on foreign ownership of agricultural land in South Africa  
The Regulation Bill, in comparison to the Namibian position, provides for more stringent 
restrictions on foreign ownership in light of the constitutional mandate to broaden access to 
land to citizens. When viewed in light of the constitutional mandate, the restrictions on the 
disposal of agricultural land owned by foreign persons and the prohibition on acquiring 
agricultural land in future seem to be a logical step. However, it is possible that this form of 
legal redress may have an adverse impact on foreign investment in South Africa. 
Accordingly, it may be prudent for South Africa to consider amendments to the Regulation 
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Bill pertaining to foreign ownership of agricultural land. In light of the Namibian position under 
ACLRA, the acquisition of foreign ownership may still be prohibited. However, it is proposed 
that such a prohibition should not be absolute53 and should rather be subject to an 
application and approval process.54 Similar to the position in Namibia as set out in ACLRA, 
prior written consent from the Minister should be required for foreigners to acquire ownership 
or occupy agricultural land for 10 years or longer. It is proposed that the Minister should 
grant his or her consent if there is sufficient evidence that (a) the acquisition of the land will 
constitute an eligible investment in terms of the Protection of Investment Act 22 of 2015; (b) 
the land is capable of being used or occupied in a beneficial manner for the purpose which 
the foreigner aims to use or occupy; and (c) the use or occupation of the land in question 
will not have an adverse effect on the environment. In this way, less restrictive means may 
be used to receive the same result, without compromising foreign investment. In other 
words, less restrictive proposed regulations will still restrict foreigners from acquiring 
ownership of agricultural land, thereby allowing South African citizens to gain access to 
agricultural land, as provided for in section 25(5) of the Constitution. 
3 3 A legal framework for the redistribution of agricultural land in South Africa 
3 3 1 Introduction  
At an overarching level, it is clear that there is no coherent framework, policy or law that 
provides for the redistribution of agricultural land in South Africa.55 The lack of such a policy 
or law makes it exceedingly difficult to measure and determine the success of the 
redistribution programme. The difficulty in measuring the effectiveness or the success of the 
redistribution programme as a whole stems from the lack of a coherent framework, policy or 
law that (a) provides accurate data regarding (i) the question of who owns what land in South 
Africa; (ii) what the land demands or needs are of South Africans; (b) how (agricultural) land 
is identified for redistribution purposes; (c) what the most suitable approach in acquiring 
(agricultural) land for redistribution, including the determination of compensation, is; (d)  
questions regarding the redistribution process, namely: (i) the content of the right in section 
25(5) of the Constitution; (ii) who the beneficiaries ought to be; (iii) how they ought to be 
selected; (iv) what quantity of agricultural land they ought to receive and; (v) what type of 
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rights the beneficiaries of the redistribution programme ought to receive. Without this 
information viable targets or criteria for measuring and monitoring the success of the 
redistribution programme cannot be formulated. Moreover, the establishment and 
cooperation between various functionaries and institutions at various stages of the 
redistribution process are also necessary for the effective implementation of such a 
redistribution framework. See Annexure A and B for an exposition of the different phases of 
the proposed legal framework for the redistribution of agricultural land in South Africa, and 
the corresponding institutions responsible for administering the respective phases. 
3 3 2 A national land audit  
Land is a finite resource, which means that there is only a certain amount of land available 
for redistribution. From the outset, it needs to be determined how much land is available for 
redistribution. The White Paper provided that:  
 
“The purpose of the Land Redistribution Programme is to provide the poor with land for residential 
and productive purposes in order to improve their livelihoods…Land redistribution is intended to 
assist the urban and rural poor, farmworkers, labour tenants, as well as emergent farmers”.56  
 
It is therefore proposed that a National Land Commission, as envisaged by the Regulation 
Bill, be established to conduct a national land audit that is correct and reliable to determine 
who owns what land in South Africa. Such an endeavour will require cooperation with the 
Registrar of the Deeds Office. While the redistribution programme has mainly focused on 
agricultural land, the redistribution programme should focus on the redistribution of urban 
and rural, including agricultural land.57 Therefore, while the focus of this dissertation is on 
the redistribution of agricultural land in particular, it is acknowledged that the national land 
audit and redistribution programme as a whole should not only focus on agricultural land, 
but on urban and rural land in general. Once it is determined who owns what land in South 
Africa, the needs and demands of potential beneficiaries need to be determined.  
3 3 3 A national land demand or need survey 
Coupled with the need for a national land audit, is the need for a national land demand or 
need survey conducted at national level, by the proposed National Land Commission.58 
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Currently, there is “no adequate system for engaging with land demand” 59 or land need. The 
data obtained should be “categorised into different categories of land demand, mapped 
across different regions”.60 To this extent, the redistribution programme is demand-driven, 
because it relies on the beneficiaries, as opposed to the State, to identify their land needs. 
In this regard, land demand may be categorised according to settlement orientated needs 
and/or farming orientated needs. Farming orientated needs can further be categorised into 
land needed for subsistence; small-; medium- and large-scale farming. Aliber notes that the 
size of the land awarded and the type of rights acquired in relation to the land will depend 
on the category of land need or demand.61 These aspects are discussed further below. 
Establishing what the land needs and demands are may also assist in identifying suitable 
(agricultural) land for redistribution. The Land Reform Report states that:  
 
“Decisions about which land to acquire can only be taken on the basis of an understanding of who 
wants and needs land, what kind of land and for what purposes”.62  
 
While it is acknowledged that the identification of suitable land for the differential land needs 
and demands relate to urban and rural land, the recommendations will henceforth only focus 
on agricultural land. In line with the needs and demands of potential beneficiaries as 
determined by the national survey, suitable agricultural land for redistribution needs to be 
identified once the national land audit is completed.  
3 3 4 Identifying suitable agricultural land for redistribution  
One of the most important aspects highlighted in the Kessl-judgment is that a uniform and 
clear approach to identifying (agricultural) land for acquisition for redistribution purposes is 
required. Accordingly, for the sake of a transparent, procedurally fair and effective 
redistribution process in South Africa, guidelines regarding objective, non-arbitrary criteria 
for identifying suitable agricultural land for redistribution purposes should be developed and 
provided for in regulations or policy.63 For example, in Namibia a set of regulations which 
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provide for (a) identification criteria;64 and (b) suitability criteria65 are used in selecting 
agricultural land eligible for expropriation. In Namibia, “suitability” means that the land must 
be suitable for settlement (residential) and farming purposes.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3 and above, the Agricultural Land Bill makes provision for the 
imposition of land ceilings on all agricultural land. In principle, any land regarded as ceiling-
surplus land, even if the land is owned by a Black person, will be available to be expropriated 
and redistributed. However, as mentioned in Chapter 3, such land may not be suitable for 
redistribution or agricultural purposes. Therefore, identification and suitability criteria have 
to be developed and provided for as regulations to the proposed Agricultural Land Bill. The 
identification criteria would include ascertaining whether the agricultural land (a) has any 
condition endorsed on the title deed thereof;66 (b) is owned by (i) a South African citizen or 
foreign national67 and (ii) a natural or juristic person;68 (iii) a Black or White person; (iv) a 
male or female; (c) is managed and by whom;69 (d) leased;70 (e) abandoned by the owner;71 
(f) neglected or under-utilised;72 and (g) will contribute to the utilisation of adjacent State 
land.73  
 
Some, if not all, of this information will be easily obtainable once the Agricultural Land 
Register, as proposed above, is created. While the National Land Commission is envisaged 
to conduct the national land audit, it is proposed that nine Provincial Land Commissions be 
created to compile an Agricultural Land Register per province. This is in line with the 
recommendation that “agricultural land”, specifically the definition of “agricultural purposes” 
or “agriculture”, and the corresponding ceiling limits should be determined for each province 
given South Africa’s diversified topography. Under the proposed Agricultural Land Bill (a 
combination of the Regulation and Preservation Bills), land owners are required to disclose 
their, inter alia, (a) race, as Black, Indian, Coloured, White or other; (b) gender, as male or 
female; (c) nationality; (d) the size and use of the land; (e) any real right registered against 
and licence allocated to the agricultural land; and (f) any other information as may be 
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prescribed,74 which should include whether the land is leased and managed and by whom. 
The other considerations above, such as whether the land is abandoned by the owner;75 (f) 
neglected or under-utilised;76 and/or (g) will contribute to the utilisation of adjacent State 
land77 will have to be determined by the Provincial Land Commission. For example, owners 
of agricultural land who are citizens of South Africa should be less likely to be expropriated 
for redistribution purposes than foreigners. Abandoned and neglected or under-utilised land 
will also be more likely to be expropriated for redistribution purposes.  
 
The determination of the ceiling limit considers criteria such as: (a) the size of the agricultural 
land;78 (b) the location of the land;79 (c) the infrastructure on the land;80 and (d) the climate, 
relief and soil of the land.81 Therefore, any land falling above the ceiling limit will be suitable 
in principle, for acquisition for redistribution purposes. In this way, the imposition of a land 
ceiling inherently identifies suitable agricultural land for redistribution purposes. However, 
as mentioned above, even if the agricultural land ceilings are not implemented, the criteria 
used to determine the land ceiling will in any event be useful in identifying suitable 
agricultural land for redistribution purposes. For example, factors such as the land capability 
and capital requirements (infrastructure) are useful in determining whether the land is 
suitable for acquisition for redistribution purposes. Similarly the criteria in the “Regulations 
on Criteria to be used for Expropriation of Agricultural Land” in Namibia also provide 
guidelines on identifying suitable land. 
 
Furthermore, as highlighted by the position in India,82 the impact that the acquisition of the 
agricultural land may have must also be taken into account in determining the suitability 
thereof for redistribution purposes. For example, the number of families likely to be displaced 
and the costs of minimising displacement should be included in the identification or suitability 
criteria. Alternatively, the Provincial Land Commission should conduct a social impact 
assessment before considering the identification of suitable agricultural land for 
redistribution. Furthermore, it is also postulated that each Provincial Land Commission 
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create a rehabilitation and resettlement scheme. In light of the social impact assessment, 
such a scheme should include an estimation of the affected families and the number of 
families among them likely to be displaced; steps that will be taken by the Commission to 
minimise displacement; employment opportunities to be allocated to the affected family, 
etc.83  
 
Each piece of agricultural land is then evaluated in accordance with these criteria and 
awarded a weighted score. The regulations should provide for a checklist and formula to 
determine whether the agricultural land is either highly suitable; suitable; moderately 
suitable; or not suitable for redistribution purposes.84 It is acknowledged that the scoring 
system may not be the best way of identifying suitable agricultural land for redistribution 
purposes, but it will, at the very least, ensure that there is a transparent and procedurally 
fair procedure. Once land is identified as suitable for redistribution, it has to be valued and 
acquired by the State.  
3 3 5 A suitable approach to acquiring agricultural land for redistribution 
3 3 5 1 Introduction  
Once agricultural land is identified as suitable for redistribution purposes, the Minister of 
Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development or a delegate must acquire the land. While 
Chapter 5 provided for an exposition of the approaches to acquiring agricultural land, 
Chapter 6 considered which approach would be most suitable for acquiring agricultural land 
for redistribution. To be considered as a suitable approach, the approach in question must 
at the very least be constitutional. Accordingly, in line with the Constitution, confiscation of 
agricultural land for redistribution purposes is not regarded as a constitutionally permitted 
approach to acquiring agricultural land. As provided for in Chapter 5, both market-led 
approaches and expropriation are constitutionally endorsed methods of acquiring 
agricultural land for redistribution purposes. To determine which approach is more suitable, 
both the efficacy and the affordability of each approach were considered further. It was 
proposed that a combination of approaches, particularly market-led approaches and 
expropriation85 should be used to acquire agricultural land for redistribution.86 The 
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combination of approaches will, in principle, allow for the acquisition of more and better 
suited land for redistribution.  
 
However, acquired property at market value or at an inflated price makes the cost of 
acquiring agricultural land too high,87 which in turn would make the acquisition of agricultural 
land unsustainable.88 Therefore, the main problem with market-led approaches and 
expropriation is that it is too costly for the government to sustain, given the budget allocated 
for land reform.89 Therefore, coupled with the acquisition of agricultural land for redistribution 
purposes is the determination of a negotiated price or just and equitable compensation. It is 
in this context that the roles of both the OVG and the court becomes important.  
3 3 5 2 The determination of compensation for land reform purposes  
As mentioned in Chapter 5, the precise role of the OVG, and the relationship, duties and 
responsibilities of the court vis-á-vis the OVG remain unclear. The following proposals 
regarding the role of the OVG and the Land Court in the process of determining 
compensation for the acquisition of agricultural land for redistribution purposes are therefore 
speculative.  
 
Once property (land) is identified for acquisition via market-led approaches or expropriation 
for land reform purposes, the OVG must value the land “for purposes of determining the 
value of the property having regard to the prescribed criteria, procedures and guidelines”.90 
In other words, the OVG must use the formula provided for in the regulations to the PVA to 
determine the value of the property. In determining the “value”91 of the land, various 
considerations will be taken into account, including the market value of the property. Market 
value is but one of the factors which the Valuer-General must take into account. The other 
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considerations, similar to those listed in section 25(3) of the Constitution,92 include the 
current use of the property; the history of the acquisition and the use of the property; the 
extent of direct State investment and subsidy in the acquisition and the beneficial capital 
improvement of the property and the purpose of the acquisition. Accordingly, while the aim 
is to establish the value of the land,93 this value may be indicative of the amount of 
compensation which should ultimately be awarded to a land owner for land acquired for 
redistribution purposes. Alternatively, it could be equated, prima facie with just and equitable 
compensation because the same considerations are considered.  
 
However, while the same factors listed in section 25(3) of the Constitution for determining 
just and equitable compensation are considered in determining value, the PVA does not 
state that the OVG makes a decision as to the compensation to be paid, nor that the Minister 
of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development is bound by the decision. In this context, 
Pienaar postulates that the determination of the OVG can be used as a guideline for 
acquiring property for land reform purposes but that neither the Minister nor the court is 
bound by such a determination.94 Accordingly, the Minister may use this value determined 
by the OVG as a compensation offer to land owners whose property have been identified 
for acquisition for land reform purposes.95 Such an offer may be made during sale 
negotiations or as part of the expropriation process. However, it is not clear where in the 
expropriation process96 the valuation in terms of the PVA fits in. Arguably, the determination 
of the value of the property can be used as the compensation offered in terms of the notice 
of intention to expropriate and “later (if needed) in the expropriation notice”.97  
 
Section 25(2)(b) of the Constitution makes it clear that compensation “must either have been 
agreed [to] by those affected or decided or approved by a court”. Only if the land owners 
accept the compensation offer or it is approved by a court, will the determination of value by 
the OVG be binding.  
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However, where the compensation offer is rejected, it may be challenged in court. In this 
light, the LCC held that “a court cannot be bound to accept a value determined by the OVG 
as the amount of compensation for an expropriation”.98 The value of the property determined 
by the OVG may be equal to just and equitable compensation in some cases, but should 
not be equated with one another in all cases.99 Du Plessis explains that “value” is determined 
by valuation techniques whereas the determination of just and equitable compensation is 
determined on the basis of justice and equity.100 The LLC recently held that the: 
 
“[V]aluation guidelines prescribed by the Valuation Regulations could…result in valuations which 
are lower than just and equitable compensation as provided for by the Constitution and which can 
be in conflict with the definition of value in the Property Valuation Act”.101  
 
Therefore, the valuation report of the OVG cannot oust the jurisdiction of the court but may 
be used by the court as a guideline for determining just and equitable compensation.  
 
It is reiterated that “just and equitable” compensation, as determined by a court, could be 
significantly lower than market value compensation and still be constitutional. Notably, in 
India, the amount of compensation payable to a land owner for land acquired for 
redistribution under the ceiling-legislation, is generally below market value.102 Accordingly, 
the State may expropriate land for redistribution purposes, against compensation lower than 
market value provided that it is just and equitable as the Constitution is currently formulated. 
3 3 5 3 Amending the Constitution  
The issue of a suitable approach to acquiring agricultural land for redistribution purposes 
cannot be discussed without reference to the question of amending the Constitution to 
provide for expropriation without compensation. The Land Reform Report holds that: 
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“[I]f the purpose of the constitutional amendment is to move away from the mandatory 
compensation-based requirement in certain circumstances, then it may be necessary to amend 
the Constitution by inserting a new section which may read as follows: Parliament must enact 
legislation determining instances that warrant expropriation without compensation for purposes 
of land reform…”.103  
 
This would entail promulgating legislation, such as the Expropriation Bill, which should 
provide clearly for circumstances and categories of land which may warrant expropriation 
without compensation. However, if the aim of a constitutional amendment to section 25 is to 
allow for expropriation without compensation “wholescale and without conditions, then such 
a motion would offend against section 1 of the Constitution and would in effect, collapse the 
core underlying values of our Constitution”.104  
3 3 5 4 The possibility of nil compensation in terms of the Expropriation Bill  
The Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 predates the 1996 Constitution and its use does not align 
with the transformative mandate of the Constitution.105 The Act also “uses market-based 
compensation with an added solatium”,106 which is contrary to the determination of “just and 
equitable” compensation in section 25(3) of the Constitution.107 In this regard, it is proposed 
that the 1975 Expropriation Act be repealed and that the new Expropriation Bill be finalised. 
As mentioned in Chapter 5,108 the Expropriation Bill provides for the determination of “just 
and equitable” compensation, with reference to the factors in section 25(3) of the 
Constitution. It also makes provision for categories of land which may be expropriated for 
redistribution purposes for nil compensation.109 However, as discussed in Chapter 5,110 the 
Bill is still vague in relation to “(a) the scope of the categories and (b) the result,” 111 in that 
some compensation may still have to be paid even if the land is categorised as falling under 
section 12(3).   
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The Land Reform Report also proposes a wider array of circumstances or categories of land 
under that may be acquired for redistribution against nil compensation:  
 
“including but not limited to: (a) abandoned land; (b) hopelessly indebted land; (c) land held purely 
for speculative purposes; (d) unutilised land held by state entities; (e) land obtained through 
criminal activity; (f) land already occupied and used by labour tenants and former labour tenants; 
(g) informal settlements areas; (h) inner city buildings with absentee landlords; (i) land donations 
(as a form of EWC); and (j) farm equity schemes”.112 
 
Interestingly, these categories of land are similar to the criteria used to determine the 
suitability of land to be expropriated for land reform purposes by the Provincial Land 
Commission.113 To avoid potential disputes regarding the categorisation of land that may 
arise if the Expropriation Bill is promulgated, it is therefore recommended that the scope of 
the categories of land that may be expropriated for nil compensation be further explored and 
clarified in regulations to the Expropriation Bill or part of the regulations under the PVA.  
 
It is also unclear what the role of the OVG or the use of the determination of value will be in 
cases where nil compensation may be payable. Because the Expropriation Bill only makes 
provision for categories of land which may be expropriated for nil compensation, the court 
will still have to confirm or determine if it is just and equitable, having regard to the 
circumstances, to do so. Where the court finds that payment of nil compensation is not just 
and equitable, the determination of the value of the property by the OVG may still be useful 
as a guideline to determine just and equitable compensation. Accordingly, the court will still 
need to determine whether (a) the property falls within the categories of land provided for in 
the Expropriation Bill; and (b) whether it is just and equitable to pay nil compensation for the 
property. 
 
Importantly, the redistribution process may continue even if an amount for compensation 
has not been finalised yet. “Even though compensation is a requirement for a valid 
expropriation, the amount need not to be determined and paid before ownership can 
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vest”.114 However, having regard to the time and manner of payment, compensation still 
needs to be paid within a “just and equitable” time.115  
3 3 6 Land Depository  
Once the land is acquired by the State via market-led approaches or expropriation, the land 
should be deposited into a Provisional Land Depository, as proposed by the Land Reform 
Report.116 The Land Depository is proposed to keep a proper record of all of land parcels 
contributed, including donations.117 Land can also be returned to the Land Depository where 
beneficiaries either fail to use the land productively, or intend to sell it. The State can also 
acquire the agricultural land in cases where beneficiaries fail to use the land productively, 
or intend to sell it.  Land in the depository will be State-owned, until ownership thereof is 
(possibly) transferred to intended beneficiaries.  
3 3 7 A National Redistribution Policy or Bill  
3 3 7 1 Introduction  
Once the land is identified as suitable for acquisition and redistribution and the land is 
acquired by the State by way of a market-led approach or expropriation, the land needs to 
be redistributed. Act 126 makes provision for the designation of (agricultural) land for 
redistribution, but it does not provide for regulations or guidelines on qualifying and selection 
criteria or a process for identifying and selecting beneficiaries. The Regulation Bill also does 
not make provision for details pertaining to the redistribution process – it only stipulates that 
agricultural land obtained under the Regulation Bill should be redistributed.118 In other 
words, there is also no single, coherent policy, scheme or law which provides for guidelines 
on the qualifying criteria; selection criteria or the selection process of beneficiaries. 
Accordingly, linked to the determination of the national land demand or needs, is the 
determination of: (i) who the beneficiaries ought to be;119 (ii) how they ought to be selected; 
                                            
114 Du Plessis “How the determination of compensation is influenced by the disjunction between the concept 
of ‘value’ and ‘compensation’” in Rethinking Expropriation Law III: Fair Compensation 193.  
115 Section 25(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; Haffejee NO v eThekwini Municipality 
2011 6 SA 134 (CC). See also ZT Boggenpoel “Compliance with section 25(2)(b) of the Constitution: When 
should compensation for expropriation be determined?” (2012) 129 South African Law Journal 605-620; Du 
Plessis “How the determination of compensation is influenced by the disjunction between the concept of ‘value’ 
and ‘compensation’” in Rethinking Expropriation Law III: Fair Compensation 193. 
116 Advisory Panel on Land Reform and Agriculture “Final Report of the Presidential Advisory Panel on Land 
Reform and Agriculture” (4 May 2019) 57.  
117 57.  
118 Clause 26 of the Regulation of Agricultural Land Holdings Bill. 
119 Aliber “How can we promote a range of livelihood opportunities through land redistribution” (13 March 2019) 
Working Paper 58 PLAAS, UWC, Cape Town 4 avers that: “One of the key failings of redistribution to date has 
been to not be clear as to who is targeted to benefit from it, or to actually apply whatever 




(iii) what quantity of agricultural land they ought to receive and; (iv) what type of rights the 
beneficiaries of the redistribution programme ought to receive. In this regard, it is proposed 
that the Redistribution Policy or Bill set out who the beneficiaries of the redistribution are; 
determine qualifying and selection criteria and develop a selection process. The Policy or 
Bill also needs to determine what quantity of land the beneficiary will acquire and what rights 
he or she will obtain in relation to the land.  
3 3 7 2 The right to have access to land 
Section 25(5) of the Constitution provides that the State must foster conditions that will 
enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis. Again, while this right includes 
broadening access to urban and rural land, the focus falls on agricultural land specifically. 
Despite this constitutional obligation, no policy or law has been enacted to define this 
right.120 Accordingly, it is recommended that, from the outset, the Redistribution Policy or 
Bill should clarify and give content to the right in section 25(5) of the Constitution. As 
mentioned in Chapter 1,121 access to land does not necessarily imply that ownership should 
be granted. It is proposed that the Redistribution Policy or Bill should align the concept of 
“redistribution” with the notions of “access to land”. Accordingly, coupled with 
conceptualising redistribution, it should be clear what the aims and proposed outcome of 
the redistribution programme are. For example, is the aim of the redistribution programme 
to diversify ownership patterns or is to ensure rights in relation to the land (urban or rural) 
for beneficiaries of the redistribution programme? 
 
In relation to the determination of the aims and outcome of the redistribution programme, 
the land needs and demands of previously disadvantaged citizens, as proposed above, 
should be determined by way of a national survey. These land needs and demands may 
also provide content to the right in section 25(5) of the Constitution and pave the way for 
determining whom the beneficiaries should be and what type of rights the beneficiaries 
should receive. For example, the land needs or demands may indicate that transfer of 
ownership is required as part of the concept of redistribution or that tenure security is 
sufficient to hold that redistribution has occurred.  
 
Importantly, the proposed Redistribution Policy or Bill should acknowledge that: 
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“Land demand, or need, is differentiated and geographically distinct – people in different areas 
need different types of land in different size parcels for different purposes”.122  
 
In line with the proposed national survey, it should be determined if the potential beneficiary 
requires land or settlement (residential) and/or subsistence; small-scale; medium-scale or 
large-scale farming purposes. For purposes of this dissertation, it is reiterated that the focus 
falls on beneficiaries wanting or needing land for agricultural purposes.  
3 3 7 3 The beneficiaries  
As mentioned above, the White Paper provided that land redistribution should assist the 
urban and rural poor including, farmworkers, labour tenants and emergent farmers for 
residential and farming purposes.123 The White Paper also provided that: 
 
“The most critical and desperate needs will command government’s most urgent attention. Priority 
will be given to the marginalised and to women in particular”.124  
 
However, having regard to the different schemes and policies over the last 22 years, it is 
unclear who the beneficiaries of the redistribution programme ought to be.  
 
The Land Reform Report highlights that “the vast majority of South Africans are eligible for 
land reform”125 and it emphasises that there should be “strong criteria for eligibility, 
prioritisation and selection”.126 Furthermore, the Land Reform Report identifies a variety of 
potential people needing and wanting access to land, including:  
 
“evictees from farms and from other settlements; farm dwellers; labour tenants; landless livestock 
owners; commonage users on overstocked commonage land; residents of informal settlements 
and backyard shacks; people occupying or encroaching on public or private land; young, 
employed black youth unable to access property markets; the black unemployed and urban 
dwellers; small emerging entrepreneurs; and aspirant black commercial players”.127    
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The variety of people wanting or needing agricultural land will also become apparent once 
the national land demand or need survey is completed. From the survey, it should therefore 
become apparent who the target groups of the redistribution programme should be. In light 
of the White Paper, vulnerable groups should still be targeted, prioritising Black people, 
specifically women, the youth (35 years old and below) and people with disabilities,128 
working or residing on farms.129 Importantly, not every person falling within the target group 
will receive land or rights in relation to the land. The survey will only provide a tentative 
indication of potential beneficiaries. Further, qualifying and selection criteria, coupled with a 
transparent selection process, must still be developed to identify specific beneficiaries.  
 
In this regard, the Redistribution Policy or Bill should provide for threshold requirements. It 
is recommended that potential beneficiaries under the redistribution programme must (a) be 
a Black South Africa citizen; (b) be at least 18 years of age; (c) must have been previously 
disadvantaged;130 (d) have no more than 150 large stock units or 800 small stock units;131 
and (d) not own any land, other than for residential purposes.132   
 
Importantly, if a person meets the qualifying criteria, it does not mean that such a person 
will receive land or rights in relation to the land automatically.133 Once the targeted groups 
meet the qualifying criteria, various other criteria are used to select the most appropriate 
beneficiary for a particular parcel of land identified as suitable for redistribution purposes. 
The Redistribution Policy or Bill should also make provision for selection criteria.   
 
Aliber provides that the selection criteria should also be developed in relation to the purpose 
for which a beneficiary wants to acquire a parcel of land. He proposes that a differential 
approach to selection criteria be developed depending on intended use of the land by the 
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potential beneficiary.134 Again, for purposes of this dissertation, the recommendations are 
restricted to land acquired for agricultural purposes. Accordingly, where land 
needs/demands relate to agricultural land, beneficiaries should be able to farm productively. 
In this regard, it is proposed that the selection criteria should be the same or similar to those 
formulated in the NRP in Namibia, namely (a) agricultural background; (b) age; (c) gender; 
(d) generational farm workers,135 such as labour tenants;136 (e) literacy; (f) current 
agricultural income (number of livestock); and (g) applicants from communal areas.137 
Applicants are then scored in relation to these criteria. It is acknowledged that, as with 
identifying suitable agricultural land, the scoring system may not be the best way of finding 
the most suitable beneficiary, but it allows for a transparent and uniform procedure in 
selecting eligible beneficiaries. Each Provincial Land Commission will then be responsible 
for dealing with the applications and selection of beneficiaries.  
3 3 7 4 The size of the land  
The size of the land redistributed to the beneficiaries will depend on whether the land will be 
used for settlement and/or subsistence, small-scale, medium-scale or large-scale farming. 
It also depends on the land that may become available if land ceiling legislation is 
implemented in South Africa and on the type of land identified as suitable for redistribution 
purposes.  
 
Aliber proposes the following very simple and rough categorisation for distributing different 
size parcels of land, depending on the purpose for which it is intended to be used: For 
settlement-orientated purposes, beneficiaries should receive “roughly 0.1 to 1 hectare per 
household”.138 For subsistence and/or small-scale farming purposes, “roughly 1 to 50 
hectares per household of arable land”139 should be allocated to beneficiaries. For large-
scale farming purposes, beneficiaries should receive “roughly 50 to 500 hectares per 
household for arable”.140 He proposes that the land should be awarded per household and 
                                            
134 Aliber “How can we promote a range of livelihood opportunities through land redistribution” (13 March 2019) 
Working Paper 58 PLAAS, UWC, Cape Town 7, 10.  
135 Generational farm workers are generally considered to be those persons who have been working on a farm 
for a least a generation or longer, often leaving them with not roots in any other settlement area, village, town 
or city.  
136 Notably, this selection process may run concurrently with the application for ownership of land under chapter 
3 of the Land Reform: Labour Tenants Act 3 of 1996.   
137 Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation Resettlement Criteria 5-7.  
138 Aliber “How can we promote a range of livelihood opportunities through land redistribution” (13 March 2019) 
Working Paper 58 PLAAS, UWC, Cape Town 5-6.  
139 5-6. 




not per individual as proposed by the Regulation Bill. As mentioned above,141 it may be 
difficult to formulate what constitutes a “family”, or in this case, “a household”. It is thus 
recommended that this aspect be researched and explored further.  
3 3 7 5 Rights of beneficiaries  
The type of rights the beneficiaries will acquire in relation to the land, directly relates to 
conceptualising redistribution under a National Redistribution Policy or Bill.  As mentioned 
above, the South African government needs to provide content to the right in section 25(5) 
of the Constitution. If it is decided that redistribution entails changing ownership patterns, 
then the beneficiaries should receive ownership of the land in the form of title or at the very 
least, should receive ownership of the land after a determined lease period.142  
 
However, if redistribution is conceptualised as broadening access to land by providing 
secure tenure at the very least, then it may be argued that the approach to awarding rights 
in relation to the land may be differential. This differential approach will depend on the size 
and the purpose for which the land is acquired by the beneficiary. This approach will also be 
dependent on the content given to section 25(5) of the Constitution. The SLLDP already 
provides for different categories of beneficiaries and different types of rights depending on 
the purpose for which the beneficiary will use the land. For example, if the beneficiary intends 
to use the land for settlement and subsistence or small-scale farming,143 then the beneficiary 
will be entitled to a lease with the State without the option to purchase the land.144 Aliber 
argues the inverse. He suggests that where the beneficiary intends to use the land for 
settlement and subsistence or small-scale farming, the possibility of project failure is so low 
that the beneficiary should be granted title.145 However, if the beneficiary intends to use the 
land for medium-scale or large-scale farming purposes under the SLLDP,146 the beneficiary 
will be entitled to a limited real right, namely a lease for a period of 30 years, with the option 
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to renew the lease for another 20 years, and with the option to purchase.147 It is opined that 
this is not necessarily practical, because beneficiaries may be 70 years old or older by the 
time they receive ownership of the land.148 It is recommended that long-term leases should 
be registered and that the option to purchase should be made available after a shorter time 
period. For example, in terms of Namibia’s land use models, specifically the HEVM, 
beneficiaries that receive high value agricultural land are given the option to purchase the 
land after 10 years.  
 
Furthermore, where the rights of beneficiaries in terms of the Redistribution Bill or Policy are 
infringed, such parties may approach the Land Court for appropriate relief. For example, if 
a beneficiary is afforded the option to purchase the land after 10 years, but the State fails to 
administer the process, the beneficiary may approach the court for an order directing the 
State to effect such a transfer of ownership.149  
 
Ultimately, it is recommended that a differential approach is required for determining what 
type of right in relation to the land the beneficiary will obtain under the redistribution 
programme. As explained, the type of right awarded to the beneficiary is dependent on the 
purpose for which the beneficiary will use the land, namely subsistence, small-scale, 
medium-scale or large-scale farming.  
 
4 Conclusion 
The unequal distribution of agricultural land remains prevalent after 25 years of democracy 
in South Africa. It is clear that various constitutional objectives have to be met in formulating 
a constitutional and effective legal framework for the redistribution of agricultural land. On 
the one hand, the State must foster conditions which will enable citizens to gain access to 
land on an equitable basis, without arbitrarily depriving land owners of their private property 
rights.150 On the other hand, the State must also promulgate reasonable regulatory 
measures which aim to secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural 
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resources, including in relation to agricultural land, for present and future generations.151 
The challenge lies in drafting and implementing pertinent policy and legislative measures 
dealing with agrarian reform which allows for the redistribution and preservation of 
agricultural land. In other words, agricultural productivity, development and food security 
may not be compromised and the regulatory measures employed have to be aligned with 
the provisions of the property clause, section 25 of the Constitution.152  
 
This dissertation set out to determine (a) to what extent the South African government may 
interfere with and regulate private property rights in relation to agricultural land for 
redistribution purposes; and (b) how the South African government should conceptualise, 
regulate, acquire and redistribute agricultural land to promote land reform, particularly 
redistribution goals without impeding agricultural productivity? The former question entailed 
a determination of whether the current and envisaged regulatory measures aimed at 
regulating agricultural land are constitutional, whereas the latter question explored different 
options for the conceptualisation, regulation, acquisition and redistribution of agricultural 
land in South Africa.  
 
The South African government may interfere with and regulate private property rights to the 
extent that it does not amount to an arbitrary deprivation of property. The different regulatory 
mechanisms discussed in this dissertation, namely (a) restrictions on the subdivision of 
agricultural land; (b) land ceilings; and (c) restrictions pertaining to the regulation of foreign 
ownership were found to be constitutional, because the mechanisms do not arbitrarily 
deprive a land owner of his or her property. Where the deprivation is not arbitrary, the 
interference may still amount to an expropriation of property. In such cases, the 
requirements for an expropriation need to be fulfilled for it to be valid. As mentioned 
throughout this dissertation, the possible amendment to the Constitution and the possible 
promulgation of recent legislative measures, may allow for nil compensation in cases where 
(agricultural) land is acquired for redistribution purposes. Such an amendment will allow for 
different constitutional parameters, as is currently envisaged by section 25 of the 
Constitution. While such an amendment may contribute to making the redistribution 
programme more affordable, it will not necessarily speed up the slow pace of redistribution 
in South Africa.  
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Instead, the slow pace of the redistribution programme can be attributed to the fact that no 
coherent and effective framework for the regulation of agricultural land for redistribution 
purposes exists in South Africa. As Pienaar summarises, the redistribution programme has 
thus far been characterised by a:  
 
“shift in focus and cycles of redistribution, both with regard to aims and goals, on the one hand, 
and the relevant tools and mechanics, on the other. Basic fairness in broadening access to land 
was gradually superseded by demands for sustainable development; and livelihood enhancement 
was overshadowed by the promotion of successful commercial farming…Increasingly, 
redistribution became caught up between different paradigms: justice and reparation, on the one 
hand, and development and commercial success on the other”.153  
 
While it is clear that initial programmes such as SLAG and LRAD focused on the poorest of 
the poor, later projects such as PLAS and the SLLDP with the aim of enabling commercial 
farming, focused on more resourced and more competent beneficiaries, such as emerging 
Black farmers.154 This shift in focus can further be characterised as a shift from demand-led 
acquisition and redistribution of agricultural land to supply-led acquisition and redistribution 
of agricultural land. The redistribution programme is also multi-dimensional and “involves 
various arms of government, government departments, organs of State, State institutions as 
well as private individuals, non-government organisations and a multitude of other 
players”.155  
 
While it is acknowledged that it is extremely complex to plan, regulate, implement and 
monitor redistribution,156 it is proposed that an overarching and coherent framework for 
redistribution is required for the successful and effective implementation of the redistribution 
programme as a whole. It is in this context that the following main components are proposed, 
aligned with a comprehensive Redistribution Policy or Bill: (a) a national land audit that is 
correct and reliable; (b) a land need or demand survey; (c) the establishment of a National 
Agricultural Land Register, comprised out of nine Provincial Agricultural Land Registers; (d) 
the development of criteria for identifying suitable agricultural land for redistribution 
purposes; and (e) the creation of a Land Depository. A new legal framework for the 
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regulation of agricultural land also requires an effective land administration system and 
warrants the creation of the following bodies or institutions, involved at various stages of the 
redistribution process: (a) a National Land Commission; (b) nine Provincial Land 
Commissions; and (c) a newly constituted Land Court. 
 
The Redistribution Policy or Bill should set out: (a) what the right in section 25(5) of the 
Constitution entails; (b) what the target or aims of the redistribution programme are; (c) what 
approach, expropriation or otherwise, should be followed in acquiring agricultural land; and 
(d) what the benefits of the redistribution programme should be, including (i) who the 
beneficiaries ought to be;157 (ii) how they ought to be selected; (iii) what quantity of 
agricultural land they ought to receive and; (iv) what type of rights the beneficiaries of the 
redistribution programme ought to receive.158  
 
Given the temporal nature of the land reform programme as a whole, and the redistribution 
programme in particular, continuous adaptations to the regulatory framework may be 
required159 having regard to the changing and differential land needs and demands of the 
citizens of South Africa.  
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Annexure A: A legal framework for the redistribution of agricultural land in South Africa  
 
 Phases Responsible 
Institution/Body  
Mechanism 










 Database  





 Agricultural Land 
Register  
 Criteria for 
identifying suitable 
agricultural land  
Phase 4 Acquisition of 
suitable agricultural 
land 
Minister of Agriculture, 





 Expropriation  
Phase 5 Land Depository Provincial Land 
Commission 
 Database of all 
available parcels of 
land 




 Redistribution Bill 







 The size of 
the parcel of 
land which  
should be 
awarded 








Annexure B: Department of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development: Role players 
in the redistribution process 
 
Institution/Body Role/responsibility 
National Land Commission   Conduct National Land Audit in 
cooperation with Deeds Office. 
 Conduct national land demand/need 
survey. 
 Disseminate information to Provincial 
Land Commission.  
 Monitor/oversee Provincial Land 
Commissions. 
 Monitor/oversee Land Depository 
Provincial Land Commission  Define agricultural land per province. 
 Establish and maintain Agricultural Land 
Register under the proposed Agricultural 
Land Bill. 
 Determine what constitutes “protected 
agricultural areas”.  
 Determine the land ceiling for agricultural 
land per region.  
 Identify suitable agricultural land for 
acquisition.  
 Conduct social impact assessment. 
 Establish rehabilitation and resettlement 
scheme. 
 Acquire agricultural land as delegate 
of/with assistance of the Minister of 
Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural 
Development.  
 Maintain Land Depository. 
 Redistribute agricultural land in line with 
Redistribution Bill or Policy. 
Office of the Valuer-General  Valuation of land identified as suitable for 
redistribution purposes by the Provincial 
Land Commission.  
 Submit valuation to Minister of 
Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural 
Development or delegate (Provincial 
Land Commission) 
 Provide information to Land Court as and 
when relevant  
Land Court   Resolve disputes emanating from 
promulgation and implementation of 
proposed Agricultural Land Bill, 
including:  





 Whether land may be subdivided 
 Whether the land in question falls 
within the ceiling limit 
 Resolve disputes pertaining to the 
determination of just and equitable 
compensation when challenged.  
 Enforce and protect rights awarded to 
beneficiaries under the proposed 






Acronym list  
AALS  Affirmative Action Loan Scheme  
ACLRA Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 
ALPF Agricultural Landholding Policy Framework 
CLARA Communal Land Rights Act 11 of 2004 
CLRA Communal Land Reform Act 5 of 2002 
CLTP Communal Land Tenure Policy 
CRC Constitutional Review Committee 
CPA Communal Property Association 
DAFF Department of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries 
DALRRD Department of Agriculture, Land Reform and 
Rural Development  
DRDLR Department of Rural Development and Land 
Reform  
FURS Farm Unit Resettlement Scheme  
HEVM  High Economic Value (Commercial) Model  
IPILRA Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act 
31 of 1996 
LEVM Low Economic Value (Commercial) Model 
LGTA Local Government Transition Act 209 of 1993 
LLC Land Claims Court  
LRAD Land Redistribution and Agricultural 
Development  
MEC Member of the Executive Council  
MEVM  Moderate Economic Value (Commercial) Model 
NEF National Empowerment Fund 
NMMM Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality 
NRP National Resettlement Policy/Scheme 
NRR  National Rehabilitation and Resettlement  
OCSLA Office of the Chief State Law Advisor  




PAJA Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 
2000 
PLAS Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy 
PVA Property Valuation Act 17 of 2014 
RFTLARRA Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency 
in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and 
Resettlement Act 30 of 2013 
SALA  Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970 
SC Scheduled Caste  
SLAG Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant 
SLLDP State Land Lease and Disposal Policy 
SPLUMA  Spatial Planning and Land Use Management 
Act  
ST Scheduled Tribe 
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